Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[bennyboy]

Wrong. In case of 9/11, we are not - repeat not - talking about the planes or their underlying reality. What we are talking about is the video of 2 planes flying into the tower and the underlying reality of that video. That is what makes this an apt comparison. You are inferring the actuality of 9/11 from that video the same way I am inferring the existence of qualia from behavior. You do not have the direct access to that event and I do not have the access to qualia.

You are still flirting with solipsism, here. I don't have direct access to ANY event or object-- in all cases I interface with them through my qualia.

This means that when I infer a plane crash, I'm remembering WHAT ITS LIKE to see a real crash, and believing that the image I see from the video matches that.

But in the case of qualia, when I describe it in its own terms, I'm talking about WHAT ITS LIKE to feel WHAT THINGS ARE LIKE.

That's another level, or layer, of reality we're talking about. Think function : derivative.

Because my doubt that robots are really experiencing the redness of red or any other qualia is the positive assertion, here?

Your denial of their capacity for subjective experience is.

I never denied that they could subjectively experience. I denied that I'm willing to extend the same philosophical assumptions to robots that I make about humans, because robots are unlike me in important ways, while humans seem not to be

Since I only accept qualia in others based on a philosophical assumption, and since robots are unlike me in many important ways, then I cannot know whether they have qualia or not. I can only go on a hunch that they do not.

Since its "just an assumption", why not assume the opposite?

I don't have an instinctive need to see them as conscious, and there's no pragmatic advantage to doing so. For my life to make sense, I don't have to believe that robots really experience.

You tell me. You are the one asserting that wherever certain functions exist, there is necessarily qualia.

And what does that have to do with energy transmutation?

Because the transmutation of energy can itself be seen as a kind of simple data processing.

Neurons function. So do neurotransmitters and hormonones. So do atoms and QM particles. So do brain parts. So does the brain. So does the mind. Human beings have all of these layers of function working together. Given both qualia and physical monism, then all these things are known to be sufficient for qualia to be experienced. I would categorize neuronal function as part of brain function, so if there are no neurons, there's no brain, and no brain function.

It is not known that taking any of these layers of function out would still leave us with qualia.

Two things:
1. We don't know yet precisely which function is required or sufficient - but we do know that function at cellular level is insufficient. Thus, my rejection of "atomic qualia".
2. We won't be taking away any of those layers of function without replacing them with equivalent ones.

1. Insufficient != Unnecessary
2. You'll have to describe how this is physically possible, or ever COULD be. The brain combines physical, chemical, and electrical interactions in ways so complex I don't think they can ever be modeled by anything less fantastically complex than a brain itself.

[I and I]

Question: Can you think of an experiment that would prove whether qualia are generated by physical processes versus facilitating them?

Those of us interested in philosophy of mind have a fair understanding of the issues and arguments surrounding the mind-body problem. To the best of my knowledge we all agree that a causal relationship exists between the brain-states and mental properties. How this fact is interpreted depends on whether you are a monist or dualist.

For philosophical reasons, I consider physical matter incapable of producing qualia and see the need for some other vehicle capable of supporting phenomena qualities (dualism). The analogy I use is that of a radio, which does not cause music, but is by virtue of its state can receive signals. Others consider first-person awareness an emergent property. They believe particular configurations of physical matter are capable of producing qualia as a non-fundamental property of reality.

Do you believe there is a non-philosophical way, i.e. scientific one, to determine which interpretation is correct?

I believe in evolution, therefore I will state that mental properties come from physical properties and both are a factor.

[genkaus]

You are still flirting with solipsism, here. I don't have direct access to ANY event or object-- in all cases I interface with them through my qualia.

This means that when I infer a plane crash, I'm remembering WHAT ITS LIKE to see a real crash, and believing that the image I see from the video matches that.

But in the case of qualia, when I describe it in its own terms, I'm talking about WHAT ITS LIKE to feel WHAT THINGS ARE LIKE.

That's another level, or layer, of reality we're talking about. Think function : derivative.

Solipsism does not enter the equation here. Within the context of this ANALOGY, your observation of a plane crash is equivalent to direct access to your own qualia. And your inference regarding the event from its images is as much of an agnostic assumption as inferring anyone else's qualia.

I never denied that they could subjectively experience. I denied that I'm willing to extend the same philosophical assumptions to robots that I make about humans, because robots are unlike me in important ways, while humans seem not to be

The philosophical assumption you are unwilling to extend happens to be subjective experience, which constitutes a denial for their capacity to do so.

I don't have an instinctive need to see them as conscious, and there's no pragmatic advantage to doing so. For my life to make sense, I don't have to believe that robots really experience.

That's the most basic mistake one can make in pursuit of knowledge - making assumptions based on need or advantage they provide.

Because the transmutation of energy can itself be seen as a kind of simple data processing.

How?

1. Insufficient != Unnecessary
2. You'll have to describe how this is physically possible, or ever COULD be. The brain combines physical, chemical, and electrical interactions in ways so complex I don't think they can ever be modeled by anything less fantastically complex than a brain itself.

1. Did you miss the point? Function at cellular level is insufficient to give rise to qualia - which is why the notion of qualia at that level is nonsensical. It is, however, necessary to give rise to qualia at a higher level.
2. I'm inclined to agree. Any model of brain with replicated functions would have to be fantastically complex. A lot of scientists are still working on the "how" and they've made some great progress - including your own given examples of Artificial Neural Networks.

[bennyboy]

Solipsism does not enter the equation here. Within the context of this ANALOGY, your observation of a plane crash is equivalent to direct access to your own qualia. And your inference regarding the event from its images is as much of an agnostic assumption as inferring anyone else's qualia.

The fundamental difference is that in one case, we are mapping the properties of supposedly external objects onto experience, and in the other, we are attempting to map the NATURE of experience onto properties the supposedly external objects. This is an unlike comparison. Qualia as an object (e.g. as we do now when we symbolize it into words and talk about it), and qualia as the subjective representation of properties of objects, are not the same thing.

The philosophical assumption you are unwilling to extend happens to be subjective experience, which constitutes a denial for their capacity to do so.

That's right. And your next point addresses my reason for making that extension.

I don't have an instinctive need to see them as conscious, and there's no pragmatic advantage to doing so. For my life to make sense, I don't have to believe that robots really experience.

That's the most basic mistake one can make in pursuit of knowledge - making assumptions based on need or advantage they provide.

Given an issue that is intrinsically agnostic, one MUST make an arbitrary decision (or arbitrarily refuse to make a decision) about how to view the issue. I cannot know whether other entities actually experience qualia, and nothing I can do changes that fact.

You've often referred to "evidence," to hypotheses and their varying likelihoods. But there's a glaring absence of the words "absolute, undeniable proof." That's because science is intrinsically agnostic, not intrinsically gnostic. It's founded on assumptions which themselves aren't provable, starting with the existence of the physical universe.

Why do we assume the world is real? Because a rock on the head hurts. Because the boredom felt during math class feels very vivid. Because the girl who finally said "yes" provides an experience so rich that I believe it couldn't be a product of the imagination.

So don't be so confident that I'm just assuming on a whim, whereas you distinguish yourself by drawing careful conclusions based on factual evidence. It's all just experience, and the tendency to draw certain inferences is based on how we feel about our experiences, not on the "real" nature of whatever underlies them.

Because the transmutation of energy can itself be seen as a kind of simple data processing.

How?

Every interaction results in a change of state, which affects the subsequent unfolding of further interactions.

[genkaus]

The fundamental difference is that in one case, we are mapping the properties of supposedly external objects onto experience, and in the other, we are attempting to map the NATURE of experience onto properties the supposedly external objects. This is an unlike comparison. Qualia as an object (e.g. as we do now when we symbolize it into words and talk about it), and qualia as the subjective representation of properties of objects, are not the same thing.

You do get that I'm making an analogy, right? An analogy means that I'm pointing out similarities between two otherwise dissimilar concepts.

Given an issue that is intrinsically agnostic, one MUST make an arbitrary decision (or arbitrarily refuse to make a decision) about how to view the issue. I cannot know whether other entities actually experience qualia, and nothing I can do changes that fact.

But its not a fact that the issue is intrinsically agnostic - which has been my argument since the start. You are taking the point of contention as a given.

You've often referred to "evidence," to hypotheses and their varying likelihoods. But there's a glaring absence of the words "absolute, undeniable proof." That's because science is intrinsically agnostic, not intrinsically gnostic. It's founded on assumptions which themselves aren't provable, starting with the existence of the physical universe.

That is your second error. Gnosticism or agnosticism are terms defined within the context of epistemology and the axiomatic premises of science are under the purview of metaphysics. The concepts of proof, evidence or assumption do not apply to metaphysical premises because those notions are derived from those premises. The idea that the existence of physical universe is not provable and therefore it must be an intrinsically agnostic assumption is nonsensical because the very concept of gnosticism derives from that premise.

Why do we assume the world is real? Because a rock on the head hurts. Because the boredom felt during math class feels very vivid. Because the girl who finally said "yes" provides an experience so rich that I believe it couldn't be a product of the imagination.

Because its negation is self-contradictory.

Every interaction results in a change of state, which affects the subsequent unfolding of further interactions.

And how does that make it a form of data processing?

[bennyboy]

Why do we assume the world is real? Because a rock on the head hurts. Because the boredom felt during math class feels very vivid. Because the girl who finally said "yes" provides an experience so rich that I believe it couldn't be a product of the imagination.

Because its negation is self-contradictory.

Contradictory with what, exactly? and what is philosophically wrong with this contradiction?

Every interaction results in a change of state, which affects the subsequent unfolding of further interactions.

And how does that make it a form of data processing?

I've just defined data processing in physical terms: the interaction of property states, which is predicated on the exchange of energy. If you have another definition, then go ahead and make your case.

[genkaus]

Contradictory with what, exactly? and what is philosophically wrong with this contradiction?

Contradictory to itself. Which is what self-contradictory means.
And logic is the primary mode of inquiry within philosophy. Any contradiction indicates a misapplication or an error.

I've just defined data processing in physical terms: the interaction of property states, which is predicated on the exchange of energy. If you have another definition, then go ahead and make your case.

Sure:
Data processing is "the collection and manipulation of items of data to produce meaningful information."

[Neo-Scholastic]

You beg the question when you call the manipulated data "meaningful". It presupposes a knowing subject that can assign meaning.

[genkaus]

You beg the question when you call the manipulated data "meaningful". It presupposes a knowing subject that can assign meaning.

Precisely.

[bennyboy]

Contradictory with what, exactly? and what is philosophically wrong with this contradiction?

Contradictory to itself. Which is what self-contradictory means.
And logic is the primary mode of inquiry within philosophy. Any contradiction indicates a misapplication or an error.

What's the "it" that is contradicting itself?

I've just defined data processing in physical terms: the interaction of property states, which is predicated on the exchange of energy. If you have another definition, then go ahead and make your case.

Sure:
Data processing is "the collection and manipulation of items of data to produce meaningful information."

Spoken like a true substance dualist. Tell me, if I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting and manipulating "meaningful" information, or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?