Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[Cato]

I'm not participating in this discussion anymore. Apparently, I am not welcome on the forums. So I'm mostly just listening and keeping my posts to a minimum.

Is this a promise, or a threat? Either way, I hope you are true to your word.

[genkaus]

There's an important difference. I've actually seen planes and buildings and explosions. My agnosticism about 9/11 is only about whether or not the video I watch is a real recording (as opposed to a complex conspiracy). My agnosticism about qualia is INTRINSIC to the way I gain knowledge, not something happenstance to my geographic location at the time of (supposed?) events.

If your agnosticism about qualia was intrinsic to the way you gained knowledge then you would be similarly agnostic about 9/11 or the moon landing. Something that you accept, by the way, when you say that "My agnosticism about 9/11 is only about whether or not the video I watch is a real recording". If that is truly the case, then you have to accept that you are agnostic about 9/11 and the oon landing as well - so ultimately, there is no difference.

No I'm not. I said I'm willing to extend that assumption to other people because of their physiological and behavioral similarities to me, and also to mammals, and to other animals, and to single-celled organisms. Extending this assumption is a process based on social instinct and philosophical pragmatism.

And you are similarly just extending the assumption that the videos and photos you see of the events you cannot directly observe are real. Which means, the same way you cannot know whether others are capable of qualia, you similarly cannot know whether those events actually occurred - only extend a pragmatic assumption that they did. That would be an intellectually honest position for you - "I don't know if the towers were brought does by terrorists, I'm just assuming they were."

It also supports the third, since you'd still need a specific arrangement of "atomic qualia," which are associated with matter, to have ideas and physical experiences.

You need a specific arrangement of "atomic qualia" to have ideas and physical experiences? That's the first I'm hearing of it. Any evidence to support this?

What if you take all qualia and remove them from the mind? Is there still something there, or nothing but the sound of one hand clapping?

What say you? Is there a difference between mind and qualia, or is "qualia" just a word for the mental state at a given time?

Wrong - there is still something left. Qualia specifically refers to subjective experience, i.e. awareness of the inner working of the mind itself. The awareness of external events is not a part of it and exists independently of qualia.

The philosophical positions I mentioned are all logical positions based on reconciling the subject/object relationship that people experience. They are all simple positions about the relationship between the mind of a person and the things he perceives.

The other things you have added aren't simple positions: they're rich mythologies full of cultural influence.

Whether or not something is "logical" is determined by the premises taken as true. Which is why those positions are about as logical as other forms of creationism and the question of simplicity or complexity is irrelevant.

As for evidence: the "evidence" you are talking about is already founded on philosophical questions, so ragging on philosophical positions is hypocritical-- intellectually dishonest, so to speak. Don't believe me? What scientific evidence can you provide to prove that qualia exist? None. You conflate the meaning of an unobservable thing with an observable thing, label the observations (which are all based on your philosophical assumption) "evidence," and call it a point well made. Except no matter how confident you are, the fact is that you can't see my mind, or experience any of my experiences.

But what I can see is your behavior - and I know that that behavior is not possible without subjective experience.

There is no intellectual dishonesty here - I accept the philosophical premises upon which science is based and use those to evaluate all the other philosophical positions. Which is why I regard your goal-directed behavior as evidence for qualia.

Every firing of every neuron is a function. You are assuming that qualia live in the course functions of entire systems. But for all we know, it is those microscopic functions that determine actual experience.

Both statements say the same thing - qualia are determined by neural functions. So, all we have to do is identify the specific functions and replicate them in a non-biological medium.

What you call reasonable knowledge IS an assumption.

No, it isn't.

First of all, you have described the process I described-- generalizing self-knowledge to an extension of the assumption of qualia in others.

The only difference is what I call a pragmatic assumption, you call evidence. In this context, I believe my term is more appropriate. Using a property of a thing to establish other instances of that thing is still a false syllogism.
-Grape juice is purple. Therefore if I see a purple liquid, it must be grape juice.
-Dogs have tails. Therefore, if I see a tail, it is great evidence that there's a dog around somewhere.

That so called "difference" is the difference between knowledge and agnosticism. And no, your "term" is not more appropriate.

If the only occurrence of purple was with a grape juice then concluding grape juice when you see purple would be a reasonable conclusion.

If the only occurrence of tails was with dogs, then using the tail as evidence for dogs is valid.

Similarly, since the only existence of qualia is associated with brain function, then concluding qualia where there is function is valid. That's the crucial middle step you ignore in your accusations of false syllogism.

More importantly, that is how evidence works. If I find that gun-powder residue is the result of someone firing a gun and I find a person with gun-powder residue on his hands, then the statement that he has fired a gun is not a "pragmatic assumption", it is one based on evidence.

[bennyboy]

If your agnosticism about qualia was intrinsic to the way you gained knowledge then you would be similarly agnostic about 9/11 or the moon landing.

No it wouldn't. The way I gain knowledge is to look at things. If I look at video of 9/11, I gain knowledge about it. I cannot look at the qualia in others. I can ONLY assume it.

Something that you accept, by the way, when you say that "My agnosticism about 9/11 is only about whether or not the video I watch is a real recording". If that is truly the case, then you have to accept that you are agnostic about 9/11 and the oon landing as well - so ultimately, there is no difference.

First of all, as a self-declared agnostic, this position doesn't bother me at all-- on some level, I'm agnostic about everything, and any positive assertion about the nature of things requires a philosophical assumption. If you want to make that argument, welcome aboard.

However, not all kinds of agnosticism are predicated on the same assumptions. When I accept your assertion that I'm agnostic about 9/11, it's because you can challenge whether the physical universe is real, or whether ALL news and video I've seen about it is fabricated.

This is not the case with qualia. I'm agnostic about the qualia of others because I know what my own qualia are like, and I am unable to find out if others have anything like them.

And you are similarly just extending the assumption that the videos and photos you see of the events you cannot directly observe are real. Which means, the same way you cannot know whether others are capable of qualia, you similarly cannot know whether those events actually occurred - only extend a pragmatic assumption that they did. That would be an intellectually honest position for you - "I don't know if the towers were brought does by terrorists, I'm just assuming they were."

Let's get even more honest. I can't go beyond even solipsism with gnostic confidence, and I've argued so. However, earlier in this thread I declared that if we were going to talk about duality, I intended to accept the reality of the physical universe as given. That includes the brain, brain function as monitored in fMRI machines and EEGs, and physical behavior.

So the framed question as I see it is whether reality is a physical monism, a mind/physical dualism, or some kind of plurality. And IF the mind is a physical property which supervenes on physical structures or functions, then it's also about how we'd determine which systems are coincidental and which are necessary.

You need a specific arrangement of "atomic qualia" to have ideas and physical experiences? That's the first I'm hearing of it. Any evidence to support this?

The BOP evidence claim fails to obvious speculation. I'm not asserting anything with this idea, except this: EVEN IF qualia is a property that is emergent on the physical, we cannot know on what material level it emerges without a question-begging definition.

It could be that small collections of particles can generate primitive "qualia." It could be that any system complex enough to be self-referential and also to interact with its environment can have qualia. It could be that only higher species, like birds and mammals, can generate qualia, because its a property of the specific physiology of the brain. And, ultimately, it could be that only I experience qualia. And it could be that it is a specific pattern of ENERGY, not matter, which causes qualia, so that (for example) a cogs-and-axles "brain" couldn't have qualia no matter how complex it became.

Wrong - there is still something left. Qualia specifically refers to subjective experience, i.e. awareness of the inner working of the mind itself. The awareness of external events is not a part of it and exists independently of qualia.

If there's no content, then what's the experience? Sounds like Buddhist nirvana or something.

Qualia is an understanding of what experiences are LIKE. So all the subjective feelings, sensations, ideas, etc. associated with, say, watching a pretty girl would be qualia.

What does pineapple taste like? You can identify the chemical composition of pineapple without really "getting" what it is like to actually eat a piece of it. That's what qualia is.

Now, if you want to argue that dream qualia can have the same qualities as qualia about real things, then we are going somewhere interesting, but I don't see the relationship to this thread.

Both statements say the same thing - qualia are determined by neural functions. So, all we have to do is identify the specific functions and replicate them in a non-biological medium.

Oh, is that all? And here I thought we'd have to do something difficult. How would YOU go about simulating trillions of neurotransmitter packets as they are released and absorbed?

That so called "difference" is the difference between knowledge and agnosticism. And no, your "term" is not more appropriate.

If the only occurrence of purple was with a grape juice then concluding grape juice when you see purple would be a reasonable conclusion.

If the only occurrence of tails was with dogs, then using the tail as evidence for dogs is valid.

What if you could ONLY see the purple, but never the juice? Would you find it reasonable to infer that there was a tasty liquid behind it? What if you could ONLY see the wagging tail, but never the dog? Would you find it reasonable to infer a cuddly puppy?

The fact is that the only behavior/qualia relationship you have ever been able fully to observe is your own. Do you really consider a sample size of one sufficient to generalize to a confident assertion of "knowledge" about the nature of everything entity around you?

I don't think that's very scientific. I think it's philosophical.

[genkaus]

Sorry for the late reply.

No it wouldn't. The way I gain knowledge is to look at things. If I look at video of 9/11, I gain knowledge about it. I cannot look at the qualia in others. I can ONLY assume it.

What you are looking at is the video - a supposed consequence of 9/11. Similarly, when you look at behavior, you see the supposed consequence of qualia. As far as you know, the video can exist without the events as shown actually happening and behavior can exist without qualia actually occurring. Which means you should be equally agnostic in both cases. The extent to which you are only assuming that other have qualia is the same extent to which you are assuming that the towers were brought down.

However, not all kinds of agnosticism are predicated on the same assumptions. When I accept your assertion that I'm agnostic about 9/11, it's because you can challenge whether the physical universe is real, or whether ALL news and video I've seen about it is fabricated.

This is not the case with qualia. I'm agnostic about the qualia of others because I know what my own qualia are like, and I am unable to find out if others have anything like them.

The reality of physical universe has never been in question here - we're both assuming that from the start. Here's why your agnosticism in both cases should be equal:

You know your own qualia from your own experience and you probably know of buildings falling from your own experience as well. You know your behavior to be a consequence of your subjective experience and you know the video to be a consequence of recording a falling building. You know of these consequences in cases of which you have no direct experience - the 9/11 and other peoples' qualia. However, you believe that it is possible for these consequences to occur without that the particular cause. Which means, you should be equally agnosctic about them.

The BOP evidence claim fails to obvious speculation. I'm not asserting anything with this idea, except this: EVEN IF qualia is a property that is emergent on the physical, we cannot know on what material level it emerges without a question-begging definition.

Since neither of us is arguing for emergentism, is there a point to this?

If there's no content, then what's the experience? Sounds like Buddhist nirvana or something.

Qualia is an understanding of what experiences are LIKE. So all the subjective feelings, sensations, ideas, etc. associated with, say, watching a pretty girl would be qualia.

What does pineapple taste like? You can identify the chemical composition of pineapple without really "getting" what it is like to actually eat a piece of it. That's what qualia is.

Now, if you want to argue that dream qualia can have the same qualities as qualia about real things, then we are going somewhere interesting, but I don't see the relationship to this thread.

What do you mean by "no content"?

Oh, is that all? And here I thought we'd have to do something difficult. How would YOU go about simulating trillions of neurotransmitter packets as they are released and absorbed?

No idea.

What if you could ONLY see the purple, but never the juice? Would you find it reasonable to infer that there was a tasty liquid behind it? What if you could ONLY see the wagging tail, but never the dog? Would you find it reasonable to infer a cuddly puppy?

The fact is that the only behavior/qualia relationship you have ever been able fully to observe is your own. Do you really consider a sample size of one sufficient to generalize to a confident assertion of "knowledge" about the nature of everything entity around you?

I don't think that's very scientific. I think it's philosophical.

But I have seen the juice behind the color purple and the dog before the wagging tail - so those "what ifs" are pointless. And given that one is all the sample size I have, that's what I have to base my reasonable conclusions on.

[bennyboy]

Sorry for the late reply.

No it wouldn't. The way I gain knowledge is to look at things. If I look at video of 9/11, I gain knowledge about it. I cannot look at the qualia in others. I can ONLY assume it.

What you are looking at is the video - a supposed consequence of 9/11. Similarly, when you look at behavior, you see the supposed consequence of qualia. As far as you know, the video can exist without the events as shown actually happening and behavior can exist without qualia actually occurring. Which means you should be equally agnostic in both cases. The extent to which you are only assuming that other have qualia is the same extent to which you are assuming that the towers were brought down.

I get it. I just don't agree that the analogy holds. In the case of 9/11, there is no sufficient explanation for the video planes crashing into buildings and causing a fire than an "actual" plane crashing into an "actual" fire (quotes because in this argument, solipsism and idealism always linger in the background). Yes, it's possible that neither the planes, nor the buildings, nor New York exist, in which case it would be a pretty fantastic conspiracy, but that's not because of their PROPERTIES as I perceive them. It's a different kind of agnosticism.

In the case of qualia, you have a secondary property which is not necessary to explain behavior. The brain itself is a sufficient explanation: "Data comes in, brain processes it, and behavior comes out." Our reason for believing in qualia therefore is not behavior-- it is the direct experience of our own qualia as a brute fact.

I do not have my own interior plane or my own interior fire which I necessarily extend by philosophical pragmatism to 9/11

The reality of physical universe has never been in question here - we're both assuming that from the start. Here's why your agnosticism in both cases should be equal:

You know your own qualia from your own experience and you probably know of buildings falling from your own experience as well. You know your behavior to be a consequence of your subjective experience and you know the video to be a consequence of recording a falling building. You know of these consequences in cases of which you have no direct experience - the 9/11 and other peoples' qualia. However, you believe that it is possible for these consequences to occur without that the particular cause. Which means, you should be equally agnosctic about them.

The difference is that nobody is equating planes with invisible secondary properties which I must ALSO assume. In a physical monism, the brain is sufficient to explain behaviors, which are really just the physical motions of the body. The only assumption I need to make is that the brain, and its relationship to the body, are real (no solipsism, no Matrix, etc.). Whether qualia exist is irrelevant, since whether or not I accept the qualia of others, their brains and behaviors are the same-- there's still no mystery which demands the extra inference.

But I have seen the juice behind the color purple and the dog before the wagging tail - so those "what ifs" are pointless. And given that one is all the sample size I have, that's what I have to base my reasonable conclusions on.

Right. Those "what ifs" are pointless because ALL the other relationships about things and their properties are based on objective experience of objects which are not you.

As for sample size-- a sample size of one is meaningless in establishing a general rule, because it's impossible to establish any principle by which to make that generalization. This is not a "reasonable conclusion." It's a philsophical assumption.

[genkaus]

I get it. I just don't agree that the analogy holds. In the case of 9/11, there is no sufficient explanation for the video planes crashing into buildings and causing a fire than an "actual" plane crashing into an "actual" fire (quotes because in this argument, solipsism and idealism always linger in the background). Yes, it's possible that neither the planes, nor the buildings, nor New York exist, in which case it would be a pretty fantastic conspiracy, but that's not because of their PROPERTIES as I perceive them. It's a different kind of agnosticism.

Actually, it is exactly the same kind of agnosticism.

Either, there were no planes and no towers and the whole thing is a fantastic conspiracy to deceive you or there were plane that hit the towers and the videos and news-reports are evidence for the event.

Similarly, either nobody has any capacity for subjective experience, except you and all of them saying that they do and acting in that way is a fantastic conspiracy to deceive you - or they do have qualia and their behavior and statement are evidence of it.

In the case of qualia, you have a secondary property which is not necessary to explain behavior. The brain itself is a sufficient explanation: "Data comes in, brain processes it, and behavior comes out." Our reason for believing in qualia therefore is not behavior-- it is the direct experience of our own qualia as a brute fact.

You ignore the fact that subjective experience is an essential part of "brain processing it". Without the subjective experience or qualia being included in the processing, the behavioral output cannot be sufficiently explained. Qualia is necessary to explain behavior.

I do not have my own interior plane or my own interior fire which I necessarily extend by philosophical pragmatism to 9/11

You do - in a manner of speaking. You have personal experience of existing planes and of existing buildings and that is what you extend by "philosophical pragmatism" to 9/11. If, instead, I told you that a spaceship flew into a crystal spire and showed you videos and news-reports to that effect, you would not believe that.

The difference is that nobody is equating planes with invisible secondary properties which I must ALSO assume.

Aren't you the one who keeps insisting that qualia is a brute fact. Which means they are not invisible secondary properties that you have to assume.

In a physical monism, the brain is sufficient to explain behaviors, which are really just the physical motions of the body.

And the capacity for subjective experience is a part of that explanation.

The only assumption I need to make is that the brain, and its relationship to the body, are real (no solipsism, no Matrix, etc.). Whether qualia exist is irrelevant, since whether or not I accept the qualia of others, their brains and behaviors are the same-- there's still no mystery which demands the extra inference.

I agree - there is no mystery that demands extra inference. The existence of qualia is required to explain how and why some behavior occurs and if its existence can be explained by brain function, there is no need to invoke anything extra like a "soul" or "atomic quale".

[bennyboy]

Actually, it is exactly the same kind of agnosticism.

Either, there were no planes and no towers and the whole thing is a fantastic conspiracy to deceive you or there were plane that hit the towers and the videos and news-reports are evidence for the event.

Similarly, either nobody has any capacity for subjective experience, except you and all of them saying that they do and acting in that way is a fantastic conspiracy to deceive you - or they do have qualia and their behavior and statement are evidence of it.

I've seen planes and explosions in real life, as things objectively observable to be existent outside myself (assuming at least physicalism, which we are). I've never seen a mind, as a thing objectively existent outside myself.

You ignore the fact that subjective experience is an essential part of "brain processing it". Without the subjective experience or qualia being included in the processing, the behavioral output cannot be sufficiently explained. Qualia is necessary to explain behavior.

Since qualia cannot, in a physical monism, be MORE than brain function, then they are not required to explain any physical behavior: the brain function is sufficient. In order to establish a qualia-> behavior relationship, you have to know for sure that there ARE qualia actually there. But the problem is, if you determine that only by looking at behavior, then you're introducing a vicious circle. It's the same as: "I know God is real because the Bible says so, and I know the Bible is true because God says so."

You do - in a manner of speaking. You have personal experience of existing planes and of existing buildings and that is what you extend by "philosophical pragmatism" to 9/11. If, instead, I told you that a spaceship flew into a crystal spire and showed you videos and news-reports to that effect, you would not believe that.

Yes, but my internal representation of the idea/symbol "plane" is of an object apparently exterior to the self. My internal represeentaion of the idea/symbol "mind" or now "qualia" is of something obviously interior to the self. So the philosophical question is this: is something SEEMING by its behavior to have qualia a good enough match to that symbol?

On a pragmatic sense, you and I both agree that yes, it is. On a philosophical sense, you see a monism as simpler and singly sufficient, therefore better, than a dualism. But that's where I draw my line-- I don't consider Occam's Razor a sufficient proof of an idea.

Aren't you the one who keeps insisting that qualia is a brute fact. Which means they are not invisible secondary properties that you have to assume.

MY qualia are a brute fact, for me. Ideas about who/what, might have or not have them is a matter of observation mated to arbitrary philosophical assumptions. The reason you and I arrive at different conclusions is that we like working under different assumptions, and no more than that.

And the capacity for subjective experience is a part of that explanation.

Not in robots or computers, it's not.

I agree - there is no mystery that demands extra inference. The existence of qualia is required to explain how and why some behavior occurs and if its existence can be explained by brain function, there is no need to invoke anything extra like a "soul" or "atomic quale".

That's fine. But how complex a system do you need to have the most primitive "qualia" that deserves that name? Do you need a fully functioning being with the ability to symbolize experiences and reference them to memories? Or do you just need a system capable of phsyical homeostasis? Or or any kind of recursive or self-referential function? Or of any form of energy being transmuted to another and processed?

In the human being, ALL those things are true. In a machine, some of them are true, but not others. How are we to separate the human-ness from the definition of qualia, and arrive at an understanding of exactly what level of processing would be required for OTHER entities to actually experience their environment, rather than being responding machines minus qualia? We can't know, because if you ask a neuron what it's feeling, or hook a single neuron up to an EEG, you can obtain no meaningful data.

[genkaus]

I've seen planes and explosions in real life, as things objectively observable to be existent outside myself (assuming at least physicalism, which we are). I've never seen a mind, as a thing objectively existent outside myself.

Why is "outside yourself" suddenly a criteria now for something being objectively existent and observable? If it isn't, then you have see a mind, as a thing objectively existent within yourself.

Since qualia cannot, in a physical monism, be MORE than brain function, then they are not required to explain any physical behavior: the brain function is sufficient.

That's just ridiculous. In physical monism, qualia are brain function and brain function is required and sufficient to explain physical behavior, but, somehow, qualia are not required to explain it? The very fact that all of brain functions are required for explaining the behavior automatically makes qualia a part of that explanation.

In order to establish a qualia-> behavior relationship, you have to know for sure that there ARE qualia actually there. But the problem is, if you determine that only by looking at behavior, then you're introducing a vicious circle. It's the same as: "I know God is real because the Bible says so, and I know the Bible is true because God says so."

Except, I do know that qualia are actually there - from my own experience - as do you. Its not a vicious circle because we are starting with the brute fact of subjective experience. "I know qualia is real because I experience it, I know my own behavior to be the consequence of subjective experience and when I see the same behavior in others, I conclude the existence of qualia in them as well". The religious parallel would be: "I know god is real because I've directly experienced him and his authorship of the bible and its veracity are the consequence of him being real and thus I can use other statements in the bible as evidence for other facts". Ofcourse, this argument fails because direct experience of god is not a brute fact and veracity of the bible is not a consequence of it.

Yes, but my internal representation of the idea/symbol "plane" is of an object apparently exterior to the self. My internal represeentaion of the idea/symbol "mind" or now "qualia" is of something obviously interior to the self.

What difference does being interior or exterior to the self make?

So the philosophical question is this: is something SEEMING by its behavior to have qualia a good enough match to that symbol?

On a pragmatic sense, you and I both agree that yes, it is. On a philosophical sense, you see a monism as simpler and singly sufficient, therefore better, than a dualism. But that's where I draw my line-- I don't consider Occam's Razor a sufficient proof of an idea.

Its not just that monism is simpler and singly sufficient, through the discussion, we've also found dualism to be insufficient and we've found evidence that takes the position beyond the Razor. But once again, consistent application of this level of agnosticism should make you equally agnostic about other things, such as 9/11. There, your options are that either the events actually happened or that its a conspiracy and the evidence has been manufactured to deceive you. Here, you are willing to use Occam's Razor as sufficient proof for the former and not the latter. Unless, ofcourse, your agnosticism and "pragmatic assumption" is the same in both cases.

MY qualia are a brute fact, for me. Ideas about who/what, might have or not have them is a matter of observation mated to arbitrary philosophical assumptions. The reason you and I arrive at different conclusions is that we like working under different assumptions, and no more than that.

Maybe that's the problem - you haven't validated your philosophical assumptions, which is what makes them arbitrary.

Not in robots or computers, it's not.

You have evidence to support that?

That's fine. But how complex a system do you need to have the most primitive "qualia" that deserves that name? Do you need a fully functioning being with the ability to symbolize experiences and reference them to memories? Or do you just need a system capable of phsyical homeostasis? Or or any kind of recursive or self-referential function? Or of any form of energy being transmuted to another and processed?

Not sure, how do you measure complexity? No. More than that. Of some kind. What does that even mean?

In the human being, ALL those things are true. In a machine, some of them are true, but not others. How are we to separate the human-ness from the definition of qualia, and arrive at an understanding of exactly what level of processing would be required for OTHER entities to actually experience their environment, rather than being responding machines minus qualia? We can't know, because if you ask a neuron what it's feeling, or hook a single neuron up to an EEG, you can obtain no meaningful data.

Except, no one is suggesting hooking up a neuron to an EEG to determine the existence of qualia. We've already established that within physical monism, qualia is brain function - FUNCTION, not a property of neurons - which mean, correctly identifying the processes involved in that function and replicating them is required to determine at what level of processing entities become capable of experience.

[bennyboy]

Why is "outside yourself" suddenly a criteria now for something being objectively existent and observable? If it isn't, then you have see a mind, as a thing objectively existent within yourself.

You've just defined subjective experience, and you're asking why it isn't objective.

Except, I do know that qualia are actually there - from my own experience - as do you. Its not a vicious circle because we are starting with the brute fact of subjective experience. "I know qualia is real because I experience it, I know my own behavior to be the consequence of subjective experience and when I see the same behavior in others, I conclude the existence of qualia in them as well". The religious parallel would be: "I know god is real because I've directly experienced him and his authorship of the bible and its veracity are the consequence of him being real and thus I can use other statements in the bible as evidence for other facts". Ofcourse, this argument fails because direct experience of god is not a brute fact and veracity of the bible is not a consequence of it.

You're saying that qualia is a brute fact, but interpretation of the CONTENT is not. And yet you are using your interpretation of the content of your qualia to establish that it also exists in others.

What difference does being interior or exterior to the self make?

The difference is that in the case of 9/11, we're only talking about planes, not the underlying reality of planes; seeing the image is enough to say, "Look. A plane!" In the case of using behavior to establish qualia, we're not just talking about whether I believe someone "really" smiled or "really" said they enjoyed my waffles or something. We're talking about inferences about what UNDERLIES those behaviors. It's an unlike process.

MY qualia are a brute fact, for me. Ideas about who/what, might have or not have them is a matter of observation mated to arbitrary philosophical assumptions. The reason you and I arrive at different conclusions is that we like working under different assumptions, and no more than that.

Maybe that's the problem - you haven't validated your philosophical assumptions, which is what makes them arbitrary.

All philosophical assumptions are arbitrary. If you could "validate" them, they wouldn't be assumptions, they'd be facts.

Not in robots or computers, it's not.

You have evidence to support that?

Because my doubt that robots are really experiencing the redness of red or any other qualia is the positive assertion, here?

Since I only accept qualia in others based on a philosophical assumption, and since robots are unlike me in many important ways, then I cannot know whether they have qualia or not. I can only go on a hunch that they do not.

Not sure, how do you measure complexity? No. More than that. Of some kind. What does that even mean?

You tell me. You are the one asserting that wherever certain functions exist, there is necessarily qualia.

Except, no one is suggesting hooking up a neuron to an EEG to determine the existence of qualia. We've already established that within physical monism, qualia is brain function - FUNCTION, not a property of neurons - which mean, correctly identifying the processes involved in that function and replicating them is required to determine at what level of processing entities become capable of experience.

Neurons function. So do neurotransmitters and hormonones. So do atoms and QM particles. So do brain parts. So does the brain. So does the mind. Human beings have all of these layers of function working together. Given both qualia and physical monism, then all these things are known to be sufficient for qualia to be experienced. I would categorize neuronal function as part of brain function, so if there are no neurons, there's no brain, and no brain function.

It is not known that taking any of these layers of function out would still leave us with qualia.

[genkaus]

You've just defined subjective experience, and you're asking why it isn't objective.

Actually, that's not how subjective experience is defined. Try again.

You're saying that qualia is a brute fact, but interpretation of the CONTENT is not. And yet you are using your interpretation of the content of your qualia to establish that it also exists in others.

Fair enough. Given that my interpretation is based on the brute fact of qualia, it would mean that either I have correctly interpreted which would make it an objective fact or I've made an error in my interpretation. Since my interpretation is that my goal-directed behavior is the result of my capacity for my capacity for subjective experience, saying that its incorrect implies that is not the case. Which means, my subjective experience happens to be incidental and irrelevant and has no actual effect on my behavior - is that the position you are arguing for?

The difference is that in the case of 9/11, we're only talking about planes, not the underlying reality of planes; seeing the image is enough to say, "Look. A plane!" In the case of using behavior to establish qualia, we're not just talking about whether I believe someone "really" smiled or "really" said they enjoyed my waffles or something. We're talking about inferences about what UNDERLIES those behaviors. It's an unlike process.

Wrong. In case of 9/11, we are not - repeat not - talking about the planes or their underlying reality. What we are talking about is the video of 2 planes flying into the tower and the underlying reality of that video. That is what makes this an apt comparison. You are inferring the actuality of 9/11 from that video the same way I am inferring the existence of qualia from behavior. You do not have the direct access to that event and I do not have the access to qualia.

All philosophical assumptions are arbitrary. If you could "validate" them, they wouldn't be assumptions, they'd be facts.

An erroneous assumption that gave rise to many ridiculous philosophies over the years.

Because my doubt that robots are really experiencing the redness of red or any other qualia is the positive assertion, here?

Your denial of their capacity for subjective experience is.

Since I only accept qualia in others based on a philosophical assumption, and since robots are unlike me in many important ways, then I cannot know whether they have qualia or not. I can only go on a hunch that they do not.

Since its "just an assumption", why not assume the opposite?

You tell me. You are the one asserting that wherever certain functions exist, there is necessarily qualia.

And what does that have to do with energy transmutation?

Neurons function. So do neurotransmitters and hormonones. So do atoms and QM particles. So do brain parts. So does the brain. So does the mind. Human beings have all of these layers of function working together. Given both qualia and physical monism, then all these things are known to be sufficient for qualia to be experienced. I would categorize neuronal function as part of brain function, so if there are no neurons, there's no brain, and no brain function.

It is not known that taking any of these layers of function out would still leave us with qualia.

Two things:
1. We don't know yet precisely which function is required or sufficient - but we do know that function at cellular level is insufficient. Thus, my rejection of "atomic qualia".
2. We won't be taking away any of those layers of function without replacing them with equivalent ones.