Free Will Debate

[polymath257]

He may be, but if he is, there is no free will.  Dennet’s compatibilism rests on the necessity to redefine free will in light of hard determinism.

Is it really a redefinition if the original concept is so vague that nothing can really be said about it?

Exactly what does the term 'free will' mean?

Does it require that there is more than one possible future whenever a choice is made? If so, what about physics suggests that is a real possibility?

---

I think it is helpful in talking about free will to have some examples where we would definitely say that there is no free will and other cases where we are more likely to say that there is. Since free will seems to be about making choices, I will focus on that aspect of things.

As a first example, suppose that I step/am pushed/or otherwise exit a flying airplane well above the ground. At that point I do NOT have the 'choice' to not fall. Even if I *really* want to not fall, the inevitable fact will be that I will fall. I simply do not have 'free will' to choose to not fall.

On the other hand, taking the example above, if I am in a grocery store, I can choose to but one brand of OJ over another. But what does it mean to say that choice is 'free'? does it mean that in spite of all my experiences, preferences, and all other variables, I *could* choose the other brand? But why would I? If my experiences, preferences, and tastes are not enough to make a free choice in line with them, what is the value of 'free will'? At that point, it doesn't sound, to me, like a 'free' choice, but rather that it is an arbitrary choice.

Going further, I would say that the choice is *mine* if the primary determiners of the outcome are, in fact, my preferences, my experiences, my emotions, and my internal state as opposed to something external to me being the primary causal factor for the following events (as it would be for falling from a plane). And having 'free will' would mean that the choice was *mine* in that sense.

What bothers people about this notion of free will is that those preferences, emotions, and experiences might be determined in ways that 'don't involve me'. but, of course, the fact that I have certain preferences is, at least partially, determined by my past experiences and my reactions to those past experiences. That also seems perfectly good and reasonable. I would not want to have my preferences NOT determined by my past experiences and reactions! That would seem to be very 'un-free'!

Ultimately, this seems to be compatible with determinism and materialism. The choices are *mine*: they happen in my brain, based on my experiences, my memories, and my preferences. Those preferences are determined my my previous experiences and how I reacted to them. Even in a deterministic system, I *am* the one 'making choices', even if those choices are determined: they are determined by who I am and how I see the world.

Unless, of course, I jump out of an airplane without a parachute.

But your preferences, your emotions, your experiences and your internal states all didn’t exist until you did, and all of them only exist in the manner they do solely because of factors with are all ultimates external to you.   so how are these “internal” processes in any way whatsoever ultimately less external than any of what you would call “external” factors?

They are internal because they are *in me*. In the same sense that the fusion reactions that power the sun are in the sun, not external to it. Sure, the hydrogen in the sun ultimately came from outside of the sun, but that doesn't seem very relevant.

The point is that very minor changes to the internal state would lead to large differences in the results. That means that the 'causal nexus', if you will, is within my brain and body. That is distinct from what happens if, say, the wind blows slightly differently. That *won't* mean that the actions I take will be substantially different.

This ultimately relies on chaotic dynamics: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The conditions that determine which brand of milk I choose depend mostly on events happening in my brain. Those are part of my interaction with my environment, as it should be. And what happens in my brain *is me*. I am not something distinct from the processes in my brain. At least, my psychology isn't.

---

I think there is a general confusion between unpredictable Will and free will.   Most argument for existence of free will seem to boils down to the formulation of Will may involve processes whose outcome can not even in theory to predicted a priori. 

But how does that make the resulting will free?

It doesn’t. We have no way to tell if any event - from tying a shoelace to dropping atomic bombs - is a willed event or a pre-determined one.

Boru

What makes you think those are exclusive possibilities? Why cannot something be both willed and pre-determined?