The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[IATIA]

1. It is possible that a Leprechaun exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a Leprechaun exists, then a Leprechaun exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a Leprechaun exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a Leprechaun exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a Leprechaun exists in the actual world, then a Leprechaun exists.
   
6. Therefore, a Leprechaun exists.
   

[Cato]

athrock,

I understand this argument is new to you; however, its first form appeared in 1078. There's also been a shitload of conversation since. If you are sincere in your quest, please get this underneath you first:

http://sandefur.typepad.com/freespace/20...=pulsenews

This isn't just someone's blog, it's the Stanfoed Encyclopedia of Philosophy that deals with arguments even handed.

[Alex K]

1. It is possible that a Leprechaun exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a Leprechaun exists, then a Leprechaun exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a Leprechaun exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a Leprechaun exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a Leprechaun exists in the actual world, then a Leprechaun exists.
   
6. Therefore, a Leprechaun exists.
   

I think he uses the 'maximal greatness' property to go from some universes to all universes, something your Leprechaun doesn't have

[IATIA]

Why not?

[Angrboda]

It looks like Anselm and Plantinga have had a love child.

[Jenny A]

Anselm's contempararies immediately noted that the same logic could be used to prove the existence of a maximumlly anything from islands to grasshoppers. David Hume argued that that no particular thing necessarily exists. It has also been noted that maximumlly great is an incoherent idea as it leads to questions  like could such a being make an object too heavy for it to lift. Kant objected to the use of existence as a predict. 

But, the OP's rendition seems to be missing a crucial couple of steps notably:  that to be maximumlly great a being must exist.  And it is this missing step that all but one of the above critisms address.  As is the OP's conclusion doesn't follow from his premises.

[brewer]

I reject premise 1, except as a fantasy of the mind. Which takes us to 6, therefore the fantasy exists. As you will see (or maybe not in your case), this can be used for any fantasy creature of maximum greatness, god, dragon, leprechaun, unicorn, ........... To then turn the fantasy into reality is delusion.

You can't argue any god/fantasy into existence. That requires evidence.

However, you can use it for a belief system (some require no evidence), many have and do. If you believe it great, just don't expect me to believe also. If your belief system requires the acceptance of others for your continued belief, from my stand point, it is not much of a belief to begin with.

[Minimalist]

Thoughts?

Pure fucking drivel.

[Whateverist]

I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

Bleh!  Pretty much what others have said.  If it is both possible and necessary that a maximally incompetent being exists, then it is possible that you've misidentified God's true nature.  So long as we can't be sure which is the actual nature of 'God' there is at least a 50% chance that God, though existing, is no one you'd want to hang with.  Therefore fuck gods.  QED.

[Alex K]

Why not?

Of you give your Leprechaun that property, it just becomes a different name for God. Of course you have a point in that the argument, even if it were valid, does not specify any further properties of this being.