Philosophical zombies

[Edwardo Piet]

No, this is NOT the argument! The claim is that a *physically identical* zombie is possible. That is what is claimed shows that physicalism is wrong.

I'm not arguing for nonphysical zombies.

I'm saying that it's possible for highly intelligent beings to evolve and not be conscious, and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. I'm a physicalist, but not an epiphenomenon.

A philosophical zombie is not necessarily a person with a physically identical brain that is nevertheless unconscious.

It's a person who acts and thinks like a person, and seems on the outside identical to us. But on the inside isn't conscious. Their brain may be very slightly different, but the only difference is the part/parts that gives them qualia, and there is no way science can possibly tell.

There are two aspects: if something physically identical (including the consciousness producing centers of the brain) is automatically conscious, then the p-zombies are impossible.

No, because a p-zed is just a person who seems conscious from the outside but on the inside isn't. Having a physically identical brain isn't part of the definition of p-zed.

Second: the claim that the *possibility* of p-zombies shows physicalism is false.

Nope. That's only the argument in the OP. It seems you are very new to this P-zed thing. It's possible to be a P-zed without having a physically identical brain to a non-P-zed. The point is that you act and behave identically and there is no way for science to possibly say whether you are or aren't conscious and yet you aren't. Like, it's physically possible for P-zeds to be among us. They wouldn't have physically identical brains, but we wouldn't be able to tell via science that they weren't conscious. Because, after all, everyone's brains are slightly different. And consciousness can't be located in the brain. It's spread throughout. So if someone is missing consciousness, we can't necessarily know it.