Epicurean Paradox

[NoMoreFaith]

Not really necessary. No matter what you say, your bible has no relevance to the philosophical argument.

The bible didn't redefine evil, evil was a concept already considered, and moreover, is understood in that way more so than the biblical way by any generation of philosophers.

All your argument states is that God cannot be evil because his will is good, and it just circular (again).

It does not change the problem of evil. The problem of what is understood to be evil. The problem of moral injustice, the problem of excessive suffering. All of which refutes a benevolent god.

In your philosophy, god is the definition, whereas philosophically, evil, moral, benevolence are clear concepts.

If you can't engage the argument philosophically, then all you can do is repeat circular mantras that have no place in intelligent reasoning.

[The Grand Nudger]

[Mister Agenda]

Demonstrate the veracity of your assertions regarding "the nature of evil"? The free will defense is unconvincing, unless you can demonstrate that free will bit as well. Just making more work for yourself. Now you're stuck defending two ghostly concepts against demonstrable objections.

"You criticisms are not logical because you failed to account for magic"

I will be most happy to. But,thier is a little matter we must resolve First:

" Regardless of what you think of the biblical definitions, even if you took the biblical definitions of of this equation, Epicurus has still affirmed the consequent. How you ask? Because the conclusion can be false even when statements 1 and 2 are true. Since P was never asserted as the only sufficient condition for Q, other factors could account for Q (while P was false)."

Conceed this point and i will most happily move to the next. After all, one has absolutly nothing to do with the other.

If the conclusion of a valid argument is false, it does not mean the argument was invalid, it means the premise was false. Conversely, the conclusion of a valid argument being true does not make the premise true. Charging that the paradox affirms the consequent is purely a challenge against the form of the argument. Taking out the 'not' does not do this and neither does challenging the premise or the conclusion.

1. If cats are mammals, then dolphins are not native to outer space.
2. Dolphins are not native to outer space.
3. Therefore, cats are mammals.

The argument is valid, the conclusion is true, but the premise is false. If the paradox affirms the consequent, it is invalid, not necessarily untrue. If it is invalid, that means the conclusion does not follow from the premise as given: that, you have not shown.

---

Thanks Rhythm, I had forgotten the name of the argument and my formulation was clumsy, it should have been:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.
3. Therefore, not P.

[Drich]

[mediamogul]

Circular argument of the day award.

Also I would like to point out that Drich is arguing for something much more disturbing than it appears at face value, as he has done in other threads. He is arguing for a crusades type morality in which the supposed "will of god" is the only standard by which actions are judged. One is compelled to follow the will of god as the ONLY moral precept. There is literally no moral in this conception only obedience to god's will.

He has expressly stated that genocide, slavery, and the like are perfectly acceptable under the guise of divine command.

This is a dangerous kind of fundamentalism. One I doubt very much that even he believes and puts into action.

[Perhaps]

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.

To be willing does not necessitate actual doing. For example, I'm willing to call my best friend bob, but that doesn't mean I'm going to (especially since that isn't his name). This also does not contradict omnipotence.

Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.

Once again, being able to do something as well as willing does not necessitate actual doing. Alternatively, is it malevolent to let your child choose not to study for a test, knowing full well that they will fail if they choose not to study?

Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?

To reiterate, being able and willing does not necessitate action.

Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

I think I've already addressed the prior faults in the argument.

____

Overall, the argument isn't valid, and certainly isn't sound. It begs the question and fails to understand necessity. I don't really wish to analyze the validity of God or its characteristics, but when speaking of the paradox as a philosophical argument, one can't just apply it and expect it to pass as good logic.

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm pretty sure I just explained that Epicuras denies (not affirms, denies) the consequent....I'm not sure why you feel the need to repeat yourself? Argumentum ad naseum ring a bell?

@Perhaps- Being able and willing does not "neccesitate action", but that's hardly a criticism of the argument, since that's precisely what the argument asks us, if able and willing, why is there no action (and before, again, free will is offered...the free will defense removes the "able"-omnipotence- bit)?

[mediamogul]

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.

To be willing does not necessitate actual doing. For example, I'm willing to call my best friend bob, but that doesn't mean I'm going to (especially since that isn't his name). This also does not contradict omnipotence.

Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.

Once again, being able to do something as well as willing does not necessitate actual doing. Alternatively, is it malevolent to let your child choose not to study for a test, knowing full well that they will fail if they choose not to study?

Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?

To reiterate, being able and willing does not necessitate action.

Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

I think I've already addressed the prior faults in the argument.

____

Overall, the argument isn't valid, and certainly isn't sound. It begs the question and fails to understand necessity. I don't really wish to analyze the validity of God or its characteristics, but when speaking of the paradox as a philosophical argument, one can't just apply it and expect it to pass as good logic.

Semantics. If god doesn't want evil to exist but is unable to prevent it then he is not omnipotent. If god wants evil to exist he is malevolent. If god doesn't want evil to exist and is able to prevent it then evil should not exist. If both then he is both malevolent and not omnipotent.

The whole argument against it is simply muddying the water. In its simplest form this argument represent a contradiction in terms of the most fundamental kind.

[Drich]

[Ashendant]

I came into this thread looking for something related to food

I leave disappointed