Moral Oughts

[Acrobat]

And if I say I’m okay with it being my last game professionally, than we would say okay.

We can see the goal here is relative.

But when most people make an equivalent moral statements, they’re appealing to some standard they see as absolute, as Wittgenstein points out.

If someone said “they’re okay with behaving badly, and they don’t want to behave any better”, that wouldn’t be seen as okay, something is not right about that, you ought to want to behave better.

Now maybe you and others here have developed your own particular moral language and meaning, but this is disconnected from the common moral language and it’s assumptions of most people, as highlighted by Wittgenstein.

I'm on the phone so can't comfortably quote bit by bit.

Regarding your last paragraph, prove it.

I am not seeing much difference between a moral ought and other types of oughts. You say relative this, relative that. But you haven't countered what I said earlier. Maybe if you meet the challenge right above, I'll be convinced.

Also I remind you, the OP argument is about oughts, not is's

That most people see morality along the line that Wittgenstein described, as the oughts as absolute rather than relative?

Well most people aren’t atheists, but are religious and subscribe to view of morality as part of some sort transcendent moral order. So it shouldn’t come a surprise that they see moral oughts, like thought shall not steal, etc.. as absolute.

Our moral language is pervaded by thousands of years of religious assumptions like this, perhaps primarily because religious views have always been the dominant views of most societies and cultures.

[Belacqua]

"You ought to play properly because if you lose it'll be your last professional game ever"

And if I say I’m okay with it being my last game professionally, than we would say okay.

We can see the goal here is relative.

But when most people make an equivalent moral statements, they’re appealing to some standard they see as absolute, as Wittgenstein points out.

If someone said “they’re okay with behaving badly, and they don’t want to behave any better”, that wouldn’t be seen as okay, something is not right about that, you ought to want to behave better.

Now maybe you and others here have developed your own particular moral language and meaning, but this is disconnected from the common moral language and it’s assumptions of most people, as highlighted by Wittgenstein.

This is an interesting argument. I've never thought of this before. 

Would it be right for me to say here that Wittgenstein isn't talking about morality as being part of metaphysics or something intrinsic in the world. But rather that language reveals how people actually think about morals. And if we know how people really think about morals, then we know what morals people have. 

So he's saying there are two kinds of good: good for a particular goal, and good because it's good. 

And a good which is only aimed at a particular goal may be accepted or discarded if the goal changes. So if your goal is to let the other guy win, then playing "badly" is good. Or if your goal is to delay your passenger from arriving at his destination because you know he's planning a crime, then taking the "wrong" road is the right thing. 

But the other kind -- good because it's good -- is a case where the variability of the goal will be denied. So if you're a bus driver and you're driving your passengers recklessly along the edge of a cliff, it wouldn't be acceptable to say, "well, it was my goal to drive recklessly today." People would, very rightly, say, "it is bad of you to choose this goal. Whether you happen to desire this end or not, it's bad." 

I wonder if this is revealing about a difference between Wittgenstein and modern Americans. I would say that Wittgenstein here is closer to my own moral views, but I have found that many people posting here disagree with me about such things. It may well be that the dominant view of morality in America is a strictly outcome-based, practical view. "If I might get punished it's bad. But if I'll be OK it's OK." With no absolute component to it. Others have thought that America was a land of expediency.

[GrandizerII]

And if I say I’m okay with it being my last game professionally, than we would say okay.

We can see the goal here is relative.

But when most people make an equivalent moral statements, they’re appealing to some standard they see as absolute, as Wittgenstein points out.

If someone said “they’re okay with behaving badly, and they don’t want to behave any better”, that wouldn’t be seen as okay, something is not right about that, you ought to want to behave better.

Now maybe you and others here have developed your own particular moral language and meaning, but this is disconnected from the common moral language and it’s assumptions of most people, as highlighted by Wittgenstein.

This is an interesting argument. I've never thought of this before. 

Would it be right for me to say here that Wittgenstein isn't talking about morality as being part of metaphysics or something intrinsic in the world. But rather that language reveals how people actually think about morals. And if we know how people really think about morals, then we know what morals people have. 

So he's saying there are two kinds of good: good for a particular goal, and good because it's good. 

And a good which is only aimed at a particular goal may be accepted or discarded if the goal changes. So if your goal is to let the other guy win, then playing "badly" is good. Or if your goal is to delay your passenger from arriving at his destination because you know he's planning a crime, then taking the "wrong" road is the right thing. 

But the other kind -- good because it's good -- is a case where the variability of the goal will be denied. So if you're a bus driver and you're driving your passengers recklessly along the edge of a cliff, it wouldn't be acceptable to say, "well, it was my goal to drive recklessly today." People would, very rightly, say, "it is bad of you to choose this goal. Whether you happen to desire this end or not, it's bad." 

I wonder if this is revealing about a difference between Wittgenstein and modern Americans. I would say that Wittgenstein here is closer to my own moral views, but I have found that many people posting here disagree with me about such things. It may well be that the dominant view of morality in America is a strictly outcome-based, practical view. "If I might get punished it's bad. But if I'll be OK it's OK." With no absolute component to it. Others have thought that America was a land of expediency.

Depends on the moral issue specifically. Eating animal meat may be morally wrong, if it is wrong, but people who do think it's wrong tend to still be relatively laissez-faire about others doing so. Same with piracy, which many argue to be a form of theft.

Other moral matters may be associated with much stronger oughts, but so are non moral matters such as to do with tradition. You ought to marry someone from your culture, for example.

Also prejudice against Americans noted (once again). You should be better than that, man. Ah see what I did there?

ETA: Regarding the reckless driving example, it's undeniably bad because who would want to get themselves killed as a result of that? It's not because of some "out there" reason.

[Mister Agenda]

If stealing is wrong is a moral fact, then it necessarily follows that one ought not to steal I don't get what's hard about this. Morality is about what you should or shouldn't do, based on whether it's right/good or bad/wrong.

I fire burns you, you oughtn't stick your hand in it if you don't want to get burned.

[DLJ]

If stealing is wrong is a moral fact, then it necessarily follows that one ought not to steal I don't get what's hard about this. Morality is about what you should or shouldn't do, based on whether it's right/good or bad/wrong.

I fire burns you, you oughtn't stick your hand in it if you don't want to get burned.

What's hard about it is what is meant by "moral fact"... and whether it's valid to extrapolate a personal principle or policy in to a general principle or policy.

[Mister Agenda]

But Acrobat agrees that 'stealing is wrong' is a moral fact, so....

[Acrobat]

If stealing is wrong is a moral fact, then it necessarily follows that one ought not to steal I don't get what's hard about this. Morality is about what you should or shouldn't do, based on whether it's right/good or bad/wrong.

I am of that view, but Gae and Grandizer don’t see the ought as following from the moral facts. For them a moral fact, like stealing is bad, is just another way of saying stealing is harmful.

They don’t view moral statements like stealing as bad as normative, but descriptive. Stealing is bad may be objectively true, but you ought not steal or so bad things is not, at least according to them.

[The Grand Nudger]

Lol. Of course oughts follow from moral facts, and at least one evaluative premise.

Unclog your ears.

You can’t go from is to ought without one.

Stealing is wrong
Therefore you shouldn’t steal

....doesn’t actually follow.

---

As for instrumental goods and intrinsic goods, moral statements play heavily with those two concepts.

We often consider our “is”-es to be representative of intrinsic goods. Our evaluative premises dip heavily into instrumental goods. Good for confirming to our moral schema. Good for generating positive consequence. Good for our mental state.

Moore has a wonderful comment on how we experience morality as a brute fact.

All you have to do to teach a person what “bad” is, is make them stand there watching four adults kick a toddler.

All of their evaluative premises will flow from having seen this and contemplating their relationship to it. Subjective premises, objective ones, considerations of instrumental and intrinsic goods.

In his view, all were rational but non empirical products. Insomuch as he considered the experience of that event and the subsequent thought processes beyond empirical verification.

Hence his non natural realism. This sort of realism reverses the distribution above. More intrinsic goods, fewer instrumental. Seeing Bad in things, rather than seeing Things that are bad.

[GrandizerII]

If stealing is wrong is a moral fact, then it necessarily follows that one ought not to steal I don't get what's hard about this. Morality is about what you should or shouldn't do, based on whether it's right/good or bad/wrong.

I fire burns you, you oughtn't stick your hand in it if you don't want to get burned.

I sort of agree with you. It's a reasonable conclusion, even if the ought does not 100 percent follow from the is.

Btw, I've been reading a bit about moral naturalism (because everyone is suggesting that's what I adhere to) and it does seem to make a lot more sense than some platonic notion of morality. Sure, at first glance it may seem like words are being redefined in a sneaky way, but when one asks oneself what is it about something that makes it good or bad, one will very often appeal to something observed in nature. Stealing bread from the poor is bad because it deprives the poor of that which they depend on to survive, for example.

[The Grand Nudger]

Cornell realism is is a good place to start natural realism.

Quick and informative.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornell_realism

A deeper dive.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natur.../#CornReal