Seeing red

[Neo-Scholastic]

It's really quite simple. DNA is not the idea itself. It is the means by which the idea expresses itself.

[bennyboy]

Well, let's look at your definition of intentionality.  Wouldn't you say, by that definition, that DNA acts with intention over a very long time?  At least a lifetime, for sure, but maybe even over the evolution of a species?

According to my definition of intentionality, the intentional representation is part of a recurring, self-sustaining feedback loop in which the thing has behaviors triggered by the representation.  In the sense that DNA triggers behaviors such as molecule building, its molecular chain would be about those molecules it is building.  However there is no feedback involved, so the DNA molecule isn't properly a representation of the molecule it is building under my definition.  But here, in which DNA gives rise to molecule building, is one area that shows the crossover between representation happening and "just stuff happening."  In that sense, looking at DNA as 'encoding' the building of certain molecules is a case in which the interpretation of what is happening is firmly "in the eye of the beholder."  It is a conceptualization of what is occurring, and that requires high level intentionality of a kind not available to the DNA molecule.

I'd say by definition an evolved DNA code represent a long-term interaction among DNA and the environment, no?

[bennyboy]

Devils advocate for what or whom ?  I think that any definition of idea that does not distinguish between a rock and an idea is likely to yield poor inferences no matter what way you go with it.  

I'm investigating a new set of ideas, not rooted in my ideas about idealism. I'm trying to look at this through a materialist world view and see if it sheds any new light on things for me.

Our conceptualizations of dna are ideas.  DNA itself is an expression of organic chemistry.  The concepts themselves are as much(and as little) a code for building life as bernoulli's principle is a code for building a plane.  

Everything in the brain is an expression of organic chemistry, too. It is the organization which represents ideas, according to you, no?

A definition that's too broad runs the risk of defining nothing at all.  You probably answered your own question -in- the question above, we don;t refer to -any- representation of state as an idea.  You said it yourself.  Expressed in certain ways, for certain reasons.  I'm sure you could draw those analogies without any fuss over whether or not dna is an idea, in any case.  The things built by dna, for example, are generally temporary themselves, requiring metabolism and growth of new cells or structures to persist, as we do, as living examples of the ship of theseus.

Well, if we are talking about physics rather than qualia, then DNA both represents an interaction between things and events, and serves as the formative pattern for new life. I'd certainly categorize that as an idea, since it's essentially memory + "will."

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm investigating a new set of ideas, not rooted in my ideas about idealism.  I'm trying to look at this through a materialist world view and see if it sheds any new light on things for me.

......and you think that materialists have a definition or description for ideas or mind that cannot distinguish between those things and a rock?  I doubt that you're going to have any light shone on something if you don't shine some yourself.  

Everything in the brain is an expression of organic chemistry, too.  It is the organization which represents ideas, according to you, no?

It is, and if it were the same expression -or- organization of the same stuff there'd be no need to call dna "dna" and ideas "ideas".  We could call them both fleeflarps.  You;ve already expressed every criticism I could make of these comments -yourself-. A boat and an airplane aren't the same thing, even though they're both made of metal. Certain expressions, certain reasons. This was a pointless non-objection in defense of a pointless non-definition..........

Well, if we are talking about physics rather than qualia, then DNA both represents an interaction between things and events, and serves as the formative pattern for new life.  I'd certainly categorize that as an idea, since it's essentially memory + "will."

Whats makes you think that we can talk physics -rather- than qualia? All things of which we are aware seem to interact between things and events.  If this made dna and ideas the same thing it makes -everything- the same and we can throw in the towel with all this naming business.  I see no will in dna.  Show us this will?   A memory state, sure, I can run with that...but you know I'm a comp mind guy,and you need more than memory to make a comp system. Do you expect a memory cell to have ideas? I don't. My cup of coffee is an effective memory cell (and it's made of the same stuff too, way way down, as dna, bonus!). In all the time I've known it it hasn't given me the slightest reason to think it either possesses a single idea or is an idea....and buddy, me and that cup are close, we share alot of time together and I'm certain I'd have noticed by now.

[emjay]

The dualist position takes a lot more for granted than I do about the responsibility of the 'homunculus'…So either we're a completely separate, disembodied mind that happens by extraordinary coincidence to process data in the same manner a neural network demonstrably can and does as a matter of course - i.e. stereotyping etc - and that again by extraordinary coincidence changes to the underlying neural network that it has laid claim to …OR we are that network. …[This] is what I see as an extreme dualist position - one where the mind is absolutely separate from brain. But I don't know where you stand on the question...

My position makes no provision for any type of homunculus, ectoplasm, or “ghost in the machine”. Neither does it rely on preexisting harmony, like Leibnitz suspected. I thought I presented it clearly enough in ( http://atheistforums.org/thread-40435-po...pid1182671 ) but you may have missed it. Simply stated, I advocate Thomistic moderate realize. I see human beings are a hylomorphic substance, they have an immaterial essence, or quiddity supported on a material medium. To turn a quote by McLuhan, the medium is not the message. Mind and brain cannot be separated in a living human being. They are distinguishable without being alienable. When material substances (like flesh and bones) participate in a certain forms (like animals), the forms put downward pressure on the material substances and either constrain or expand matter’s operations. My position is that properties do not ‘emerge’ (appear from nowhere by magic) so much as ‘manifest’ (actualize what already exists in potency).
Scholasticism lacks the mind/body problem. Mental properties fall into the category of formal and final causes. Brain states fall into the categories of material and efficient causes. The idealism/materialism dilemma arises when people object to the causal power of one or more of the four Aristotelian causes.

Hi Chad. I'm sorry I didn't reply to this until now. I wanted to but I didn't know how so I decided to leave it but just seeing what you've said in that other thread - 'there are many kinds of dualists' - I just wanted to acknowledge that I understand that your position is very different from the stereotypes I have of dualists. I did read your other post before, and understood some of it but not all, but in light of this one and rereading the other (not just now... before - when I chose to leave it be), it's pretty clear.

But ultimately I didn't know how to reply because your position seems to be steeped in heavy-duty philosophy... which, along with heavy duty logic, as I said before, tends to go right over my head. So I didn't see the point in trying to present my position for comparison because I'd be at a distinct disadvantage in trying to argue my case in this terminology because I don't understand it. And that's made worse by the fact that I'm not entirely sure what my position is on that particular question. You say manifest, I say emergent, but I'm not even sure if emergent quite captures what I mean.

[Angrboda]

According to my definition of intentionality, the intentional representation is part of a recurring, self-sustaining feedback loop in which the thing has behaviors triggered by the representation.  In the sense that DNA triggers behaviors such as molecule building, its molecular chain would be about those molecules it is building.  However there is no feedback involved, so the DNA molecule isn't properly a representation of the molecule it is building under my definition.  But here, in which DNA gives rise to molecule building, is one area that shows the crossover between representation happening and "just stuff happening."  In that sense, looking at DNA as 'encoding' the building of certain molecules is a case in which the interpretation of what is happening is firmly "in the eye of the beholder."  It is a conceptualization of what is occurring, and that requires high level intentionality of a kind not available to the DNA molecule.

I'd say by definition an evolved DNA code represent a long-term interaction among DNA and the environment, no?

The DNA by itself doesn't represent any specific interaction. Only by embedding it in a system (the living cell inside the living body) does it achieve any level of "long term interaction" at all. So once again we see that it isn't the 'idea' or representation in memory or the sequence of DNA that represents — these are all shorthands for the system which makes their content refer to other things. Without the system, they are nothing on their own.

[bennyboy]

I'd say by definition an evolved DNA code represent a long-term interaction among DNA and the environment, no?

The DNA by itself doesn't represent any specific interaction.  Only by embedding it in a system (the living cell inside the living body) does it achieve any level of "long term interaction" at all.  So once again we see that it isn't the 'idea' or representation in memory or the sequence of DNA that represents — these are all shorthands for the system which makes their content refer to other things.  Without the system, they are nothing on their own.

Of course, any code requires a context.  If I encoded the bits of an .mp3 file on a beach, would it be an .mp3 file?  Only if there was someone/something designed to act on it.  And yet-- there it is, and organized patterns of black and white stones.

The same goes for the brain.  If you could isolate whatever specific neural systems represente a discrete idea, and pull them out of the brain, would it still be an idea out of its context?

I sometimes feel with you and Rhythm that there's special pleading happening (and I think you can see why I feel that clearly from our past exchanges).  I don't mean either of you is using dishonest argument to push a point.  What I mean is that for your definitions of things, I can always find other physical systems that I think share those properties, and you guys will add a new "rule" why my thing doesn't match that definition.  Again, nobody please get mad at this-- I'm not trying to insult anyone, only to say that it's very hard for me to pin down and understand exactly what you guys mean by things.

Maybe we need to stop and define the word "idea."  I tried to, but I don't think my definition was accepted, on terms of it being to broad.  So what defines a more narrow, and hopefully, more useful definition?  I'd like a definition that, if I can match all criteria, we will definitely all agree: yes. . . this is definitely an "idea."

[bennyboy]

......and you think that materialists have a definition or description for ideas or mind that cannot distinguish between those things and a rock?  I doubt that you're going to have any light shone on something if you don't shine some yourself.  

You seem to be enraged by a position I'm not taking.

It is, and if it were the same expression -or- organization of the same stuff there'd be no need to call dna "dna" and ideas "ideas".  We could call them both fleeflarps.  You;ve already expressed every criticism I could make of these comments -yourself-.  A boat and an airplane aren't the same thing, even though they're both made of metal.  Certain expressions, certain reasons.  This was a pointless non-objection in defense of a pointless non-definition..........

Okay, so let's get a precise definition that doesn't beg the question. If you're going to say, "Ideas are whatever the brain does" in the end, then I'll agree but there will be nothing more to talk about.

Whats makes you think that we can talk physics -rather- than qualia?  All things of which we are aware seem to interact between things and events.

That's right, and I considered adding a sentence in anticipation of this argument. However, the vocabulary we use in talking about qualia and physics is different. When I talk about my experience of a painting, I'll say something like, "That particular orange has such a warm feeling to it." When I talk about the brain function behind that experience, I'll talk about blood flow, brain waves, or maybe the release of NTs from specific neurons. I'm saying let's forget the qualitative language and go straight for the quantitative: if there is an idea, in any physical system in the universe, how is it to be recognized (or even manipulated)?

 If this made dna and ideas the same thing it makes -everything- the same and we can throw in the towel with all this naming business.  I see no will in dna.  Show us this will?   A memory state, sure, I can run with that...but you know I'm a comp mind guy,and you need more than memory to make a comp system.  Do you expect a memory cell to have ideas?  I don't.  My cup of coffee is an effective memory cell (and it's made of the same stuff too, way way down, as dna, bonus!).  In all the time I've known it it hasn't given me the slightest reason to think it either possesses a single idea or is an idea....and buddy, me and that cup are close, we share alot of time together and I'm certain I'd have noticed by now.

What's will? It's a tendency to act. The will of the DNA to reproduce is so strong that the instincts represented in it wall subvert a person's conscious decision-making. I don't want to have a baby, but mannnn that girl in the bar is so hot. Maybe I'll just play around in the backseat of my Imapala. Well. . . she's naked now. . . it wouldn't hurt to stick it in for just a second, right? Wait. . . she won't get off me. . . girl stop moving like that. . . I . . . I. . .

Reproduction achieved. Will of DNA: 1; will of independent young man: 0

[Angrboda]

The DNA by itself doesn't represent any specific interaction.  Only by embedding it in a system (the living cell inside the living body) does it achieve any level of "long term interaction" at all.  So once again we see that it isn't the 'idea' or representation in memory or the sequence of DNA that represents — these are all shorthands for the system which makes their content refer to other things.  Without the system, they are nothing on their own.

Of course, any code requires a context.  If I encoded the bits of an .mp3 file on a beach, would it be an .mp3 file?  Only if there was someone/something designed to act on it.  And yet-- there it is, and organized patterns of black and white stones.

The same goes for the brain.  If you could isolate whatever specific neural systems represente a discrete idea, and pull them out of the brain, would it still be an idea out of its context?

No. I'm saying the 'context' is the idea (or the encoding). It's more than 'just' context, that context is the beast itself.

I sometimes feel with you and Rhythm that there's special pleading happening (and I think you can see why I feel that clearly from our past exchanges).  I don't mean either of you is using dishonest argument to push a point.  What I mean is that for your definitions of things, I can always find other physical systems that I think share those properties, and you guys will add a new "rule" why my thing doesn't match that definition.  Again, nobody please get mad at this-- I'm not trying to insult anyone, only to say that it's very hard for me to pin down and understand exactly what you guys mean by things.

I think I've been clear throughout that it is the system that matters. You keep taking pieces of the system out and asking me if they're the system? No, the pieces aren't; the system is.

Maybe we need to stop and define the word "idea."  I tried to, but I don't think my definition was accepted, on terms of it being to broad.  So what defines a more narrow, and hopefully, more useful definition?  I'd like a definition that, if I can match all criteria, we will definitely all agree: yes. . . this is definitely an "idea."

I think 'idea' under whatever definition is going to be too broad to yield any profitable discussion. It's like trying to have a discussion about animals, without being more precise than 'animals'. There are simply too many differences in the specie to which that refers to group them all under the same rubric. Maybe if you back up a moment and tell us why you want to focus on 'idea'?

[bennyboy]

I think I've been clear throughout that it is the system that matters.  You keep taking pieces of the system out and asking me if they're the system?  No, the pieces aren't; the system is.

Well, if the brain (which is the system in question I suppose, we can talk about DNA later) is the system, and also the idea, then I'm not sure what an idea is at all. I had assumed that discrete configurations of encoded information were the ideas, and that the brain was the context in which ideas would have meaning.

I think 'idea' under whatever definition is going to be too broad to yield any profitable discussion.   It's like trying to have a discussion about animals, without being more precise than 'animals'.  There are simply too many differences in the specie to which that refers to group them all under the same rubric.  Maybe if you back up a moment and tell us why you want to focus on 'idea'?

I'd be as happy understanding intention, or will, or "mind," or consciousness. I suspect that definitions of ANY of them will beg the question-- again, not out of any dishonesty, but because we are reverse-engineering our ideas about mind from the brain. So let's say we say that intentionality is a function of the brain; specifically, it involves an organism feeling its needs or wants, polling the environment to see what's missing, accessing memories in order to build a plan to bring its needs to fruition, and then acting on that play.

This sound fine, and we can identify to some degree the brain parts, states and functions that go into this process, and we expect to have a more comprehensive view of this in the future. However, what ABOUT the brain constitutes ideas, and what just constitutes a complex processing of information?

My other question is how we go from that to a new context (i.e. not the brain or something made by us), and have a good understanding of an alien mind? Do we have to apply human standards of intent? What if we have a cleverly-built machine. Should we allow that its programming is a kind of "memory" in that it allows the machine to act based on past states of systems even though it has no mechism on its own of measuring them?