Devil's advocate for why ontology is meaningless and vacuous.

[JuliaL]

---

Given that subjective preferences are mediated by objectively measurable neural configurations, I think it's premature to declare morality subjectivity.

Let's assume that "objectively true" means there's an isomorphic map-territory relationship (correspondence theory of truth). If someone empathizes with my mental state--which is to say, simulates my sentiments by experiencing (via mirror neurons) what I'm experiencing, that they have true information about a part of reality (me).

This is not only objectively true, but it entails that the empathizing person will not cause me gratuitous suffering. In order to justify causing other people suffering, we have to shut off our capacity for empathy, by demonizing people, or regarding them as animals, or insane, etc. I think that when you cash it out, this amounts to the kind of moral ontology you get from contractariansim, due to the fact that determining values by emulating the mental states of others via mirror mirror neurons is practically identical to determining values by rational agents behind a veil of ignorance.

---

When was it established that morality inherently entails minimizing suffering? Or that acts of capriciousness and prejudice aren't moral?

I'm with ANKA here.  My model, in which morality is an observed emergent property of replicating, evolving systems allows morality to be subjective and contextual.  Proving objectivity of morals (correspondence with a reality agreed to be tentative) is just as impossible as proving we have true access to that reality in the first place.  
Though someone empathizing with Gemini might have "true information about a part of reality."  They cannot know that that information is true.
We do, in good conscience, treat others with varying degrees of empathy.  I do not feel the same disquiet over the starving children in Africa as I do over my own starving children.  It is no coincidence that those who I feel most responsible for are those who are my closest relations.
Gemini might find it good that others feel her pain, but is that pain good for the others?

[ApeNotKillApe]

For what it's worth, turtle, I'm pretty sure I'm on board with you. Objectivity is an entirely illusory concept when you get right down to it.

[Gemini]

When was it established that morality inherently entails minimizing suffering? Or that acts of capriciousness and prejudice aren't moral?

That's a question about the target of moral theorizing. How is morality defined?  A normative definition stipulates that morality refers to any rational person's preference not to experience things like unnecessary suffering or acts of capriciousness and prejudice.

I think a descriptivist (morality refers to a code of conduct put forward by society, groups, or individuals for their own use) would have a harder time giving an objective answer to your question, which is why I think descriptivists tend toward subjectivism.

I'm with ANKA here.  My model, in which morality is an observed emergent property of replicating, evolving systems allows morality to be subjective and contextual.  Proving objectivity of morals (correspondence with a reality agreed to be tentative) is just as impossible as proving we have true access to that reality in the first place.  
Though someone empathizing with Gemini might have "true information about a part of reality."  They cannot know that that information is true.

We certainly seem to operate as though our capacity for empathy delivers reliable information about people. If you mean that we can't know this information is true 100% of the time, sure. But this is true of most everything we know.

We do, in good conscience, treat others with varying degrees of empathy.  I do not feel the same disquiet over the starving children in Africa as I do over my own starving children.  It is no coincidence that those who I feel most responsible for are those who are my closest relations.

This seems to be the result of having a concrete rather than abstract conceptualization of empathy. For someone with an abstract conceptualization of empathy, the starving children in Africa may cause the same disquiet you feel for your own starving children.

Gemini might find it good that others feel her pain, but is that pain good for the others?

Whether it's good for people to feel my pain is not the issue. The issue is that the capacity to empathize with me gives you objectively true information about the part of the universe that is me.

[Mudhammam]

Devil's advocating for some premises:

Premise 1. Subjectivity is ontologically objectively existent.

Premise 2. Moral values are purely and wholely epistemlogically subjective.

Premise 3. Those wholly epistemolgically subjective moral values reside ontologically objectively existent within all human brains.

Premise 4.  Those ontologically objectively existent moral values residing in human brains are just as capable of disageeing with one another as if they were not ontologically objective.

Premise 5. Ontological objectivity is both entirely meaningless and valueless and there is no difference whatsoever between ontologically objective moral values and fully subjective moral values.

In summary I'd conclude that ontology is meaningless. 'Being' is indefinable and therefore no different to 'nothingness' because nothingness can't be anything anyway because it's nothing. There is no nothing.

I'm doubtful of premise 2, absent of clarification. There's a lot to unpack in your usage of the words "moral values" and "purely and wholly epistemologically subjective." I would argue that, in my understanding of "moral values," that is, how one ought to live in relation to others, the maximization of the total happiness is an ideal that is intrinsically valuable, or good, and moreover, entails an epistemologically objective truth about the world insofar as its broader principles are apprehended and confirmed by anyone capable of rationality. It is only subjective when applied to particular situations.

I don't see how premise 4 can be true. People disagree because knowledge is derived from subjective experience, the multiplicity of which perceives the world from a variety of vantage points, both inwardly per one's physical composition and due to the surrounding circumstances, yet this doesn't render the world as if nothing were "ontologically objective." I assume you believe that we can speak objectively with regards to ideas about material facts. Why then do you assume otherwise with regards to ideas about ideas, which are what moral values amount to, more or less?

Thus, premise 5 doesn't follow. There surely is a difference between truth and opinion, reality and appearance; "chocolate is relatively better than vanilla" is an opinion that expresses a subjective fact about a particular consciousness; "pleasure is intrinsically better than pain" is a truth that expresses an objective fact about general consciousness.

Being is not nothingness, and nothingness is not meaningless, at least taken relatively. So, no, ontology is not meaningless. The problem is rather that your premises make all sorts of ontological assumptions about the reality or actuality of ideas as opposed to material objects, which is ironic given that their aim is itself an idea that purports to be true... But what is the ontology of truth (is it objective?), and why grant it, but reject moral values?

[Excited Penguin]

Devil's advocating for some premises:

Premise 1. Subjectivity is ontologically objectively existent.

Premise 2. Moral values are purely and wholely epistemlogically subjective.

Premise 3. Those wholly epistemolgically subjective moral values reside ontologically objectively existent within all human brains.

Premise 4.  Those ontologically objectively existent moral values residing in human brains are just as capable of disageeing with one another as if they were not ontologically objective.

Premise 5. Ontological objectivity is both entirely meaningless and valueless and there is no difference whatsoever between ontologically objective moral values and fully subjective moral values.

In summary I'd conclude that ontology is meaningless. 'Being' is indefinable and therefore no different to 'nothingness' because nothingness can't be anything anyway because it's nothing. There is no nothing.

I'm doubtful of premise 2, absent of clarification.  There's a lot to unpack in your usage of the words "moral values" and "purely and wholly epistemologically subjective."  I would argue that, in my understanding of "moral values," that is, how one ought to live in relation to others, the maximization of the total happiness is an ideal that is intrinsically valuable, or good, and moreover, entails an epistemologically objective truth about the world insofar as its broader principles are apprehended and confirmed by anyone capable of rationality.  It is only subjective when applied to particular situations.  

I don't see how premise 4 can be true.  People disagree because knowledge is derived from subjective experience, the multiplicity of which perceives the world from a variety of vantage points, both inwardly per one's physical composition and due to the surrounding circumstances, yet this doesn't render the world as if nothing were "ontologically objective."  I assume you believe that we can speak objectively with regards to ideas about material facts.  Why then do you assume otherwise with regards to ideas about ideas, which are what moral values amount to, more or less?

Thus, premise 5 doesn't follow.  There surely is a difference between truth and opinion; "chocolate is relatively better than vanilla" is an opinion that expresses a subjective fact about a particular consciousness; "pleasure is intrinsically better than pain" is a truth that expresses an objective fact about general consciousness.

Being is not nothingness, and nothingness is not meaningless, at least taken relatively.  So, no, ontology is not meaningless.  The problem is rather that your premises make all sorts of ontological assumptions about the reality or actuality of ideas as opposed to material objects, which is ironic given that it is itself an idea that purports to be true... But what is the ontology of truth, and why grant it, but reject moral values?

Hey, dude, where you been at?

[Mudhammam]

Hey, dude, where you been at?

Oh, I've just been dicking around really. I didn't intend to stay away for so long, needed a little break, and then concern over getting sucked back into some asinine debate kept me off for a wee bit longer. But... here I am lol.

[Edwardo Piet]

For what it's worth, turtle, I'm pretty sure I'm on board with you. Objectivity is an entirely illusory concept when you get right down to it.

Epistemological objectivity is impossible and ontological objectivity is trivially true absolutely 100% tautologically true to the point of useless redundancy.

It's the difference between impossible and pointless.

[Edwardo Piet]

Given that subjective preferences are mediated by objectively measurable neural configurations, I think it's premature to declare morality subjectivity.

Let's assume that "objectively true" means there's an isomorphic map-territory relationship (correspondence theory of truth). If someone empathizes with my mental state--which is to say, simulates my sentiments by experiencing (via mirror neurons) what I'm experiencing, that they have true information about a part of reality (me). 

This is not only objectively true, but it entails that the empathizing person will not cause me gratuitous suffering. In order to justify causing other people suffering, we have to shut off our capacity for empathy, by demonizing people, or regarding them as animals, or insane, etc. I think that when you cash it out, this amounts to the kind of moral ontology you get from contractariansim, due to the fact that determining values by emulating the mental states of others via mirror mirror neurons is practically identical to determining values by rational agents behind a veil of ignorance.

This all fascinates me.

Again, the ontological aspect is meaningless.

This would be a weak form of 'knowing' the ontologically objective subjectivity of another. So hmmm... ontology is meaningful to one extent: To distinguish between it and epistemology.

People's subjectivity objectively exists. Without distinguishing between ontological and epistemological objectivity a statement like that can confuse people.

Morality can be objective if defined in a certain way so as to consider disregarding the empathy of others to be bad.

The way I see it is... objective morality is not the same as universal morality. Sure there will always be idiots who are like "I think not giving a shit about people is just as moral" but we can discard them like we discard the idiots who think fossils were placed there by Satan. "You can't prove that empathy and compassion has anything to do with morality" makes as little sense to me as "You can't prove that dogs and cats have anything to do with pets."

[Gemini]

This all fascinates me.

Again, the ontological aspect is meaningless.

This would be a weak form of 'knowing' the ontologically objective subjectivity of another. So hmmm... ontology is meaningful to one extent: To distinguish between it and epistemology.

People's subjectivity objectively exists. Without distinguishing between ontological and epistemological objectivity a statement like that can confuse people.

Morality can be objective if defined in a certain way so as to consider disregarding the empathy of others to be bad.

A few years ago I read a paper by a philosopher who argued that philosophy doesn't make progress. He argued that intractable philosophical disagreements are the result of people conceptualizing things in different ways, which results in philosophers talking past one another on the key issues that cause their disagreements.

I think he's wrong on philosophy not making progress (we shouldn't expect all philosophical disciplines to progress at the same rate, and we've only been doing this for a few thousand years), but I think he's right on the latter point. Which means that when two philosophers use words like "universals" or "free will" or "morality," the targets of their terms may be irreconcilably different concepts.

So it's absolutely true that morality can only be objective if it's defined a certain way. And nothing compels us to define it that way. We could define "morality" in terms of obeying commands or rules, and then it would be impossible to find an objective basis for it. Just as if we defined or conceptualized "bachelor" differently, then there might be a possible world in which there were married bachelors. The question is which definition/concept of morality is the most useful.

The way I see it is... objective morality is not the same as universal morality. Sure there will always be idiots who are like "I think not giving a shit about people is just as moral" but we can discard them like we discard the idiots who think fossils were placed there by Satan. "You can't prove that empathy and compassion has anything to do with morality" makes as little sense to me as "You can't prove that dogs and cats have anything to do with pets."

I think part of the problem is that when we first learn about "right and wrong" as children, our capacity for empathy isn't fully developed. When we're children, we can't rely on empathy to moderate our behavior, for the same reason that sociopaths can't. We're missing some vital hardware (and many psychologists argue that kids can't be diagnosed as sociopaths, because normal kids share too many symptoms with sociopaths).

So we start out conceptualizing morality in terms of commands issued by authorities. But trying to define morality qua morality in the way that children understand it strikes me as being the same kind of mistake epistemologists make when they try to define epistemic justification in a way that grants children epistemic rationality (some do!). Which leads to "properly basic beliefs" and that general class of bullshit.

I mean, come one. Children believe in Santa Clause. And (in reasonable courts of law) they can't be tried as adults either, which makes them neither rational nor moral.

Which is an important pragmatic consequence of this philosophical issue. We've got to teach kids what real morality and rationality are. And as a society, we're not making much of an effort right now.

[Edwardo Piet]

I think he's wrong on philosophy not making progress (we shouldn't expect all philosophical disciplines to progress at the same rate, and we've only been doing this for a few thousand years), but I think he's right on the latter point. Which means that when two philosophers use words like "universals" or "free will" or "morality," the targets of their terms may be irreconcilably different concepts.

I think clearing up the equivocations is how philosophers make progress

^^

So it's absolutely true that morality can only be objective if it's defined a certain way. And nothing compels us to define it that way. We could define "morality" in terms of obeying commands or rules, and then it would be impossible to find an objective basis for it.

True but there are certain definitions that are just plain silly. If we define morality to be "Becoming a serial killer and murdering everyone for fun" then I'd say that's objectively immoral because if serial-killing isn't considered immoral then the word "immoral" wouldn't mean anything at all, but it does.

To say that murdering to people just for fun can be the definition of "moral" would be like saying bleeding constantly from both eyes can be the definition of "healthy".

Hehe.

Just as if we defined or conceptualized "bachelor" differently, then there might be a possible world in which there were married bachelors.  The question is which definition/concept of morality is the most useful.

Of course we'd have to remember that was completely the opposite of the definition we normally use

Redefining bachellors so they can be married is like redefining a circle so it can be square... or redefining morality so it can apply to mass murdering without any relief

I think part of the problem is that when we first learn about "right and wrong" as children, our capacity for empathy isn't fully developed. When we're children, we can't rely on empathy to moderate our behavior, for the same reason that sociopaths can't. We're missing some vital hardware (and many psychologists argue that kids can't be diagnosed as sociopaths, because normal kids share too many symptoms with sociopaths).

Agreed but then again objective is not the same as universal

I mean, come one. Children believe in Santa Clause. And (in reasonable courts of law) they can't be tried as adults either, which makes them neither rational nor moral.

There can still be objectively moral answers in principle even if they're impossible in practice though

Which is an important pragmatic consequence of this philosophical issue. We've got to teach kids what real morality and rationality are. And as a society, we're not making much of an effort right now.

Yes. And for a start I think "Don't become a serial-killer" is step one of the meaning of "morality" at least