Do you believe in free will?

[Norfolk And Chance]

Do you have evidence for the black dots that keep appearing? Or are they an illusion brought on by the physical process the mind uses to create images?

You have free will because you experience it, is the same as claiming the black dots are real because you experience it.

They are both illusions created by the physical processes of your brain, and how stimuli causes chains of reaction which is beyond our ability to comprehend.

The true question of free will, is what constitutes the reality. Is it purely what we perceive, or is there a higher measure for reality than our limited perceptions.

You claim theists have no evidence for God, yet how often do you hear of their private inner conviction. What you have presented is that you have a private inner conviction that you could have chosen differently. What evidence do you have of that? Its an unfalsifiable self-authenticating private belief, and no different to that of a belief that a sky daddy made the universe and tells you right from wrong.

You believe in free will, completely, just like a theist does with God, but you have no evidence of its existence, beyond the illusion of it. You are deluded I'm afraid.

Your definition of free will is different to mine.

My definition of free will is that an individual can make their own decisions - I don't believe I can do that, I know it.

[NoMoreFaith]

Your definition of free will is different to mine.

My definition of free will is that an individual can make their own decisions - I don't believe I can do that, I know it.

Hence my comparison with a strong theist. You have no objective evidence for your belief, merely a strong private conviction it is true.
Completely irrelevant, since it is indistinguishable from the illusion of it.

You don't KNOW that you make the decisions, and as referred to before, studies show that the action is initiated by the subconscious before your conscious even knows wtf is going on, and apparantly then justifies the action as "yeah, that was my idea all along, honest".

[Norfolk And Chance]

Your definition of free will is different to mine.

My definition of free will is that an individual can make their own decisions - I don't believe I can do that, I know it.

Hence my comparison with a strong theist. You have no objective evidence for your belief, merely a strong private conviction it is true.
Completely irrelevant, since it is indistinguishable from the illusion of it.

You don't KNOW that you make the decisions, and as referred to before, studies show that the action is initiated by the subconscious before your conscious even knows wtf is going on, and apparantly then justifies the action as "yeah, that was my idea all along, honest".

Yes, I know I make my decisions.

[NoMoreFaith]

Yes, I know I make my decisions.

[genkaus]

There is still a lack of alternative choices, the other part of free will. If you are unable to choose a different alternative, then you cannot posit any rational description of free will.

The correlation between motivation and its corresponding action is a demonstration of Will, but not Free. You had no alternatives.

No, the alternative choices are available. Which one of the alternative choices you'd choose is determined by your will. It is within the nature of the agent to have alternate wills and it is that difference that makes alternate choices possible.

The correlation of an action with motivation is demonstration of uncoerced will - which by your definition is the same as free-will.

Firstly, incapability of opting for an alternative.

The very existence of alternatives indicates capacity of choice.

Secondly, the motivation and action become inconsistent because the motivation is the rationalisation of the action itself. Based upon our own private perception, it appears that we rationalise then act, which is far more debatable than most people realise, and in regards to minor movements, actively wrong. Whether this applies to large rational decisions rather than instinct is where it gets very fuzzy, its an area which we may never fully understand.

Putting motivation before action is putting cause before its effect - its ignoring the chain of causality. Perhaps you are talking about the difference between conscious and unconscious motivations. But most of meaningful actions undertaken are the result of conscious motivation - otherwise all we'd see would be people acting instinctively and then trying to justify those actions.

If we limit things to the motivation leading to the action, it ignores the reactionary nature of motivation. You are motivated only as result of external or internal stimuli. You are drawing a line where no line need be drawn in order to justify your definition from my perspective.

Firstly, its your definition.

Secondly, the question is simple - how do you differentiate between a coerced and an uncoerced action?

I agree on a certain level, that the apparent correlation between our motivation and the action is strong, and strong enough to make a case that we have a will, but I do not go so far as to call it free because I do not ignore the causations which led to the motivation.

Who's ignoring the causations leading to the motivation? And how are they relevant to your definition of free will? Its not a complicated issue. Coercion means action against will, i.e. action against motivation. The knowledge of these two are all that are required to judge the issue. The cause of the will or the external entity making the action contrary to the will are irrelevant.

On the contrary, that makes the assumption of free will at all. I do not, therefore cannot see free-will starting. Determinism doesn't end, and free will never starts.

Having understood the deterministic position, all you can say is determinism doesn't end - it bears no relevance on whether free-will starts or not. But because you have misunderstood free-will and assumed that it holds a position fundamentally contrary to determinism - you cannot see it starting.

From my position you are mired so deeply in the assumption of free will, that you fail to see it is an irrelevant term for our actions.

On the contrary - I never assumed free-will. I deduced it. And how is the question of whether our actions are uncoerced irrelevant?

I think we can both agree, that any attempt to define the self, is fuzzy and incomplete as to be pointless to reach consensus.

And thus the answer to where free-will begins would be as fuzzy and incomplete - because free-will cannot start before the self does.

You certainly asserted the illusion, and actuality of free will were different, but never coherently backed up the assertion. Which I note you have done once more.

How is the fundamentally different understanding of the principle an incoherent backup for the distinction made?

What you are doing, is asserting something which is compatible with free will, and hijacking the phrase free will to a deterministic causal chain as an explanation via creation of action through motivation to do so.

So, I'm staying true to the definition of free-will, rejecting the irrational and self-contradictory interpretation of it and explaining it as a mechanism which is very real. I don't see a problem here.

So far neuroscience seems to indicate, although only in terms of non-consequential actions, that the activity to commit to an action, occurs before the conscious motivation to do so.
Whether this is also true of larger conscious decisions is open to debate, but it would not surprise me if all actions occur on this level, which are merely rationalised by the conscious mind.

If I recall the cited experiment correctly - the action was not committed to before conscious motivation was available - it was still open to retraction. As suggested by the name of the activity - readiness potential.
Further, in non-consequential actions, this argument might hold, since the time difference between the motivation and the action are minimal. But in goal-directed behaviour, this certainly would not hold, since the motivation and all possible actions leading to it need to be considered before the action is undertaken.

[Anomalocaris]

If uncoerced will is, in principle, predictable with finite information, is it still free?

[Norfolk And Chance]

Yes, I know I make my decisions.

Why? No one would care. We all know we have our own free will, there's nothing to discuss.

I used my free will to decide to post this reply on this thread, and I may or may not decide to reply again.

[genkaus]

If uncoerced will is, in principle, predictable with finite information, is it still free?

By definition - yes.

[Anomalocaris]

Yes, I know I make my decisions.

Why? No one would care. We all know we have our own free will, there's nothing to discuss.

I used my free will to decide to post this reply on this thread, and I may or may not decide to reply again.

Why do you think your really had the freedom to choose from all the options that you recognized but eventually didn't chose? All you know is you don't see why you couldn't have chosen differently. But given the state of neuroscience, it seem hard to believe that you really could have seen very far down the exact neurological mechanism of your decision making process.

May be you recognize multiple choice, but it was as predictable as night following day that you will choice the one you actually chose. Choices only appears to be there due to gaps in your understanding of how you think. In reality you will chose exactly how you chose, and you can't deviate from it regardless of how many choices you imagine to have been available to you.

In this scenario, what is the meaning of free will?

[NoMoreFaith]

No, the alternative choices are available. Which one of the alternative choices you'd choose is determined by your will. It is within the nature of the agent to have alternate wills and it is that difference that makes alternate choices possible.

As long as we are leaving the word free from your will, it naturally contradicts the possibility of alternate choice.

The correlation of an action with motivation is demonstration of uncoerced will - which by your definition is the same as free-will.

My definition of free will is the ability of an agent to to choose between alternatives free from causation.
It is important in a discussion of this nature to use the common consensus for the definition.

EDIT: Just to add.. there is no consensus, hence the difficulty in trying to discuss it with you.

“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.

As such, and I repeat, the human agent cannot choose a particular action from among various alternatives. His choices are made for him through the natural processes of his mind.

You wish that free will is compatible with determinism, which is fine, thats your view, but just because it appears to be a free choice, ignorance of the causation of motivation make it pure illusion.

Putting motivation before action is putting cause before its effect - its ignoring the chain of causality. Perhaps you are talking about the difference between conscious and unconscious motivations. But most of meaningful actions undertaken are the result of conscious motivation - otherwise all we'd see would be people acting instinctively and then trying to justify those actions.

What can I say, our illusion of free will is a strange beast.

More to the point, if our instincts are subject to being justified, what makes you think the big decisions aren't.

You're starting to remind me of the creationist who claims macro-evolution cannot be implied from micro-evolution.
What do you think big decisions are? They are just lots of small decisions put together.

If we limit things to the motivation leading to the action, it ignores the reactionary nature of motivation. You are motivated only as result of external or internal stimuli. You are drawing a line where no line need be drawn in order to justify your definition from my perspective.

Firstly, its your definition.

No, Its not. I was responding to your point where you brought up action and motivation. Let's go back in time....

Certainty and inevitability do not indicate any necessary conflict between the action and motivation. The action maybe certain and inevitable - however, if the agent's motivation behind the action and the action itself are consistent with each-other, then the action is uncoerced.

The point is, that your motivation is certain and inevitable in a given situation. Of course their consistent. But ignoring the causation of motivation is your fundamental error in reasoning.

However, do not apply that definition to me, you brought it up. I was merely pointing out that motivation and action are consistent merely because the causation of motivation leads to the action.

Secondly, the question is simple - how do you differentiate between a coerced and an uncoerced action?

You don't. There is no such thing as an uncoerced action. Hence hard determinism
The argument is that the illusion of freewill can make you feel free from the coercion of causative factors, but that is all it is.

But because you have misunderstood free-will and assumed that it holds a position fundamentally contrary to determinism - you cannot see it starting.

Simply because I agree with a hard deterministic school of thought on the matter does not equate to misunderstanding free-will. I can only put this down to arrogance on your behalf.

Kant sums it up quite nicely;

According to this, that is sometimes called a free effect, the determining physical cause of which lies within the acting thing itself, e.g., that which a projectile performs when it is in free motion, in which case we use the word freedom, because while it is in flight it is not urged by anything external; or as we call the motion of a clock a free motion, because it moves its hands itself, which therefore do not require to be pushed by external force; so although the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which precede in time, we yet call them free, because these causes are ideas produced by our own faculties, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances, and hence actions are wrought according to our own pleasure. This is a wretched subterfuge with which some persons still let themselves be put off, and so think they have solved, with a petty word- jugglery, that difficult problem, at the solution of which centuries have laboured in vain, and which can therefore scarcely be found so completely on the surface.

If I recall the cited experiment correctly - the action was not committed to before conscious motivation was available - it was still open to retraction. As suggested by the name of the activity - readiness potential.
Further, in non-consequential actions, this argument might hold, since the time difference between the motivation and the action are minimal. But in goal-directed behaviour, this certainly would not hold, since the motivation and all possible actions leading to it need to be considered before the action is undertaken.

CERTAINLY would not hold? The world of neuroscience awaits your revelation with baited breath. Everyone's a closet Nobel prize winner today.

It still comes down to lots of little decisions to create the larger conscious decisions. But until you present some evidence that the conscious ever directs the action itself without recourse to causation, I will remain a hard determinist.
For that, there is no evidence you act after you think. I think that is remarkably telling.

The indications do so far, seem to correlate heavily with a determined response system. Whether it is entirely true or has exceptions like you suggest, remains to be seen. But the indications are certainly there, and until I see evidence to the contrary, I see no reason to see determinism and free will as compatible.

Typical philosophy discussion, if the definitions are not clearly defined at the start, and philosophers have yet to come to a consensus on it, so theres no hope for amateurs like you and me.

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Why? No one would care. We all know we have our own free will, there's nothing to discuss.

Yeah, its only been discussed for thousands of years with no conclusion, and only now being touched upon by neuroscience.

Who would care. If you don't nobody does! Its so obvious now