The Problem of Good

[orangebox21]

I am certain that it is God acting, I am certain that it is not [only] me acting, I am not certain but open to the possibility that it is God and me acting.

Fair enough.

The reason I'm trying to figure out, is that it seems that good actions are only caused by God acting and are impossible without him, then by very definition, God is responsible for all good actions.

That's a valid argument if we assume that libertarian free will is not true.

Similarly, he is responsible for all good actions not taken.

That would be true if determinism is true.
That would not be true if compatibilism is true.

The whole idea of the free will defense to the problem of evil is to shift responsibility form a God that could act but chooses not to, and shifts it to us, because we were given a choice; however, if we are unable to do good without God, then God would be the sole determining factor as to whether or not a good action was taken. Of course, there are other defenses of free will, but this approach would totally obviate the free will defense.

If I may suggest, at this point you'll need to decide how you are defining free-will.  If you choose libertarian, then you wouldn't have an argument at all given that man's choice is completely independent of God's will [although that would strongly support your initial contention; if people have done good then they did it and if they have done bad they did it, and they deserve the credit/blame for it, although your contention would be limited to choices completely within the control of the individual, which would rule out things like getting a job, etc.]  If you choose determinism, then you could attempt to bring a charge against God but only at the expense of inconsistency within your own worldview.  In your worldview, if determinism is true and God does not exist then people would not be morally responsible for their actions but rather naturalistic processes would be.  At that point you would have to defend the position that no one does anything right or wrong.  At that point your worldview could either claim that morality does not exist [I think this is the more consistent naturalistic deterministic position/If morality does not exist then how can God be morally responsible] or you could claim that morality exists but all moral responsibility lies with naturalistic processes [this position is unlike the reality in which we live/This position would allow you to bring a charge against God but you would have to deny reality in order to do it].  Or you could choose the compatibilist view which would allow for both determinism and morality.  In that case the moral responsibility is held by the person making the choice and not the determiner.  In that case God [the determiner] would not be morally responsible.  

Some things to think about.

[RobbyPants]

Why isn't it true under those definitions? If one actor has to make a decision to allow someone to do X, and that person can only do X if the actor acts, then the person cannot do X without the actor. Period. If the person has a choice, then the outside actor isn't the only determining factor. Period. These things are tautologically true.

If the person is responsible for doing good, then by very definition, God cannot be the only one making the choice. Splitting free will into different types is just a red herring at this point.

[orangebox21]

If one actor has to make a decision to allow someone to do X, and that person can only do X if the actor acts, then the person cannot do X without the actor.  Period.

That's determinism.

If the person has a choice, then the outside actor isn't the only determining factor. Period. These things are tautologically true.

That's compatibilism.

If the person is responsible for doing good, then by very definition, God cannot be the only one making the choice.

That's libertarian free will.

Do you see that you used three different definitions of free will?  That's equivocation.  The conclusions you are coming to are a result of equivocation.

Splitting free will into different types is just a red herring at this point.

Not a red herring but a semantic dispute. 

"A semantic dispute is a disagreement that arises if the parties involved disagree about the definition of a word, not because they disagree on material facts, but rather because they disagree on the definitions of a word (or several words) essential to formulating the claim at issue. It is sometimes held that semantic disputes are not genuine disputes at all. But very often they are regarded as perfectly genuine, e.g., in philosophy. It is also sometimes held that when a semantic dispute arises, the focus of the debate should switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms of which there are different definitions (understandings, concepts, etc.). Semantic disputes can result in the logical fallacy of equivocation."  Reference

The reason it's important to define our terms is to avoid a semantic dispute that result's in the fallacy of equivocation.  Professional debaters will agree that step one is defining the terms.

Our conversation has come to the point that in order to continue we need to switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms, with the intention of returning back to the thesis with a proper understanding of our terms.  If not, we'll end up talking past one another or equivocating within our arguments.

[RobbyPants]

Our conversation has come to the point that in order to continue we need to switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms, with the intention of returning back to the thesis with a proper understanding of our terms.  If not, we'll end up talking past one another or equivocating within our arguments.

This might be true. I honestly don't care about free will, let alone types of free will. I'm still responding to your assertion that God must act for us to do good. You are up in the air as to whether or not we also act in this way. That's fine.

That being said, if:

• God must act for us to do good.
  
• God not acting makes it so we can't do good.
  
• We don't have the capacity to do good on our own.
  

How would we be responsible for doing/not good?

Are those bullet points a misrepresentation of what you said?

[orangebox21]

Our conversation has come to the point that in order to continue we need to switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms, with the intention of returning back to the thesis with a proper understanding of our terms.  If not, we'll end up talking past one another or equivocating within our arguments.

This might be true. I honestly don't care about free will, let alone types of free will. I'm still responding to your assertion that God must act for us to do good. You are up in the air as to whether or not we also act in this way. That's fine.

That being said, if:

• God must act for us to do good.
  
  
• God not acting makes it so we can't do good.
  
  
• We don't have the capacity to do good on our own.
  
  

How would we be responsible for doing/not good?

Are those bullet points a misrepresentation of what you said?

No those bullet points are not a misrepresentation of what I said, thanks for the opportunity to clarify.

Given the above premises I would assert that we're not responsible for not doing the good we can't do, we are responsible for doing the bad that we can do.

[RobbyPants]

Given the above premises I would assert that we're not responsible for not doing the good we can't do, we are responsible for doing the bad that we can do.

What do you mean by the good we "can't do"? Stuff that's just beyond our abilities, or stuff where God isn't "allowing" it?

If it's the latter, wouldn't it be God's fault that more good isn't being done?

---

What is the difference between not doing a good and actively doing bad? In some cases I think it might be obvious. Stealing from someone is bad, giving to someone is good (generally speaking), and doing neither seems somewhat neutral.

But I don't think everything works quite that way. Obviously, killing someone is bad. I'd say that saving someone from dying at no (serious) cost to yourself is good. But, what about not saving someone, if there's no serious cost to you? That doesn't strike me as "neutral". The closest thing I could see to that would be to declare that saving people at no real cost is neutral (and failing to is bad), but saving someone at a considerable cost to yourself is good (and failing to is neutral).

What are your thoughts on this?

[orangebox21]

Given the above premises I would assert that we're not responsible for not doing the good we can't do, we are responsible for doing the bad that we can do.

What do you mean by the good we "can't do"? Stuff that's just beyond our abilities, or stuff where God isn't "allowing" it?

Both.  I'm not responsible for the choices I don't or can't make, I am responsible for the choices I do make.  What I'm trying to show here is that to blame God for the immoral things I do is a conflation of the issues. The two questions facing us are:  Am I responsible for my choices?  Is God responsible for not enlarging my set of choices?  To conclude that I am not responsible for my choices because God does not enlarge my set of choices is a conflation.

Free will is a person's ability to make choices consistent with his/her nature.  The Bible teaches that we are born with a sinful nature (imputed to us from Adam).  If I have a sinful nature then all my [moral] choices will result in immorality.  (I can only make choices consistent with a sinful nature, i.e. sinful ones).  So while I have many different choices that I can use my free will to choose, all of those choices will result in immorality.  Therefore, I use my freewill to make immoral choices.  So if I use my free will to make immoral choices then I alone am morally responsible for those choices.

The second question is related to your question:

If it's the latter, wouldn't it be God's fault that more good isn't being done?

Here's where I'll probably get into trouble by offending the majority of readers (Christians included).  I hope each readers emotions do not over ride the explanation.

The answer to that question is found in Romans 9

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10And not only this, but there was Rebekah also, when she had conceived twins by one man, our father Isaac; 11for though the twins were not yet born and had not done anything good or bad, so that God’s purpose according to His choice would stand, not because of works but because of Him who calls, 12it was said to her, “THE OLDER WILL SERVE THE YOUNGER.” 13Just as it is written, “JACOB I LOVED, BUT ESAU I HATED.”

     14What shall we say then? There is no injustice with God, is there? May it never be! 15For He says to Moses, “I WILL HAVE MERCY ON WHOM I HAVE MERCY, AND I WILL HAVE COMPASSION ON WHOM I HAVE COMPASSION.” 16So then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on God who has mercy. 17For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, “FOR THIS VERY PURPOSE I RAISED YOU UP, TO DEMONSTRATE MY POWER IN YOU, AND THAT MY NAME MIGHT BE PROCLAIMED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE EARTH.” 18So then He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires.

     19You will say to me then, “Why does He still find fault? For who resists His will?” 20On the contrary, who are you, O man, who answers back to God? The thing molded will not say to the molder, “Why did you make me like this,” will it? 21Or does not the potter have a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for common use? 22What if God, although willing to demonstrate His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? 23And He did so to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared beforehand for glory, 24even us, whom He also called, not from among Jews only, but also from among Gentiles.

---

You'll notice that in light of verses 10-13 the same question you have asked is asked in verse 14.  Is there injustice with God?  Isn't God to blame then?  Reading verses 15-18 should lead a person to ask the question in verse 19, "How can He blame us, for who can resist His will?  

The answer is found in verses 20-24.

Two things to take away from this.  First, these are questions of authority.  Who get's the right to decide how something is used?  The maker or the made?  Secondly, it appears God's reason for functioning this way is to demonstrate His wrath, make His power known, and to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy.  The reason passages like this are so offensive is because we live in a very 'me centered' world.  We think it's all about us.  The truth is, it is all about God and making Himself known.  

What is the difference between not doing a good and actively doing bad? In some cases I think it might be obvious. Stealing from someone is bad, giving to someone is good (generally speaking), and doing neither seems somewhat neutral.

When it comes to the law, there is either guilt or innocence, there is no "neutral" ground.  Each moral choice you make is either right or wrong.

But I don't think everything works quite that way. Obviously, killing someone is bad.

Is it?  What if that person was going to kill one million people?  Would it be right in that case?

I'd say that saving someone from dying at no (serious) cost to yourself is good. But, what about not saving someone, if there's no serious cost to you? That doesn't strike me as "neutral".

The reason these questions are difficult to answer is because we lack the understanding to answer them in truth.  We're left with a "subjective best guess."  I often struggle with hypothetical choices.  If someone were attacking me do I fight back?  What if a family member is being attacked?  What if it is a stranger?  Do I have a moral obligation in each of these cases to engage in violence?  When is violence justified?  When is killing justified?  And it gets more complicated in that not everyone agrees.  Some people think violence is never justified.  Should I be forced to adhere to their standard?  Should they to mine?  

The closest thing I could see to that would be to declare that saving people at no real cost is neutral (and failing to is bad), but saving someone at a considerable cost to yourself is good (and failing to is neutral).

If you believe this, then certainly you understand the magnitude of Christ's sacrifice on the cross.  "6For while we were still helpless, at the right time Christ died for the ungodly. 7For one will hardly die for a righteous man; though perhaps for the good man someone would dare even to die. 8But God demonstrates His own love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. 9Much more then, having now been justified by His blood, we shall be saved from the wrath of God through Him. 10For if while we were enemies we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved by His life. 11And not only this, but we also exult in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation (Romans 6:6-11)."

[robvalue]

Free will, free will. Ah, everything's better after free will.

I was wondering, while driving home, do I really have the choice to throw the steering wheel to the right and crash my car for no reason, probably killing myself and others? I rather doubt that I do. Too many fail-safes.

[orangebox21]

Free will, free will. Ah, everything's better after free will.

I was wondering, while driving home, do I really have the choice to throw the steering wheel to the right and crash my car for no reason, probably killing myself and others? I rather doubt that I do. Too many fail-safes.

You have the free will to throw the steering wheel to the right. The results of that choice are beyond the control of your will. Please don't throw the steering wheel to the right. Go see a mechanic and get it reattached to the steering column instead.

[Brian37]

I have never seen in my 15 years of online debate, any solid refutation of Epicurus.

I do find it petty and selfish to pray for all the good that happens to you on a planet that averages 50 million deaths of all types per year worldwide.