Jesus' Mission....

[GrandizerII]

Then, in a possible world, it is necessarily true that the future cannot be known, therefore it is true in all possible worlds that the future cannot be known.

I'm not sure I follow. Maybe you're defining possible world differently than what I'm used to reading. But the way I see it, in a possible world, the future can be known by an all-knowing being but it cannot be changed.

I agree a lot of it is word game, and I would personally just challenge the logically-oriented theist to logically establish free will instead of assuming it is possible at the start to try to see if it's compatible with another notion that I'm also not quite sure is logical (omniscience).

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

And what I'm trying to say is that God predetermines what world is actual in light of which free choice you make God predetermines to be actual.

Ta da! 

I agree that it's a word game when you say that God predetermines what my free choices will be.

Boru

[GrandizerII]

And what I'm trying to say is that God predetermines what world is actual in light of which free choice you make God predetermines to be actual.

Ta da! 

I agree that it's a word game when you say that God predetermines what my free choices will be.

Boru

Predermines to be actual. Not the same thing as predetermining what choices you're free to make.

To be clear, the argument is making use of possible worlds semantics.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Ta da! 

I agree that it's a word game when you say that God predetermines what my free choices will be.

Boru

Predermines to be actual. Not the same thing as predetermining what choices you make.

To be clear, the argument is making use of possible worlds semantics.

Which is precisely the same as actualizing the 'choices' themselves.

Boru

[GrandizerII]

Predermines to be actual. Not the same thing as predetermining what choices you make.

To be clear, the argument is making use of possible worlds semantics.

Which is precisely the same as actualizing the 'choices' themselves.

Boru

Yeah, you're restricted to only one choice in the actual world. But if in other possible worlds you chose something that wasn't made in the actual world, then the choice not being actualized does not mean you weren't free to make it, because you do make it in other possible worlds.

Now is that really free will? No, I have strong doubts that it is. But if we're defining free will in the traditional sense: that I could have done not-X instead of X given the same conditions, then whether that's possible and could really be deemed as free will, as long as we're going with this definition, then it seems like such free will can be compatible with omniscience.

[LadyForCamus]

Free will can only exist if god doesnt know our future; if god doesnt know our future then god isnt omnipotent. Cool?

You mean omniscient?

And while I used to agree in the past, this argument can be defeated actually.

God actualizes the world in which you freely choose to do X beforehand. So he doesn't have to actually change it at any point in time to ensure you choose X.

Of course, this doesn't mean that free will makes sense. But to argue for the incompatibility between God and free will is going to be hard with this counter in mind.

Yes, but if god chooses to actualize world A (of which he knows the future) from a set of possible worlds he could potentially choose from (say, A, B, or C),  then once he makes that decision to actualize world A, he is essentially revoking the free will of the people who are going to exist in that world. Am I making any sense?

[GrandizerII]

You mean omniscient?

And while I used to agree in the past, this argument can be defeated actually.

God actualizes the world in which you freely choose to do X beforehand. So he doesn't have to actually change it at any point in time to ensure you choose X.

Of course, this doesn't mean that free will makes sense. But to argue for the incompatibility between God and free will is going to be hard with this counter in mind.

Yes, but if god chooses to actualize world A (of which he knows the future) from a set of possible worlds he could potentially choose from (say, A, B, or C),  then once he makes that decision to actualize world A, he is essentially revoking the free will of the people who are going to exist in that world. Am I making any sense?

You are making sense, but I will have to counter. :p

If free will means you could have done not-X instead of X given the same conditions, then even if one choice ends up being actualized, it doesn't mean that you weren't free to do the other choice because in other possible worlds you do. God decides what world is actualized but does not eliminate the possibility of you having done otherwise.

I think it might help to see each world as a complete world from the start rather than progressively building over time. Maybe.

[EgoDeath]

Free will can only exist if god doesnt know our future; if god doesnt know our future then god isnt omnipotent. Cool?

You mean omniscient?

And while I used to agree in the past, this argument can be defeated actually.

God actualizes the world in which you freely choose to do X beforehand. So he doesn't have to actually change it at any point in time to ensure you choose X.

Right. Meaning he already actualized that I would choose x. Meaning i have no free will to choose anything other than x. Its already been actualized, as you put it.

[GrandizerII]

You mean omniscient?

And while I used to agree in the past, this argument can be defeated actually.

God actualizes the world in which you freely choose to do X beforehand. So he doesn't have to actually change it at any point in time to ensure you choose X.

Right. Meaning he already actualized that I would choose x. Meaning i have no free will to choose anything other than x. Its already been actualized, as you put it.

The second sentence does not follow from the first.

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This might help:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_fallacy

[The Grand Nudger]

Possible worlds semantics explicitly invoke necessity rather than contingency, since a thing contingent on one possible world cannot be said, by possible worlds semantics, to be true. Mostly because you only need one counterexample to show a statement is false.

"God" isn't the problem in the free will/omniscience dilemma, he's just collateral damage.