Rosenberg's Argument Against Beliefs

[Angrboda]

In addition to other problems, this reduces to a proof by definition. If we define beliefs the way the author does, then no beliefs exist. Well, so what? I'm perfectly willing to accept that beliefs as the author defines them do not exist. That's not saying the same thing as that beliefs qua beliefs do not exist.

In addition to an implied reductio ad absurdum and equivocation, the author relies on what Dennett calls "an intuition pump." The argument relies on enhancing our perception of an intuition to the point that the intuition becomes sufficiently compelling to carry the burden of persuading us that some proposition which is implied by the contents of that intuition is true. In this case, the intuition that beliefs are "about" something is the intuition that is used. However, by admission, the author claims that he can't define it in terms of brain states. Again, so what? Are we to accept that he's trying to persuade us by way of an argument from ignorance, that because he can't do it, it can't be done? I doubt that. More to the point, I think you, Chad, are trying to persuade us by using an implied reductio ad absurdum, that beliefs obviously are "about" something, therefore the conclusion is absurd. However, since the reductio depends on accepting the truth of the intuition about beliefs, and not an explicit fact, it falls because what "aboutness" or intentionality means is never defined except perhaps by reference to the intuition. As an argument based on the truth of an intuition, the reductio is an irrational argument and any implied conclusions about the relationship between brain states and beliefs becomes a non sequitur.

There's a lot going wrong here, but it fails readily by referring to something that, by the author's own admission, he can't define materially. Which, in your hands, Chad, I suspect leads to the conclusion that non-material processes are at work. However, as noted, in addition to relying on the truth of an intuition, this is an argument from ignorance and thus fails accordingly. (Even if I granted the rest, the equivocation in premise 5 renders the syllogism invalid.)

(I wasn't going to contribute because this is one of those cases that prompted comments like Wolfgang Pauli's about something being so flawed that not only was it not right, it wasn't even wrong. I guess I'm feeling weak this morning. I will note for your benefit Chad that this appears to be another case in which you rely uncritically upon the mind's own testimony about its contents; if we are arguing about something outside of the mind, it's perfectly valid to rely on inter-subjective validity to carry the burden of proof; if what is at issue is the nature of the mind, we can't rely on the mind itself to settle the question of that nature, no matter how many times you try, nor how vehemently you insist that doing so is not special pleading or circular logic. It is.)

(ETA: I will also note that this is another case where you are playing both ends against the middle. If it is indeed the case that intentionality cannot be defined naturalistically, then premise 4/5 can never be made a rational fact; it will forever elude naturalistic definition and therefore the lynchpin itself can never form the basis of a logical, rational argument. Where exactly were you expecting to go with this, Chad?)

[Whateverist]

If not just electro-chemical processes then what is the extra ingredient?

The extra ingredient isn't present as an input, only as an output. Sometimes, with emergent phenomena, 1 + 1 > 2. The only thing in the pot is grey matter, chemicals and electrical activity. But that gives rise to all the subjective phenomena we think of as putting the "my" into the sense of self we all exhibit. I guess you think that can only be explained by an extra causal input from God-only-knows where, but that is just an assumption as is the idea that the whole can never exceed the sum of the parts.

The naturalist assumption is that the physical universe is causally closed.

But you are quicker than I to claim to know the extent of the causes emanating from the natural world. My definition of natural extends not only to what is known to exist but to what can be discovered to exist. Even if the physical universe is closed, it isn't completely known.

---

We do not suppose that ink and paper, thermostats, and computers have minds?

Soon computers might.

There is a good possibility that computers will advance to a level where what they do will be impossible to distinguish from a "mind".
At that point you could say that they have a mind.

Well .. no, never mind.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Apo, your contribution to the subject warrants a more thoughtful response, so first I'd like to do a little housekeeping.

It is fact that nothing which is not a physical process has been found. That is not a prejudice. That is a fact...Only physical evidence matters. After you have established physical evidence you can argue the physical evidence.

Physicalism is the so-called fact that is under consideration, since mental processes and properties do not fit neatly into the laws of physics. Our understanding of the physical universe rests upon the foundation of philosophy. Your idea that only physical evidence counts as evidence is a self imposed limitation.

[The Grand Nudger]

since mental processes and properties do not fit neatly into the laws of physics

They don't? How would you know? Weren't they mysterious to the point of magic not too far back?

[A_Nony_Mouse]

Apo, your contribution to the subject warrants a more thoughtful response, so first I'd like to do a little housekeeping.

It is fact that nothing which is not a physical process has been found. That is not a prejudice. That is a fact...Only physical evidence matters. After you have established physical evidence you can argue the physical evidence.

Physicalism is the so-called fact that is under consideration, since mental processes and properties do not fit neatly into the laws of physics. Our understanding of the physical universe rests upon the foundation of philosophy. Your idea that only physical evidence counts as evidence is a self imposed limitation.

Since physics has never at any time claimed to address mental processes I have no idea why would state the obvious.

The fact remains there has not been one identified mental thing or process independent of the physical brain and body.

No amount of mental masturbation on your part is going to make it otherwise. If you really want to play the game go conduct the research to find something which is independent. Sitting in front of a computer playing word games will never get you any farther than you are today which is a rather sad if not retarded position.

[Neo-Scholastic]

...mental masturbation ...playing word games...is a rather sad if not retarded position.

This post is in the philosophy section. If you have such great contempt for philosophy you should play elsewhere rather than pissing in our sandbox.

[A_Nony_Mouse]

...mental masturbation ...playing word games...is a rather sad if not retarded position.

This post is in the philosophy section. If you have such great contempt for philosophy you should play elsewhere rather than pissing in our sandbox.

Making concrete statements about the mind and science that are false by inspection is not philosophy.

If you want to post philosophy then stick to philosophy.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I'm perfectly willing to accept that beliefs as the author defines them do not exist. That's not saying the same thing as that beliefs qua beliefs do not exist.

A common understanding of the term ‘belief’ includes intentionality. If you have an alternate definition that excludes intentionality, I would enjoy learning it. Doing so entails a risk. You run the risk of performing a logical sleight-of-hand that eliminates an idea by redefining it as a conceptual error.

For the sake of my overall response I will temporarily grant you the premise that Rosenberg’s argument relies on a strong intuition that beliefs have intentionality.

…the intuition that beliefs are "about" something is the intuition that is used.

Even if it is, as you call it, an intuition, it is a particularly strong intuition. If you believe the opposite then you need a particularly strong argument to show it false.

…the reductio depends on accepting the truth of the intuition about beliefs, and not an explicit fact, …the reductio is an irrational argument and any implied conclusions about the relationship between brain states and beliefs becomes a non sequitur.

What you say is true. A strong intuition about what could be does not prove what actually is. The idea that beliefs have intentionality is highly predictive of human behavior. This gives it empirical justification, in addition to the deductive observations of Bertano on which intentionality is based. Another such strong intuition is that the physical universe is causally closed. This intuition comes from an empirical evaluation of science history and the intellectual preference for simple monist theories.

…this is an argument from ignorance and thus fails accordingly.

I would remind you that materialism makes a similar argument from ignorance. It says that since no means of interaction between the material and immaterial is known, then there cannot be any such interaction.

… his appears to be another case in which you rely uncritically upon the mind's own testimony about its contents.

Not at all. Your beliefs about the mind can be wrong, but you cannot doubt that you have beliefs. You consistently dismiss distinctions between the brute fact of qualitative experience itself and the quantitative contents of experience.

…if we are arguing about something outside of the mind, it's perfectly valid to rely on inter-subjective validity to carry the burden of proof.

Actually, we are not arguing about anything outside the mind. The issue at hand is the relationship between the semantic mental contents of the mind and physical body. As for the burden of proof, why do you believe it is invalid to make judgments about the behavior of others based on their stated mental processes, especially when it is confirmed by ones own inner experience?

…If … intentionality cannot be defined naturalistically, then premise 4/5 can never be made a rational fact; it will forever elude naturalistic definition and therefore…can never form the basis of a logical, rational argument.

That is exactly my point. Physicalism/naturalism and the intentionality of mental processes are mutually exclusive. Intentionality cannot be easily dismissed therefore you face a choice that cannot be rationally determined. That means that you have an existential choice between two very strong intuitions. Both views are, by your definition, equally irrational. And each view comes at a cost. In my opinion the cost of physicalism is nihilism. And that is a very steep price to pay for anyone who values the acquisition of knowledge.

[Angrboda]

…If … intentionality cannot be defined naturalistically, then premise 4/5 can never be made a rational fact; it will forever elude naturalistic definition and therefore…can never form the basis of a logical, rational argument.

That is exactly my point. Physicalism/naturalism and the intentionality of mental processes are mutually exclusive. Intentionality cannot be easily dismissed therefore you face a choice that cannot be rationally determined. That means that you have an existential choice between two very strong intuitions. Both views are, by your definition, equally irrational. And each view comes at a cost. In my opinion the cost of physicalism is nihilism. And that is a very steep price to pay for anyone who values the acquisition of knowledge.

Your point eludes you. The point here is that if premises 4/5 cannot be verified to be true or false by some reliable method, then Rosenberg's syllogism can never be made logically valid, and any reductio based on his syllogism is thus invalid. So, besides the glaring fallacy of the stolen concept, if I grant Rosenberg his syllogistic conclusion, it invalidates the syllogism upon which it is based. (In more ways than one.)

In addition, you've added new errors and I haven't even provided an exhaustive list of the original ones.

In no particular order:

1. The man's name is 'Brentano', not 'Bertano'.
2. I don't have to show anything other than that your syllogism or argument is invalid or that one or more of the premises is either unsound or not verifiably sound. Showing otherwise is your and Rosenberg's job. But nice try once again attempting to shift the burden of proof.
3. As noted, the syllogism can never be made valid in the ways noted in addition to other less obvious ways.
4. You seem to keep repeating the claim that a person cannot doubt the brute fact of their experience all the while debating with someone who does just that; surely you realize how absurd your attempting to persuade me that I can't deny the very fact which I do in fact deny is? Get a clue.
5. Is that what materialism says? Tant pis pour ils. I will tell you for your own benefit that you and Rosenberg are carelessly treating metaphysical naturalism, methodological naturalism, materialism and physicalism as if these were synonyms; they are not.
6. I'm bored, and you're not helping.
7. You're still missing several major errors.
8. You appear to be hallucinating that I said certain things I did not say. You might want to see a physician.
9. Yet another theist runs afoul of the law of the excluded middle by setting up a false dichotomy. I am not faced with any such choice. Your belief that I am is likely a result of a failure of imagination on your part.
10. Piss off.

[Neo-Scholastic]

We do indeed have a great difference of opinion about qualia and there is no need to beat a dead horse. Mentioning it was unavoidable in reply to your post. We both agree that Rosenberg's syllogism is invalid, but for different reasons.

Apophenia, I recognize that you have no obligation to respond to my post. Whether you are bored, annoyed, or cannot be bothered is beside the point, but I would have preferred that you bowed out of the discussion more gracefully.

As for me this is my last post on this thread. Take care.