Morality

[The Grand Nudger]

You mean the convenience of being the person-owner..not some economic benefit to society or humanity, necessitated i by a dire situation.

The person-owner, and his tribe that he’s contributing to, with no real concern for the greater society or humanity as a whole.

God deferred to simple human greed?  

God didn’t defer to anything.

Magic book says it did.  Is magic book an authority on what god did or didn't do?  

I never appealed to the Bible in this argument about morality, so I never appealed to its credibility in this area either.  

You must have realized..when making blanket and untrue assertions about atheists and moral concepts...that you may end up explaining how you overcome those difficulties you seem to find prescient.  

What is meaningful objective morality?

Good question.  You tell me..so that we're on the same page with this and can always refer back to it.  

Is there an external reality called the Good, that places moral obligations on us, tells us how we ought to behave and live? That I ought serve it, over my own self interest?

Yes, no.....no.....and yes....all regardless of moralities ontological status.  

In order for morality to be objective, it’s requires a reality independent of ourselves, that contains moral values, and moral aims and purposes. Not some cold disinterested reality, but one that’s concerned about our moral lives.

Why would it need to contain aims or purposes?  We supply those handily.  

Why would it need to be interested?  We're interested enough.  -How- could it be interested?  Concerned?  These are human attributes.  Anthropomorphization of the cosmos.  A god.

Are we discussing objective moralities..or gods?  

Is that what you believe? Like I do. If not than your moral realism is in doubt.

OFC not..I'm an atheist.  Why would my moral realism be in doubt on account of my atheism..and why is your moral realism -not- in doubt on account of your god beliefs?

[Acrobat]

Do you subscribe to moral realism?

I ascribe to evolution. Not old mythology.

Evolution produces BOTH cruelty and compassion. I chose non violence and empathy beyond that.

You subscribe to old mythology, but that is your baggage, not mine.

Evolution is not a moral view.

Are you a moral realist, moral subjectivist, a moral relativist, a moral nihilist, etc...?

Or are you just confused, and don’t know really where your views on morality stand?

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Is there an external reality called the Good, that places moral obligations on us, tells us how we ought to behave

In order for morality to be objective, it’s requires a reality independent of ourselves, that contains moral values, and moral aims and purposes. Not some cold disinterested reality, but one that’s concerned about our moral lives.

Why would it need to contain aims or purposes?  We supply those handily.  

Ah my suspicions that your just a confused relativist, appears to be true.

So it’s not the moral facts and values, that exist independently of “we” that reveal moral aims? But “we” do? So moral aims are a human construct?

If moral values and facts exist independently of us, then they define our moral aims, not us. If you disagree you should rethink your supposed moral realism.

Why would it need to be interested?  We're interested enough.  -How- could it be interested?  Concerned?  These are human attributes.  Anthropomorphization of the cosmos.  A god.

If a rock was telling me that I ought to do good, wouldn’t it be safe to say it’s interested in my moral life? If there’s a reality external to us human beings, in which moral facts and values exist, revealing that we should live good lives, as moral realism suggests, wouldn’t you say it’s interested in my moral life?

Are we discussing objective moralities..or gods?  

The rock telling me I ought to do good, sounds like a little god doesn’t it?

[The Grand Nudger]

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Why would it need to contain aims or purposes?  We supply those handily.  

Ah my suspicions that your just a confused relativist, appears to be true.

Or..you know, you could just ask, lol.  Natural realist.  

So it’s not  the moral facts and values, that exist independently of “we” that reveal moral aims? But “we” do? So moral aims are a human construct?

Do you require my assistance to have this argument with yourself?  Yes, moral aims are a human construct..regardless of whether moral facts of a matter exist.  A fact just is, and this would be equally true of any potential moral fact. Aims are the product of intentional moral agents..like ourselves. We may attempt to construct our aims with rference to those facts (and we may not) but throughout all of this it;s very clear that the moral fact is not the aim, but the evaluative metric of any potential or hypothetical aims.

If moral values and facts exist independently of us, then they define our moral aims, not us. If you disagree you should rethink your supposed moral realism.

If moral facts exist independently of us, then moral facts exist independently of us.   They do not define our aims on sheer account of their existence.  No more so than the sheer existence of Total Drama Island compels me to watch it with my daughters.

If a rock was telling me that I ought to do good, wouldn’t it be safe to say it’s interested in my moral life? If there’s a reality external to us human beings, in which moral facts and values exist, revealing that we should live good lives, as moral realism suggests, wouldn’t you say it’s interested in my moral life?

Are you a rock?  No?  Then good....?  No, I wouldn't say that anything that lacks interest or even the means to be interested is interested in us, or in you.  Mostly because I'm sane..and I know that the universe isn't watching me pee, counting the amount of times I shake my dick in various expressions of contentment and disappointment.

The rock telling me I ought to do good, sounds like a little god doesn’t it?

You tell me?  Do rocks make moral suggestions to you?

[DLJ]

...
As a moral nihilist ( the meta-ethical view that nothing is intrinsically moral or immoral. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is neither inherently right nor inherently wrong) I hold that the holocaust is not inherently right nor wrong. Neither good nor evil.

That at best what you and other's consider good is your subjective opinion, and not a fact.

The moral realist claims that holocaust is objectively wrong.

The nihilist responds that's it not.
...

The main problem with this is the weak semantics.

“nothing is intrinsically moral or immoral”:
If this is in reference to ‘a moral’ then yes, a moral would be extrinsic.
If this is in reference to ‘be moral’ then yes and no. If ‘being moral’ is in reference to knowing right from wrong, then what is “being immoral”? Knowing wrong from right?

It’s weak semantics... why not just say ‘nothing is intrinsically good or bad’?

A human can have the ability to detect a wrongness with reference to their own or a group’s ethical baseline and that would be an intrinsic/evolved ability. Rightness is unlikely to trigger any alarms.
The moral-event detecting ability is intrinsic but what is considered to be a moral event is not, it's contextual.

So, given what we know about physics, chemistry and biology, nihilism trumps essentialism (we realise that the universe doesn’t give a shit) we are also aware that “Brooklyn is not expanding” thus morality (more strictly ethics) is a social construct (in both the idea construction and the constitutive construction sense).

I recommend leaving terms like “subjective” and “objective” our the equation completely. That’s 18th century thinking and again, weak semantics.

[Brian37]

I ascribe to evolution. Not old mythology.

Evolution produces BOTH cruelty and compassion. I chose non violence and empathy beyond that.

You subscribe to old mythology, but that is your baggage, not mine.

Evolution is not a moral view.

Are you a moral realist, moral subjectivist, a moral relativist, a moral nihilist, etc...?

Or are you just confused, and don’t know really where your views on morality stand?

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Why would it need to contain aims or purposes?  We supply those handily.  

Ah my suspicions that your just a confused relativist, appears to be true.

So it’s not  the moral facts and values, that exist independently of “we” that reveal moral aims? But “we” do? So moral aims are a human construct?

If moral values and facts exist independently of us, then they define our moral aims, not us. If you disagree you should rethink your supposed moral realism.

Why would it need to be interested?  We're interested enough.  -How- could it be interested?  Concerned?  These are human attributes.  Anthropomorphization of the cosmos.  A god.

If a rock was telling me that I ought to do good, wouldn’t it be safe to say it’s interested in my moral life? If there’s a reality external to us human beings, in which moral facts and values exist, revealing that we should live good lives, as moral realism suggests, wouldn’t you say it’s interested in my moral life?

Are we discussing objective moralities..or gods?  

The rock telling me I ought to do good, sounds like a little god doesn’t it?

Evolution is a a word denoting scientific observation. Just like the word "gravity" denotes the falling of an object.

The rock isn't telling you squat and is is absurd for you to even imply that is what I was claiming.

God/s/deities/super cognitions do not exist, so that also means humans cannot act or be a "God/god/s either.

I can no more be God or Allah or Vishnu than I can be Yoda.

[Acrobat]

So it’s not  the moral facts and values, that exist independently of “we” that reveal moral aims? But “we” do? So moral aims are a human construct?

Do you require my assistance to have this argument with yourself?  Yes, moral aims are a human construct..regardless of whether moral facts of a matter exist.  A fact just is, and this would be equally true of any potential moral fact.  Aims are the product of intentional moral agents..like ourselves.  We may attempt to construct our aims with rference to those facts (and we may not) but throughout all of this it;s very clear that the moral fact is not the aim, but the evaluative metric of any potential or hypothetical aims.

If moral values and facts exist independently of us, then they define our moral aims, not us. If you disagree you should rethink your supposed moral realism.

If moral facts exist independently of us, then moral facts exist independently of us.   They do not define our aims on sheer account of their existence.  No more so than the sheer existence of Total Drama Island compels me to watch it with my daughters.

If moral facts exist and values existent idenpendently of us, they define our moral aims. Or else you’re just describing some cold fact of the world. In order to be moral it has to be both prescriptive and descriptive, be the source of is and ought.

If the ought is human construct as you suggest, then you’re really arguing for moral relativism, or some sort of confused moral realism.

This is far more evident in Plato:

“Plato was a moral realist who thought that there are ideal forms (abstract objects) that exist in the world as ideal “perfect” things. There’s perfect goodness, perfect virtue, perfect courage, and so on. In some sense what ought to be the case really does exist—as the forms. We can somehow know these forms through contemplation or intuition. Perhaps we experienced the forms before we were born and can remember them throughout our lives. For Plato certain forms are “moral facts” that exist in a way similar to any other state of affairs. We ought to acquire characteristics of the forms, such as goodness, virtue, justice, wisdom, and moderation. Once we have those characteristics (perfections or virtues), we will do what we morally ought to. No one acquires virtues completely, and people who do so well are better people who don’t.

Simply put, the Platonic solution is that what ought to be the case is based primarily on actually existing abstract objects, and we are “what ought to be” insofar as we approximate these objects. What we ought to do is based on what we will do naturally once we are perfect.”

I am guessing you reject Platos form of the good? Because clearly for Plato the ought, moral aims is not a human construct.

If moral facts exist independently of us, then moral facts exist independently of us.   They do not define our aims on sheer account of their existence.  No more so than the sheer existence of Total Drama Island compels me to watch it with my daughters.

If that were the case why even call them moral. If it’s moral fact that stealing your wallet is wrong, but this fact is not saying that I ought not steal your wallet, then it’s not really a moral fact, it may be a fact about the unpleasantness on having your wallet taken, but it’s not a moral fact, if it’s not implying what I ought not do. Calling it a moral fact is just semantic trickery.

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I recommend leaving terms like “subjective” and “objective” our the equation completely. That’s 18th century thinking and again, weak semantics.

Well I mean it as "objective". That the wrongness of something exists as objectively as the yellow of my wife's dress, as 1+1 = 2, independent of you or I.

That when I observe the wrongness of something, I'm recognizing something true about reality itself, independent of myself, like the cup in front of me, that doesn't merely exist in my mind.

If atheists who consider themselves moral realist, but don't see it as such, they should perhaps think of dropping moral objectivism.

[The Grand Nudger]

If moral facts exist independently of us, then moral facts exist independently of us. They do not define our aims on sheer account of their existence. No more so than the sheer existence of Total Drama Island compels me to watch it with my daughters.

If that were the case why even call them moral. If it’s moral fact that stealing your wallet is wrong, but this fact is not saying that I ought not steal your wallet, then it’s not really a moral fact, it may be a fact about the unpleasantness on having your wallet taken, but it’s not a moral fact, if it’s not implying what I ought not do. Calling it a moral fact is just semantic trickery.

Because that's what they are?  Why call Total Drama Island Total Drama Island if it doesn't compel me to watch?  Because that's what it is.  Moral facts and moral compulsion are distinct subjects, Acro, lol.

Morality isn't stomping around making anyone do anything, or handing out oughts. We do that, sometimes we do it by reference to moral fact and sometimes we don't. Sometimes we find those oughts compelling, sometimes we don't. Moral compulsion is a thing even if I'm wrong, and there are no moral facts of any matter.

(-and no, I don't find platonic idealism all that convincing - natural realist, remember? As a system for communicating what he thought and meant to say, and allow him the freedom to comment on a wide range of things from a unified framework.. I think it was admirable , but as a description of reality or anything in it - dead end. Floating "eggness" as an explanation for eggs , like total drama island...exists, but doesn't compel me on account of it's sheer existence, either.)

As a side note, most atheists don't consider themselves realists, certainly not here on these boards. It seems to be an issue of the faithful having so competently filled up the well with their silly bullshit that it gets condemned by association, lol. If you ask them whether or not the thing they think makes something wrong is a fact of a matter, though...they'll generally answer in the affirmative. It's not just their opinion that skullfucking children is wrong, they presume that their opinion refers to relevant facts. Most of us live our lives as though we were realists, regardless of whether or not we are..or can communicate our reasons for doing so. The faithful also live their lives as realists, mostly...despite advancing a purportedly subjective moral schema.... that's actually a relativist cultural phenomena...and then calling it "objective".

The whole thing is kindof amusing from my perspective...I'm sure you'll be able to appreciate that.

[Acrobat]

If that were the case why even call them moral. If it’s moral fact that stealing your wallet is wrong, but this fact is not saying that I ought not steal your wallet, then it’s not really a moral fact, it may be a fact about the unpleasantness on having your wallet taken, but it’s not a moral fact, if it’s not implying what I ought not do. Calling it a moral fact is just semantic trickery.

Because that's what they are?  Why call Total Drama Island Total Drama Island if it doesn't compel me to watch?  Because that's what it is.  Moral facts and moral compulsion are distinct subjects, Acro, lol.

You're under no obligation to watch total drama island.

In platonic moral realism moral facts and moral obligations are not distinct subjects.

In fact in order to be moral anything, the obligation, the ought has to be a part of it.

Holocaust is morally wrong. I'm assuming you accept this as a moral fact?

Now explain why this is morally wrong, without reference to obligations, or oughts.

Is it just a description of the negative societal impact of the holocaust? Or something akin to such explanations?

[The Grand Nudger]

You're under no obligation to watch total drama island.

No shit, lol!

In platonic moral realism moral facts and moral obligations are not distinct subjects.

So?  In reality, they are.  That's always the problem with idealism, huh..lol?

In fact in order to be moral anything, the obligation, the ought has to be a part of it.

Not so much.  What you're discussing is deontological ethics.  

Holocaust is morally wrong. I'm assuming you accept this as a moral fact?

I do, yeah.

Now explain why this is morally wrong, without reference to obligations, or oughts.

Harm.

Is it just a description of the negative societal impact of the holocaust? Or something akin to such explanations?

Could be, sure.  When we refer to negative societal impacts we're referring to conceptual harm..but it's sheer presence doesn't compel us to avoid it, and we may have good reason to do that harm (or to let it be done) - so..you can see, that no specific obligation presents itself at this point or level of scrutiny.  

We require an evaluative premise -in addition- to our moral fact, in order to derive an ought.  This is what the much bandied around is-ought problem refers to.  It's the addition of the evaluative premise that supplies the ought, not the mere existence of the moral fact (in this case, the harm of holocaust).

We could run the same in reverse, btw. We could posit that holocaust is morally good, or we could posit that holocaust will benefit our society. Neither of these things, by themselves, is a compulsion to holocaust. We'd need the addition of a different evaluative premise. We obviously don't do everything that's good, or that will benefit us...the situation is identical no matter which direction you take something (and regardless..again, of morality's ontological status).

In either case, generalized, we'd need some premise along the lines of "we should always do whats good, or whats good for our society/we should never do whats bad, or whats bad for our society". Neither of these things qualifies as a moral fact in a realists conception. The specific nature of obligation (it's limits) and how we determine the consequence or reward of success or failure in obligation is actually a big deal in contemporary moral realism. It forms a sort of trifecta of related but distinct subjects.

The moral schema.
Purported obligations.
Coherent consequence.

Morality, deontology, desert.

[vulcanlogician]

If Plato conception of The Good, constitutes as a God, than you can’t be an atheist and subscribe to Plato’s conception of the Good.

Ummmm, no. I've known quite a few professional philosophers (ie they have doctorates) who find Plato's theory of forms compelling and yet are thoroughly atheist. The form of the Good is goodness itself- full stop. Plato thought that goodness (all by itself) was intelligible to the intellect- full stop. If you accept these conclusions, then you are (at least somewhat) in agreement with Plato. No God belief whatsoever required.

Sure, those who followed in Plato's footsteps (especially the Christians) drew an equal sign between the form of the Good and their own God concepts. So what? Do some research and point out where Plato himself makes this claim. Plato had a God concept that he employed from time to time in some of his arguments. Funny how he never equates his God concept with the form of the Good.

But what if Plato did (in the back of his mind) think that the form of the Good was (in fact) some kind of God. It still doesn't matter. People who appreciate Plato's thinking are under no obligation to swallow his philosophy whole. I reserve the right to say that Plato was absolutely right about X, except for one particular idea concerning X, which is completely wrong. This is philosophy, not Sunday school. If I'm going to adopt a belief, there had better be good reason to do so. I don't accept philosophical conclusions because Plato said so. Plato himself didn't want his readers to accept truths on Plato's own authority. Plato was not some idiot evangelist like Saul of Tarsus!

I think there is something compelling about the notion of "goodness itself"-- that goodness can be understood apart from this or that particular "good" thing. The whole point of the forms is that they are intelligible to the intellect but not the senses. They can be understood but not seen, heard, or felt. How is God intelligible to the intellect? Believers say (rightly) that it takes faith-- not thought -- to believe in God (read Paul's diatribes against philosophy some time). At the very least, belief in God is a matter of the heart and has little to do with intelligibility. Plato was concerned with something altogether different.