On naturalism and consciousness

[Brian37]

When a Captain Kirk si fi wooer postulates "us" existing after the brain dies it is as absurd as when a theist does it. As someone already said in this thread consciousness is an emergent property. On top of that the fact is that you are your brain in motion, nothing more. When your brain dies you die. A single particle does not act in the same manor as a functioning brain nor is it shaped like a functioning brain. It would be as stupid to pretend the key on your keyboard after the computer is smashed with a sledge hammer that one key will function as the entire computer in tact.

Si fi woo is as bad as theist woo.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I'm not sure why you bother with the word "know". Why not stick to "faith"? I have great faith in my ability to observe and interpret my subjective experience. But no way would I throw around claims of knowing it in an interpersonally persuasive way. Our epistemic position in trying to describe and explain our inner workings just is not all that good. Fortunately not much rides on it. It fascinates me but I won't go hungry if I get it wrong.

Actually, a great many important things depend on the ability to know. The calculations I perform for work depend on knowledge like the a^2 + b^2 = c^2. And getting through life often requires an ability to know that thing cannot simultaneously be and not-be. Other things I take on faith, like that my mother loves me.
Now I think you may have had something in mind like believe in God. I have no problem saying that I know there are transcendent non-physical aspects of reality. That has been fairly well established in the Western philosophical tradition extending from Plato to Kant. I really do not take the objections to non-physical reality very seriously since our very ability to reason requires the intellect to reference attributes that span multiple physical manifestations.

[Surgenator]

But none of this explains why, in our universe, mind manifests rather than not.

In physical monism, a mind is not necessary. So it is not required to prove how a mind arises. I only need to show how a mind can arise and still have physical monism be valid. And I did so with the ANN example.

The study of how human consciousness arises is still on going.

Let me phrase our opposition in the simplest terms I can. Given a universe in which objects and energy interact according to mathematically-determinable rules, which view is "correct"?
1) The underlying reality is mathematical (or otherwise conceptual), and this reality manifests in the form of matter and movement. For example, if you look at a wave, you'd say that the pure wave function is the reality, and the position of atoms around that idealistic wave represents a crude approximation.
2) The underlying reality is that of form of matter and movement, and the math is a symbolic representation of that underlying reality. Again looking at the wave, you'd say that the molecules are just moving in response to constantly-changing forces acting on them, and the wave function is a highly-simplified statistical "best fit" for a gazillion atoms, which we cannot possibly calculate individually.

I would say #2, excect for the "which we cannot possibly calculate individually." QM is an imcompete model of the universe. QFT is a little better, but it still doesn't incorporate gravity . M-theory and Quantum Loop theory are still metaphysical mathematics.

I think all "things" ultimately will reduce down to concepts. Things get squirelly at QM, and if we try to discover what framework or sub-particles QM particles consist of, we'll end up with lots of beautiful math, and no actual things we can put our finger on. To me, this represents case (1) above. I'd argue that if all things are reducible only to concepts, then the universe is conceptual-- even though there is a subset of things which behave so incredibly consistently that for convenience's sake we address them on their own level without reference to that underlying reality.

Here is my point, not everything can be reduced to concepts. Case in point, actions are not concepts. Actions have to change something; concepts describe something. You can conceptualize an action, but that is still not an action. For example, you can conceptualize that your dancing, but it doesn't mean your dancing.

Plus, all concepts exist even the contradictory ones. Does that mean reality is filled with contradictions? For example, the concept of a universe where God exist does exist. The concept of a universe where God doesn't exist also exist. If the reality is a collection of concepts, then the universe is where God does exist and where he doesn't exist. Right?

That applies to other living human beings in the here and now, doesn't it Benny? How do you even know that being an ANN would grant you this knowledge . . .

Quite right. Even with other people, I have to make a philophical assumption. In the case of people, it's a fairly comfortable assumption to make: I'm a person, and I think, so I look at other people, and assume they also think.
The same goes for mammals and birds. They have similar brains to mine, and they respond in ways that I do to much of their stimuli.

Mosquitos, I'm less sure. Microorganisms, I'm VERY unsure whether they have anything I'd call subjective consciousness. In the end, I can't even disprove a solipsistic world view in an absolute sense.

So your looking at the similiarity of the brain, which is a collection of physical objects, to support the claim of a third party. I find this very strange since physical things don't exist in concept reality.

[bennyboy]

But none of this explains why, in our universe, mind manifests rather than not.

In physical monism, a mind is not necessary. So it is not required to prove how a mind arises. I only need to show how a mind can arise and still have physical monism be valid. And I did so with the ANN example.

No, I don't think you did. You are conflating complex data processing with the subjective experience of mind-- something which makes sense if you're trying to support the idea of physical monism, but which does not if you're actually talking about a mind.

I would say #2, excect for the "which we cannot possibly calculate individually."

Really? Okay-- there's a wave. Go calculate all the movements, spins and trajectories of all the particles in it.

QM is an imcompete model of the universe. QFT is a little better, but it still doesn't incorporate gravity . M-theory and Quantum Loop theory are still metaphysical mathematics.

The problem with statistics is that even if you start making a statistical model of mind, you won't actually be able to trace the supervenience of mind down to the fundamental events or processes which make it possible. It will get hidden in the numbers, much as in an ANN. In my college experience programming ANNs, I can get a computer to input data and guess that something's a banana. I do not, however, have any idea exactly what is happening in the network to arrive at that result: only that I spent freaking hours and hours punishing it for guessing "grape" for yellow things.

Here is my point, not everything can be reduced to concepts. Case in point, actions are not concepts. Actions have to change something; concepts describe something. You can conceptualize an action, but that is still not an action. For example, you can conceptualize that your dancing, but it doesn't mean your dancing.

Interactions are not things, but you include events in a physical monist view. Idealism is no different in this regard: you have concepts, and then their interactions.

Plus, all concepts exist even the contradictory ones. Does that mean reality is filled with contradictions?

I think contradictions, ambiguity and paradox work better in an idealistic relaity. It does not make sense to say that a photon is both a wave and a particle in physical terms, because a photon is categorized as a "thing," and things are not expected to be ambiguous. Things like the timeless creation of the universe also work better as ideas. In fact, I'd say that any system which includes ambiguity must necessarily be idealistic, and necessarily not physical monistic.

For example, the concept of a universe where God exist does exist. The concept of a universe where God doesn't exist also exist. If the reality is a collection of concepts, then the universe is where God does exist and where he doesn't exist. Right?

It depends what you mean by "real." All concepts and ideas are real as concepts and ideas. Only some are part of the shared framework that we call the universe.

You have a false syllogism there: all dogs have tails, so all tails are connected to dogs : all real manifested things are concepts, so all concepts are real manifested things.

So your looking at the similiarity of the brain, which is a collection of physical objects, to support the claim of a third party. I find this very strange since physical things don't exist in concept reality.

You seem to think that all idealism is a kind of Buddhist "not-being" or that things are all dreamed illusions. I don't take this position, so if you want to argue against it, it will have to be with someone else. My position is that whether we live in an objective physical universe, or the Matrix, or the Mind of God, a brain is a brain.

The difference is that in an idealistic universe, mind is omnipresent (or, more accurately, all is mind), and all "things" reduce down only to concepts: if you try to examine particles and sub-particles, you'll never find that atomic pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

[Whateverist]

I'm not sure why you bother with the word "know". Why not stick to "faith"? I have great faith in my ability to observe and interpret my subjective experience. But no way would I throw around claims of knowing it in an interpersonally persuasive way. Our epistemic position in trying to describe and explain our inner workings just is not all that good. Fortunately not much rides on it. It fascinates me but I won't go hungry if I get it wrong.

Actually, a great many important things depend on the ability to know. The calculations I perform for work depend on knowledge like the a^2 + b^2 = c^2. And getting through life often requires an ability to know that thing cannot simultaneously be and not-be. Other things I take on faith, like that my mother loves me.
Now I think you may have had something in mind like believe in God. I have no problem saying that I know there are transcendent non-physical aspects of reality. That has been fairly well established in the Western philosophical tradition extending from Plato to Kant. I really do not take the objections to non-physical reality very seriously since our very ability to reason requires the intellect to reference attributes that span multiple physical manifestations.

I think you realize I would agree that you are justified in deciding whether or not your mother loved you - even if you are mistaken. You at least know if you felt loved. But do you know it in the same way you understand the Pythagorean theorem? I don't think so. You can prove that a couple of hundred ways where as the evidence you can offer for your mother's love is of a completely different sort all together. You can call it "knowing" if you like but in so doing you have diluted what ever significance you were hoping would accrue to it.

But I'm not someone who denies the reality of subjective states - as such. What I am contesting is any conclusions you think you have reached about the significance of your subjective experience in determining anything beyond your personal reality. It is your baby, call it what you like. Think what you will. I've heard nothing to persuade me to endorse any of your conclusions.

[bennyboy]

What I am contesting is any conclusions you think you have reached about the significance of your subjective experience in determining anything beyond your personal reality.

But doesn't this apply to everything we know, or think we know?

[Surgenator]

In physical monism, a mind is not necessary. So it is not required to prove how a mind arises. I only need to show how a mind can arise and still have physical monism be valid. And I did so with the ANN example.

No, I don't think you did. You are conflating complex data processing with the subjective experience of mind-- something which makes sense if you're trying to support the idea of physical monism,

That is exactly what I'm trying to support.

but which does not if you're actually talking about a mind.

I didn't know you were an expert on the mind. Can you tell me exactly how you know this to be true?

The problem with statistics is that even if you start making a statistical model of mind, you won't actually be able to trace the supervenience of mind down to the fundamental events or processes which make it possible. It will get hidden in the numbers, much as in an ANN.

Why would I be forced to do statistics to look at ANN or the human brain? The neurons and their interactions are micro-level, i.e. they behave classically. And you can open the "black box" of an ANN and look at what the hidden variables are. I did that plenty of times.

[quote]
Here is my point, not everything can be reduced to concepts. Case in point, actions are not concepts. Actions have to change something; concepts describe something. You can conceptualize an action, but that is still not an action. For example, you can conceptualize that your dancing, but it doesn't mean your dancing.

Interactions are not things, but you include events in a physical monist view. Idealism is no different in this regard: you have concepts, and then their interactions.

It's nice that your making your explanations by referencing physical monism. However, I prefer if you just explain to me in idealism monism terms instead, because I have a sneaking suspession that it will sound ridiculous.

I think contradictions, ambiguity and paradox work better in an idealistic relaity.

No, contradictions show that something is wrong. Red-flags, load-sirens wrong. A model (in this case of reality) has to be internally consistent to be a good model. If it has contradictions, it is not internally consistent.

It does not make sense to say that a photon is both a wave and a particle in physical terms, because a photon is categorized as a "thing," and things are not expected to be ambiguous. Things like the timeless creation of the universe also work better as ideas. In fact, I'd say that any system which includes ambiguity must necessarily be idealistic, and necessarily not physical monistic.

Thats nice that you think that, but where is your reasoning for this belief?

For example, the concept of a universe where God exist does exist. The concept of a universe where God doesn't exist also exist. If the reality is a collection of concepts, then the universe is where God does exist and where he doesn't exist. Right?

It depends what you mean by "real." All concepts and ideas are real as concepts and ideas. Only some are part of the shared framework that we call the universe.

There is some framework? Made out of what, concepts? The interactions of the concepts? How does it prevent any other concept from existing in it? How does it prevent the all-powerful, all-knowing, omnipresent God concept from existing in it?

As a side, do you find the ontological argument for God compelling?

So your looking at the similiarity of the brain, which is a collection of physical objects, to support the claim of a third party. I find this very strange since physical things don't exist in concept reality.

You seem to think that all idealism is a kind of Buddhist "not-being" or that things are all dreamed illusions. I don't take this position, so if you want to argue against it, it will have to be with someone else. My position is that whether we live in an objective physical universe, or the Matrix, or the Mind of God, a brain is a brain.

Yes, I do think all idealism is a kind of Buddhist "not-being," because I can't picture how a concept(s) can produce a physical(-like) universe.

In the matrix, the humans still exist in a physical world.
The mind of God makes no sense to me. So please explain it to, details would be appretiated.

The difference is that in an idealistic universe, mind is omnipresent (or, more accurately, all is mind), and all "things" reduce down only to concepts: if you try to examine particles and sub-particles, you'll never find that atomic pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

What? What "atomic pot of gold"?

[bennyboy]

No, contradictions show that something is wrong. Red-flags, load-sirens wrong. A model (in this case of reality) has to be internally consistent to be a good model. If it has contradictions, it is not internally consistent.

Okay, try this one. Qualia (the experience of what things are like to a subjective experiencer) are said by you to be physical. And yet you cannot see them, measure them, or establish any criteria by which you can be sure they even exist in a given physical system. This is a logical inconsistency-- to claim that something exists which cannot be reasonably inferred without already assuming that it exists.

Or this. For something to be said to exist in a physical framework, it must be locatable in both time and space. Something cannot both be a particle and a wave, because those things are substantively different in nature. We cannot therefore draw an image of a photon as it moves through space. So in what sense does a photon exist?

Thats nice that you think that, but where is your reasoning for this belief?

Because we can talk about them, and even accept the ambiguity and embed it into a system of thought. But we cannot directly observe things like photons, or make a spatial model of them.

There is some framework? Made out of what, concepts? The interactions of the concepts? How does it prevent any other concept from existing in it? How does it prevent the all-powerful, all-knowing, omnipresent God concept from existing in it?

I don't know any more about how an idealistic universe works than you know about a physicalist one.

Yes, I do think all idealism is a kind of Buddhist "not-being," because I can't picture how a concept(s) can produce a physical(-like) universe.

Have you never dreamed? Or read fantasy or sci-fi?

What? What "atomic pot of gold"?

Atomic means "indivisible," i.e. that you have reduced reality down to its most fundamental possible element/s. If, in the process of reduction, you find yourself resorting exclusively to math, and unable to visualize or spatialize a model of things, then you have discovered that the universe is composed of concept rather than things and their interactions.

[Whateverist]

What I am contesting is any conclusions you think you have reached about the significance of your subjective experience in determining anything beyond your personal reality.

But doesn't this apply to everything we know, or think we know?

Yes and no. Yes it does .. in some, brain-in-a-vat/matrix/idealist sense. But in another sense, no, not at all. We are all able to make the objective/subjective distinction. We should all understand the difference between "pistachio is the best ice cream flavor ever" and "pistachio is the flavor of ice cream I like best". It isn't that hard. The first is the hyperbole of private experience; the second is true in interpersonal-space.

That which is demonstrable in interpersonal-space .. like the Pythagorean theorem or historical facts .. is true in a stronger sense than that which is true only for you and those who think/experience as you happen to.

I will always resist those who want to plant the flags of their personal experience in interpersonal-space. Those who wish to share their private experience in a less domineering way will receive no resistance from me.

[Surgenator]

Qualia (the experience of what things are like to a subjective experiencer) are said by you to be physical.

Yeap, chemicals interacting in my brain.

And yet you cannot see them,

Why am I blind?

measure them,

And you took my ruler away.

or establish any criteria by which you can be sure they even exist in a given physical system.

All kidding aside, no one can be sure. I never claimed to be sure. I claim to be convinced. I still leave a little room for doubt.

This is a logical inconsistency-- to claim that something exists which cannot be reasonably inferred without already assuming that it exists.

So you think I started with this belief and found evidence to support it. Then you would be mistaken. I arrived at this belief because of my experiences. I started out not having a world view, developed a dualist world view, and eventually ended up where I am today.

You know whats the best part of my world view, I can make accurate, testable predictions.

For something to be said to exist in a physical framework, it must be locatable in both time and space. Something cannot both be a particle and a wave, because those things are substantively different in nature. We cannot therefore draw an image of a photon as it moves through space. So in what sense does a photon exist?

First, something can be both a particle and a wave. Here is a link http://users.df.uba.ar/dasso/fis4_2do_cu...walker.pdf

Second, QM says that photons have wave-like and particle-like properties. The water down version says that it is both a particle and a wave. There is a clear difference. Also, Quantum Field Theory (the big brother of QM) explains why photons have particle and wave like properties.

Third, a 3D gaussain wave packet going east at 3E8 m/s. Picture drawn.

Forth, a photon exist the same way I think you exist. It is inferred.

There is some framework? Made out of what, concepts? The interactions of the concepts? How does it prevent any other concept from existing in it? How does it prevent the all-powerful, all-knowing, omnipresent God concept from existing in it?

I don't know any more about how an idealistic universe works than you know about a physicalist one.

I don't mean to brag, but I do know a lot about how a physical universe works.

Plus, adding a framework doesn't prevent the contradiction between the God existing and not existing. Because the framework would still have to be either made out of concepts or made out of the interactions between concepts.

Yes, I do think all idealism is a kind of Buddhist "not-being," because I can't picture how a concept(s) can produce a physical(-like) universe.

Have you never dreamed? Or read fantasy or sci-fi?

Yes I have. I also realize that reality doesn't behave like dreams. A story doesn't make objects come into existence.

Atomic means "indivisible," i.e. that you have reduced reality down to its most fundamental possible element/s. If, in the process of reduction, you find yourself resorting exclusively to math, and unable to visualize or spatialize a model of things, then you have discovered that the universe is composed of concept rather than things and their interactions.

Non sequitur. Me not able to visualize a model is more of a comment on my limitations than the universe.