A timeless being cannot create

[GrandizerII]

I just got done reading up to the author's alleged dismantling of the argument for logical determinism, and I remain unconvinced that he did.

The argument does not say A is necessarily true if A is always true in the actual world. The argument is that if A is always true in the actual world, then it cannot ever be false in the actual world, not that it cannot be false in a possible world. I don't see how the argument is invalid and unsound.

Maybe I'm confused and missing something here?

I'll read the rest later as have to go now.

And I just got done reading the concluding paragraphs. I don't think the author effectively solved the problem he was describing at the start. Only one possible world gets to be actualized, and there's no way the praying believer would have done other than to pray that their child survived the sinking ship in such a world. God being omniscient means he had to know in advance what the believer in the actual world would do, and so he knew that the believer would end up praying for their child. This is not an exercise of free will (in the libertarian sense), but an exercise of inevitable will (or random will, depending on how you look at it). Had the believer not prayed, then God's knowledge would've been false and God would not therefore be omniscient.

Ok I had time to reread the concluding sections of this article and understand better what he is and is not arguing, and now I'm thinking the author actually makes fair points. I can't really find a way to counter his counterarguments. This doesn't mean, of course, that libertarian free will makes sense (it doesn't) but if we assume such free will exists somehow, then God's omniscience does not necessarily preclude such free will if you look at it from a different angle than what we tend to be used to.