First order logic, set theory and God

[T0 Th3 M4X]

Or..... we're staring at a pile of garbage insisting that a diamond just has to be in there, somewhere...it's only an issue of lumping it up just right.

But you don't know.  Even randomness can yield results.  No different than trying to catch a fish in a muddy pond.  You can't see any fish, but  based on what you know already, you can optimally improve your chances of catching one.  Even if you don't know the optimal spot, you could just happen to cast in the right spot anyway and catch one.  But if I assume there are no fish anywhere in the pond, there's 0 percent chance that I'll catch one.  That doesn't mean I won't come up empty handed, but my chances go from 0 to possible.  And yes, I'm talking about "fish", just so it doesn't drift.

[The Grand Nudger]

You must mean that you don't know.  I already commented on what I know.

[Belacqua]

The B-theory of time, for example, has the flow of time being an illusion and that nothing objectively precedes anything else. All moments in time just are ("past, present, and future"). In this case, if the B-theory of time is true, then this is not a problem at all for the B-theorist. The B-theorist can simply ignore this as it does not assume the B-theory of time.

As you know, what is logically prior need not be temporally prior. 

If a logician says that space-time is logically or essentially prior to, say, hydrogen, it doesn't matter whether space-time appeared first in time and then hydrogen appeared later, or whether they appeared at the same instant. 

So I'm not sure whether A-theory or B-theory would affect the argument. 

Again, I'd like dron3 to clarify whether he sees this as a purely temporal argument. I think, maybe, we could say the car doesn't cause the steering wheel, even if there is no time at all.

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That doesn't mean I won't come up empty handed, but my chances go from 0 to possible.

And if we learn in the process why the argument is bad, then we have learned something. 

It's better than rejecting it for no reason.

[GrandizerII]

As you know, what is logically prior need not be temporally prior. 

If a logician says that space-time is logically or essentially prior to, say, hydrogen, it doesn't matter whether space-time appeared first in time and then hydrogen appeared later, or whether they appeared at the same instant.

In what way is a part of a car logically prior to the car itself without being perhaps temporally prior?

[The Grand Nudger]

If a is the cause of b, then in what sense would it be reasonable to imply that b existed prior to a? How could a have caused b in a span of time that b was existent and a was not? If b relies on a, then how could b exist prior to a? How could b have existed in a span of time prior to a if b's existence relies on a?

The argument you're discussing is explicitly temporal. It's okay to insist that something in the future is the cause of some other thing in the past....but lets make sure that we understand that this is what were doing.

[Belacqua]

As you know, what is logically prior need not be temporally prior. 

If a logician says that space-time is logically or essentially prior to, say, hydrogen, it doesn't matter whether space-time appeared first in time and then hydrogen appeared later, or whether they appeared at the same instant.

In what way is a part of a car logically prior to the car itself without being perhaps temporally prior?

Space-time is essentially prior to hydrogen in that space-time has to exist for hydrogen to exist. If space-time winked out, so would hydrogen. 

This is different from a temporal causal chain, in which the cause (e.g. your parents) may cease to exist while the caused thing (e.g. you) continues. 

I think the parts of a car must exist for the car to exist. If the parts melted and burned, the car would disappear too. Thus, the parts are essentially prior. In this case, they are also temporally prior, but I'm not sure that's what the argument is using.

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If a is the cause of b, then in what sense would it be reasonable to imply that b existed prior to a?

It isn't reasonable to imply that.

[GrandizerII]

If a is the cause of b, then in what sense would it be reasonable to imply that b existed prior to a?  How could a have caused b in a span of time that b was existent and a was not?  If b relies on a, then how could b exist prior to a?  How could b have existed in a span of time prior to a if b's existence relies on a?

The argument you're discussing is explicitly temporal.  It's okay to insist that something in the future is the cause of some other thing in the past....but lets make sure that we understand that this is what were doing.

First of all, no idea if this is a response to me or not.

Second of all, if it is, then I could argue that causality is not necessarily a fundamental feature of reality. Under some metaphysical views (supportable by modern cosmology), just as a -> b, then b -> a because time objectively may be symmetric.

[The Grand Nudger]

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If a is the cause of b, then in what sense would it be reasonable to imply that b existed prior to a?

It isn't reasonable to imply that.

It can be, but only in one sense, only in one case.  Backward causation. In all other cases, any cause preceding any effect must happen in either one moment, or one -plus moments.

[GrandizerII]

I think the parts of a car must exist for the car to exist. If the parts melted and burned, the car would disappear too. Thus, the parts are essentially prior. In this case, they are also temporally prior, but I'm not sure that's what the argument is using.

That's fair. I still suspect there is something "trappy" about P3 but can't pinpoint exactly what the trap is, but let me give this a good think and I'll get back to you later.

[The Grand Nudger]

Rahn already described what was wrong with the above, a few posts back.

Is a blind man no longer a human being because he doesn't have two functioning eyes ?

According to P3, he's not. In fact he doesn't even logically exist until he has every functioning part that makes up a human being.

-and to that we can add...if the car disappears when some part burns up...which it doesn't...then a man would disappear when he lost a leg.....which, again, just a friendly psa, we don't. If the type of cause we're referring to is the type of cause that makes some dependent x disappear in it's absence, neither car parts nor human parts are those kinds of causes...nor are cars and humans those kind of effects of those causes. I've got cars out in my yard missing parts, and I've got a chunk lost here and there.

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-this, just for completeness sake, has implications for both non temporal and temporal notions of any first cause - in that if this cause was like car part causes and human part causes...it only needed to exist just long enough to instantiate those effects..and could have blinked out immediately afterward.

If this were the case...then the first cause could very literally not exist in the present. Entirely like, as Belaqua pointed out.....our parents. So, if we insist that car parts and human parts -are- the kind of causes we're discussing.....then they are exactly like temporal causal chains in the respect specified.