Is it true that there is no absolute morality?

[bennyboy]

That's right.  The kind of objective moral truth I'm talking about-- that of a hypothetical best action at all given moments-- is useless in establishing and acting on a moral system.

If objective moral truths are useless in establishing and acting on a moral system then...perhaps, you're not talking about moral truths at all?

Well, there is intent and outcome. I'd say that a subjective moral truth, if you can call it that, is about intent; an objective moral truth would have to be about the outcome-- basically, whatever you think is right, there is an ACTUAL best act you could take at a given moment.

Please note that I'm not really sold on this idea-- I'm just looking for a kind of morality that could sensibly be called "objective," apart from the super-obvious "morality is the human capacity for acting on a sense of social balance," which is more true by definition than by proof.

What I think would more closely speak to potential objective moralities...is why you leveraged infanticide as the hook of the dilemma, and not just any baby, Hitler.  The "cure all diseases" part is explicit and fits with the metrics- this would be a selectively advantageous outcome.  But killing a kid...and why hitler?  Those two probably have moral opinions behind them...it would be those statements, themselves...that were the moral opinions in question.

My point is that on different scales, killing a kid is clearly immoral, killing a kid if it will save millions might be moral, but saving millions if they start an intergalactic war of carnage and planetary destruction would, if you knew the outcome, be immoral.

I might even go so far as to say that intent must be completely divorced from objective morality.

I don't know why the timescale is important at all?  Can't an action be the "best" for that moment?  Do we have to save the universe to present a clearcut example of "best action".  I'd aim lower, our day to day lives, our common interactions.

Well, this is the problem with my theory, isn't it? To have a maximally best behavior, there still has to be some goal by which the behavior's goodness is measured, either immediately or at different time scales. And unless there is a non-arbitrary time scale to choose from, at least that part of the equation must be subjective: "I think we should look at moral consequences as they affect a single lifetime" or whatever.

Another possibility would be to have a kind of conditional subjective/objective pairing. So you could say, "Given goal X, there should be a hypothetical maximally perfect behavior Y at any given moment in time." So the goals of the morality are then subjective, and the (objective) moral facts would be those actions which, almost certainly unknowingly, would have the best chance of leading to that goal.

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, there is intent and outcome.  I'd say that a subjective moral truth, if you can call it that, is about intent; an objective moral truth would have to be about the outcome-- basically, whatever you think is right, there is an ACTUAL best act you could take at a given moment.

Please note that I'm not really sold on this idea-- I'm just looking for a kind of morality that could sensibly be called "objective," apart from the super-obvious "morality is the human capacity for acting on a sense of social balance," which is more true by definition than by proof.

Now I understand, lol.  Well, I think the criticism you'll receive, constantly, from a selective advantage morality, is that it's not morality at all.  It's just a search for selective advantage.  The moralities we currently possess may sensibly be called objective moralities, though such classification may be partly or wholly inaccurate.  An objective morality is one in which moral opinions correlate to moral facts.  Do any of our moral opinions correlate to moral facts?  

Is it subjectively or objectively wrong to kill an infant?
Did you make it wrong to kill an infant? (subjective)
Is it only your opinion that it is wrong to kill an infant? (subjective)
Could it be right, if you decided that it was so? (subjective)
Is it wrong based upon something independent of any given observers perspective? (objective)

Now, in defense of selective opportunism....I'd say that it's at least objective...even if it isn't a morality, lol. There is a fact of "optimally advantageous" to refer to. Objective morality looks for these as well, moral facts. For example..is it true that hurting someone is harmful, or that morality is a means to avoid being either the agent or victim of harm? If it is..then harming someone is immoral, this would be a moral fact of the matter just as "optimally advantageous" is a selective fact of the matter.

My point is that on different scales, killing a kid is clearly immoral, killing a kid if it will save millions might be moral, but saving millions if they start an intergalactic war of carnage and planetary destruction would, if you knew the outcome, be immoral.

On different scales, an apple weighs a third of a pound.  Now, does it weigh a third of a pound on different scales because there is such a things as a pound and it possesses a third of one as an attribute.....or for some other reason(or non-reason)...like, say, different scales just so happen to yield "a third of a pound" in the case of an apple due to it's method of manufacture?  The former would be an objective morality analog.  The latter would be an evolutionary or selective advantage analog.  

Now, in your example, the dependent immediacy of moral dilemma is brought to bare by knowledge of a negatively valued consequence...but why is killing the kid wrong, by those metrics?  It's not a dilemma at all unless killing a kid is a selective problem for evolved moralities.  It doesn't seem to be...that's a strategy employed both within and between species.  It certainly worked out to our advantage.  In your example..it's difficult to see the dilemma at all....but yet you perceive one.  Figuring out -why- killing a kid would be immoral (or moral) in your proposed scale would go further toward discussing objective moralities than wondering about the consequences beyond the subject of the moral dillemma itself.....which is killing a baby named hitler.  

I might even go so far as to say that intent must be completely divorced from objective morality.

Why?  If our intent was to adhere to an objective morality, but for whatever reason we failed at that, there are likely moral provisions for the resultant scenario.  Unintended consequences that we consider to be beyond the moral culpability of the agent.  Would a moral act become immoral if it yielded, through some strange and unforseeable future gyrations, a terrible unintended outcome?  I don't see why.  A moral act may have terrible consequences...but that's exactly why I asked the question..."can a moral behavior also be selectively deleterious".  Can doing the right thing yield undesired outcomes.  I'd say that much is trivially easy to answer.  Yes.  Sometimes, doing the right thing is disadvantageous..and not just by selective standards.  

Well, this is the problem with my theory, isn't it?  To have a maximally best behavior, there still has to be some goal by which the behavior's goodness is measured, either immediately or at different time scales.  And unless there is a non-arbitrary time scale to choose from, at least that part of the equation must be subjective: "I think we should look at moral consequences as they affect a single lifetime" or whatever.

Well, the problem with your theory is probably more to do with it not being a moral theory, but a biological persistence theory.  You've misused subjectivity.  Our possession of subjective moral opinions based upon timescales..arbitrary or well defined does not tell us whether or not there is a moral fact of the matter, or whether or not our moral opinions correlate to them....and it certainly has no ability to make a moral fact (again, if there are any) a moral opinion..or vv.  The only question relevant to subjectivity and objectivity in the context of morality is whether or not our moral opinions, at any point between the immediate and the infinite, correlate to moral facts.  

Another possibility would be to have a kind of conditional subjective/objective pairing.  So you could say, "Given goal X, there should be a hypothetical maximally perfect behavior Y at any given moment in time."  So the goals of the morality are then subjective, and the (objective) moral facts would be those actions which, almost certainly unknowingly, would have the best chance of leading to that goal.

You're misusing subjectivity again.  Goal x may -be- morality.  That a person views goal x through their subjective agency would not and does not make the goal, itself..subjective..it merely restates that we view it through subjective filters.  That we possess moral opinions.  The reason that this is uninformative is that while I may subjectively value goal x, and I definitely view goal x subjectively...goal x might -also- objectively -be- true.  The reverse is not the case, which is why it makes sense to separate them.  Just because goal x is true, doesn't mean that my subjective moral opinion will align with it, or that my subjective filters will detect or appreciate it.  Hence, moral disagreement and error theory.

[The Grand Nudger]

 Is it morally good to murder  ?
 Is it morally good to abuse children ?
 Is it morally good to rape ?
 Is it morally good to steal ?
 Is it morally good to have a martial affair?

Nope.  
 

 Knowing it is absolutely wrong to murder can stop an individual from murdering while to say it is arbitrary wrong to murder can justify murder in one's mind

People justify murders even when they do conceptualize murder as absolutely wrong, most of us are morally compromised, though maybe not about murder (lol).  I doubt it's uility, and would point out that it's utility is not a demonstration of it's objectivity...unless you only seek to demonstrate that it's objectively useful, but not necessarrily objectively true.  

Now I'm curious on what the board thinks. If Albert Fishes actions were wrong, and the Romans and Greeks were ok by their standards at the time. Am I a being hypocrite to my own morality?

I don't think so.  Implicit in your assessment of the romans and greeks is that you still consider what they did to be wrong..you simply understand they might not have thought so.  Whereas you can see no circumstance that would diminish the moral culpability of Albert Fish. You consider both acts wrong, you're differentiating between the actors, not either acts moral status.

[Sterben]

 Is it morally good to murder  ?
 Is it morally good to abuse children ?
 Is it morally good to rape ?
 Is it morally good to steal ?
 Is it morally good to have a martial affair?

Nope.  
 

 Knowing it is absolutely wrong to murder can stop an individual from murdering while to say it is arbitrary wrong to murder can justify murder in one's mind

People justify murders even when they do conceptualize murder as absolutely wrong, most of us are morally compromised, though maybe not about murder (lol).  I doubt it's uility, and would point out that it's utility is not a demonstration of it's objectivity...unless you only seek to demonstrate that it's objectively useful, but not necessarrily objectively true.  

Now I'm curious on what the board thinks. If Albert Fishes actions were wrong, and the Romans and Greeks were ok by their standards at the time. Am I a being hypocrite to my own morality?

I don't think so.  Implicit in your assessment of the romans and greeks is that you still consider what they did to be wrong..you simply understand they might not have thought so.  Whereas you can see no circumstance that would diminish the moral culpability of Albert Fish.  You consider both acts wrong, you're differentiating between the actors, not either acts moral status.

         Thank you, ever since I posted this I kept thinking about it and came to a similar conclusion. I was thinking to hard in black and white setting when morality does not have a black and white standard.

[bennyboy]

Is it subjectively or objectively wrong to kill an infant?

If killing the infant will definitely serve a greater good, like saving hundreds of other babies, then it is not wrong at all, though your subjective ideas about that act, without foreknowledge, will be incorrect. In other words, there may be an objective moral fact, and you act wrongly due to a lack of information.

Did you make it wrong to kill an infant? (subjective)
Is it only your opinion that it is wrong to kill an infant? (subjective)
Could it be right, if you decided that it was so? (subjective)
Is it wrong based upon something independent of any given observers perspective?  (objective)

It's wrong because without other knowledge, it is likely to do more harm than good. WITH knowledge, it may or not be wrong to kill the infant.

On different scales, an apple weighs a third of a pound.  Now, does it weigh a third of a pound on different scales because there is such a things as a pound and it possesses a third of one as an attribute.....or for some other reason(or non-reason)...like, say, different scales just so happen to yield "a third of a pound" in the case of an apple due to it's method of manufacture?  The former would be an objective morality analog.  The latter would be an evolutionary or selective advantage analog.  

That's a strangely useless equivocation on "scale." I'm talking about the duration of time in which the moral consequences of an action are considered.

Why?  If our intent was to adhere to an objective morality, but for whatever reason we failed at that, there are likely moral provisions for the resultant scenario.

You can't "adhere" to objective morality except by acting on your instincts and hoping they approximate a maximally good behavior.

Would a moral act become immoral if it yielded, through some strange and unforseeable future gyrations, a terrible unintended outcome?  I don't see why.

If there were such a thing as objective morality, and if objective facts represented the maximally beneficial act at a given time, then yes, your mind and actions would be out of tune with that moral fact, and would be immoral.

 
Well, the problem with your theory is probably more to do with it not being a moral theory, but a biological persistence theory.

It's a persistence theory based on social instincts, and the behaviors that maximally serve the goals of those instincts.

 
You're misusing subjectivity again.  Goal x may -be- morality.  That a person views goal x through their subjective agency would not and does not make the goal, itself..subjective..it merely restates that we view it through subjective filters.  That we possess moral opinions.

And where those opinions are not in accord with the the moral facts of the moment (i.e. the most perfect possible behavior), then the person's opinions, or at least their actions, are incorrect.

This doesn't even require objective goals. Let's say a well-meaning samaritan attempts to save a suicide victim, but knows nothing about how to do so. They start babbling about how everyone has access to love, but the potential suicide is only reminded about how everyone they loved abused and abandoned them. They start talking about God, but the potential suicide is only reminded how many times they tried to hold on to their faith, only to be sorely disappointed. "Fuck this," and exeunt.

Is the do-gooder's action moral or immoral? I'd argue it's immoral. Despite good intent and a particular moral idea in mind, the person had insufficient information to take important action, and fucked everything up. The moral fact was that the intended behavior was deleterious, and the intent had very little to do with whether the act was moral or not. In fact, I'd say that VERY MUCH of what Christian fucktards do is immoral in this exact way-- their intent (they think) is often very good, but because they are such deluded fuck-ups, they are unaware of the moral facts of life, and end up doing much harm.

[The Grand Nudger]

If killing the infant will definitely serve a greater good, like saving hundreds of other babies, then it is not wrong at all, though your subjective ideas about that act, without foreknowledge, will be incorrect.  In other words, there may be an objective moral fact, and you act wrongly due to a lack of information.

OFC, but..again, some would say that killing an infant is never a moral good even if there were a positively valued outcome from it.  People who, for example...wouldn;t kill baby Hitler, or would...but think it was wrong to kill baby Hitler....and they made a morally compromised choice.  

It's wrong because without other knowledge, it is likely to do more harm than good.  WITH knowledge, it may or not be wrong to kill the infant.

Harm =/= selective advantage.  Is the scale of morality harm or is it selective advantage?  

That's a strangely useless equivocation on "scale."  I'm talking about the duration of time in which the moral consequences of an action are considered.

You can't "adhere" to objective morality except by acting on your instincts and hoping they approximate a maximally good behavior.

If you're going to use the term, then learn it.  A scale is simply something used to measure a quantity.  There are many types of scales, that measure different types of quantities.  Some different types of scales measure the same types of quantities.  Deciding how much bad or good an act is is, in principal, no different than determining how many "pounds" something weighs.  We use a scale, maybe we use different scales.  They count up the units in question.  It's easy, for pounds..because there's an objective unit of measurement.  A fact of the matter ( ).  The question of objective morality is whether or not there is any objective moral unit of measure, a moral fact of the matter.  If there were, is there a scale?  A way to count the units of question?  If so, do any of our moral opinions correlate to those moral facts as quantified by our scale?  Whether or not we could adhere to it would be an issue separate to it's objectivity - related to our moral competency and actual ability - you provide a great example below.  

If there were such a thing as objective morality, and if objective facts represented the maximally beneficial act at a given time, then yes, your mind and actions would be out of tune with that moral fact, and would be immoral.

Well, we're kind of going back and forth between harm and selective advantage, so I'll ask the question.  Does the above follow, in your opinion, from moral opportunism as the objective morality, or from the nature of harm as the objective morality?  

It's a persistence theory based on social instincts, and the behaviors that maximally serve the goals of those instincts.

All well and good, but is it a moral theory?  A theory on the evolutionary origin of morality is not necessarily informative as to what our moral imperatives are, and where they come from...today.  

And where those opinions are not in accord with the the moral facts of the moment (i.e. the most perfect possible behavior), then the person's opinions, or at least their actions, are incorrect.

* Yeah.   *conditions and terms may vary

This doesn't even require objective goals.  Let's say a well-meaning samaritan attempts to save a suicide victim, but knows nothing about how to do so.  They start babbling about how everyone has access to love, but the potential suicide is only reminded about how everyone they loved abused and abandoned them.  They start talking about God, but the potential suicide is only reminded how many times they tried to hold on to their faith, only to be sorely disappointed.  "Fuck this," and exeunt.

Is the do-gooder's action moral or immoral?  I'd argue it's immoral.  Despite good intent, the person had insufficient information to take important action, and fucked everything up.  The moral fact was that the intended behavior was deleterious, and the intent had very little to do with whether the act was moral or not.  In fact, I'd say that VERY MUCH of what Christian fucktards do is immoral in this exact way-- their intent (they think) is often very good, but because they are such deluded fuck-ups, they are unaware of the moral facts of life, and end up doing much harm.

I'd call it a moral action with an unfortunate outcome.  

Christards are in moral disagreement with us.  Not, usually, about whether morality is objective...but the contents of their purportedly objective moralities...particularly as compared to others.  However, let's just use an easy one.  We're all pretty sure murder is bad.  We've all got some extenuating circumstance and minutae... but we can draw a line on that one with reasonable certainty.  Do christards and ourselves both think that murder is wrong for some reason x...or do we both think that murder is wrong because the moral statement purports to reports facts, does report facts, and is true?  They may be deluded, largely..or we may be, or we both may be to some extant or another...but on this question?

I'd say, for example...that while an objective morality based upon selective advantage -could- report facts...they are not the facts it purports to report.  Whereas an objective morality based upon the nature of harm can also report facts, and they are the facts it purports to report.  A category error.

[parrotfish]

I've seen people say a lot that there is an absolute morality, but it seems to me that there is not. 


There definitely is no absolute morality. Nothing humans do or create in their minds exists outside of their minds. Though I like to live like there is an absolute morality--albeit it is a continuum we are constantly improving upon. 

[bennyboy]

Harm =/= selective advantage.  Is the scale of morality harm or is it selective advantage?  

That's right. I've discussed that already, I think.

All well and good, but is it a moral theory?  A theory on the evolutionary origin of morality is not necessarily informative as to what our moral imperatives are, and where they come from...today.

I've never claimed that my definition of moral facts or moral objectivity was useful. I doubt it, since we can't see the future. However, there may be some utility in considering things this way: not digging in because I'm "right," but considering the long-term implications of an action. A good example would be bombing wedding to get bad guys. You might be "right" in getting the bad guys, but the long term effect will be some deeply angry people and possible retribution.

Christards are in moral disagreement with us.  Not, usually, about whether morality is objective...but the contents of their purportedly objective moralities...particularly as compared to others.  However, let's just use an easy one.  We're all pretty sure murder is bad.  We've all got some extenuating circumstance and minutae... but we can draw a line on that one with reasonable certainty.  Do christards and ourselves both think that murder is wrong for some reason x...or do we both think that murder is wrong because the moral statement purports to reports facts, does report facts, and is true?  They may be deluded, largely..or we may be, or we both may be to some extant or another...but on this question?

I'd say implicit in views about murder is a social instinct. All our goals, basically, are expressions of love, fear, and so on. However, when ideas are skewed by false beliefs, for example in an eternal soul which mediates the effects of murder (read: crusades, torture, drone strikes), then I'd argue that (though we can't know for sure), we'd suspect that they've wandered pretty far from the moral facts.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's right.  I've discussed that already, I think.

It's important to know which were using so that we can see whether or not the statements made about objective morality follow from them, or only apply to an objective morality if it is determined to be judged by the metrics of selective advantage, is all.  Is there a problem with objective morality, in that regard, or is it a problem with moral opportunism -called- objective morality?  

I've never claimed that my definition of moral facts or moral objectivity was useful.  I doubt it, since we can't see the future.  However, there may be some utility in considering things this way: not digging in because I'm "right," but considering the long-term implications of an action.  A good example would be bombing wedding to get bad guys.  You might be "right" in getting the bad guys, but the long term effect will be some deeply angry people and possible retribution.

It's utility is without question.  It's downright definitional.  Moral opportunism by selective advantage can't help be anything -but- useful, I'm just not sure it's moral.  We can see enough of the future to keep our heads above water.  

Getting the bad guys and bombing a wedding to get the bad guys aren't the same thing.  One might be good, the other bad.  

I'd say implicit in views about murder is a social instinct.  All our goals, basically, are expressions of love, fear, and so on.  However, when ideas are skewed by false beliefs, for example in an eternal soul which mediates the effects of murder (read: crusades, torture, drone strikes), then I'd argue that (though we can't know for sure), we'd suspect that they've wandered pretty far from the moral facts.

If you accept moral facts (even with the priviso that we can;t know for sure..because honestly, what can we know for sure, eh?) then you don't have -too- much of a problem with objectivity in morality. Maybe the issues you have with it don't stem from it's objectivity.....but from the metrics by which you determined it?

It may be a social instinct, but does it correlate to a moral fact, and what moral facts are those, if any?

[bennyboy]

That's right.  I've discussed that already, I think.

It's important to know which were using so that we can see whether or not the statements made about objective morality follow from them, or only apply to an objective morality if it is determined to be judged by the metrics of selective advantage, is all.  Is there a problem with objective morality, in that regard, or is it a problem with moral opportunism -called- objective morality?  

I wouldn't call moral opportunism objective morality, nor call it that methinks. Selective advantage fails to possible cross effects over time. For example, we can maximize the growth of the species, end up with 30 billion people, and then explode in WWIV. So as I said, there still needs to be a kind of "god" idea, but not one of Sky Daddy-- one in which different outcomes may affect something universal, like the ability of the cosmos to sustain life rather than not to.

I'll readily concede it's not a very useful system of thought. More pragmatic would be an intent to look for the best overall decision in all cases, rather than the most emotionally appealing one. So we can hope to approximate the moral fact though we can't really know how close we are/aren't.

It's utility is without question.  It's downright definitional.  Moral opportunism by selective advantage can't help be anything -but- useful, I'm just not sure it's moral.  We can see enough of the future to keep our heads above water.  

Getting the bad guys and bombing a wedding to get the bad guys aren't the same thing.  One might be good, the other bad.  

Yeah, probably. It's pretty hard to get legit bad guys without ending up with a dead kid or something, though, at least in today's world.

If you accept moral facts (even with the priviso that we can;t know for sure..because honestly, what can we know for sure, eh?) then you don't have -too- much of a problem with objectivity in morality.  Maybe the issues you have with it don't stem from it's objectivity.....but from the metrics by which you determined it?

It may be a social instinct, but does it correlate to a moral fact, and what moral facts are those, if any?

It's very hard to say, though I'd still say that whatever morality IS, there may be said to be a hypothetical best action for every agent at every moment. That we can't define it, or can't cog it's proper definition, doesn't affect that too much. It just means that it's very hard to know whether you're getting it right or not.

Another example would be supporting starving people in Africa. Is it moral to do so? Immoral? Amoral? It's impossible to say. A country filled with healthy, multiplying muslims might very well lead to war like we've never seen. On the other hand-- babies with AIDS or malaria are a sad thing to know about. But if you COULD know whether a stronger African continent would benefit or hurt the species, you'd know the moral fact, and could act accordingly.