We are no different than computers

[Angrboda]

So, if we were able to reduce HUMAN minds, this combination of intellect and sensation, i.e. our personal experiences, to something like a vast network of computations and signals, does that force us to view our experiences---and by extension, of the entire world---as a sort of computer simulation?

I don't know what you mean by this.  Comp mind says that consciousness and experience is a form of computation.  Just what that form takes is currently unknown.  

[Thumpalumpacus]

@Parker I do agree that the OP's wording is unfortunate, but I wonder whether you and I are -as- different from computers of today as you seem to believe. -and yes, I have many instances of computers telling lies which they were not programmed to tell..we call them errors.......I'll send you (rather than windows) my next report dump, lol.

Mistakes aren't lies. Lies have the quality of intention. That is the underlying point I've been making all along.
 

(You think you haven't been programmed - that you can point to this as a difference, willing to reconsider? Will all of your objections aim to simply assert computational minds out of existence?)

I'm sorry if I gave you the impression that I think we aren't programmed.  I certainly believe that programming is a part of human consciousness. We've been programmed by our parents to speak English, we've been programmed by our society to accept certain behavioral norms.

The issue is, we humans can break our programming by virtue of our volition. Can computers do the same?

***************************************

I don't disagree with everything you've written here in this thread, and it seems like I haven't gotten that across very well. If so, I'm sorry for not being so clear. We don't see eye-to-eye, clearly, but I appreciate the discussion thus far.

[Anomalocaris]

A machine can certainly be programmed in such a way that it can escape from parts of its own programming under the right circumstance. That's actually what error checking and handling does. A machine can even be programmed to learn what the appropriate error condition is and where to go when error is trapped.

We humans are also evidently programmed in such a way that we can instruct ourselves to escape part of our own programming when certain circumstances arise. So the ability to seemingly escape parts of program does in itself distinguish us from computers.

[Mudhammam]

So, if we were able to reduce HUMAN minds, this combination of intellect and sensation, i.e. our personal experiences, to something like a vast network of computations and signals, does that force us to view our experiences---and by extension, of the entire world---as a sort of computer simulation?

I don't know what you mean by this.  Comp mind says that consciousness and experience is a form of computation.  Just what that form takes is currently unknown.  

I guess what I mean is one of two aspects of the mind-body problem: 1) Imagine what the world might appear like to an AI that possesses experience (or for that matter, a bat). It would undoubtedly be quite different than what we experience as "the external world." If mind is but a physical arrangement of molecules (those also being concepts that we derive from mind), does our experience of a self that perceives distinct objects, colors, sounds, etc., and conceives of thoughts, unity, order, etc., imply that those "outside" things are also computations which exist as they appear to us only in the hardware of "like-minded" biological designs? Or do those qualities take on the characters that they do because of attributes that are exclusive to their own natures and which exist independently from a creature's internal "simulation" of them, though in a manner that mental hardware can never apprehend apart from definitions (as opposed to direct or indirect experience)? I mean something like Kant's "thing-in-itself." Or 2) as the mind is a form of computation that develops its own computational systems (such as AI), is nature also a programmer in the sense that we are? Is nature at large also a form of computation? Where is the dividing line between the machine (us) and its artificer (the environment)? Does comp theory deal with that? Or is everything part of one Great Machine as Descartes proposed, and we stand as something like highly specialized programs within a "universe's hard drive"?

[Angrboda]

Still not sure I understand you. The mind, on this view, is a construct. Whether or not it can experience the things in themselves, I'd say no; the mind is a construct just like memory is a construct -- bits and pieces woven together to appear as a seamless whole. Whether a machine would experience the world as we do would depend on how similar its 'construct' is to our own.

[Brian37]

This new QM language of "simulated" pisses me off, not because of the scientist who use it, but more the fact that si fi assholes jump all over it. To me that is nothing more than attempting to replace the bullshit myths and gods they RIGHTFULLY reject only to replace it with their own woo.

If one can accept that that "all this" was not started by a cosmic bearded man watchmaker, then why would a Star Trek cosmic Bill Gates si fi explanation be any better? Wouldn't that still suffer the problem if infinite regress? Wouldn't that put us as lab rats?

I don't think "All this" needs a cognition, be it the bullshit gods we rightfully reject, nor do I think we are a program written by a giant Bill Gates. I think, even with what we don't currently know, my safe bet is that "all this" is nothing more than a giant weather pattern, no different than accepting the seasons changing on this planet.

[JuliaL]

I guess what I mean is one of two aspects of the mind-body problem: 1) Imagine what the world might appear like to an AI that possesses experience (or for that matter, a bat). It would undoubtedly be quite different than what we experience as "the external world." If mind is but a physical arrangement of molecules (those also being concepts that we derive from mind), does our experience of a self that perceives distinct objects, colors, sounds, etc., and conceives of thoughts, unity, order, etc., imply that those "outside" things are also computations which exist as they appear to us only in the hardware of "like-minded" biological designs? 1a Or do those qualities take on the characters that they do because of attributes that are exclusive to their own natures and which exist independently from a creature's internal "simulation" of them, though in a manner that mental hardware can never apprehend apart from definitions (as opposed to direct or indirect experience)? I mean something like Kant's "thing-in-itself." Or 2) as the mind is a form of computation that develops its own computational systems (such as AI), is nature also a programmer in the sense that we are? Is nature at large also a form of computation? Where is the dividing line between the machine (us) and its artificer (the environment)? Does comp theory deal with that? Or is everything part of one Great Machine as Descartes proposed, and we stand as something like highly specialized programs within a "universe's hard drive"?

My bolded addition of 1a.
I really enjoy reading your posts.  I think I understand them, but only after half a dozen readings.
In this case, I'd say,
1) yes, different minds will have different perspectives of a single event.  I remember a neuroanatomy lecturer describing the sensory equipment of several animals and speculating on their viewpoints.  For instance, a catfish, living on the bottom of a river, uses its 'whiskers' for chemical, electrical and touch senses in finding small arthropods to eat with neural mappings to match. Do they (no term here in English to describe an electric sensation humans don't have) tasty?  A dolphin gains 3d information of not only the external form, as we do with binocular vision, but also the insides of their companions ("My Martha, your spleen is lovely today.")
1a) yes, because sensation is mediated, there will always be that suspicion that what we see isn't what is there.  But it can only remain a suspicion because the "thing-in-itself" is unavailable to us if it exists at all.
2) yes, but only if 'computation' is extended to include any form of regularity.  Persistence of a mass in a vacuum and a charged well in silicon may each be looked at as information storage, but they are not the same thing.  The calculations reality does with the universal wave function includes us, our environments and everything else.  But, other than by an arbitrary classification of similarity, it has nothing to do with register manipulation. I see nothing to suggest that Nature is an intentional calculator or producer of anything.

[Alex K]

This new QM language of "simulated" pisses me off,

What does the word have to do with QM, and which use of it pisses you off in particular?

[The Grand Nudger]

@Parker I do agree that the OP's wording is unfortunate, but I wonder whether you and I are -as- different from computers of today as you seem to believe. -and yes, I have many instances of computers telling lies which they were not programmed to tell..we call them errors.......I'll send you (rather than windows) my next report dump, lol.

Mistakes aren't lies. Lies have the quality of intention. That is the underlying point I've been making all along.

-and when it's "intentional" (ignoring that not all human lies are intentional) we'll say ..."well, it was programmed to do that".  Poor comp sys just can't win...lol.
 

(You think you haven't been programmed - that you can point to this as a difference, willing to reconsider? Will all of your objections aim to simply assert computational minds out of existence?)

I'm sorry if I gave you the impression that I think we aren't programmed.  I certainly believe that programming is a part of human consciousness. We've been programmed by our parents to speak English, we've been programmed by our society to accept certain behavioral norms.

The issue is, we humans can break our programming by virtue of our volition. Can computers do the same?

....can we now....lol?  

[AFTT47]

Brian, don't make us beat your ass here again.

Are you pissed of at the romance novelists too?