Mind is the brain?

[bennyboy]

Not really, because the truth is embedded in the semantics.  If a duck is a thing which experiences, then by definition you can be guaranteed that a duck experiences.  Of course, we have no way of knowing whether a duck actually experiences, and cannot "correlate" quacking with actual experiences of the duck, at least from a gnostic position.

But you have no guarantee that ALL ducks experience exactly the same. One duck might see a piece of bread as delicious; another duck might see less than delicious, almost as disgusting. You have no way of knowing that. So you saying, "by definition you can be guaranteed that a duck experiences", you're just speculating. And without empirical evidence, according to my definition, you have a crackpot theory. 

Fair enough.  If you want to stipulate that all ducks, which may experience by definition (without actually being known to experience) could experience differently from each other, then I will accept that.  This reinforces the idea that even given a particular organism, we cannot know what (or if) it experiences-- which is one of my primary points in this thread.

[bennyboy]

Dude do you not understand the difference between just saying shit and actually making a point and supporting it?

Dude this is the BIG question, he makes his point well IMO, but there is no supporting it. None of us know for certain, but all the evidence points towards his point of view being correct.

He's just outlined the materialist position, but hasn't actually put forward either a new idea nor his reason for holding it.

[bennyboy]

I'd be willing to bet that something as complex as mental activity takes into account many different levels of processing, and trying to assign it to one arena of activity (if you'll pardon the clunky term) is probably misguided.

Would you allow that if mental activity is about the flow of information, the most fundamental activity would be that of the most basic interchange of information? See, the irony of this thread is that I'm trying to treat mind as NOT a special case, or a magi-mysterious thing, but as something intrinsic to matter.

Does this look like an android?
No, you're talking to a real live human being. That's who you're talking to: me. If you cannot tell that I'm not an android, well, perhaps you should study people more and philosophy less?

Where would that mind reside, do you think? How might it operate absent living processes? What energy transfer would fuel the process?

If mind is not intrinsic to ALL energetic transfers, then by what magical process would energy transfer be mind?

[Thumpalumpacus]

Would you allow that if mental activity is about the flow of information, the most fundamental activity would be that of the most basic interchange of information?  See, the irony of this thread is that I'm trying to treat mind as NOT a special case, or a magi-mysterious thing, but as something intrinsic to matter.

Then you should perhaps demonstrate the existence of mind in matter which isn't organized in a structure permitting information processing.

If mind is not intrinsic to ALL energetic transfers, then by what magical process would energy transfer be mind?

You should perhaps answer my questions instead of eliding them, that would be the courteous thing to do. (Also, I didn't say that energy transfer is mind, asked what energy transfer might fuel the process. This is the second time in this conversation you've tried to impute to me a position I don't hold. Stop doing that.)

ETA: Y'know what, never mind. I'm done with this discussion.

[little_monkey]

But you have no guarantee that ALL ducks experience exactly the same. One duck might see a piece of bread as delicious; another duck might see less than delicious, almost as disgusting. You have no way of knowing that. So you saying, "by definition you can be guaranteed that a duck experiences", you're just speculating. And without empirical evidence, according to my definition, you have a crackpot theory. 

Fair enough.  If you want to stipulate that all ducks, which may experience by definition (without actually being known to experience) could experience differently from each other, then I will accept that.  This reinforces the idea that even given a particular organism, we cannot know what (or if) it experiences-- which is one of my primary points in this thread.

*** my boldening

But are you really that sure?

For instance, I can point to you to a tree, and say it's a tree, and for the sake of argument, it's the first time you see a tree. Later I can point to you another tree, which you will agree that it is also a tree. Yet, that second tree has a slightly different trunk, the leaves are designed differently, the branches are more drooping than the first tree. Yet, you can agree with me that it's still a tree. Why? Didn't you understand the first time the essence of what constitute a tree, otherwise you would disagree that the second object is also a tree? Isn't it the way we teach our kids? If our experience would be so widely different, we would not be able to communicate, we would not be able to pass on our knowledge to the next generation, our ideas would be stuck in first gear, and we would never be able to unstuck ourselves. Solipsism would rule. Yet, look around, and solipsism doesn't rule.

[bennyboy]

ETA: Y'know what, never mind. I'm done with this discussion.

Oh.

Next time, lead with that, and I can save the time to read your post.

[bennyboy]

*** my boldening

But are you really that sure?

For instance, I can point to you to a tree, and say it's a tree, and for the sake of argument, it's the first time you see a tree. Later I can point to you another tree, which you will agree that it is also a tree. Yet, that second tree has a slightly different trunk, the leaves are designed differently, the branches are more drooping than the first tree. Yet, you can agree with me that it's still a tree. Why? Didn't you understand the first time the essence of what constitute a tree, otherwise you would disagree that the second object is also a tree? Isn't it the way we teach our kids? If our experience would be so widely different, we would not be able to communicate, we would not be able to pass on our knowledge to the next generation, our ideas would be stuck in first gear, and we would never be able to unstuck ourselves. Solipsism would rule. Yet, look around, and solipsism doesn't rule.

In the case of a tree, we are defining tree such that the idea of multiple trees can be inherited from a more general "tree" idea: a trunk, some branches, and leaves. As more exposure is gained, that general idea can be fleshed out to a pretty good understanding of the qualities of the general category, tree.

In the case of a human being, something happens when the mind realizes that the 10 fingers under its control are part of the category "human," that when he feels happy, he "smiles" as other people smile, etc.-- the person considers himself a child of that category. The person, realizing he himself has a mind, will see in human behavior the feelings he himself experiences: apparent anger, love, sadness, etc. He will then generalize that very specific property to his understanding of "human:" other humans who frown likely frown for the same reason he does: they have the capacity to feel anger. Other people who cry probably cry because they have the capacity to feel sadness; and so on. So now, he's satisfied that humans have minds, and that he is one of them.

I think we all agree on how this semantic process works, so let me stop here and see if anyone still in the thread disagrees or woulud add to this narrative of how we see mind in other humans. Then we can look at how scientific inquiry should refine, or support, or contradict those semantics, or how we could refine science to give answers meaningful not just to a pharmaceutical developer but to someone with a philosophical interest in the nature of mind.

As I've said before, I have two interests: 1) establishing whether those processes allowing for "mind" are specific to the human brain or are more generally found in the Universe; 2) establishing whether we can know non-Earth-animal systems are/aren't mindful without just assuming them so because they seem "human" enough. Due to improvements in AI and robotics, I think it possible that in our lifetime, real androids might pass the Turing test, or at least seem sufficiently human to elicit our instinctive emotional response: they seem to feel, so it is easily believed that they DO feel. What does this mean for a philosopher interested in qualia, and how would science assist in establishing whether complex androids really would feel, or just seem to?

[ignoramus]

Fuck! Is this shit still going on! When's the movie coming out?

[Expired]

Fuck! Is this shit still going on!  When's the movie coming out?

December 2025

[bennyboy]

Fuck! Is this shit still going on!  When's the movie coming out?

When the androids have finally taken over Earth.