Mind is the brain?

[The Atheist]

I can make a very rational argument against the existence of the soul because I'm like genius or something.

1.) Sight happens because the eye captures light, which is then interpreted as sight by the brain. Ditto with ears and soundwaves.

2.) If you have no eye and no ear and no brain, you can neither "see" nor "hear."

3.) Therefore, either the soul is an "immaterial" item (whatever that means) and it will experience an eternity of total sensory deprivation, or it will have sensory experience because it's a material item with its own means of interpreting light and sound waves and so on.

As far as I know, no religion claims that the soul will experience an eternity of sensory deprivation, so we must conclude that the soul is a material thing.

So why haven't we found it, religious people?

[Thumpalumpacus]

ETA: Y'know what, never mind. I'm done with this discussion.

Oh.

Next time, lead with that, and I can save the time to read your post.

Perhaps instead of philosophy you might consider taking up speed-dating? It's a very efficient way to meet people and really get to understand their views, I'm told.

[The Atheist]

Fuck! Is this shit still going on! When's the movie coming out?

I don't know, but I hope Michael Bay directs it.

[ignoramus]

As long as Megan Fox doesn't star as "the brain", then count me in.

[little_monkey]

*** my boldening

But are you really that sure?

For instance, I can point to you to a tree, and say it's a tree, and for the sake of argument, it's the first time you see a tree. Later I can point to you another tree, which you will agree that it is also a tree. Yet, that second tree has a slightly different trunk, the leaves are designed differently, the branches are more drooping than the first tree. Yet, you can agree with me that it's still a tree. Why? Didn't you understand the first time the essence of what constitute a tree, otherwise you would disagree that the second object is also a tree? Isn't it the way we teach our kids? If our experience would be so widely different, we would not be able to communicate, we would not be able to pass on our knowledge to the next generation, our ideas would be stuck in first gear, and we would never be able to unstuck ourselves. Solipsism would rule. Yet, look around, and solipsism doesn't rule.

In the case of a tree, we are defining tree such that the idea of multiple trees can be inherited from a more general "tree" idea: a trunk, some branches, and leaves.  As more exposure is gained, that general idea can be fleshed out to a pretty good understanding of the qualities of the general category, tree.

In the case of a human being, something happens when the mind realizes that the 10 fingers under its control are part of the category "human," that when he feels happy, he "smiles" as other people smile, etc.-- the person considers himself a child of that category.  The person, realizing he himself has a mind, will see in human behavior the feelings he himself experiences: apparent anger, love, sadness, etc.  He will then generalize that very specific property to his understanding of "human:" other humans who frown likely frown for the same reason he does: they have the capacity to feel anger.  Other people who cry probably cry because they have the capacity to feel sadness; and so on.  So now, he's satisfied that humans have minds, and that he is one of them.

I think we all agree on how this semantic process works, so let me stop here and see if anyone still in the thread disagrees or woulud add to this narrative of how we see mind in other humans.  Then we can look at how scientific inquiry should refine, or support, or contradict those semantics, or how we could refine science to give answers meaningful not just to a pharmaceutical developer but to someone with a philosophical interest in the nature of mind.

As I've said before, I have two interests: 1) establishing whether those processes allowing for "mind" are specific to the human brain or are more generally found in the Universe; 2) establishing whether we can know non-Earth-animal systems are/aren't mindful without just assuming them so because they seem "human" enough.  Due to improvements in AI and robotics, I think it possible that in our lifetime, real androids might pass the Turing test, or at least seem sufficiently human to elicit our instinctive emotional response: they seem to feel, so it is easily believed that they DO feel.  What does this mean for a philosopher interested in qualia, and how would science assist in establishing whether complex androids really would feel, or just seem to?

So it seems you're basically saying what I'm saying with different words. Remind me why we disagree?

[bennyboy]

So it seems you're basically saying what I'm saying with different words. Remind me why we disagree?

I think the difference is in what assumptions we make, and the degree to which we are willing to extend them. I'd say I'm at one end-- I'm very suspicious of extending givens about mind into general rules, especially at the scientific level-- it smacks of begging the question. You're in the middle it seems-- acknowledging the philosophical difficulties but asking what else we are going to do if we want to move forward in a sensible way. Rhythm's at the other end-- he's willing to make philosophical assumptions about mind based on a computational model, and define terms in such a way that extending them into non-human systems is not only acceptable, but pretty much a given.

[bennyboy]

Oh.

Next time, lead with that, and I can save the time to read your post.

Perhaps instead of philosophy you might consider taking up speed-dating? It's a very efficient way to meet people and really get to understand their views, I'm told.

It's not too late.  I like chocolates better than flowers.  Just saying. 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Perhaps instead of philosophy you might consider taking up speed-dating? It's a very efficient way to meet people and really get to understand their views, I'm told.

It's not too late.  I like chocolates better than flowers.  Just saying. 

I'm already over you.

[little_monkey]

So it seems you're basically saying what I'm saying with different words. Remind me why we disagree?

I think the difference is in what assumptions we make, and the degree to which we are willing to extend them.  I'd say I'm at one end-- I'm very suspicious of extending givens about mind into general rules, especially at the scientific level-- it smacks of begging the question.  You're in the middle it seems-- acknowledging the philosophical difficulties but asking what else we are going to do if we want to move forward in a sensible way.  Rhythm's at the other end-- he's willing to make philosophical assumptions about mind based on a computational model, and define terms in such a way that extending them into non-human systems is not only acceptable, but pretty much a given.

Studying that stuff is entering uncharted territories. I'm not an expert in that field, I can only relate to physics. So if I'm making any historical comparison, the study of mind/brain is like the year 1900 in physics when Planck discovered that energy was quantized. No one knew at the time what was going to happen, how physics was going to unfold and the shift in our thinking it would demand. And after 116 years, there are still debates of what QM really means. So, I cannot imagine how this mind/brains study will really turn out. 

[bennyboy]

Yeh. To be honest, modern physics has a lot to do with my agnosticism. I mean, I "know" my desk is 99.999999% empty space, and that .0000000001% is so mysterious. Then you look at double-slit experiments, read a little about entanglement, and what? I think a lot of people just spout the stuff out as rote memory without thinking about it: "A photon is a particle with no volume or rest mass." Those words make sense until you try to imagine what they mean.

Obviously, you're the physics expert, and maybe my IQ just isn't up to the job of modern physics, but I'm increasingly of the opinion that the Universe is run by Loki, and that reality is constantly fucking with us.