Jesus' Mission....

[GrandizerII]

Free will can only exist if god doesnt know our future; if god doesnt know our future then god isnt omnipotent. Cool?

You mean omniscient?

And while I used to agree in the past, this argument can be defeated actually.

God actualizes the world in which you freely choose to do X beforehand. So he doesn't have to actually change it at any point in time to ensure you choose X.

Of course, this doesn't mean that free will makes sense. But to argue for the incompatibility between God and free will is going to be hard with this counter in mind.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Free will can only exist if god doesnt know our future; if god doesnt know our future then god isnt omnipotent. Cool?

You mean omniscient?

And while I used to agree in the past, this argument can be defeated actually.

God actualizes the world in which you freely choose to do X beforehand. So he doesn't have to actually change it at any point in time to ensure you choose X.

Of course, this doesn't mean that free will makes sense. But to argue for the incompatibility between God and free will is going to be hard with this counter in mind.

But if God actualizes a world in which I will do X, this means that the world has been constructed in such a way that it is impossible for me to do not-X.  If this option is not possible, I cannot have free will.  If God created the conditions under which I cannot do not-X, then God's actualization eliminates free will.

Hobson's Choice:  God determines which horse I choose.  I have no say in the matter.

Boru

[Succubus]

I recently went to Italy.  You've heard of this Jesus guy, right?  Whew, is he ever big there!  Every place you look...there's Jesus, there's Jesus, there's JesusJesusJesus.  He's like the Coca-Cola of Italy.'  - Lewis Black

Boru

He is indeed everywhere.



Do not wander around Vatican tat shops on a full stomach!

[The Grand Nudger]

It doesn't matter what other superpowers a god is alleged to have, or doesn't have. Doesn't have to be a god, either. The dilemma was best expressed in another myth by reference to a precognitive human female. Cassandra was cursed. She knew what was to come, but it being -what was to come-, she could not change it. In her case, because no one believed her. The lesson of the story is simple..when Apollo wants to grab you by the pussy, you let him.

It's an incompatibility between a future state of supposed choice, and the necessity of fatalism in the hypothetical knowledge of that future state.
Technically, it doesn't even matter whether or not a god or anyone else actually knows the future, only that the future can be known.

If that much is true, no matter who or what knows it, how, or if no one knows it, or how.....if the future "choice" between vanilla and chocolate is fixed from some point in the past, then it is not a "choice" at all. More like a selection. The same thing a vending machine does when you hit the button. Just one automaton poking another automaton, fumbling around in it's orifices. Not entirely unlike Apollo's plans for Cassandra. No choices between the lot. The god was always going to desire the woman, the woman was always going to fail to change the outcome of events, the vending machine was always going to dispense the snickers....and you were always going to "choose" that candy bar.

The christian counter to this is not to reassert the same set of circumstances that manufacture the dillemma, but to reject them both. God is "omniscient" in the sense that it knows all that can be known. Leaving wiggle room for human choice. Mooted, somewhat, by the deprivation of "sin", which constrains your choices.

[GrandizerII]

If God created the conditions under which I cannot do not-X, then God's actualization eliminates free will.

You could have done not-X. In other possible worlds, that's what you do. But God actualizes the world in which you do X.

So in this sense, God knows beforehand what you would do in this actual world because he knows what world he actualized, but this doesn't mean you weren't free to have done not-X (because in other possible worlds, you do just that).

I agree, though, free will perse (in the libertarian sense) makes no sense, but we're assuming that somehow free will is possible.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

It doesn't matter what other superpowers a god is alleged to have, or doesn't have.  Doesn't have to be a god, either.  The dilemma was best expressed in another myth by reference to a precognitive human female.  Cassandra was cursed.  She knew what was to come, but it being -what was to come-, she could not change it.  In her case, because no one believed her.  The lesson of the story is simple..when Apollo wants to grab you by the pussy, you let him.  

It's an incompatibility between a future state of supposed choice, and the necessity of fatalism in the hypothetical knowledge of that future state.
Technically, it doesn't even matter whether or not a god or anyone else actually knows the future, only that the future can be known.  

If that much is true, no matter who or what knows it, how, or if no one knows it, or how.....if the "choice" between vanilla and chocolate is fixed from some point in the past, then it is not a "choice" at all.  More like a selection.

I'd hesitate to even call it a 'selection'.  You aren't selecting the flavour, it's been selected for you.  Sort of like being locked in an otherwise empty room that contains you and a single marble.  You invited to choose any marble you like.

But I agree that knowing the future is the linchpin of the whole thing.  If God is omniscient, there is no free will.  If there is free will, God cannot be omniscient.

Boru

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

If God created the conditions under which I cannot do not-X, then God's actualization eliminates free will.

You could have done not-X. In other possible worlds, that's what you do. But God actualizes the world in which you do X.

So in this sense, God knows beforehand what you would do in this actual world because he knows what world he actualized, but this doesn't mean you weren't free to have done not-X (because in other possible worlds, you do just that).

I agree, though, free will perse (in the libertarian sense) makes no sense, but we're assuming that somehow free will is possible.

I'm not sure that 'other possible worlds' applies here.  Even if it does, the argument doesn't change, as God will have actualized those worlds as well, and he would have actualized them in such a way that I will either do X or not-X.  God has predetermined what I will do or not do.  There not only is not choice, there is no possibility of choice.

Boru

[The Grand Nudger]

Possible worlds semantics only reasserts the dilemma. If it's necessarily true in one possible world that you must choose the snickers, then it's true in all possible worlds that you must choose the snickers.

Notice that I didn't need to invoke a god, or even a gods knowledge? All of that is hellenic window dressing that got jumbled into christo-pagan theology from the onset.

[GrandizerII]

You could have done not-X. In other possible worlds, that's what you do. But God actualizes the world in which you do X.

So in this sense, God knows beforehand what you would do in this actual world because he knows what world he actualized, but this doesn't mean you weren't free to have done not-X (because in other possible worlds, you do just that).

I agree, though, free will perse (in the libertarian sense) makes no sense, but we're assuming that somehow free will is possible.

I'm not sure that 'other possible worlds' applies here.  Even if it does, the argument doesn't change, as God will have actualized those worlds as well, and he would have actualized them in such a way that I will either do X or not-X.  God has predetermined what I will do or not do.  There not only is not choice, there is no possibility of choice.

Boru

Possible worlds don't necessarily mean they must be actualized.

And what I'm trying to say is that God predetermines what world is actual in light of which free choice you make God predetermines to be actual. It's a matter of adjusting your perspective to see it differently from how you're currently seeing it.

But again, this assumes that somehow free will can somehow make sense in terms of modal logic. I don't think it does, but that's why I'd rather just say free will makes no sense rather than make it more difficult for myself by arguing for incompatibility between God's omniscience and this free will thing that's supposed to make sense but doesn't.

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Possible worlds semantics only reasserts the dilemma.  If it's necessarily true in one possible world that you must choose the snickers, then it's true in all possible worlds that you must choose the snickers.

It should be contingently, though.

If it's contingently true in one possible world that you choose the snickers, then it's true that in other possible worlds you do not.

[The Grand Nudger]

Then, in a possible world, it is necessarily true that the future cannot be known, therefore it is true in all possible worlds that the future cannot be known.

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-it's just a fun glitch between the ideas and propositional logic, that's why free wills and gods are compatibalist, rather than libertarian and determinist, respectively...nowadays.

But hey, it's just a game at the end of the day. A useful one, a good heuristic, beyond that.........

There's always the absurdist option. God knows everything, and we have choices. Just because we can't wrap our feeble human minds around it with the meager tools we've cobbled together ad hoc and called "logic" doesn't mean it's not true. It's just one of those Mysteries™. The ultimate defeater for any logical argument. Throw the peices at the other guy, flip the table over, burn down the house the table is in, sow the fields around the house with salt....then nuke globe from orbit. One less "possible world" to worry about.

Success!