Objective morality: how would it affect your judgement/actions?

[brewer]

OP: I doubt it would change a damn thing. I've heard objective morals all my life and it has done little to effect my behavior.

[Edwardo Piet]

This is mainly aimed at people who believe that "objective morality" is a coherent concept, and that there can be some sorts of statements about it which are independent of all opinion. I'll let each person approach it with whatever definition of morality they want.

Alright then.

Let's say you discovered that you are incorrect about some position you currently hold. You have concluded so far that, "A is a moral/immoral action, under circumstances C". Add whatever other caveats you like. Now imagine that you have access to "moral facts" somehow, and that it shows the opposite to be true.

Okay.

Which of your positions would you be willing to reverse? Would you now act differently, and judge others acting that way differently?

I'd hope that I'd put into practice the moral facts I had discovered.

Personally, I don't care about any such "facts", as I feel it would represent nothing more than some specific way of evaluating actions. Without a supporting argument as to why I should change my position by adopting this system, I won't be changing my actions or my judgements. I don't see it as a factual matter.

Well since I define objective morality as "At the very least not causing people to suffer needlessly" then when I change my position on a particular action it would merely mean that I had reason to believe that an action would cause more suffering than I had previously thought, when I had previously thought another action instead caused more suffering. I don't see any problem here. It's just facts about what causes the least suffering.

Objective morality matters because you can, for instance, say that the genital mutilation of females in another culture is wrong and immoral... period. And it's not just a matter of "I don't personally like it" or "in this culture it's immoral but in theirs it's fine". or "in my opinion it's horrible but there is no fact of the matter so my assertion that it is immoral is completely meaningless."

This is the problem with subjective morality. Why the hell should anyone listen to anyone who says such things are immoral if they're full on admitting that their opinion is the moral equivalent of them not liking the taste of Marmite?

I think the mere idea that female genital mutilation isn't objectively morally wrong is objectively morally wrong in itself. There's a big difference to saying there's a fact of the matter that such and such thing is immoral and saying that it's immoral "because God says so".

[robvalue]

Hi guys

I'll come back to check out your replies properly when my head's in the right space (this stuff makes me go a bit funny sometimes!) but I wanted to add a few more thoughts in the meantime.

I notice a kind of tautological use of "morality", as this simulated conversation between a pretend objective morality person is supposed to indicate. I'm not saying this is anyone in particular, it's just a simplified strawman to indicate my thoughts. Feel free to comment on where the conversation could differ.

Action A is objectively immoral.

Why?

It causes a form of unnecessary harm H.

What makes that objectively immoral?

Because causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral.

So... the usage of the word "immoral" here is entirely redundant. It just means "unnecessary harm". All I'm actually being told is that action A causes consequences H. Whether or not that means someone should or shouldn't care about this when deciding on their actions has yet to be established. It's only relevant to someone who cares about this, and so it's not objective morality, in that sense.

But I appreciate that if you simply assume that immoral means the cause of unnecessary harm, then by defining harm as well, you can make objective statements. However, I find this all rather sneaky, as it doesn't address morality as a code of conduct at all; that part has already been assumed before we even start.

I'm probably missing the point and/or objecting to the wrong kind of usage of "objective". One final objection is that it doesn't seem to take into account the method used, either. How do we determine if the ends justify the means? And more importantly, how do we balance harm against benefit, when we're in a real situation where it's not just a simple matter of "do horrible thing or don't do it"?

Congrats to anyone who read through to the end of this philosophobabble. Thanks very much!

[Edwardo Piet]

So for example, if we were somehow magically given factual information that "putting someone in solitary confinement is not wrong", then that would mean all the things we thought were harmful about it are somehow not as important as we thought; or else, there are some sort of countering benefits that cancel it out that we're unaware of.

The point is there's an objective fact of the matter whether we can know that fact or not. And knowledge changing (or rather what we think is knowledge: information... changing) is not the same thing as truth changing.

And new information coming to light and making us realize we were wrong no more means that the truth itself changes than it does in science.

Basically: You don't take a Jordan Peterson stance of truth on the matter of scientific truth, philosophical truth, logical truth or mathematical truth... so why take a Jordan Peterson stance of truth on the matter of moral truth?

---

I think what you are saying here is that moral facts can't be proven. So why call them facts? You can empirically prove that the Earth goes around the sun. You cannot, in the same fashion, prove that torture is wrong.

Unless one is a moral naturalist, a moral fact need not be empirically provable. (Khem has argued in favor of moral naturalism before, but I disagree with the theory, precisely because I see no way that science can determine objective moral values.)

If something is not empirically demonstrable, this does not make it non-factual. It is a fact that the square of a right triangle's hypotenuse is equal to the sum of squares of its other sides, but one can understand it a priori, without empirical proof. I take this sort of axiomatic approach to moral facts.

But before I go into further detail, I'd like to make sure I haven't completely missed the spirit of your question. Have I?

I'm a moral naturalist but I also accept the fact that objective moral knowledge is indeed not necessary for objective moral truth.

---

I notice a kind of tautological use of "morality", as this simulated conversation between a pretend objective morality person is supposed to indicate. I'm not saying this is anyone in particular, it's just a simplified strawman to indicate my thoughts. Feel free to comment on where the conversation could differ.

Action A is objectively immoral.

Why?

It causes a form of unnecessary harm H.

What makes that objectively immoral?

Because causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral.

So... the usage of the word "immoral" here is entirely redundant. It just means "unnecessary harm".

As I said elsewhere... proving things isn't the point of definitions. Check this article out on that:

https://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.co.u...nt-of.html

Yes, the idea is that causing needless harm and being immoral is one and the same thing. Saying "X action causes needless suffering" is identical in meaning to "X action causes needless suffering which is morally wrong". Saying that allowing or causing needless suffering is "wrong" doesn't add any extra meaning to it. There's no extra step. This is also exactly why the fact/value dichotomy proposed by Hume is a false distinction. It's redundant to say that we should prevent needless suffering whenever possible. The fact that allowing needless suffering to happen is immoral already implies that we should prevent it. It's like asking "Should we be morally good?". It's a nonsensical question because it's like asking "Should we do what we should do?".

[Neo-Scholastic]

OP: I doubt it would change a damn thing. I've heard objective morals all my life and it has done little to effect my behavior.

That may well be true. At the same time your behavioral norms are predicated on something even if you do not know what the something is. Otherwise you are just acting on your passing fancies which is no morality at all. For those whose behaviors are not purely driven by their momentary desires, their norms are informed by some underlying principles - the respective virtues of those principles is the difference between the principled stance of a hero and the rationalizations of a criminal.

Western atheists that promote the "Good without God" simply take for granted that the behavioral norms and principles they consider self-evidently good and true are in fact predicated on Judeo-Christian principles.

[Foxaèr]

Western atheists that promote the "Good without God" simply take for granted that the behavioral norms and principles they consider self-evidently good and true are in fact predicated on Judeo-Christian principles.

Incorrect, for anthropologically speaking, morality (the concept of being good for the benefit of all) existed in society well before Judeo-christianity attempted to monopolize it.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Western atheists that promote the "Good without God" simply take for granted that the behavioral norms and principles they consider self-evidently good and true are in fact predicated on Judeo-Christian principles.

Incorrect, for anthropologically speaking, morality (the concept of being good for the benefit of all) existed in society well before Judeo-christianity attempted to monopolize it.

You misunderstood. It is true that every culture and society has some kind of morality defining obligations and prohibitions, they are not identical because each is predicated on underlying assumptions about authority, human nature, and Man's place in the world. The moral principles of Western civilization are informed by underlying assumptions that come from Jewish and Christian traditions. The moral systems of ancient paganism, in Imperial China, among barbarian Germanic tribes, etc. were much different precisely because they did not have those traditions. If you want to know what morality looks like divorced from Judeo-Christian values all you need to do is read a little Nietzsche.

[brewer]

OP: I doubt it would change a damn thing. I've heard objective morals all my life and it has done little to effect my behavior.

That may well be true. At the same time your behavioral norms are predicated on something even if you do not know what the something is. Otherwise you are just acting on your passing fancies which is no morality at all. For those whose behaviors are not purely driven by their momentary desires, their norms are informed by some underlying principles - the respective virtues of those principles is the difference between the principled stance of a hero and the rationalizations of a criminal.

Western atheists that promote the "Good without God" simply take for granted that the behavioral norms and principles they consider self-evidently good and true are in fact predicated on Judeo-Christian principles.

Nice try Chad. Keep up the rationalizations. 

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/...-societies

[henryp]

Hi guys

I'll come back to check out your replies properly when my head's in the right space (this stuff makes me go a bit funny sometimes!) but I wanted to add a few more thoughts in the meantime.

I notice a kind of tautological use of "morality", as this simulated conversation between a pretend objective morality person is supposed to indicate. I'm not saying this is anyone in particular, it's just a simplified strawman to indicate my thoughts. Feel free to comment on where the conversation could differ.

Action A is objectively immoral.

Why?

It causes a form of unnecessary harm H.

What makes that objectively immoral?

Because causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral.

So... the usage of the word "immoral" here is entirely redundant. It just means "unnecessary harm". All I'm actually being told is that action A causes consequences H. Whether or not that means someone should or shouldn't care about this when deciding on their actions has yet to be established. It's only relevant to someone who cares about this, and so it's not objective morality, in that sense. 

I'm buying what you're selling here.  For example, I've just created Squirrality.  Squirrality says causing unnecessary harm to squirrels is objectively imsquirral.

[Angrboda]

Incorrect, for anthropologically speaking, morality (the concept of being good for the benefit of all) existed in society well before Judeo-christianity attempted to monopolize it.

You misunderstood. It is true that every culture and society has some kind of morality defining obligations and prohibitions, they are not identical because each is predicated on underlying assumptions about authority, human nature, and Man's place in the world. The moral principles of Western civilization are informed by underlying assumptions that come from Jewish and Christian traditions. The moral systems of ancient paganism, in Imperial China, among barbarian Germanic tribes, etc. were much different precisely because they did not have those traditions. If you want to know what morality looks like divorced from Judeo-Christian values all you need to do is read a little Nietzsche.

You're a dishonest and disingenuous twat. Your claims are false and you're sufficiently educated to know that.

The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant is a literary work from the Middle Kingdom of Egypt (2040-1782 BCE) which illustrates the value society placed on the concept of justice and equality under the law. In the story, a peasant named Khun-Anup is beaten and robbed by Nemtynakht, a wealthy landowner, who then tells him there is no use in complaining to the authorities because no one will listen to a poor man. The rest of the tale relates how Khun-Anup, believing in the power of justice, refutes Nemtynakht and wins his case.

The Eloquent Peasant & Egyptian Justice