Trolley Problem/Consistency in Ethics

[Aegon]

It's a trick isn't it? The woman with gastric issues actually has RABIES and you won't find out until the other 5 patients die of rabies and that's what you get for being a cock.

[vulcanlogician]

Vulcan, I agree with Steve that the 2 scenarios are not morally equivalent, though not sure I would use the "responsibility/no responsibility" way of explaining why. Ill leave that up to steve since it was his analysis.

For my own part, I'd use the principle of double effect like I explained in my first post.

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The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/

Just to reiterate, I agree with you guys. I would not do the organ transplant. All three of us agree that the organ transplant is wrong.

But it seems that we also all agree that pulling the switch is morally right. The question is: WHY? 

CL, the doctrine of double effect can be applied to the trolley problem but it's hard to see why it would come to bear in one situation and not the other. IF "it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end" then it is morally wrong to pull the switch isn't it?

The reason I differentiate the two scenarios is because a doctor is individually responsible for each of his patients, and it is wrong for a doctor to violate that trust, even if a greater good is going to come of it. In the trolley example you are just a bystander who happens to be standing next to the switch. You are still morally responsible, but not for each person individually. It's normally a facet of moral responsibility that doesn't influence one's potential choices, but in oddball cases like the trolley experiment, it makes all the difference.

Keep in mind, I'm still fraught with the same misgivings anyone else has in the two situations. This is just the best thing I can come up with to solve the paradoxical intuitions inherent when comparing the two scenarios. There really is no right answer. The comparison was meant to provoke thought about what drives a moral decision.

[Catholic_Lady]

Vulcan, I agree with Steve that the 2 scenarios are not morally equivalent, though not sure I would use the "responsibility/no responsibility" way of explaining why. Ill leave that up to steve since it was his analysis.

For my own part, I'd use the principle of double effect like I explained in my first post.

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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/

Just to reiterate, I agree with you guys. I would not do the organ transplant. All three of us agree that the organ transplant is wrong.

But it seems that we also all agree that pulling the switch is morally right. The question is: WHY? 

CL, the doctrine of double effect can be applied to the trolley problem but it's hard to see why it would come to bear in one situation and not the other. IF "it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end" then it is morally wrong to pull the switch isn't it?

The reason I differentiate the two scenarios is because a doctor is individually responsible for each of his patients, and it is wrong for a doctor to violate that trust, even if a greater good is going to come of it. In the trolley example you are just a bystander who happens to be standing next to the switch. You are still morally responsible, but not for each person individually. It's normally a facet of moral responsibility that doesn't influence one's potential choices, but in oddball cases like the trolley experiment, it makes all the difference.

Keep in mind, I'm still fraught with the same misgivings anyone else has in the two situations. This is just the best thing I can come up with to solve the paradoxical intuitions inherent when comparing the two scenarios. There really is no right answer. The comparison was meant to provoke thought about what drives a moral decision.

Because in the first scenario, the one person dying is an unintended consequence of saving the most amount of lives possible. The goal isn't for the other person to die. In the second scenario, the goal IS for the other person to die, since you directly and purposely killed them in order to steal their organs.

Death from unintended consequence, vs death from direct killing in order to take something from them.

[vulcanlogician]

If we propose that this were the same person in two different situations in their life it;s easy to see that in saving five in the trolley example a person is being consistent with their consequentialist ethics.,..but having had their moral agency compromised by mortality has chosen a course of action in body farming quantitatively less optimal in killing 1 to save 5 rather than killing 1 to save 6.  

In the one, the subject could do no better.  In the other, he has failed by degree and made himself a murderer in the process.

The numbers game can get interesting... kill one to save 5?--nah. Kill one to save 50?--nope. Kill one to save 500?--um... 5,000? What about 5,000,000?

Comparing the thought experiments does cause me to rethink my intuitions, perhaps more than you. To me, it demonstrates that consequentialism is important in ethics, but not final. At some point it fails, and other considerations supercede the "maximally good outcome." You and I agree that the doctor's particular brand of responsibility causes a divergence, but you seem to stick to consequentialism a bit more than I do: "the medical system could not function if this were permissible" (or perhaps yours is a more Kantian take on the issue). I see the doctor's unique responsibility in terms of his being individually responsible for each patient, while a person next to the trolley switch is collectively responsible for the lives of those on the track. For me, moral responsibility exists in both situations (I part with Steve on this) but the nature of that responsibility prompts different courses of action.

[Longhorn]

Aside from the difference in causation, I think another issue here are the cirumstances like Mathilda, Khem and others mentioned. You have a moral obligation as a practitioner of medicine to never deliberately harm your patients. Being a bystander in an extraordinary situation, choosing between the inevitable death of one or five, neither directly caused by you doesn’t follow the same rules.

[The Grand Nudger]

The numbers game can get interesting... kill one to save 5?--nah. Kill one to save 50?--nope. Kill one to save 500?--um... 5,000? What about 5,000,000?

Comparing the thought experiments does cause me to rethink my intuitions, perhaps more than you. To me, it demonstrates that consequentialism is important in ethics, but not final. At some point it fails, and other considerations supercede the "maximally good outcome." You and I agree that the doctor's particular brand of responsibility causes a divergence, but you seem to stick to consequentialism a bit more than I do: "the medical system could not function if this were permissible" (or perhaps yours is a more Kantian take on the issue). I see the doctor's unique responsibility in terms of his being individually responsible for each patient, while a person next to the trolley switch is collectively responsible for the lives of those on the track. For me, moral responsibility exists in both situations (I part with Steve on this) but the nature of that responsibility prompts different courses of action.

I don't personally think that consequentialist ethics are final, I only illustrated how..confined solely to consequentialist ethics, killing one to save six is a better trade than killing one to save five and in the process turning hospitals into a den of vultures, lol.

I also think that "the maximally good outcome" can be superceded, but even if it couldn't, the desert of either actor (or action) is not and would not become equivalent by fiat. I can see why, for example..killing himself would not be an acceptible solution to the doctor. I don't expect him to make that decision....no moreso than I would expect the rolley switch thrower to lay down his own life if..for example, he could gum up the works and save errybody with his bones.

I simply note that, from a purely consequentialist standpoint from numbers, that would be the way to go..and since the one is in a situation in which that option is present and the other is not..it;s more an example of predictably compromised agency than of moral inconsistency.

I, personally, would kill 50k to save one.....lol. To be honest, if I;d committed to saving one single person..and everyone on earth was trying to kill that person..the killings wouldn;t end until I was dead, because I;d keep killing in retribution if they managed to off that one person. I'm not big on consequentialism in killing. I'm duty bound, not outcome seeking. Besides, somebody has to water the grass, amiright?

[vulcanlogician]

I don't personally think that consequentialist ethics are final,

I'm with you here. But do you think consequentialism is important? If so, is it more central or peripheral?

Just curious. I kind of struggle with consequentialism because of the paradoxes that arise from it (that's what I was trying to express in the OP). But in a more basic way of looking at "is this action ethical?" what better measuring stick can there be than a good or bad outcome?

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You kinda answered me in your edit...

[The Grand Nudger]

I can elaborate.  I think that consequentialist ethics have more value to the group than to the individual.  Particularly, I think that they are useful in compelling an individual to do "the bad thing" for the greater good or allow "the bad thing" to happen to them without reprisal in service of that same greater good, which might explain why c-ethics are normative and institutional..because a single individual is unlikely to be able to assess the full consequences of an action (or inaction) in a moment..or, if they could..have the interests of the group at heart over their own personal ones.

A person, for example..may not want to flip the switch at all, hoping someone else comes along and does something.  People are notoriously inactive.

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I see another poster mentioned that we have laws that might be set against a person who chooses either option.  That is nothing if not an institutional consequentialist ethic.  The notion that a world full of switch flippers that make trolleys run over one person or another person is..in point of fact..not actually likely to yield a world in which fewer people die.

So, we're compelled to allow the bad thing to happen even if we -didn't- want to, because otherwise jackasses would make stupid decisions.  Heroes with guns come to mind.

[LastPoet]

I guess there is a third solution...

I guess that takes care of survivour's guilt. Uh-oh.

[RoadRunner79]

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Hey folks!

I was recently musing over two different thought experiments whose purpose is to test the value of ethical consequentialism. For those who aren't familiar, consequentialism is a type of normative ethical theory which emphasizes the results (or consequences) of a given action.

In this paper, Judith Thompson analyzes the famous trolley problem alongside another thought experiment: the transplant problem.

Anyone who is unfamiliar with the trolley problem can find a description of it by clicking below:

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You find yourself standing next to a trolley track when, to your horror, you notice a runaway trolley which is set to hit five hapless individuals who are in the trolleys path. But there is hope! A few feet away from you stands a lever that, if pulled, will divert the trolley from its default course, thus saving the lives of five people. There is only one problem. If you pull the lever, and switch it off its track, it will be on course to hit one person who is on the other track.

So what do you do? Do you kill one person to save five? Or do you do nothing? (I should add that, even though the picture has people tied to the tracks, the original example uses railway workers who are unaware of the oncoming trolley.)

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The transplant problem is a different variation on the same ethical dilemma. In this example you are a world class surgeon whose area of expertise is organ transplants. You currently have five patients under your care who will die by the end of the day if they don't receive organ transplants. The window for any last-minute organ donations to show up has closed, and you are basically watching the clock waiting for them to die.

A patient shows up to your office complaining of mild gastric discomfort. This gives you an idea   .

If you were to subdue this patient and harvest her organs, you could save the lives of all five of your patients. But if you do this, there is no chance that the "donor" will survive. So what do you do? Do you kill one person to save five? Or do you do nothing?



The question here is: are you a consistent consequentialist? If you saved five lives at the cost of one in the trolley example, did you do so in the doctor example? If there is inconsistency, how do you justify it? Keep in mind, both examples are essentially the same: you can either ACT and save five lives (at the cost of one) or NOT ACT and let five people die. I'd like to hear people's reasoning for deciding differently or remaining consistent concerning both thought experiments.

(Even if you don't reply, please answer the attached poll. I'd like to get some raw numbers. I set it up to be anonymous.)
[/hide]

Wow.... this is about the best version of the problem, that I have seen. I think someone mentioned, that in a common form of the dilemma, one is pushing some fat guy onto the tracks. And at this point, I was fairly confident in my answer... No you can't do that. Changing it to a switch somehow makes it different. But why? The addition of the similar scenario of the doctor and the organ transplants highlights the issue well. Here, I think it is natural to have more difficulty.

It's a good thought exercise. I think that if you don't have difficulty with it, then I think that there is something wrong. Every time I think I'm getting somewhere, I look at it from another angle, and end up back with no good answer. There was a couple, that said that the trolley is different, in that you are saving, rather than actively killing someone. This sounds reasonable. But then you look at it from another angle.... if you remove the five people on the active track, and still throw the switch, it's difficult to say that you are not guilty of killing the one person. The difference that was mentioned in that their is an obligation of the doctor to the individual is interesting. A little more practical than moral; I think. But what if someone else offers to do the killing, what if it's out of the doctors hands, or they simiply get another doctor? What if this is not a one time event, but standard practice? We test everyone, and when their are a certain number of people desperate for a transplant, there is a lottery of those who are compatible. What if it is a loved one who is the individual does that effect your choice in either case.

Also I had seen a couple of answers that where extreme in concrete (literal) thinking. You need to work on your abstract though and thinking through the ideas. However for a very real world situation.... terrorist have hijacked an airplane, and are redirecting the airplane towards a large city/population group. Do you shoot down the plane, along with the innocent people on board before it gets there? Here you are actively killing some to save more. Why would this be any different from the organ transplant scenario? Does an unspoken social obligation outweigh any ethical or moral underpinnings.... I have trouble saying that it does. I think that there is something else.... I've tried coming at this from multiple angles, and to me, it is one of those things that the more you think about it; the more difficult it is.