Modal Argument: The Mind is Not the Brain

[bennyboy]

Etymology isn't only concerned with accurate conjugation but also root, form, history & usage so...

Because 'atheos' is rooted from 'theos' there's a superior word for 'athe-ism' which also roots from 'theos': anti-theism (opposition to theism). Let's remember that 'atheos' was created to generalise & stereotype those who didn't believe in the Olympic pantheon, irrespective of whether there was belief in other deities involved or not. Therefore there's additional baggage in the word 'athe-ism' that there isn't in the word 'a-theism'. If we're looking for highly accurate descriptors/definitions and applying the strictest etymology, we should reject the word 'athe-ism' as being too ambiguous and stick to 'a-theism' and 'anti-theism'.

I agree about anti-theism, but even that roots to anti-theos, which means you are against God, as well as to anti-theism, which would mean against (bullshit) religion.

Why not just use a simpler term, like "church-hating baby eater," and then we never have to worry about ambiguity again.

---

a-symmetrical : the absence of symmetry
a-symptomatic : the absence of symptoms
a-theism : the absence of theism

The other two are poor parallels, because they don't have the same issue with ambiguity, e.g.:

a + sym + metric(al) = not + same + measure
(a + sym) + metric(al) = (not same) measure
a + (sym + metric(al)) = not (same measure)
Which are so close that you wouldn't worry about the difference.

The point is that "sym" is not a root, as "theos" is. "sym" is a prefix, and so is "a-." If you can find another case where "a-" is attached to a root rather than to another prefix, you'd have the same ambiguity issue.

[Neo-Scholastic]

In corner one, Websters. In the other, Oxford...

[MindForgedManacle]

The fact that you're essentially trotting out substance dualism should've given you - and Plantinga - pause.

Merely because Plantinga trotted out the argument gives me no confidence in its worth.

Given that all minds that we know of are coincident with a complex nervous system, a claim of non-dependence of the former on the latter seems absurd from an evidentiary standpoint. And like all arguments whose proponents refuse to defend the premises, it can just as validly be reversed to reach the opposite conclusion, getting us no further.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The close interaction between mind and body (brain) has been well established, long before modern neuroscience. You use of the word “coincident” is entirely appropriate. However, you carry the idea one step too far if you consider the body logically prior to the mind.
Everyone knows that psychoactive drugs, head trauma, and direct electrical stimulation cause changes, sometimes very dramatic, in human consciousness. You could easily conclude that brain processes and operations of the mind are one and the same. The substance dualist position I advocate accommodates this evidence without over-determination, falling into epiphenomenalism, or denying consciousness altogether.

According to dualist theories, the brain does not generate consciousness. Instead there are two interacting entities: the material brain and immaterial mind, or knowing subject. One provides signs; the other interprets the meaning of signs. The relationship between the two is analogous to that between a scoreboard and its operator.

The scoreboard electronics, its lights and dials, is like the material body. The operator serves as the knowing subject. The lights on the scoreboard are just lights until the knowing subject interprets their meaning. Like brain damage, if some of the lights are burned out the knowing subject will not have anything to interpret from scoreboard. Like mental illness, if the connections between the controls and the panel are faulty the operator cannot control the results. Like drugs, if you spill water on the wiring…you get the idea. Most brain functions are unconscious, invisible to the knowing subject. Likewise the operator does not need to see or understand the electronics between the controls and the scoreboard. Pattern recognition is a brain function. Interpreting and assigning meaning to those patterns belongs to the mind.

This is not to say that substance dualism doesn’t have its own problems. Fortunately these are not as fatal as they appear on first blush. The main objection to this theory is the so-called interaction problem, i.e. the lack of an apparent means by which immaterial and material substances can interact? This is an argument from ignorance. And an means of interaction, like the Penrose-Hamerhof theory of micro-tubules, is conceptually possible. The fact that such a means has not yet been found is not sufficient reason to dismiss dualism.

[MindForgedManacle]

I'm aware that neuroscience didn't establish that, I didn't even mention such. Further, my use of 'coincedent' there was both appropriate and intentional: I don't assume my position is true a priori.

Now, here is where you fall into problems. What is an 'immaterial object'? You might as well be talking about ontological Platonism with regards to mathematics for all the sense that makes, i.e none.

Further, the following is, I think, a nice, quick refutation of substance dualism, and among the reasons there are few serious thinkers left who adhere to it and why:






You saying that substance dualism isn't fatally flawed reminds me of the theist YouTube user 'InspiringPhilosphy' who takes on all number of controversial and damaged positions as if they're nothing, with the worst being his adherence to the libertarian view of free will.

[Neo-Scholastic]

He confused substances with matter. His video is nonsense.

[MindForgedManacle]

Er, what? He was referring specifically to the two substances in question as what substance dualists believe them to be and demonstrated the insuperable problems with it.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Er, what? He was referring specifically to the two substances in question as what substance dualists believe them to be and demonstrated the insuperable problems with it.

"Substance" is a Scholastic concept derived from Aristotle. He is obviously ignorant of the concept as it applies to substance dualism. There are some good objections to substance dualism. His is not one of them. Moreover, substance dualism is not a single theory, but rather a heading under which multiple theories fall.

[Bucky Ball]

a-symmetrical : the absence of symmetry
a-symptomatic : the absence of symptoms
a-theism : the absence of theism

The other two are poor parallels, because they don't have the same issue with ambiguity, e.g.:

a + sym + metric(al) = not + same + measure
(a + sym) + metric(al) = (not same) measure
a + (sym + metric(al)) = not (same measure)
Which are so close that you wouldn't worry about the difference.

The point is that "sym" is not a root, as "theos" is. "sym" is a prefix, and so is "a-." If you can find another case where "a-" is attached to a root rather than to another prefix, you'd have the same ambiguity issue.

Nope. "A" in front of anything, means "absence of".
That is the pattern. What was your SAT score ?

[MindForgedManacle]

"Substance" is a Scholastic concept derived from Aristotle. He is obviously ignorant of the concept as it applies to substance dualism. There are some good objections to substance dualism. His is not one of them. Moreover, substance dualism is not a single theory, but rather a heading under which multiple theories fall.

The point is you didn't specify how he was ignorant of such as you say.

And where did I say substance dualism is a single theory? Few positions in philosophy can be pinned down as such.

---

One of the reasons that makes me doubt your claim Chad (aside from his education in philosophy) is that in the description of his video he provides links to reputable sources (ex: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) as to what he means by 'substance' in relation to substance dualism and my preliminary look seems to indicate he's using it correctly.