Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[bennyboy]

I can appreciate your position of agnosticism, given current development in the cognitive sciences, but on what basis do you "suspect" that it may not be knowable at all? That seems a somewhat intellectually dishonest agnosticism if you're willing to kibitz on the matter that you say you intend to keep at arm's length.

I'm not only agnostic because I don't know things: we all don't know most things. I take it as a philosophical position, as well-- agnostic-ISM. I don't think we have access to the layer of reality "under" what we can observe.

This shouldn't be strange, since in good ol' science we have plenty of that. For example, why do things exist, rather than not existing? What caused the Big Bang? We just say it's nonsense, because time started with the Big Bang-- but what we're really saying is that we are part of the universe, and have access only to it, not to whatever underlies it.

Okay, so now to qualia. The only entity I know for sure to experience qualia, rather than just seeming to, is me. However, since I'm human, I'm willing to extend this property to other humans as a highly pragmatic assumption. Since I'm a mammal, and other mammals behave similarly to humans in many ways, and have similar physiology, I extend it to them, too. Since I'm an animal, and at least some animals behave similarly to mammals, and have similar physiology, I extend it to them, too-- kind of. Bugs, I'm not so sure, because their physiology and behaviors are very different than mine, but I'm willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.

This process is so natural to us that it seems simple common sense. We aren't even aware that it's a philosophical process, rather than an objective observational one. But this becomes more clear when we see what many OTHER people have attributed qualia and intent to: weather, God, a deck of cards, their old car that always fails on the most important days. Who hasn't said at some point things like, "Come on baby, start just one more time, and I'll take you to the shop tomorrow, I promise," and then been grateful (or enraged) depending on how that inanimate object "behaved"? Why do we do this? Are people retarded? No-- it's the same instinctive process of inferring qualia and intent from observable behaviors, without direct access to the reality underlying those behaviors.

As for intellectual dishonesty-- obviously, I disagree. If you can show me a way to know for sure what qualia are and what processes/structures cause them to exist, then great. But agnosticism is always the most sensible default position (I don't know until I do know), so the BOP is on anyone positively asserting knowledge-- and that burden has not yet been met. Look, for example, at genkaus' definition of qualia. Has this been proven to be factual? Has anyone even suggested a method by which it could be? Or is it just a projection of the world view he's already chosen: "(If physical monsism then) qualia must be a purely physical function."

[genkaus]

The reason I'm not sure is that there are multiple possibilities , and I do not know which one represents truth. I'm agnostic.

Now, clearly brain function and brain structure are related to the existence and nature of qualia. However, whether it is a property of an organic brain, or of a certain kind of data processing, or something else entirely, is not known to me, and I suspect may not be knowable

Are you similarly "agnostic" about 9/11? Or about the moon-landing? What about healing through prayer?

When, among all the so-called "multiple possibilities", only one explanation has the evidence to back it up while the others are not even intelligible, then saying that not only you don't know, but you cannot know is intellectually dishonest. At the very least, you should accept that while you cannot know, others can.

It depends what you mean by brain function. I refer to the total mechanism of the brain: the release and absorption of neurotransmitters in large numbers, the way in which neurons branch out to form networks of communication, the interaction between chemical properties and the flow of electricity, etc.

Since I don't know which of these mechanisms are required for qualia, then it's not safe just to say that "the machine saw a red traffic light and stopped. Therefore it is experiencing qualia." Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't.

Are any of the mechanisms listed here unique to a biological medium?

But, let's get this straight - you don't know which of these mechanisms is required for qualia because you don't have an explanation for what qualia is. But that is something you claim that you not only don't know, but you cannot know.Which means you can never know which of these mechanisms is required for qualia and thus not know whether or not a machine is experiencing qualia.

So, given that the machine sees a red light and stops, on what basis do you assume that it doesn't experience?

You can define things however you want. But the real question is this-- can you demonstrate that your idea represents reality? You are throwing around a lot of "IS" statements, as though your ideas are foregone conclusions. That is, quite simply, not the case.

Don't make me repeat myself. I've stated at the outset that this is my hypothesis about what qualia is. It fits the evidence we have so far and it jives with the generic view on the subject - but I've never stated it as an established fact.

I think we're back to our stand off, here. I do not accept your definition of qualia, as that word is quite specifically reserved to talk about the subjective experience of an entity, rather than its behaviors. It doesn't matter what a machine says or does, what matters is whether it experiences as I do.

And here we go with straw-manning. I AM talking about the subjective experience of an entity. When I say qualia. I mean the "subjective experience of an entity". When I say "qualia is a specific form of self-referential data-processing", I'm given an explanation about why and how an entity experiences subjectively. When I talk about behavior, I'm talking about actions consequent of the entity experiencing subjectivity. We've been through this before, so there should be no reason for you to "misunderstand".

[bennyboy]

Are you similarly "agnostic" about 9/11? Or about the moon-landing? What about healing through prayer?

When, among all the so-called "multiple possibilities", only one explanation has the evidence to back it up while the others are not even intelligible, then saying that not only you don't know, but you cannot know is intellectually dishonest. At the very least, you should accept that while you cannot know, others can.

First, please don't use the words "intellectually dishonest." They are overused, and assumed by all parties. Everyone in a debate thinks this at some point: "Either this guy is stupid, or he's deliberately refusing to accept my obviously-true idea." However, saying it isn't a very good debate tactic-- it's a much better way to have people lose interest in debating you.

Second, all the things you mentioned are directly observable. I don't have to make philosophical assumptions about other people's subjective awareness to know that planes crashed into buildings, or to figure out that people who pray are no better off than people who don't.

Finally, with regard to qualia, here's what I know:
I experience qualia.
I have a brain.
The brain functions in certain ways (self-referential thinking etc.)
When I'm not experiencing qualia, my brain isn't functioning in those ways (I'm assuming based on second-hand observations, here).

Given this, your idea that brain function is qualia is a reasonable theory to try. However, it's not exclusive. There are in fact several plausible ideas to consider:

1) ONLY gross functions are necessary for qualia (i.e. input->black box-> output is sufficient, and the specific mechanism doesn't matter so long as it involves both self-reference and environmental awareness). This is your idea, I think.
2) The gross functions AND the specific physiology of an organic brain are necessary for qualia (i.e. qualia can supervene on the function of neurons, but not on that of other structures)
3) Qualia are associated with all configurations of matter and energy, i.e. they are not supervenient on either specific physical configurations nor specific kinds of data processing-- but the FORMS we appreciate and take interest in require an interaction of a great number of these "qualia particles." This conforms well to physics, where individual particles are highly elusive to us, but the courser forms they take on (like billiard balls or stars) have a collective meaning to us.


And these are all just physical monist explanations. Add in solipsism, idealism, dualism, and other inescapable philosophical possibilities, and agnosticism is looking pretty good.

Are any of the mechanisms listed here unique to a biological medium?

Yes. Neurotransmitters and neurons are both limited to a biological medium.

But, let's get this straight - you don't know which of these mechanisms is required for qualia because you don't have an explanation for what qualia is. But that is something you claim that you not only don't know, but you cannot know.Which means you can never know which of these mechanisms is required for qualia and thus not know whether or not a machine is experiencing qualia.

So, given that the machine sees a red light and stops, on what basis do you assume that it doesn't experience?

As I explained, I start with my self, and extend the likelihood of qualia to other people, to other mammals, and to other animals, because we share not only some similar behaviors (like expression of emotion), but also the mechanism of the brain. On the most fundamental level, everything I accept to have qualia is at least living.

Now, if you made artificial DNA (maybe we will be able to model DNA in a computer one day and "print" it), and managed to produce something mechanically identical to a simple organism, then I'd really have to wonder if it experienced qulia. I think I'd probably give it the benefit of the doubt.

We've also talked about the possibility of a human brain / AI computer interface, which might actually shed some light on the issue. If my brain could access memories stored by someone else to an external medium (like a childhood memory), that would be very good evidence in support of your idea, I think.

And here we go with straw-manning. I AM talking about the subjective experience of an entity. When I say qualia. I mean the "subjective experience of an entity". When I say "qualia is a specific form of self-referential data-processing", I'm given an explanation about why and how an entity experiences subjectively. When I talk about behavior, I'm talking about actions consequent of the entity experiencing subjectivity. We've been through this before, so there should be no reason for you to "misunderstand".

You still haven't explained how you can test your hypothesis, rather than just assuming it. So far, there's only a false syllogism:
-Wherever there's qualia, certain kinds of data processing are found. Therefore, wherever those kinds of data processing are found, there's necessarily qualia.
-Wherever there's a dog, a tail can be found. Therefore wherever a tail can be found, there's necessarily a dog.

[Whateverist]

I'm going to be brief without going into requisite detail because it's been a long day and for that and other reasons, I'm not up to a complete response at the moment.

---

It is probably accurate to say that it is impossible to prove monism or dualism to the satisfaction of most dualists, perhaps ever, but definitely for now. This has to do with a number of issues, one of which has to do with what is meant by proof, it's relationship to whatever truth is, and other epistemo-ontological questions. That being said, I don't think it's necessary to handle those questions at the moment. To my mind, at present, it is safe to say that the proposition that the mind is a product of the brain is a scientific fact, yet you need to be precise in your understanding of what the term 'scientific fact' means technically. A scientific fact is often misunderstood or rather ambiguously defined by most non-specialists. It does not mean that science has demonstrated what the truth is nor that what science says is the way reality is. A scientific fact is a hypothesis about the behavior of reality which, in conjunction with all necessaey auxiliary theories such as the theory of measurement and so on, is corroborated to a sufficiently high level that the possibility of the null or alternate hypothesis being true in spite of the corroboration meets a specific statistical improbability. This refers to type I and type II errors (type I in this case). There are a number of caveats to bear in mind. First, the hypothesis can be well corroborated and still be wrong, due to any number of things from an error in an auxiliary theory to ignorance of alternate explanations or the appropriate null hypothesis. Different sciences and different situations also call for different strength of statistical improbability, known as significance, and afaik, there is no hard and fast rule as to what is appropriate when. Moreover, from what I understand, if the exact mechanism by which the phenomenon occurs is unknown or implausible, it is considered appropriate to require greater significance in the result to consider the hypothesis to have been demonstrated. (E.g. As far as I know, the mechanism underlying the analgesic effect of acupuncture is not understood, but the effect is sufficiently strongly demonstrated that it is considered a scientific fact that acupuncture has these analgesic effects.)

Now, back to monism and dualism. There are legitimate philosophical questions still at large. At one of my philosophy groups, we spent a year or more in monthly meetings discussing topics in philosophy of mind, and many of the questions are subtle, deep, and dumbfounding, more so than at first blush it appears. The depth of the subject only truly revealed itself to me thanks to the stimulation of debate with people with different views, and I would not claim in any sense to have come close to mastering the subject. (If one wants to hit the ground running on the subject, I can't recommend Patricia Churchland's book Neurophilosophy highly enough. It doesn't solve all the issues, but rather furnishes a helpful untangling of some of the more fundamental philosophical questions. It's the best primer on the subject that I know.)

Again, back to the question, a friend at a philosophy discussion once said to me that neuroscience is "awash in a sea of data." By this he meant that there is a lot of detail known about mind and brain, but no overarching model or explanation which ties all the data together, makes sense of it, and explains the subject in question, the nature of mind and consciousness. (IMO) As noted, I don't think this is as big a scientific issue as it is essentially a scientific fact that the brain is the cause of the mind in the technical sense given above, but that certainly doesn't put either the scientific or philosophical questions to rest, especially in the absence of an actual mechaistic model of how the brain and mind are explicitly related, causally. The lack of an established model or complete theory is a problem for both science and philosophy. This is just my personal opinion, but I'm not a fan of the way the concept of 'emergence' is used, both by professionals and non-professionals, and imo, saying that consciousness is 'an emergent property of the brain' is little more than hand-waving the problem aside; that answer doesn't explain anything. It just replaces a puzzle with a vague, official sounding word. That being said, I still think physicalism as an explanation has virtues over dualism, but I'm not going to go into specifics here. (Read Curchland.)

---

The key point is that dualism itself doesn't actually explain anything either; it's just kicking the can down the road. "A seperate substance is responsible for consciousness." "Well, how does that second substance give rise to consciousness?" "I dunno; it just does." Dualism is similar in that respect to a lot of arguments that seek to justify belief in a creator, but then fail to explain where the creator came from or how, or how he created everything, and by what process or means. It's the philosophy of mind equivalent of "goddidit," to my understanding. (Correct me if I'm wrong. How does this other substance give rise to mind, qualia, and consciousness?)

So my understanding in summation is, it is a scientific fact that the brain gives rise to the mind; however that doesn't really imply that we understand how, why, or in what sense yet. There are legitimate scientific and philosophical issues to be explored and answered. Monism doesn't have it completely in the bag, but it has many virtues over dualism, dualism has vices and problems that themselves are as daunting as those facing monism, and to my view dualism's problems are insurmountable; moreover, dualism itself doesn't really answer the question which motivates the positing of dualism in the first place. It just defers it, and tucks it safely inside some commonly accepted but likely vacuous metaphysical and ontological notions.

IMHO.

Agreed. To be even more terse and correspondingly less helpful, I would say the suggestion that the brain is a receiver for a phenomena that originate elsewhere which we don't know how to study .. amounts to a conspiracy theory. If consciousness is something we don't entirely understand then I am inclined to think it is the functioning of the material brain in response to the sensory world that give rise to these qualia. We can't rule out that qualia are a kind of mana from the gods which we receive through our skull meat, but for me that goes on the shelf reserved for far-fetched alternative explanations.

Aside from the fact that this alternative explanation is not disprovable Chad, can you think of any reason which would lead any reasonably thoughtful person to look beyond the material?

[genkaus]

First, please don't use the words "intellectually dishonest." They are overused, and assumed by all parties. Everyone in a debate thinks this at some point: "Either this guy is stupid, or he's deliberately refusing to accept my obviously-true idea." However, saying it isn't a very good debate tactic-- it's a much better way to have people lose interest in debating you.

Your intellectual dishonesty isn't about being stupid or disagreeing with me - its about the inconsistent application of your own ideas about knowledge. Because you can't directly observe the subjective experience of another person, you claim that the existence of qualia and the nature of its existence in others is unknown and unknowable and yet, where other not-directly-observable phenomena are concerned, you regard them as both knowable and known. So, I don't care if the words "intellectually dishonest" are overused or if you don't like it, if I see it happening, I'll call you on it.

Second, all the things you mentioned are directly observable. I don't have to make philosophical assumptions about other people's subjective awareness to know that planes crashed into buildings, or to figure out that people who pray are no better off than people who don't.

No, they're not. Not unless you were in New-York on 9/11 or on the moon at landing or with the person who prays. You are making the philosophical assumption that material evidence is a valid method for gaining knowledge about those things and you are rejecting the the same philosophical assumption when it comes to other people's subjective awareness.

Finally, with regard to qualia, here's what I know:
I experience qualia.
I have a brain.
The brain functions in certain ways (self-referential thinking etc.)
When I'm not experiencing qualia, my brain isn't functioning in those ways (I'm assuming based on second-hand observations, here).

Given this, your idea that brain function is qualia is a reasonable theory to try. However, it's not exclusive. There are in fact several plausible ideas to consider:

1) ONLY gross functions are necessary for qualia (i.e. input->black box-> output is sufficient, and the specific mechanism doesn't matter so long as it involves both self-reference and environmental awareness). This is your idea, I think.
2) The gross functions AND the specific physiology of an organic brain are necessary for qualia (i.e. qualia can supervene on the function of neurons, but not on that of other structures)

These two possibilities are not alternative to my explanation. In both cases qualia is brain function, just in latter case, that function becomes inherent to physiology. Further, here is where the evidence train stops. The evidence we currently have for subjective experiences, supports one of these two possibilities.

3) Qualia are associated with all configurations of matter and energy, i.e. they are not supervenient on either specific physical configurations nor specific kinds of data processing-- but the FORMS we appreciate and take interest in require an interaction of a great number of these "qualia particles." This conforms well to physics, where individual particles are highly elusive to us, but the courser forms they take on (like billiard balls or stars) have a collective meaning to us.

That's not plausible at all. Quale are mental phenomena, i.e. they require a mind in order to exist and mind does not exist in all configurations of matter and energy.

And these are all just physical monist explanations. Add in solipsism, idealism, dualism, and other inescapable philosophical possibilities, and agnosticism is looking pretty good.

And evolution is just the scientific explanation. Add in Biblical creationism, Vedic creationism and Raelianism and suddenly, agnosticism is looking pretty good.

Both position have the same failing - only one of the so called "philosophical possibilities" have any evidence for it.

Yes. Neurotransmitters and neurons are both limited to a biological medium.

You mean their function cannot be replicated using non-organic media?

As I explained, I start with my self, and extend the likelihood of qualia to other people, to other mammals, and to other animals, because we share not only some similar behaviors (like expression of emotion), but also the mechanism of the brain. On the most fundamental level, everything I accept to have qualia is at least living.

Now, if you made artificial DNA (maybe we will be able to model DNA in a computer one day and "print" it), and managed to produce something mechanically identical to a simple organism, then I'd really have to wonder if it experienced qulia. I think I'd probably give it the benefit of the doubt.

This is where your assumptions about "knowledge" get in the way. Here, where you should have concluded reasonable knowledge, instead, you end up on an assumption.

Your argument:
P1: I have direct access to my own experience but not to anyone else's.
C1: Therefore, I can only know that I am capable of experiencing qualia, but not anyone else.
P2: Others have similar physiological structure to mine, display similar behavior, similar emotions and so on.
C2: Given C1, I cannot know that they experience, but given P2, I can assume they do.

The problem here is C1. An examination of your own psyche should reveal to you that a lot of your behaviors - specifically, developing desires and acting on them - require your subjective experience. These can, therefore, be regarded as evidence for the existence of qualia and if others display similar behavior then their being capable of subjective experience is not an assumption but a conclusion based on evidence.

You still haven't explained how you can test your hypothesis, rather than just assuming it.

I have explained it - not only in the very first post but in the other threads where we discussed this topic as well.

So far, there's only a false syllogism:
-Wherever there's qualia, certain kinds of data processing are found. Therefore, wherever those kinds of data processing are found, there's necessarily qualia.
-Wherever there's a dog, a tail can be found. Therefore wherever a tail can be found, there's necessarily a dog.

Another strawman - you are missing the crucial middle step.

[bennyboy]

Your intellectual dishonesty isn't about being stupid or disagreeing with me - its about the inconsistent application of your own ideas about knowledge. Because you can't directly observe the subjective experience of another person, you claim that the existence of qualia and the nature of its existence in others is unknown and unknowable and yet, where other not-directly-observable phenomena are concerned, you regard them as both knowable and known. So, I don't care if the words "intellectually dishonest" are overused or if you don't like it, if I see it happening, I'll call you on it.

There's an important difference. I've actually seen planes and buildings and explosions. My agnosticism about 9/11 is only about whether or not the video I watch is a real recording (as opposed to a complex conspiracy). My agnosticism about qualia is INTRINSIC to the way I gain knowledge, not something happenstance to my geographic location at the time of (supposed?) events.

No, they're not. Not unless you were in New-York on 9/11 or on the moon at landing or with the person who prays. You are making the philosophical assumption that material evidence is a valid method for gaining knowledge about those things and you are rejecting the the same philosophical assumption when it comes to other people's subjective awareness.

No I'm not. I said I'm willing to extend that assumption to other people because of their physiological and behavioral similarities to me, and also to mammals, and to other animals, and to single-celled organisms. Extending this assumption is a process based on social instinct and philosophical pragmatism.

These two possibilities are not alternative to my explanation. In both cases qualia is brain function, just in latter case, that function becomes inherent to physiology. Further, here is where the evidence train stops. The evidence we currently have for subjective experiences, supports one of these two possibilities.

It also supports the third, since you'd still need a specific arrangement of "atomic qualia," which are associated with matter, to have ideas and physical experiences.

That's not plausible at all. Quale are mental phenomena, i.e. they require a mind in order to exist and mind does not exist in all configurations of matter and energy.

What if you take all qualia and remove them from the mind? Is there still something there, or nothing but the sound of one hand clapping?

What say you? Is there a difference between mind and qualia, or is "qualia" just a word for the mental state at a given time?

And evolution is just the scientific explanation. Add in Biblical creationism, Vedic creationism and Raelianism and suddenly, agnosticism is looking pretty good.

Both position have the same failing - only one of the so called "philosophical possibilities" have any evidence for it.

The philosophical positions I mentioned are all logical positions based on reconciling the subject/object relationship that people experience. They are all simple positions about the relationship between the mind of a person and the things he perceives.

The other things you have added aren't simple positions: they're rich mythologies full of cultural influence

As for evidence: the "evidence" you are talking about is already founded on philosophical questions, so ragging on philosophical positions is hypocritical-- intellectually dishonest, so to speak. Don't believe me? What scientific evidence can you provide to prove that qualia exist? None. You conflate the meaning of an unobservable thing with an observable thing, label the observations (which are all based on your philosophical assumption) "evidence," and call it a point well made. Except no matter how confident you are, the fact is that you can't see my mind, or experience any of my experiences.

You mean their function cannot be replicated using non-organic media?

Every firing of every neuron is a function. You are assuming that qualia live in the course functions of entire systems. But for all we know, it is those microscopic functions that determine actual experience.

This is where your assumptions about "knowledge" get in the way. Here, where you should have concluded reasonable knowledge, instead, you end up on an assumption.

What you call reasonable knowledge IS an assumption.

Your argument:
P1: I have direct access to my own experience but not to anyone else's.
C1: Therefore, I can only know that I am capable of experiencing qualia, but not anyone else.
P2: Others have similar physiological structure to mine, display similar behavior, similar emotions and so on.
C2: Given C1, I cannot know that they experience, but given P2, I can assume they do.

The problem here is C1. An examination of your own psyche should reveal to you that a lot of your behaviors - specifically, developing desires and acting on them - require your subjective experience. These can, therefore, be regarded as evidence for the existence of qualia and if others display similar behavior then their being capable of subjective experience is not an assumption but a conclusion based on evidence.

First of all, you have described the process I described-- generalizing self-knowledge to an extension of the assumption of qualia in others.

The only difference is what I call a pragmatic assumption, you call evidence. In this context, I believe my term is more appropriate. Using a property of a thing to establish other instances of that thing is still a false syllogism.
-Grape juice is purple. Therefore if I see a purple liquid, it must be grape juice.
-Dogs have tails. Therefore, if I see a tail, it is great evidence that there's a dog around somewhere.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Aside from the fact that this alternative explanation is not disprovable Chad, can you think of any reason which would lead any reasonably thoughtful person to look beyond the material?

I'm not participating in this discussion anymore. Apparently, I am not welcome on the forums. So I'm mostly just listening and keeping my posts to a minimum.

[Zazzy]

]I'm not participating in this discussion anymore. Apparently, I am not welcome on the forums. So I'm mostly just listening and keeping my posts to a minimum.

What happened? Is there a link to a relevant thread?

[bennyboy]

Aside from the fact that this alternative explanation is not disprovable Chad, can you think of any reason which would lead any reasonably thoughtful person to look beyond the material?

I'm not participating in this discussion anymore. Apparently, I am not welcome on the forums. So I'm mostly just listening and keeping my posts to a minimum.

Chad, a forum with no dissenters is basically a moral support group. If you are attacked for your ideas, that is a sign that people hold a contrary view for emotional reasons, rather than well-formed logical ones. No sensible person says, "A-B:B-C therefore A-C, so fuck you asshole."

[Whateverist]

Aside from the fact that this alternative explanation is not disprovable Chad, can you think of any reason which would lead any reasonably thoughtful person to look beyond the material?

I'm not participating in this discussion anymore. Apparently, I am not welcome on the forums. So I'm mostly just listening and keeping my posts to a minimum.

Really?! Why the heck not? We don't agree on everything but I appreciate getting your point of view. Sorry you feel that way. But then you're the one on the forums that is predominantly opposite to you thieist orientation. Got to respect your limits.