Why materialists are predominantly materialists

[The Grand Nudger]

This is simply an abuse of Leibniz' law.  That they do not appear to be interacting in the same way is no evidence that they are different.  This is simply a philosophical maneuver.  If experiences like redness do occur in the brain, they are a result of being 'poked' by the right nerve impulses.  That I poke something with the impulse from a probe rather than an impulse from a nerve is a difference without a difference.  You seem to be making an abstruse argument that things happen in your subjective awareness because of non-physical events.  You are simply assuming your conclusion again.

I'm not disputing any of this.  I'm saying you can poke the mechanism for experience, and this is not the same as poking the experience.  The experience is say slow-dancing with Tomb Raider era Angelina Jolie; how does one poke that?  Am I going to have a big needle coming into my field of view?  Feel a sudden pinch on my butt?  How would it even work?

I'm NOT saying that anything other than the brain is responsible for experiences.  I'm 100% agnostic on where experiences come from in a deep philosophical sense, BUT in our practical understanding, it seems to be all about the brain.  Please understand this-- I'm not even saying you're wrong. . . I'm simply saying you can't equate the framework which allows for the supervenience of a property with the supervened property.  They cannot be said to be identical, because they must be treated differently.

Must, lol.  No, they mustn't.  The addition done by your computer and the computers hardware are -exactly- the same thing (addition, to a computer, is simply a description of the state of the adders).  You can say "may computer does addition" or, you can point at the adder in-state and say "this is my computers addition".   Your general rule is demonstrably invalid.  If it's applicable to a brain....it would be a special case.

If your experience of redness is, in fact, the state of some portion of your brain..then poking the portion does indeed poke red. Now the rule has been made invalid in the specific because it fails to exclude this -sufficient- possibility.

[bennyboy]

If your experience of redness is, in fact, the state of some portion of your brain..then poking the portion does indeed poke red.  Now the rule has been made invalid in the specific because it fails to exclude this -sufficient- possibility.

Okay, I'll dream up a unicorn, and then you try and poke it with a big needle. Then try and poke the brain portions in which the unicorn is represented. I might smell smoke, or the unicorn might vanish, but I can tell you what won't happen, 100%-- the unicorn won't get poked with your needle. That's because the experience is an experience, and the mechanism is a mechanism. They aren't the same.

And no, you can't poke red. That's because red is a color, not an object, and only objects can be poked. You can poke maybe the brain part that generates the experience of red, but you can't poke red.

I think you are conflating representation with reality. There are little people on my TV screen, but that's just a representation. I can't touch the little people cuz boink! my finger will just bounce off the screen. The movie characters won't be like "Hey, dude! Don't poke me!" Yeah, I could corrupt the file, or melt the physical film, or whatever, and fuck up the movie-- but that doesn't mean I'm doing those things to say Angelina Jolie.

[The Grand Nudger]

Okay, I'll dream up a unicorn, and then you try and poke it with a big needle.  Then try and poke the brain portions in which the unicorn is represented.

Is there a difference?  

I might smell smoke, or the unicorn might vanish, but I can tell you what won't happen, 100%-- the unicorn won't get poked with your needle.

I'm not sure how you could know that.

That's because the experience is an experience, and the mechanism is a mechanism.  They aren't the same.

It was invalid as a general rule, and unsupportable as a specific rule.  I don't know what else to tell you.  They may not be, in the special case of a brain (plead away)...but we have no good reason to think that and plenty of good reason to think otherwise.  

And no, you can't poke red.  That's because red is a color, not an object, and only objects can be poked.  You can poke maybe the brain part that generates the experience of red, but you can't poke red.

If you say so, I guess. 

I think you are conflating representation with reality.  There are little people on my TV screen, but that's just a representation.  I can't touch the little people cuz boink! my finger will just bounce off the screen.  The movie characters won't be like "Hey, dude!  Don't poke me!"  Yeah, I could corrupt the file, or melt the physical film, or whatever, and fuck up the movie-- but that doesn't mean I'm doing those things to say Angelina Jolie.

When you say you can't touch the "little people" that's demonstrably untrue.  You can.  I know this because those "little people" are just a bunch of bits.  You can hold them in your hand.  They aren't, -actually- "little people".  OFC you aren't doing any of those things to angelina jolie.  You're doing those things to the collection of bits you -call- angelina jolie...for whatever godforsaken reason.  You can probably see how this can be extended to include our brains and our experiences, right?

Wasn't I the one that was supposed to be conflating representation with reality....?

[Angrboda]

If your experience of redness is, in fact, the state of some portion of your brain..then poking the portion does indeed poke red.  Now the rule has been made invalid in the specific because it fails to exclude this -sufficient- possibility.

Okay, I'll dream up a unicorn, and then you try and poke it with a big needle.  Then try and poke the brain portions in which the unicorn is represented.  I might smell smoke, or the unicorn might vanish, but I can tell you what won't happen, 100%-- the unicorn won't get poked with your needle.  That's because the experience is an experience, and the mechanism is a mechanism.  They aren't the same.

This doesn't follow at all if experiences are the behavior of the mechanism. You may have different viewpoints on the behavior of the mechanism, that doesn't make them separate. What exactly are you arguing here? That because the experience appears different from the mechanism that brings about the experience that the two are distinct? That's just philosophical posturing. Even you can understand the reason why mechanism and experience are being equated. If I take the digital signal going to a TV and change out those bits representing Walter Cronkite with those representing Brad Pitt, I've certainly changed the experience because the experience and the mechanism are indivisible. You can't change the bits at all without changing the experience. The behavior of the mechanism is the experience. If I disable those parts of the brain that are responsible for creating the experience of redness, how have I not 'poked' redness? What are you expecting to see differently if the behavior of the mechanism and the experience aren't united?

And no, you can't poke red.  That's because red is a color, not an object, and only objects can be poked.  You can poke maybe the brain part that generates the experience of red, but you can't poke red.

You are being overly literal here. Your experience is being asserted as the behavior of the brain. You have no point here other than an obvious bit of perspectivism.

I think you are conflating representation with reality.  There are little people on my TV screen, but that's just a representation.  I can't touch the little people cuz boink! my finger will just bounce off the screen.  The movie characters won't be like "Hey, dude!  Don't poke me!"  Yeah, I could corrupt the file, or melt the physical film, or whatever, and fuck up the movie-- but that doesn't mean I'm doing those things to say Angelina Jolie.

But you are manipulating the image of Angelina Jolie. If I say instead of 'poke' that you can manipulate the experience of red by manipulating the brain? Then you have no argument, as your entire argument depends on a slavish literalism. How does what you are saying in any sense indicate that consciousness is not a product of the brain?

[bennyboy]

But you are manipulating the image of Angelina Jolie.  If I say instead of 'poke' that you can manipulate the experience of red by manipulating the brain?  Then you have no argument, as your entire argument depends on a slavish literalism.  How does what you are saying in any sense indicate that consciousness is not a product of the brain?

That's a strange argument, since I haven't been arguing that consciousness is not a product of the brain. I've been arguing that products (aka supervenient properties) are not identical to the systems on which they supervene-- much as "red" is not "apple."

[The Grand Nudger]

Which is a demonstrably false statement.  That's -exactly- how your computer works. The product -is- the system, literally and physically. If the product is -not- identical to the system....then the system is malfunctioning.

As I said before..it might be that the brain works differently. But the statement above can't be used as a general rule to infer as much or demand that they be described as such, because it's simply false.

[Silver]

I bought a PS4. Does that make me a materialist?

[Mudhammam]

Why don't you try and describe to me a non-material something. Anything at all. I'll wait.

I might start with the relations between the various properties discovered by experimenting with different functions that can be developed in abstract thought using these non-material objects :


Or you can always follow Plato's lead, and consider what on earth it could mean to call the True, the Good, and the Beautiful "material." Or "being," "one," "thing," "something," "substance," etc., none of which are "material entities" if by matter you mean the collection of objects that relate to sense perception.

[bennyboy]

Which is a demonstrably false statement.  That's -exactly- how your computer works.  The product -is- the system, literally and physically.  If the product is -not- identical to the system....then the system is malfunctioning.

As I said before..it might be that the brain works differently.  But the statement above can't be used as a general rule to infer as much or demand that they be described as such, because it's simply false.

Eh?  League of Legends is not my computer.  p0rn is not my monitor.  Redness is not an apple.  Your way of thinking is so strange to me that I think there's little point trying to argue.  Let's say the process is this: the brain does some stuff, and I experience that stuff as an imagined unicorn.  The unicorn isn't the brain function-- it's a four-legged horse-thingie with one horn.  That you cannot see that the neurological representation of the unicorn and the unicorn as I qualitatively experience it are different is truly mystifying to me.  I sincerely don't know where to go from here-- but I see that there are a lot of new shows on now, so maybe it's time to take a break from this.

[The Grand Nudger]

Eh?  League of Legends is not my computer.  p0rn is not my monitor.  Redness is not an apple.  Your way of thinking is so strange to me that I think there's little point trying to argue.

I'm not really sure what you mean.  The porn on your computer -is- a colleection of physical computational devices.  The game, pron, and color on your screen -are- the system.   This isn't any way of thinking of mine..it's just how your computer works.  

 Let's say the process is this: the brain does some stuff, and I experience that stuff as an imagined unicorn.  The unicorn isn't the brain function-- it's a four-legged horse-thingie with one horn.

That might be what a unicorn out in the world would be...but we're not talking about one of those, are we?  We're talking about a brain function.  So what is or isn't true of a unicorn out in the world, if there are any...isn't informative with regards to what we're discussing.  A unicorn and a brain function may not be the same thing, but so what? The unicorn of your mind -can- be a brain function.  We know that it's possible.

That you cannot see that the neurological representation of the unicorn and the unicorn as I qualitatively experience it are different is truly mystifying to me.

You haven't been talking about nuerological representations or qualitative experience...you've been counting the legs and horns of unicorns as though we were discussing a hard bodied horse rather than a thought about a horse.

I sincerely don't know where to go from here-- but I see that there are a lot of new shows on now, so maybe it's time to take a break from this.

Till next time, I suppose.