Animal Slavery

[Angrboda]

This can be made even stronger. The advocates often bring up marginal cases — brain damaged persons and not yet mature children — as examples of beings similar to animals in mental ability, and asks us to explain why we don't treat them, morally, the same as we do animals who are possessed of similar mental abilities. Under my evolutionary foundation, the reason we treat them different is because they are human; no additional rationalization is necessary and the problem of marginal cases disappears. This seems to indicate that we naturally, via intuition, make a distinction between the moral significance of the experiences of animals, and that of humans. This seems to show that "humanness" is the default moral boundary, even if it's not fully clear why and how this is.

Firstly regarding evolution, what drives evolution is not the fitness of a species as a whole, but the fitness of individuals and their offspring. For example if one individual in a species develops a mutation it can than outcompete other members of its species and selectively breed with those individuals who have other competitive advantages until they become a new species or the species splits like Darwin's finches. Therefore there is no intrinsic reason for evolution to select for a whole species to be empathise with each other, and indeed considerable reason for us to not empathise as we are all competing for the same environmental niche.

The point is not that we satisfy some arbitrary criterion for species, but that, because of our compatibility, we have shared interests which are furthered by us possessing and fostering certain traits, and we have those traits in common because of the way evolution works. So, yes, evolution works at the gene level, but what's at issue is not strictly the shared genetic material, but the instrumental utility of "playing along" with those traits which we have in common and which serve that sort of shared utility.

Now we will need the ability to empathise some what as we are a tribal species, and the survival of our offspring is intrinsically linked to the success of the tribe. However, warfare and inter-tribal violence has always been a feature of humans, and so we also have the ability to not empathise and be violent towards others for our own gain. There is no intrinsic reason however for us to value one of these tendencies over the other merely from an evolutionary standpoint.

This is a strong objection. However, the point that these shared traits can conspire to produce instrumentally useful results doesn't make them "objectively" valuable, and we don't indulge them solely because they are more natural than other behaviors, we indulge them because our evolved values make it rational for us to indulge them, because their benefits are consistent with the things we have evolved to consider beneficial.

Secondly, using species as a guide to ethics leads to contradictions. Consider our earliest evolutionary ancestor with which we could still breed and create fertile offspring. They are human and so would therefore deserve rights. But then consider this individuals evolutionary ancestors with whom it could breed, but that we (modern humans) could not. Does this very early hominid deserve ethical consideration? It is a different species from us, but not from the intermediate human. Either way one is left with a contradiction because species has fuzzy boundaries.

This is a problem, admittedly. But I think it's more a problem that my explanation is using 'evolution' and 'genetic compatibility' as a short-hand for a bunch of processes that need to be unfurled to show an actual rational basis for shared self-interest. If we have to decide whether to let a denisovans or a Yahweh into the framework, that would be decided on whether those processes line up in that case. And this is only the beginning of the problems for my framework.

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From our point of view, he is neither moral nor immoral. He's just a thing. A thing to be opposed. God is not good. His commands are not moral.

When you say he's not good, are you saying he's neutral? I ask because if you mean he's evil, that seems to contradict your statement that he's neither moral nor immoral.

I mean he's amoral from our perspective. In addition, it's not even clear morality would apply, as he didn't evolve his "needs." Regardless, to us, he's just a blunt force of nature, like hurricanes or gravity.

[James2014]

But I think it's more a problem that my explanation is using 'evolution' and 'genetic compatibility' as a short-hand for a bunch of processes that need to be unfurled to show an actual rational basis for shared self-interest. If we have to decide whether to let a denisovans or a Yahweh into the framework, that would be decided on whether those processes line up in that case.

What shared interest do I have with conducting experiments on people who are conscious but mentally disabled from birth? They have no chance of recovery and are also familyless and friendless, so no-one to care for them. We could make a whole load of medical advances. I will never be mentally disabled from birth, yet I care for their welfare none-the-less. I can explain that this might be because I have evolved to value humans. But this is very different from a justification.

I justify giving this person rights because they are conscious, and on this basis animals too must be given rights.

[Angrboda]

What shared interest do I have with conducting experiments on people who are conscious but mentally disabled from birth? They have no chance of recovery and are also familyless and friendless, so no-one to care for them. We could make a whole load of medical advances. I will never be mentally disabled from birth, yet I care for their welfare none-the-less. I can explain that this might be because I have evolved to value humans. But this is very different from a justification.

I justify giving this person rights because they are conscious, and on this basis animals too must be given rights.

In what way does your giving anything that is conscious rights rest on a rational basis? And how do you know what is and isn't conscious? Is a rat conscious? An octopus? A bacterium? A squid? A tree? Gaia?

Illicit major is a formal fallacy committed in a categorical syllogism that is invalid because its major term is undistributed in the major premise but distributed in the conclusion.

[James2014]

In what way does your giving anything that is conscious rights rest on a rational basis? And how do you know what is and isn't conscious? Is a rat conscious? An octopus? A bacterium? A squid? A tree? Gaia?

Illicit major is a formal fallacy committed in a categorical syllogism that is invalid because its major term is undistributed in the major premise but distributed in the conclusion.

The only rational basis for our values is that they don't lead to contradictions. Valuing species does lead to contradictions. Consciousness does not.

If the animals are capable of binding together multiple sensory inputs to form a new representation of the world, then this suggests one is conscious. For example you can train a rat or a mouse to learn to associate a noise with a shock, but only in a cage with stripes on the walls and only in the afternoon. The rat has then taken information about the what where and when of events and created a new representation of the world. A drosophila for example can learn to associate an odour with a shock, but it is not able to bind together multiple sensory inputs to learn about the what where and when of events. So binding I would say is a good first criteria of consciousness.

Secondly, cognitive biases. First one can train an animal to associate a high pitched sound with a positive reward, and a low pitched sound with a negative reward. A normal animal will then respond to an ambiguous sound as if it was associated with a positive reward. An animal that had exposed to chronic unpredictable stress will however respond as if its associated with a negative reward. These experiments show that the animal's perception is affected by their emotional state, and that they therefore have subjective awareness, ie they are conscious.

[Fromper]

Wish I'd noticed this thread days ago. I would have participated along the way. Now I'm forced to multi-quote the hell out of it. Sorry in advance for the long post.

I do justify animal slavery because of mental capacity.

But then I only really use chickens and fish as slaves personally.

I hate the use of animals in the circus, I avoid eating beef and pork.

When a chicken dies I have less sympathy for it because I doubt the chicken is thinking

oh no I'm about to die and I haven't even completed my bucketlist yet

I doubt the chicken is even thinking anything that a human could relate to in consciousness it has the brain the size of a tip of a thumb.

And I'd just like to add that even though this is the case I still buy free range eggs as opposed to the normal ones because I think even animals with brains the size of thumb nails don't deserve to be treated like battery hens are.

Also I have owned cats and they live much longer safer comfier lives than those cats in the wild.

You've obviously never spent any time with birds. I used to have a pet cockatiel, much smaller than a chicken, with a brain smaller than a pea. He had a distinct personality, responded to his surroundings, recognized specific individuals, etc. He's the one who convinced me to go vegetarian.

Pet animals are a special case. They've been bred so long to BE pets, that to allow them to exist in any other capacity would represent a horrific violation of contract: "YOU will have your evolution controlled by us, WE will cuddle and feed you and take care of you in every way that we can imagine, since we've destroyed the natural viability of your species." You can't take a miniature poodle and set him "free." That would be retarded.

The same goes for large-uddered milk cows: they'd surely be unviable in nature because of the phenotypes we've imposed on them through selective breeding. Or pigs-- I don't think if you turned domesticated pigs loose in nature that they'd be anything but a snack for wolves or other natural predators.

That being said, the forced EXISTENCE of millions of animals in poor living conditions-- food animals whose lives are spent in enclosed spaces and then shortened by slaughter, for example-- is morally wrong in my opinion. One of the arguments for abortion is that it's wrong to bring a child into the world if you already know it is doomed to have a horrible life. I don't see any non-anthropocentric and -arbitrary reason why this same standard of preknowledge of suffering shouldn't mean we should not force the existence of those animals.

Well said. Even the most militant of vegans won't advocate taking pets away from good homes and setting them free in the wild. Those animals exist because of humanity, so we have a responsibility to give them good lives as long as they're here. But we shouldn't be breeding more of them. And really, forced breeding by humans is the reason that the animals we (as a species) "use" exist in such massive quantities.

Animals cannot be slaves, because 'slavery' specifically denotes human beings being held as property by other human beings (I think an earlier reply mentioned this, but I'm not sure and can't be arsed to scroll back and look for it).

If non-human organisms are to be classed as slaves, then we shouldn't stop at animals (either pets or agricultural). Why not plants? Clearly, the potted ficus in our sitting room is bemoaning its state of servile bondage. Clearly, it is just a matter of time until this plant, tired of the situation, makes a break for it.

I was digging in the garden a few days back (more enslaved plants, by the way). While I didn't see any, I'm sure that the soil round my house is positively teeming with protists. I've no doubt that at some point, they're going to organize, throw off the shackles which enslave, them, and rise up and demand their freedom from my oppressive tyranny.

Seriously? Did you flunk middle school biology?

Animals have brains and central nervous systems. They feel fear, pain, and have a desire to live.

Plants don't.

Now for Part II:

We do as we please with animals. Some we kill. Some we imprison and use for our purposes. Some we show favor to. Some we ignore. We do this merely because we can, or we justify it by our greater mental capacity.

How, then, do we justify criticism of God for his treatment of us? Cannot he use the same justifications that we use regarding animals?

That pretty much sums up my agreement with vegan ethics and my reason for being glad the God of the Judeo-Christian Bible doesn't exist all in one short post. Good job.

If biological factors are not sufficient to justify an action as moral, then they're not necessary for this discussion, which regards justifications.

Actually, you haven't gotten to justifications yet. You need to show first that animal suffering and animals generally have moral significance. If they don't, no justification is necessary. That's where the evolutionary argument comes from, from arguments with vegetarians and animal rights advocates who mount an argument from ignorance that a moral division between how we treat animals and how we treat humans cannot be made. My argument shows that it can be made, so the advocate is put in the position of bearing the burden of proving that the lives of animals has moral significance. So far, I haven't seen anyone adequately shoulder that burden. Until they do, the default assumption is that a thing, a rock, a stick, or a chicken, does not have moral significance, and so no justification is needed.

You know, I originally tried to multi-quote a bunch of the posts in the argument about evolution as a consideration in ethics, but got lost in the details. This last post that I'm quoting is really the only one I feel the need to respond to at the end of that whole line.

Again, animals feel fear, pain, and a desire to survive. How can it ever be moral to cause pain to anyone or anything? To kill something that wants to live?

To me, the primary basis for all morality is the golden rule. I don't want to be hurt or killed, so it's immoral to do that to anyone or anything else. I'll admit that I suck at philosophy debates, but I think this is a good enough reason to ignore your entire debate about whether or not evolution should play a part in ethics.

[Angrboda]

Speaking of which, the next PBS Nova is on bird intelligence.

[John V]

FWIW I had an African Gray and a Goffin's cockatoo and they're pretty smart, despite the small brain size. And I'm pretty sure that elephants, whales etc. have bigger brains than humans. I guess when it comes to intelligence, size doesn't matter.

[Fromper]

FWIW I had an African Gray and a Goffin's cockatoo and they're pretty smart, despite the small brain size. And I'm pretty sure that elephants, whales etc. have bigger brains than humans. I guess when it comes to intelligence, size doesn't matter.

Don't know about cockatoos, but African Grays are WAY smarter than people give them credit for. My friend's parents had one, and he learned the names of everyone in the house, so he would call for attention by calling people's names.

[bennyboy]

FWIW I had an African Gray and a Goffin's cockatoo and they're pretty smart, despite the small brain size. And I'm pretty sure that elephants, whales etc. have bigger brains than humans. I guess when it comes to intelligence, size doesn't matter.

There's a yellow-naped Amazon that my Mom bought. He showed not only intelligence but also feeling and wit. He used to sneak up on my dog when she was sleeping and bite her tail, then fly away shrieking in delight.

He also had a very good memory. He'd remember visiting relatives from a couple years earlier.

He also showed strong emotional reactions-- depression, joy, etc. He might not be good at calculus, but I don't see how any person could know him and not see value in his life.

[John V]

Alex the African Gray was a pretty amazing bird.