The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[downbeatplumb]

no, as i said before God is an immaterial mind. since there are clear examples of things that are immaterial (color, sound etc.) it is certainly possible for the mind to be immaterial.

Um no.

Sound and colour are the result of our very physical brains processing input from our senses having detecting physical things photons, movements in the air etc. they are in no way immaterial.

The only immaterial things I can think of that exist are concepts like truth, justice and so on.

I'n fact that is what I think god is, a convenient place holder for abstract concepts. how often have you heard the phrase "god is love"? for instance.

[Rational AKD]

The slippery part about your argument is that none of the language is precise enough to really nail down what is stated where, so you can shift back and forth the point where you switch from necessary properties of God to actual properties of God. This becomes more clear if one puts the argument in one sentence, where it is harder to do stealth shifts in meanings of words.

all properties of God are necessary properties. the only part that becomes actual is his existence when it is shown he is is necessary in C3.

You cannot conclude that God's existence is not dependent on an external factor from saying that the concept of God includes this necessity. Since you have before only said things about the concept of God, it only allows you to conclude statements about God's existence if he exists: something that does not exists does not have to fulfil the requirements laid out in its concept. This is confusing in this case because you put existence as a requirement into the concept.

i think you misunderstand. the argument pretty much starts by stating the coherence of the concept of God. this coherence means it is metaphysically possible. then it goes into hypothetical "what if God exists?" if God existed he could either exist contingently or necessarily. but if he existed contingently, that would contradict his omnipotence. therefore, if God were to exist, he could only exist necessarily. so if he exists he exists necessarily, if he doesn't exists then he must necessarily not exist. that's the point of the argument. since the only way it could be impossible for God to exist is if he was incoherent, then if P1 is true God exists. thus P1 is the only controversial premise.

I actually did read it, but the second part was complete hand-waving. Again I'll repeat what you dodged: What does being contingent have to do, AT ALL, with being able to be overcome? You asserted that with no defense whatsoever. Nor would God being contingent mean he was made of matter.

if the existence of A is contingent upon B, then A's existence is dependent upon B's. this means if you get rid of B, you get rid of A. i did give the example of "what if God were made of matter" did i not? if he were made of matter, we could break him down. if we can break him down, he's not very omnipotent now is he? now, if God were necessary then you wouldn't have this problem. this is why P3 is true, because contingency creates a weak point which is contrary to being omnipotent.

This is why I said you need to read up some more. I wasn't insulting, I meant it because you have no idea what you're talking about. There is ONLY one way to demonstrate actual metaphysical possibility and that's by being shown to exist. The reason why is because simply being unable to find the incoherency in a concept doesn't actually mean it's coherent. Without a demonstration of existence, you ONLY have epistemic possibility because you only have your own limited set of knowledge.

you obviously don't know what you're talking about and you contradict yourself later.

Hah! Do you even READ what you quote?

sure... did you?

For one, faster-than-light particles are ALREADY theoretically possible...

in other words, it hasn't been demonstrated... yet it can only be metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated... so is it metaphysically possible or not?

such as Tacyons, so inasmuch as one accepts that science talks about the world as it is, FTL particles is possible.

you've got to be kidding... tacyons were introduced with the intention of being capable of faster than light speed travel but they haven't even worked out the mathematics yet, yet alone detected any.

We already know that motion is possible, so motion at any particular rate implies not contradiction or impossibility given a different kind of universe.

so as far as you know, because motion is not contradictory, faster than light motion is also not contradictory. it hasn't been demonstrated so how do you know? what if light is necessarily the fastest thing in all metaphysically possible worlds? that would throw off your whole guess work. but we don't know that it is, but then again we don't know that it isn't. the point is you're simply making inferences based on your current knowledge to say it is metaphysically possible. that's exactly what i was doing involving God. but on top of that, the modal perfection argument provides a sound argument for God's metaphysical possibility.

I'm using "valid" in the sense of logic. In other words, my argument has NO fallacies, ergo valid. It's soundness can be disputed, but only by disputing one of the premises, namely the 2nd one.

you obviously don't know what valid means. valid doesn't mean free of fallacy, it means the conclusion is true if the premises are true. however, the thing that seems to be confusing is your use of can't and cannot. when you say those, are you saying he can't exist in any possible world or just that one? i can easily grant you that if naturalism is true in a possible world God can't exist in that possible world, but i don't see how you could say that therefore he can't exist in any possible world. that would only be true if the MOA is valid since it shows God can't be contingent.

Now, what you've clearly missed is that this argument stalemates your argument and the MOA because both (or at least Plantinga's is) are valid, but they stalemate.

i hardly see your argument as a stalemate. either your first premise is a claim of necessity or a claim of possibility. if it is a claim of possibility then your conclusion must also be that of possibility or it is invalid. if it is a claim of necessity, then you have that burden to prove that God necessarily can't exist if naturalism is possible or true a possible world.

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Um no.

Sound and colour are the result of our very physical brains processing input from our senses having detecting physical things photons, movements in the air etc. they are in no way immaterial.

i notice that you say sound and color are "the result of..." and then you describe the physical process. i can actually agree with that; however, you're telling me that sound and color have a correlation to this physical process but they are not equivalent. so you haven't reduced sound and color to a physical substance or process. you've only pointed out sound and color correlate to that physical process.

[Tonus]

You said:

maybe someday you'll realize how silly it is to argue semantics.

And your very next sentence was:

not the way i'm using the word conceivable.

[Whateverist]

If you let your logic work like this, it would mean that any idea you dream up is necessarily realized in the world if only you attach the necessity of existence in its definition.

Good point. Well made. Of course if you tried such a tactic with anything you can actually point to it wouldn't work because we would have more than your deceitful words to go on. It is only with something as nebulously defined as god that anyone attempts such a tactic. Of course the reason they do so is their desperation to preserve both the god they grew up with and the capacity for reason which they would like to think makes them a peer of the realm. Unfortunately for our friend here he tries to salvage too much of god on a literal level to pull it off. He should really take notes on how Jacob manages this. It can be done.

[MindForgedManacle]

if the existence of A is contingent upon B, then A's existence is dependent upon B's. this means if you get rid of B, you get rid of A. i did give the example of "what if God were made of matter" did i not? if he were made of matter, we could break him down. if we can break him down, he's not very omnipotent now is he? now, if God were necessary then you wouldn't have this problem. this is why P3 is true, because contingency creates a weak point which is contrary to being omnipotent.

And as I thought, you really didn't have an answer. If God, say, popped into existence ex nihilo his existence would be contingent, yet that has nothing to do with diminishing omnipotence in the slightest. If you got rid of that event, then you'd get rid of God, sure. But then it becomes a "so what?" moment. God is still capable of doing anything logically possible (for the most part) regardless. Now, you can add to the concept of omnipotence that it must include non-contingence, but you are trying to disguise what you're doing.
And again, if God were contingent, why would that mean he was made of matter?

you obviously don't know what you're talking about and you contradict yourself later.

Great response, by which I mean you had none.

sure... did you?

Indeed. Especially where, in the article and on the first example regarding epistemic possibility, it limits it to the things one knows.

in other words, it hasn't been demonstrated... yet it can only be metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated... so is it metaphysically possible or not?

How can I know that when all I have is epistemic possibility?

you've got to be kidding... tacyons were introduced with the intention of being capable of faster than light speed travel but they haven't even worked out the mathematics yet, yet alone detected any.

Er, hence "theoretical" in my post. But hey, ignoring words is your game so by all means continue.

so as far as you know, because motion is not contradictory, faster than light motion is also not contradictory. it hasn't been demonstrated so how do you know? what if light is necessarily the fastest thing in all metaphysically possible worlds? that would throw off your whole guess work. but we don't know that it is, but then again we don't know that it isn't. the point is you're simply making inferences based on your current knowledge to say it is metaphysically possible. that's exactly what i was doing involving God. but on top of that, the modal perfection argument provides a sound argument for God's metaphysical possibility.

In a real sense, all I have is epistemic possibility that it's possible. After all, it hasn't been demonstrated, and is as far as we know physically impossible in this world. So sure, within the language-game of an epistemic-metaphysical distinction, I only have epistemic possibility, and so do you, about certain things. Of course, whichever stance you take on this distinction, accept or reject, basically defeats your argument because on the former the argument is inert and on the latter it is stalemated, hence why I say it's useless for this sort of thing.

Are you referring to Madoyle's argument? Both of tye versions of his argument run into the same problem as Plantinga's argument. How does Maydoyle know that "great-making" properties are better to have than to lack? How does Maydoyle know that certain "great-making" properties are even compatible when held by the same object? Again, confusing epistemology with metaphysics.

I
you obviously don't know what valid means. valid doesn't mean free of fallacy, it means the conclusion is true if the premises are true.

..WHAT? No. To be logically valid is to say the argument's conclusion follows from the premises, i.e free from logical fallacies. SOUNDNESS deals in the actual truth of the premises themselves.

[Your question about God and my argument]

Here's how it works, and it answers the last part you addressed to me as well:

If there is even a SINGLE possible world in which metaphysical naturalism is true, then God cannot exist, period. Why? Just think about your own argument and take into account what Alex K has been trying to tell you. God is defined as a necessary being. A being who, if and ONLY IF he exists, he exists in all possible states of affairs. But if there is even ONE possible world that is a Metaphysically natural one, God does not exist there. But if God does not exist in any possible world, he exists in none of them because God only exists if he exists in all possible worlds by your own argument.

Hence, the only way to to defeat this is to say that metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, and thus not true in any possible world. Regardless, this is the stalemate. If we accept ontological arguments as such to be valid, then contradictory , yet equally valid arguments, result.

[Angrboda]

A god that is made of anything can be affected by some thing, even if not matter. The only god that can be omnipotent on that score then is one that isn't composed of something, or in other words, one that doesn't exist. I think all you've managed to prove, by definition, is that an omnipotent god cannot exist. Why your definition is presumed to be correct, I don't know. It seems counterproductive.

[Darkstar]

lets see... first you're making an assumption that the mind is produced by the brain, i would argue it is the other way around

The brain is produced by the mind?

second, you're making an argument from ignorance fallacy in an attempt to support your assumption. just because no one has ever seen a mind function independent of the brain doesn't mean that can't be the case, there are many things that we haven't seen before that turn out to be true. lack of evidence has nothing to do with the truth of the statement.

So you admit to a lack of evidence? Sure, it technically doesn't prove that a mind needs a brain, but how could this even theoretically be done (assuming it is true)? At the very least, lack of evidence for independent sentiencies should not lead to the conclusion that they are likely to exist. I recall you saying that something is metaphysically possible so long as it is not internally contradictory. How about physically? Would blatantly breaking the laws of physics still be possible (under the assumption that it weren't some obscure exception to the rule we didn't know about)?

In what sense? Colors, sounds, etc. are the result of energy (either directly or indirectly) and while they certainly exist, this does not lead to them being sentient.

i never suggested they were sentient, i simply stated they exist and can't be broken down to matter. as such, the mind can't be broken down to matter either. even Sam Harris agrees with this.

Energy is not matter, agreed. Thoughts and abstract concepts are not matter, agreed. However, you argued that a non-physical god would be unimpeded by anything else, which is not what we see here. Light, for example, can be bent or stopped altogether, sound waves bounce off of physical objects, and things can be insulated against heat. So, while they are themselves not composed of matter, they are by not means unopposable.

Again, you're making baseless assumptions. from what we can observe, there is a clear connection between mind and brain. we can also clearly observe that the functional capabilities of the brain can determine how well the mind can interact with the brain. but none of that clearly shows that the mind is dependent upon the brain. there is nothing you have said that shows a necessity of a brain dependent mind. even if you indeed showed that our minds are brain dependent, that doesn't mean it's impossible to have one that isn't.

Is dualism falsifiable? If not, then there is no point in discussing it.

i don't think you realize that by admitting necessary truths can exist, you have also admitted the possibility that something's existence can be necessary in and of itself.

Laws of nature and laws of logic, only.

if something can be true because it is necessary for it to be true, then it can be true that something exists simply because it is necessarily true that it exists.

I don't think that the truths are necessary, per se, rather, they are axiomatic. For all I we know, the universe could have had very different laws of physics for whatever reason.

So it follows that literally everything that is possible is also true?

no, it follows that anything that is metaphysically possible but not metaphysically contingent is metaphysically necessary and anything that is metaphysically necessarily is also true.

So, if I define the wonderful cosmic cheeseburger as "a non-physical entity that projects the illusion of a cheeseburger into people's minds, whose existence is not contingent on anything, but is otherwise limited in power", does it now exist? In fact, would said cheeseburger not be more likely to exist, because it is not infinite? After all, infinity is a mathematical concept that cannot be applied to the real world, even theoretically. Surely true omnipotence would require infinite power, which would be impossible, which would make god impossible.

It is metaphysically possible for their to be no god, then? I can certainly imagine a universe without one.

when you analyze the coherence of the statement in conjunction to the validity of the MOA, you can see that it is not. if it were possible for there to be no God, then this would mean it is impossible for God to exist, or God's existence is contingent. but upon further inspection, necessary existence is a necessary part of the property of omnipotence, and omnipotence is a necessary property of God. therefore, it is only metaphysically possible for there to be no God if it is metaphysically impossible for God to exist. so given the MOA is sound, it is not possible for there to be no God.

bolding mine
I again direct you to objection one.

[Simon Moon]

sure.
1. he is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect immaterial mind.

Besides in these fallacious logical 'proofs', name one instance of a mind that exists absent a physical brain.

Please produce just one that actually manifests in reality.

On a more general subject, does anyone know anyone that has ever been convinced that a god exists based purely on one of these logical proofs?

Were you an atheist until someone posited this argument to you? Or any of the other fallacious arguments (Teleological, Cosmological, the truly inane TAG argument, etc)?

Just curious...

[Darkstar]

sure.
1. he is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect immaterial mind.

Besides in these fallacious logical 'proofs', name one instance of a mind that exists absent a physical brain.

Please produce just one that actually manifests in reality.

You can't prove that they can't be non-physical. So long as it isn't self-contradictory, it is metaphysically possible. That is what he told me, anyway. I don't buy it.

On a more general subject, does anyone know anyone that has ever been convinced that a god exists based purely on one of these logical proofs?

Were you an atheist until someone posited this argument to you? Or any of the other fallacious arguments (Teleological, Cosmological, the truly inane TAG argument, etc)?

Just curious...

Only someone who is a moron ignorant of religious apologetics would fall for something like this.

Biologist Richard Dawkins, in his book The God Delusion, rejects the argument as "infantile". Noting that he is "a scientist rather than a philosopher", he writes: "The very idea that such grand conclusions should follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically." Also, he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

I share Dawkins's sentiment here.

[Simon Moon]

Biologist Richard Dawkins, in his book The God Delusion, rejects the argument as "infantile". Noting that he is "a scientist rather than a philosopher", he writes: "The very idea that such grand conclusions should follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically." Also, he feels a "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."

I share Dawkins's sentiment here.

I forgot about that quote from Dawkins.

He is correct though. Coming to the conclusion that a god exists based purely on a logical argument is ridiculous.

Logic only works if it is fed sound premises.

Do most people posting them even understand the difference between 'validity' and 'soundness' when it comes to logic, and why they are both essential?

Sooner or later, the 'rubber has to hit the road' so to speak, and actual evidence has to be produced. All these logical arguments are nothing more than word play until then. They are kind of fun to dismantle, though.