(December 21, 2015 at 9:14 am)RobbyPants Wrote:

(December 19, 2015 at 12:02 pm)orangebox21 Wrote: I am certain that it is God acting, I am certain that it is not [only] me acting, I am not certain but open to the possibility that it is God and me acting.

Fair enough.

The reason I'm trying to figure out, is that it seems that good actions are only caused by God acting and are impossible without him, then by very definition, God is responsible for all good actions.

That's a valid argument if we assume that libertarian free will is not true.

(December 21, 2015 at 9:14 am)RobbyPants Wrote: Similarly, he is responsible for all good actions not taken.

That would be true if determinism is true.
That would not be true if compatibilism is true.

(December 21, 2015 at 9:14 am)RobbyPants Wrote: The whole idea of the free will defense to the problem of evil is to shift responsibility form a God that could act but chooses not to, and shifts it to us, because we were given a choice; however, if we are unable to do good without God, then God would be the sole determining factor as to whether or not a good action was taken. Of course, there are other defenses of free will, but this approach would totally obviate the free will defense.

If I may suggest, at this point you'll need to decide how you are defining free-will.  If you choose libertarian, then you wouldn't have an argument at all given that man's choice is completely independent of God's will [although that would strongly support your initial contention; if people have done good then they did it and if they have done bad they did it, and they deserve the credit/blame for it, although your contention would be limited to choices completely within the control of the individual, which would rule out things like getting a job, etc.]  If you choose determinism, then you could attempt to bring a charge against God but only at the expense of inconsistency within your own worldview.  In your worldview, if determinism is true and God does not exist then people would not be morally responsible for their actions but rather naturalistic processes would be.  At that point you would have to defend the position that no one does anything right or wrong.  At that point your worldview could either claim that morality does not exist [I think this is the more consistent naturalistic deterministic position/If morality does not exist then how can God be morally responsible] or you could claim that morality exists but all moral responsibility lies with naturalistic processes [this position is unlike the reality in which we live/This position would allow you to bring a charge against God but you would have to deny reality in order to do it].  Or you could choose the compatibilist view which would allow for both determinism and morality.  In that case the moral responsibility is held by the person making the choice and not the determiner.  In that case God [the determiner] would not be morally responsible.  

Some things to think about.

Why isn't it true under those definitions? If one actor has to make a decision to allow someone to do X, and that person can only do X if the actor acts, then the person cannot do X without the actor. Period. If the person has a choice, then the outside actor isn't the only determining factor. Period. These things are tautologically true.

If the person is responsible for doing good, then by very definition, God cannot be the only one making the choice. Splitting free will into different types is just a red herring at this point.

(December 22, 2015 at 10:13 am)RobbyPants Wrote: If one actor has to make a decision to allow someone to do X, and that person can only do X if the actor acts, then the person cannot do X without the actor.  Period.

That's determinism.

(December 22, 2015 at 10:13 am)RobbyPants Wrote: If the person has a choice, then the outside actor isn't the only determining factor. Period. These things are tautologically true.

That's compatibilism.

(December 22, 2015 at 10:13 am)RobbyPants Wrote: If the person is responsible for doing good, then by very definition, God cannot be the only one making the choice.

That's libertarian free will.

Do you see that you used three different definitions of free will?  That's equivocation.  The conclusions you are coming to are a result of equivocation.

(December 22, 2015 at 10:13 am)RobbyPants Wrote: Splitting free will into different types is just a red herring at this point.

Not a red herring but a semantic dispute. 

"A semantic dispute is a disagreement that arises if the parties involved disagree about the definition of a word, not because they disagree on material facts, but rather because they disagree on the definitions of a word (or several words) essential to formulating the claim at issue. It is sometimes held that semantic disputes are not genuine disputes at all. But very often they are regarded as perfectly genuine, e.g., in philosophy. It is also sometimes held that when a semantic dispute arises, the focus of the debate should switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms of which there are different definitions (understandings, concepts, etc.). Semantic disputes can result in the logical fallacy of equivocation."  Reference

The reason it's important to define our terms is to avoid a semantic dispute that result's in the fallacy of equivocation.  Professional debaters will agree that step one is defining the terms.

Our conversation has come to the point that in order to continue we need to switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms, with the intention of returning back to the thesis with a proper understanding of our terms.  If not, we'll end up talking past one another or equivocating within our arguments.

(December 22, 2015 at 4:59 pm)orangebox21 Wrote: Our conversation has come to the point that in order to continue we need to switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms, with the intention of returning back to the thesis with a proper understanding of our terms.  If not, we'll end up talking past one another or equivocating within our arguments.

This might be true. I honestly don't care about free will, let alone types of free will. I'm still responding to your assertion that God must act for us to do good. You are up in the air as to whether or not we also act in this way. That's fine.

That being said, if:

• God must act for us to do good.
  
• God not acting makes it so we can't do good.
  
• We don't have the capacity to do good on our own.
  

How would we be responsible for doing/not good?

Are those bullet points a misrepresentation of what you said?

(December 23, 2015 at 2:34 pm)RobbyPants Wrote:

(December 22, 2015 at 4:59 pm)orangebox21 Wrote: Our conversation has come to the point that in order to continue we need to switch from the original thesis to the meaning of the terms, with the intention of returning back to the thesis with a proper understanding of our terms.  If not, we'll end up talking past one another or equivocating within our arguments.

This might be true. I honestly don't care about free will, let alone types of free will. I'm still responding to your assertion that God must act for us to do good. You are up in the air as to whether or not we also act in this way. That's fine.

That being said, if:

• God must act for us to do good.
  
  
• God not acting makes it so we can't do good.
  
  
• We don't have the capacity to do good on our own.
  
  

How would we be responsible for doing/not good?

Are those bullet points a misrepresentation of what you said?

No those bullet points are not a misrepresentation of what I said, thanks for the opportunity to clarify.

Given the above premises I would assert that we're not responsible for not doing the good we can't do, we are responsible for doing the bad that we can do.

(December 23, 2015 at 4:06 pm)orangebox21 Wrote: Given the above premises I would assert that we're not responsible for not doing the good we can't do, we are responsible for doing the bad that we can do.

What do you mean by the good we "can't do"? Stuff that's just beyond our abilities, or stuff where God isn't "allowing" it?

If it's the latter, wouldn't it be God's fault that more good isn't being done?

---

What is the difference between not doing a good and actively doing bad? In some cases I think it might be obvious. Stealing from someone is bad, giving to someone is good (generally speaking), and doing neither seems somewhat neutral.

But I don't think everything works quite that way. Obviously, killing someone is bad. I'd say that saving someone from dying at no (serious) cost to yourself is good. But, what about not saving someone, if there's no serious cost to you? That doesn't strike me as "neutral". The closest thing I could see to that would be to declare that saving people at no real cost is neutral (and failing to is bad), but saving someone at a considerable cost to yourself is good (and failing to is neutral).

What are your thoughts on this?

Free will, free will. Ah, everything's better after free will.

I was wondering, while driving home, do I really have the choice to throw the steering wheel to the right and crash my car for no reason, probably killing myself and others? I rather doubt that I do. Too many fail-safes.

(December 28, 2015 at 4:58 pm)robvalue Wrote: Free will, free will. Ah, everything's better after free will.

I was wondering, while driving home, do I really have the choice to throw the steering wheel to the right and crash my car for no reason, probably killing myself and others? I rather doubt that I do. Too many fail-safes.

You have the free will to throw the steering wheel to the right. The results of that choice are beyond the control of your will. Please don't throw the steering wheel to the right. Go see a mechanic and get it reattached to the steering column instead.

I have never seen in my 15 years of online debate, any solid refutation of Epicurus.

I do find it petty and selfish to pray for all the good that happens to you on a planet that averages 50 million deaths of all types per year worldwide.