Animal Slavery

[John V]

My point is that the Christian concept of god moves this a step further, because god is not constrained by anything or anyone else.

Yes, I got that, and I agree with you.

My point is that the pet cats have every reason to fear, because god is not constrained by anyone or anything else, and is not compelled to treat the pet cat any different than a gnat. Most Christians consider all of humankind to be unworthy of god's consideration; they feel that god's mercy and justice are undeserved and that we can never square the debt we owe god...

Yes, and this is where faith comes in. Consider Romans 8:
28 And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose.

When a Christian experiences adversity, they tend to think of verses like this one, and conclude that God has a purpose for the adversity which will work to the Christian's ultimate benefit. Maybe they're wrong, and God is capricious, but again, it's called a faith for a reason.

If you wish to continue this line of the discussion I suggest starting a new thread, as this is off the main topic. Thanks.

[truthBtold]

My point is that the Christian concept of god moves this a step further, because god is not constrained by anything or anyone else.

Yes, I got that, and I agree with you.

My point is that the pet cats have every reason to fear, because god is not constrained by anyone or anything else, and is not compelled to treat the pet cat any different than a gnat. Most Christians consider all of humankind to be unworthy of god's consideration; they feel that god's mercy and justice are undeserved and that we can never square the debt we owe god...

Yes, and this is where faith comes in. Consider Romans 8:
28 And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose.

When a Christian experiences adversity, they tend to think of verses like this one, and conclude that God has a purpose for the adversity which will work to the Christian's ultimate benefit. Maybe they're wrong, and God is capricious, but again, it's called a faith for a reason.

If you wish to continue this line of the discussion I suggest starting a new thread, as this is off the main topic. Thanks.

Whos the christian here?

[Angrboda]

I don't have a false dichotomy, as I'm not insisting on the initial dichotomy presented at the beginning of Part II.

Okay.

If, as your argument goes, it is in our interest as a biological species to maximize the utility of non-human resources to increase our odds of survival, it does not follow that god has an equally rational basis for his behavior because he is not a biological being whose interest is defined by his biological nature.

It could be argued that human slavery could be structured to increase the odds of survival of humanity. Are you arguing that such slaveru would be ethical?

As indicated in my last post, that it is pro-survival is a necessary but not sufficient condition to make something moral. What the other conditions which are also necessary is left unspecified, and at this time can only be grappled for with intuition and philosophy. In that vein, our intuitions about empathy may have some role to play in determining a necessary condition for moral behavior, but not necessarily in the way the animal rights advocate suggests.

The existence of species which do not enslave other species indicates that such behavior is not necessary for survival.

Ethics based on evolutionary principles do not transfer across species. What's 'moral' for another species is irrelevant to what's moral for us.

The existence of humans who do not enslave other animals indicates that such behavior is not necessary for human survival.

That something be 'necessary' for human survival is different from something being conducive to human survival. You've altered the framework.

Humans don't act as a whole for the benefit of the species.

While true, I'm not sure this is a strong objection. Humans don't procreate for the benefit of the species, but if they all stopped, it would be a bad result for the species.

Biological evolution produces slavers and rapists and all the other bad things we see in humanity. Do you really think it's a good source of ethics?

This was answered in my last post. Being consistent with evolutionary principles is a first bar an ethic must pass, not the last.

What do you base species-centrism on?

Because evolutionary psychology and biological evolution operate at the level of species due to genetic compatibility. Altruism towards a chicken will, in the general case, reduce the resources that go to the benefit of those I can breed with. Benefiting the chicken will never benefit my species in the same way that benefiting another human will, because of biology. Thus, acts which benefit the chicken (or harm it) have drastically less moral significance than those which help or harm a human. My argument is that these ethical judgements evolved to serve species-centric purposes, so it would be against our self-interest as humans to put the welfare of other species above our own. Perhaps someday, when we have chimpanzees who can work as EMTs saving human lives, a chimpanzee's suffering may acquire moral significance, but only second hand from the perspective of humans.

[John V]

As indicated in my last post, that it is pro-survival is a necessary but not sufficient condition to make something moral.

If biological factors are not sufficient to justify an action as moral, then they're not necessary for this discussion, which regards justifications.

What the other conditions which are also necessary is left unspecified, and at this time can only be grappled for with intuition and philosophy.

Which is what we were doing in the first place. This is the philosophy section after all.

Because evolutionary psychology and biological evolution operate at the level of species due to genetic compatibility.

This is off-topic, but anyway, you would need to support this. While some people do think that evolution can operate at the species level, some disagree, and no one to my knowledge thinks this is the only or typical unit of selection. Selection at the gene or individual level is generally thought to be more important, and groups may be the unit of selection in some cases.

[Angrboda]

As indicated in my last post, that it is pro-survival is a necessary but not sufficient condition to make something moral.

If biological factors are not sufficient to justify an action as moral, then they're not necessary for this discussion, which regards justifications.

Actually, you haven't gotten to justifications yet. You need to show first that animal suffering and animals generally have moral significance. If they don't, no justification is necessary. That's where the evolutionary argument comes from, from arguments with vegetarians and animal rights advocates who mount an argument from ignorance that a moral division between how we treat animals and how we treat humans cannot be made. My argument shows that it can be made, so the advocate is put in the position of bearing the burden of proving that the lives of animals has moral significance. So far, I haven't seen anyone adequately shoulder that burden. Until they do, the default assumption is that a thing, a rock, a stick, or a chicken, does not have moral significance, and so no justification is needed.

(ETA: This can be made even stronger. The advocates often bring up marginal cases — brain damaged persons and not yet mature children — as examples of beings similar to animals in mental ability, and asks us to explain why we don't treat them, morally, the same as we do animals who are possessed of similar mental abilities. Under my evolutionary foundation, the reason we treat them different is because they are human; no additional rationalization is necessary and the problem of marginal cases disappears. This seems to indicate that we naturally, via intuition, make a distinction between the moral significance of the experiences of animals, and that of humans. This seems to show that "humanness" is the default moral boundary, even if it's not fully clear why and how this is.)

[John V]

Actually, you haven't gotten to justifications yet. You need to show first that animal suffering and animals generally have moral significance. If they don't, no justification is necessary.

OK. Humans are animals, and God needs no justification for his treatment of us.

That's where the evolutionary argument comes from, from arguments with vegetarians and animal rights advocates who mount an argument from ignorance that a moral division between how we treat animals and how we treat humans cannot be made. My argument shows that it can be made, so the advocate is put in the position of bearing the burden of proving that the lives of animals has moral significance.

Your argument doesn't hold up, as it's based on the unsupported idea that biological evolution occurs solely or primarily at the species level. You've no doubt heard of The Selfish Gene. Science debates whether the unit of selection for biological evolution is the gene, the cell, the individual, groups of individuals within a species, or species. From what I've read, the gene and the individual are considered to be much more significant than the species. So, no, you haven't shown that your argument can be made.

[Angrboda]

Actually, you haven't gotten to justifications yet. You need to show first that animal suffering and animals generally have moral significance. If they don't, no justification is necessary.

OK. Humans are animals, and God needs no justification for his treatment of us.

Indeed. From his point of view, he may be perfectly moral. From our point of view, he is neither moral nor immoral. He's just a thing. A thing to be opposed. God is not good. His commands are not moral.

That's where the evolutionary argument comes from, from arguments with vegetarians and animal rights advocates who mount an argument from ignorance that a moral division between how we treat animals and how we treat humans cannot be made. My argument shows that it can be made, so the advocate is put in the position of bearing the burden of proving that the lives of animals has moral significance.

Science debates whether the unit of selection for biological evolution is the ... species. From what I've read, the gene and the individual are considered to be much more significant than the species. So, no, you haven't shown that your argument can be made.

You've admitted the argument can and is made in science. What you debate is how good an argument it is. It need not be a good argument to deflate the opposing notion that no argument can be made.

[John V]

Indeed. From his point of view, he may be perfectly moral.

OK.

From our point of view, he is neither moral nor immoral. He's just a thing. A thing to be opposed. God is not good. His commands are not moral.

What's with the our? Speak for yourself.

When you say he's not good, are you saying he's neutral? I ask because if you mean he's evil, that seems to contradict your statement that he's neither moral nor immoral. Same with your statement that his commands are not moral - do you mean that they're amoral or immoral? If immoral, how do you conclude that a being which gives immoral commands is neither moral nor immoral?

You've admitted the argument can and is made in science. What you debate is how good an argument it is. It need not be a good argument to deflate the opposing notion that no argument can be made.

Technically true I suppose, and so this argument works against people making such an absolute claim, but it's very weak absent such a claim.

[Rampant.A.I.]

Re: "Biological evolution produces slavers and rapists, do you really think that's a good source of morality?"

Christianity produces child molestors, rapists, condones rape, condones slavery, produces more serial killers and career criminals than any other religion. How is that a good source of morality?

Re: "Humans are just animals, and God needs no justification for his treatment of us"

What kind of animals? Primates?

[James2014]

This can be made even stronger. The advocates often bring up marginal cases — brain damaged persons and not yet mature children — as examples of beings similar to animals in mental ability, and asks us to explain why we don't treat them, morally, the same as we do animals who are possessed of similar mental abilities. Under my evolutionary foundation, the reason we treat them different is because they are human; no additional rationalization is necessary and the problem of marginal cases disappears. This seems to indicate that we naturally, via intuition, make a distinction between the moral significance of the experiences of animals, and that of humans. This seems to show that "humanness" is the default moral boundary, even if it's not fully clear why and how this is.

Firstly regarding evolution, what drives evolution is not the fitness of a species as a whole, but the fitness of individuals and their offspring. For example if one individual in a species develops a mutation it can than outcompete other members of its species and selectively breed with those individuals who have other competitive advantages until they become a new species or the species splits like Darwin's finches. Therefore there is no intrinsic reason for evolution to select for a whole species to be empathise with each other, and indeed considerable reason for us to not empathise as we are all competing for the same environmental niche.

Now we will need the ability to empathise some what as we are a tribal species, and the survival of our offspring is intrinsically linked to the success of the tribe. However, warfare and inter-tribal violence has always been a feature of humans, and so we also have the ability to not empathise and be violent towards others for our own gain. There is no intrinsic reason however for us to value one of these tendencies over the other merely from an evolutionary standpoint.

Secondly, using species as a guide to ethics leads to contradictions. Consider our earliest evolutionary ancestor with which we could still breed and create fertile offspring. They are human and so would therefore deserve rights. But then consider this individuals evolutionary ancestors with whom it could breed, but that we (modern humans) could not. Does this very early hominid deserve ethical consideration? It is a different species from us, but not from the intermediate human. Either way one is left with a contradiction because species has fuzzy boundaries.