If beauty doesn't require God, why should morality? (Bite me Dr. Craig.)

[Whateverist]

[bennyboy]

Unsupported assertion. You don't know they aren't the same thing. Having different terms for something doesn't imply any existential difference, no matter what you mean.

It doesn't matter. The fact is that both the subjective and objective exist in this universe, but that in a physical monism, the objective explains all possible behaviors, as well as all possible observations. The capacity of the universe for the subjective therefore is highly suspicious.

Sure it does. "Casablanca" is something which must be experienced to be understood.

Understood? What is that bullshit about? We're asking what a thing is, not what to understand a thing is.

Casablanca is a movie-viewing experience. You can decide for yourself whether you want to debate the semantics of thing-ness and whether qualia count. But whether you are willing to call experiences things or not, the fact is that Casablanca as an experience and Casablanca as a physical entity on film are not the same thing.

Irrelevant. I don't need to know "what it's like for you."

Sure you do. We're talking about qualia, and that's what qualia are-- what things are like to someone.

It is the appearance of experience which defines the experience. Any view of qualia which does not accept this is not a view of qualia at all.

Unsupported assertion.

No. Well-supported definition:

qualia is "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us."

An apple is red, and it is wet. Are you saying that redness is wetness? The view of qualia which would be most compatible with your view is that qualia are a property of either matter or its functions. To say that qualia ARE the functions is to say that redness IS the apple.

No it's not. You're equating it to saying that is just a bizarre red herring.

Qualia are not the same as neuronal activity. One can be seen under a microscope by anyone who needs extra Neuropsych credits, and one is only experienced. Therefore, if qualia have any connection to matter, it is as a property. Qualia:brain as redness:apple.

No, there isn't a 1:1 correlation between birth and death at any particular time. You're equivocating. If there is a 1:1 correspondence between the two, in the absence of evidence of additional effects, it is irrational to believe without justification that there is some additional unspecified causal factor. Arguments from appearance don't count. Arguments from semantics don't count. Arguments from "ooh pretty" don't count. Arguments from incredulity don't count. Unsupported assertions don't count.

Okay so correlation is not causation-- unless you want it to be? That seems like special pleading to me.

[Angrboda]

It is the appearance of experience which defines the experience. Any view of qualia which does not accept this is not a view of qualia at all.

Unsupported assertion.

No. Well-supported definition:

qualia is "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us."

You're using the word "defines" in two different senses, one semantic, one ontological.

At the end of the day, all that matters is whether you have a logical argument for why qualia cannot be brain processes and nothing more than brain processes. So far what you've given me is "well they seem different" and "we mean different things when we refer to them." Neither is a logical argument for why qualia cannot be brain processes and nothing more than brain processes. Do you have such an argument or not?

[bennyboy]

At the end of the day, all that matters is whether you have a logical argument for why qualia cannot be brain processes and nothing more than brain processes. So far what you've given me is "well they seem different" and "we mean different things when we refer to them." Neither is a logical argument for why qualia cannot be brain processes and nothing more than brain processes. Do you have such an argument or not?

I've never said they "seem" different. You said that.

The reason that qualia cannot be brain processes I've said often enough, and had ignored often enough, to merit an end to the discussion. Qualia is the "what it's like" to experience things, and cannot be viewed objectively or directly interacted with; brain function can be subjected to fMRIs, EEGs, and direct physical manipulation using electrodes. Since you cannot use the same means to observe both qualia and brain function, they cannot be said to be the same thing. At best, one must be a property of the other, or they must be properties of a third system which serves as parent to both. The best you can do is to correlate reports of qualia with brain function, and then treat them as equivalent-- which is what you do.

Note that in none of this have I claimed that anything, including qualia, is independent of the natural universe. I'm saying that since the capacity for the subjective is intrinsic to the universe, and since it has no bearing at all on our understanding of any physical mechanism, a purely physical model is an insufficient description of reality.

[Whateverist]

Note that in none of this have I claimed that anything, including qualia, is independent of the natural universe. I'm saying that since the capacity for the subjective is intrinsic to the universe, and since it has no bearing at all on our understanding of any physical mechanism, a purely physical model is an insufficient description of reality.

Why word it like that? Of course the capacity for subjective experience is in the universe. Where else could it be. But this way of putting it suggests that it is spread uniformly like space, time or ether. It also suggests that it does not owe its existence to the necessary conditions of the physical world as "smiles" do. If you believe that qualia are (subjective) states experienced by creatures with the necessary physical attributes, why not just say so? If that's what you have in mind, there is no disagreement. Qualia is different in kind by virtue of being the first person experience of entities in the universe which are capable of first person experience.

[bennyboy]

Note that in none of this have I claimed that anything, including qualia, is independent of the natural universe. I'm saying that since the capacity for the subjective is intrinsic to the universe, and since it has no bearing at all on our understanding of any physical mechanism, a purely physical model is an insufficient description of reality.

Why word it like that? Of course the capacity for subjective experience is in the universe. Where else could it be.

It could be nonexistent, and that it is not is significant. It's one thing to evolve the ability to perceive, or to form perceptions into specific kinds of qualia involving shapes, colors, sounds, etc. We treat the universe as mechanical-- it is composed of four fundamental forces interacting through the medium of energy and matter (if there's any sense distinguishing it as different from energy anymore). This understanding involves the movement through space and time of that energy (and/or matter), and none of this either explains or predicts qualia-- except if qualia is redefined in terms of physical correlates.

But this way of putting it suggests that it is spread uniformly like space, time or ether.

This implication wasn't my intent.

It also suggests that it does not owe its existence to the necessary conditions of the physical world

The intended implication is that since qualia are part of the natural world, there's no "special sauce." And since qualia are incidental to our mechanical understanding of the natural world, that mechanical understanding is insufficient in a very important way.

[Whateverist]

Why word it like that? Of course the capacity for subjective experience is in the universe. Where else could it be.

It could be nonexistent, and that it is not is significant.

I don't know that it could be otherwise, though I assume the capacity for communicating ideas about subjective experiences did not exist on this planet until (to be safe) about 5 million years ago. I would still think that subjective experience was wide spread on the planet in lots of organisms long before that. But even before the first forms of life arose I would think the potential for life and subjective experience existed in potential just as the potential for rust to form on iron existed before an earlier generation of giant stars ever cooked any iron up. What we know now feeds back on our knowledge of what was possible in potential before the necessary conditions existed.

It also suggests that it does not owe its existence to the necessary conditions of the physical world

The intended implication is that since qualia are part of the natural world, there's no "special sauce." And since qualia are incidental to our mechanical understanding of the natural world, that mechanical understanding is insufficient in a very important way.

Of course there is a difference between understanding that qualia exist and therefore are supported by an adequate theory of everything on the one hand, and on the other hand, being able to actually explain everything that exists in terms of the theory we currently have. I'm not sure how many people believe the theories we currently have are entirely adequate. Of course, I do sometimes encounter on these very forums a kind of naive expectation that science can do just that or, where it can't, will be able to shortly. My own intuition is that the everything we would hope to understand will always exceed our reach.

[Angrboda]

At the end of the day, all that matters is whether you have a logical argument for why qualia cannot be brain processes and nothing more than brain processes. So far what you've given me is "well they seem different" and "we mean different things when we refer to them." Neither is a logical argument for why qualia cannot be brain processes and nothing more than brain processes. Do you have such an argument or not?

I've never said they "seem" different. You said that.

The reason that qualia cannot be brain processes I've said often enough, and had ignored often enough, to merit an end to the discussion. Qualia is the "what it's like" to experience things, and cannot be viewed objectively or directly interacted with; brain function can be subjected to fMRIs, EEGs, and direct physical manipulation using electrodes. Since you cannot use the same means to observe both qualia and brain function, they cannot be said to be the same thing.

And as noted multiple times, if qualia are nothing more than brain processes, then observing those brain processes is observing one aspect of qualia. If they are the same thing, observing one is observing the other. They are simply two sides of the same coin. The observational limits don't of necessity make the two distinct. There are many things we can't observe (e.g. evolutionary history), but if we can make sound inferences based in naturalistic assumptions, we treat them as having been observed. You can't observe the blood flow in the human brain. Yet with an fMRI, we can detect markers that are mechanically tied to blood flow. To say that, when we observe the display on an fMRI of blood flow that we aren't observing the blood flow in the brain and therefore the blood flow in the brain is "something different" would be perverse.

At best, one must be a property of the other, or they must be properties of a third system which serves as parent to both. The best you can do is to correlate reports of qualia with brain function, and then treat them as equivalent-- which is what you do.

You seem to treat the current limitations on observation as sacrosanct limits which cannot be superceded. This makes most of your arguments appear to be rooted in an argument from ignorance, that because we can't observe the relationship between qualia and brain processes today, then we will never be able to observe the relationship between the two. I confess we don't know enough today to determine the contents of qualia from brain processes, but to imply that we never will be able to do so is something you simply do not know. ("the best you can do") This makes for fallacious inferences about what must be. I suspect, though do not know, that once we understand both processes sufficiently well, inferring the contents of consciousness from brain processes will be as straight forward as inferring the combustion of gas inside a car engine from the mechanical details of the car engine. I don't expect us to have this level of detail for a long time, as the brain is complex, and our current tools of investigation crude. However, you seem to imply that this level of understanding is unachievable, and I wonder from where you get such confidence.

Note that in none of this have I claimed that anything, including qualia, is independent of the natural universe. I'm saying that since the capacity for the subjective is intrinsic to the universe, and since it has no bearing at all on our understanding of any physical mechanism, a purely physical model is an insufficient description of reality.

The way you phrase things makes matters even more difficult. Being a property of one or the other? What does that have to do with whether or not they are two sides of the same thing or not; properties aren't ontological distinctions. I share whateverist's concern about your expression here. By intrinsic do you mean that the mechanical properties of the universe are sufficient to explain qualia, or are you implying something more? Regardless, it's an odd way to phrase things.

It also suggests that it does not owe its existence to the necessary conditions of the physical world

The intended implication is that since qualia are part of the natural world, there's no "special sauce." And since qualia are incidental to our mechanical understanding of the natural world, that mechanical understanding is insufficient in a very important way.

Again I wonder what you mean. Where do you get the idea that qualia are incidental to our mechanical understanding of the world? If qualia are a necessary consequence of classical mechanics level operation of the brain, that seems hardly incidental. Regardless, if qualia is a straight forward result of classically mechanical processes, then in what way is a mechanical understanding insufficient? If by mechanical understanding you mean our current mechanical understanding is insufficient, then it appears that you've fallen back on an argument from ignorance once again.

I suppose you had hoped to clarify your position with these latest responses, yet for me they've done as much to add to the confusion about your stance on the matter as they have done to clarify it.

[bennyboy]

And as noted multiple times, if qualia are nothing more than brain processes, then observing those brain processes is observing one aspect of qualia. If they are the same thing, observing one is observing the other.

That is necessarily true, but is a poor semantic argument, since it redefines what people MEAN when they say qualia. If qualia is nothing more than the subjective experience of brain function, then it is still something different than brain function-- it is the subjective experience of it.

If you're arguing that there's no such thing as qualia separate from physical systems capable of "generating" it, then that's fine. However, Qulia is an important enough property, and is so absolutely unnecessary in a mechanical description of the universe, that I wouldn't accept that description as sufficient in fully describing reality as we observe it-- if you include experience as a kind of observation.

They are simply two sides of the same coin. The observational limits don't of necessity make the two distinct.

Is the hardness of an apple distinct from its redness? Or is it all just appleyness? I don't think any measure of the hardness of an apple will allow a non-red-seer to know that it is red.

You seem to treat the current limitations on observation as sacrosanct limits which cannot be superceded. This makes most of your arguments appear to be rooted in an argument from ignorance, that because we can't observe the relationship between qualia and brain processes today, then we will never be able to observe the relationship between the two. I confess we don't know enough today to determine the contents of qualia from brain processes, but to imply that we never will be able to do so is something you simply do not know.

Fair enough. If somehow we are able to directly interact with qualia (maybe via a kind of "mental field" produced electromagnetically or something), then I'll change my opinion. But in the same way I would accept God if there was some way to show exactly what it was and identify via physical means exactly where it was. Right now, we can't say that about God, and we can't say that about qualia.

I reserve the right to change my mind as I collect more information. But given the information I have right now, the mechanical description of the universe is insufficient in explaining the things I can observe-- because it does not sufficiently explain the nature of qualia or why there are qualia associate with some systems rather than with none.

The way you phrase things makes matters even more difficult. Being a property of one or the other? What does that have to do with whether or not they are two sides of the same thing or not; properties aren't ontological distinctions. I share whateverist's concern about your expression here. By intrinsic do you mean that the mechanical properties of the universe are sufficient to explain qualia, or are you implying something more? Regardless, it's an odd way to phrase things.

No, I think that would be to bend too far our understanding of what "mechanical" means. There's is no component of a mechanical understanding of the universe which requires qualia for any calculation, or which explains qualia as a property which naturally supervenes on the mechanical properties of its parts.

Take in contrast light. It's pretty slippery stuff. But we understand about QM and electrons, about conservation of energy, etc. We have a working model of how the amount of energy imbued into an electron's orbit, when released, affects the wavelength of a photon. Despite the mystery around apparent duality in light, I'd say that we've done a pretty good job of describing both the mechanism in creating light, and the impact of that light on another physical system.

The study of qualia has absolutely none of this going for it. Therefore, rather than trying to explain qualia in purely mechanical terms, I would say that a mechanical description of the universe is at best incomplete, and is at worst wrong in important ways.

[The Grand Nudger]

If somehow we are able to directly interact with qualia (maybe via a kind of "mental field" produced electromagnetically or something), then I'll change my opinion.

Doesn't sound any more direct than interacting with qualia via chemicals or sound, or visual stimulation. All of which we're currently capable of doing. I suppose that there are two ways of reading that statement , but it would hold under either. I imagine that sort of thing though (a mental field) would take a very long time. We can't expect that we all "speak the same language", regardless of whether it's mechanical or "other". Devils always in the details.