Devil's advocate for why ontology is meaningless and vacuous.

[Jenny A]

Devil's advocating for some premises:

Premise 1. Subjectivity is ontologically objectively existent.

Premise 2. Moral values are purely and wholely epistemlogically subjective.

Premise 3. Those wholly epistemolgically subjective moral values reside ontologically objectively existent within all human brains.

Premise 4. Those ontologically objectively existent moral values residing in human brains are just as capable of disageeing with one another as if they were not ontologically objective.

Premise 5. Ontological objectivity is both entirely meaningless and valueless and there is no difference whatsoever between ontologically objective moral values and fully subjective moral values.

In summary I'd conclude that ontology is meaningless. 'Being' is indefinable and therefore no different to 'nothingness' because nothingness can't be anything anyway because it's nothing. There is no nothing.

My brain may be fuzzy , premise 1 doesn't make sense to me. Ontology is the study of what is existent. So the statement seems redundant. All you've said is subjectivity is objectively extent. Is that all you mean?

Premise 2 is also fuzzy. Moral values subjective in that there is no agreed upon moral standard. But some proposed standards are objective so morals are not wholly subjectve.

As per premise 3 subjective values are objectively found to reside in people's brains.

Premise 4 merely means just because all humans objectively have moral standards doesn't mean they have the same moral standards.

Premise 5 makes no sense to me either. Extant objectivity is valueless or meaningless because there is no difference between existing objective and subjective morals?

Regardless, you premises don't lead to the conclusion that existence is a meaningless term.

[robvalue]

I'll just go ahead and throw my stuff in again:

The way I see it, there are two main ways we relate to reality, in order to inform our decisions. We measure (or estimate measurements) and we value. The first is an attempt to gain factual information, close enough that it is fit for purpose. We choose the method by which we measure. We should all expect to get pretty much the same answer using this method, for any particular measurement, if done correctly.

Valuation is a much more complex procedure. Even if they wanted to, I doubt the average person could put their value systems into a neat method for others to reproduce without grossly oversimplifying. Also, they are highly dynamic. In order for any kind of valuation to become "objective", a method must be agreed. Clearly there is no problem agreeing methods for measurement. We just want information, in ways we can process it. But the whole point of valuation is that we all have different methods. It's the methods that make it subjective. Of course, you could just create a method, like you create a way of measuring length. But it's of no practical use, because the results don't help anyone make decisions unless they happen to agree with that value system. In such a case, they are already using it, so...

[Edwardo Piet]

My brain may be fuzzy , premise 1 doesn't make sense to me. Ontology is the study of what  is existent.  So the statement seems redundant.  All you've said is subjectivity is objectively extent.  Is that all you mean?

No because many would think that "subjectivity is objectively existent" would be a contradictory statement. Indeed ontology is the study of being or existence. There is ontological objectivity and there is epistemological objectivity. For that reason "subjectivity is objectively existent" is not a contradiction because I have specified that I am talking about ontological subjectivity which is indeed is objectively existent if only as a totality of subjective objects or 'subjects'.

I specified it because although "subjectivity exists objectively" is a contradiction if we're talking about epistemology it's not a contradiction if we're talking about ontology.

Premise 2 is also fuzzy.  Moral values subjective in that there is no agreed upon moral standard. But some proposed standards are objective so morals are not wholly subjectve.

What do you mean some proposed standards are objective? Could you give an example?

Premise 5 makes no sense to me either.  Extant objectivity is valueless or meaningless because there is no difference between existing objective and subjective morals?

Ontologically objective moral values are moral values that objectively "exist" but the point is it doesn't matter whether moral value "X" objectively 'exists' outside of subjectivity or not.

A lot of confusion resides over a different answer to the question "Does the imagination exist?" or "Is the imagination real?" and the proposed differences between the two. For the former question I'd either answer "yes" or "yes but only in one sense" but to the latter I'd answer "no".

What is imaginary is the opposite of what is real but both imaginary things that only reside in the mind and real things that also reside outside the mind still reside somewhere or are present or existent or extant or 'there'.

Regardless, you premises don't lead to the conclusion that existence is a meaningless term.

In that case I challenge you to define "existence" in a non-circular way and also allow it to include the fact that subjectivity and the imagination itself objectively exists without it collapsing into "everything exists in the sense that every thing exists in the sense that if a thing does not exist it is not a thing at all. Whether that 'thing' be an imaginary or real thing."

[robvalue]

I've given up defining "existence" and "reality" in non-circular terms. I've not seen it done. I use them only comparatively, or informally. Hence absurdism

[Edwardo Piet]

I define "existence" as "presence" and "reality" as "non-imaginaryness" that's how I get round it.

That's my metaphysics.

[Edwardo Piet]

By the way I'd just like to say that discussing logic, epistemology and philosophy in general with Rob is extremely satisfying to me.

[Arkilogue]

I've given up defining "existence" and "reality" in non-circular terms. I've not seen it done. I use them only comparatively, or informally. Hence absurdism

It get's even better with the meaning of "nothing"...

Nothing | Definition of Nothing by Merriam-Webster
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nothing
Merriam‑Webster
Full Definition of nothing. 1 a : something that does not exist b : the absence of all magnitude or quantity; also : zero 1a c : nothingness, nonexistence. 2

The first word in the definition of nothing...is "something".

Then it says "the absence of all magnitude or quantity"....which is not found in nature.....doesn't sound like science can help here. So then I come full circle in concluding that "nothing" actually does exist by virtue of the nonexistence of it's definition. "Nothing" is true.

---

I define "existence" as "presence" and "reality" as "non-imaginaryness" that's how I get round it.

That's my metaphysics.

Funny thing though, looking at civilization around us, every single iota of it was once just an idea in someone's imagination.

Take Buzz Lightyear for instance: He's a real toy from a real movie about made up characters, echoing a real cultural schism during America's space race with Russia...

Is the "post 911 world" real? Or do manufacturers of "patriotism" need it to be real? Are we real characters in a made up movie?

Who's paradigm is the real paradigm? Maybe none of them. Like in a dream, perhaps "reality" isn't needed when content can be emotional produced "out of nothing" and people move accordingly.

[robvalue]

Here is how I view things, as I discussed with Hammy. I attempt to abstractly model and label things, that's all.

Let's assume there is some form of objective reality. I call this reality 1. I don't even attempt to say "how real" this is. I find such concepts meaningless and circular. So I can deduce that two objects are both 1-real, they are as real as each other. I can't prove it, I can just reasonably demonstrate it to be apparently the case. My car and my table, for example.

My imagination is reality 2a let's say. Anything in it is as real as anything else in it. They are 2a-real. Again, I don't even attempt to say how real this is, or that it's more or less real than 1-real. It's just (possibly) different. I'm not saying it necessarily is different, either.

I say 2a because it's fairly reasonable to put some other guy's imagination on the same sub-level. Joe Bloggs' imagination is 2b-real. It's just a way of arranging it. It's not an attempt to directly compare them, just to note apparent similarities.

And so on. I find this is a useful way of labelling, and it doesn't fail under solipsism. If nothing is "real" at all, that is fine. If reality 1 turns out to be an "illusion", that's fine too.

[Edwardo Piet]

Funny thing though, looking at civilization around us, every single iota of it was once just an idea in someone's imagination.

Very true. However outside of civilization you have many things that were around before human imagination or even the imagination at all existed. 'Tis the reality of evolution via natural selection.

[Edwardo Piet]

@ Rob

I see what you mean by it all being labelling... as you said here:

If nothing is "real" at all, that is fine.

Replace this sentence with "If everything is "real", that is fine" or "if nothing is "imaginary" at all, that is fine" or "if everything is "imaginary", that is fine" and nothing changes... indeed... all labels.

It's also why I said this in the OP:

In summary I'd conclude that ontology is meaningless. 'Being' is indefinable and therefore no different to 'nothingness' because nothingness can't be anything anyway because it's nothing. There is no nothing.

Let's say I replaced that with the following:

In summary I'd conclude that nothingness is meaningless. 'Nothingness' is indefinable and therefore no different to 'Being' because 'Being' itself has to be everything which is indistinguiable from it being nothing. All there is is 'Being'.

What's the difference between the two? I'd say in reality it makes no difference and is labels. The first one is bascially saying "Existence is indefinable and there is no such thing as nothing" and the second one is saying "Nothingness is in definable and every thing is a thing".

It's rather like how "everything is equally different to everything else" and "everything is equally similar to everything else" is saying the same thing regardless of "different" and "similar" having opposite meanings.

What do you reckon?