Question about "faith"

[The Grand Nudger]

The theory of ethics is named after the truth theory (or, in this case, anti-truth theory) which corresponds to it, and you most certainly asked about emotivism when you suggested that we may not have a way of knowing other than feeling like we know.

Knowledge, in that view, is impossible. For us, at least - it's all misattribution. Even that wouldn't certify the general impossibility of knowledge, or the non existence or insensibility of distinct categories of knowledge claims, though. It would be an example of the specific incompetence of a species.

Now, personally, I don't afford that view any credibility whatsoever. It's absurd, on it's face, to claim that knowing because we feel a certain way is equivalent to knowing because we engaged in a thorough investigation of the subject and after much consideration have arrived at an inescapable conclusion. Knowing that britney spears is the best pop artist to ever live, and knowing the decay rate of oxygen. As absurd as suggesting that we have no knowledge whatsoever, no way to know. ..anything. We can't actually have (or be having) a sensible or logical conversation about this, or anything else, if that were true.

I doubt that you believe this to be the case, and to an extent, the reality of living as a human being gives us good reason to doubt our competence, but I don't think it gives us any reason whatsoever to doubt the possibility of knowledge. You, for example, are a person who can assess claims for their truth value, and you employ methods and criteria other than some certain way to feel. Sometimes...I'm sure, you've been lead to change your mind about a fact even though you felt a very certain and very negative way about it. An unhappy or inconvenient truth that we nevertheless concede to be true on the merits of the claim rather than our emotional attachments to it's antithesis. I'm sure you also...like all of us...engage in plenty of knowledge based solely and explicitly on feeling a certain way. I don't want you to walk away feeling like I think that it's impossible - I think we do it all the time - just that this is not the full extent of our ability or potential.

[Angrboda]

The theory of ethics is named after the truth theory (or, in this case, anti-truth theory) which corresponds to it, and you most certainly asked about emotivism when you suggested that we may not have a way of knowing other than feeling like we know.

I suggested no such thing. You did. You asserted that something was true. That assertion implicitly contains the assertion that it can be false. You've been chasing strawmen from the word go. That doesn't really bother me much, but I will point out that any argument that depends on the refutation of a strawman is basically invalid.

It's absurd, on it's face, to claim that knowing because we feel a certain way is equivalent to knowing because we engaged in a thorough investigation of the subject and after much consideration have arrived at an inescapable conclusion.  

I haven't said this either.

Are you prepared to finally answer the question I asked, or am I going to have to suffer through several more posts filled with falsehoods, red herrings, and strawmen from you before I get an answer?

[Simon Moon]

If "faith" is defined as "complete trust or confidence in someone or something".(dictionary.com) As an atheist, do you have complete confidence or trust in anything? or anyone? If so, what is the foundation for that "complete" faith.

I'm not looking for an argument, so you don't have to be guarded. I'm simply wanting to learn more about your belief, or absence of belief.

I am a little late to this thread, but I'll contribute.

First of all, the word 'faith' has several definitions.

The definition you are using, can simply be substituted with the term, "reasonable expectations", which to me, has a lot less baggage connected to it.

I do not have 'faith' that a chair will support my weight, I have reasonable expectations based on EVIDENCE. And, using that definition of faith, I do not have "complete" faith in anything. Since I know, that in rare occasions, a chair can collapse.

But this is NOT the definition most Christians use, when defining "faith", from my experience.

Most Christians I come across use the Hebrews 11:1 definition, which has nothing to do with defining faith as you are in your OP.

Hebrews 11:1 - "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen". Which is defining faith more as, believing without evidence.

Also, a lot of theists I encounter, seem to think, that if one does not have absolute certainty of something (as I am not absolutely certain that a chair will not collapse when I sit down), then I am exercising some level of faith. Which is also wrong, since I have reasonable expectations that the chair will not collapse, but not absolute certainty. I do not think that absolute certainty is obtainable.

The foundation of my 'faith', or 'reasonable expectations', is evidence, reasoned argument, and valid and sound logic.

I do not have any of the Hebrews 11:1 type of faith. That type of faith is a horrible epistemology, and is not a path to truth.

---

Since faith is a human quality, attaching eternal to faith is a bit of a reach for atheists.

There may be eternal things, human faith is not one of them.

brewer, could you please tell me, is "atheism" considered a human religious belief system, even though a deity isn't worshipped? Or would an atheist consider themselves 100% void of any spiritual belief. That they simply exist one day, and they don't the next.

Thank you!!

I'll give you my opinion on this.

Atheism is not considered a belief system. How can it be?

At its most fundamental level, atheism is simply, not being convinced that gods exist. Atheism for many atheists (the majority?), is usually a provisional mental state, not a dogmatic one. In other words, my atheism will continue, as long as theists continue to fail to meet their burden of proof to support their claims that a god exists.

As far as atheists being void of spiritual beliefs, no. Atheism only defines one as not being convinced of god claims, There are some atheist that have other, 'spiritual' or supernatural beliefs. I'm sure you will find atheists that believe: astrology, Tarot, ESP, ancient aliens, etc.

Just because one is an atheist, does not make them a skeptic or a critical thinker.

[Belacqua]

In other words, my atheism will continue, as long as theists continue to fail to meet their burden of proof to support their claims that a god exists.

In writing this, you demonstrate that you have a belief system.

Usually in philosophy, "I believe it" means "I hold it to be true." And a belief system is a set of things you hold to be true. 

One of the things we hold to be true is: "what constitutes good evidence?" or "what would have to be evident to constitute proof?" These are not things that people are born with. They are learned. One person from one culture will hold it to be true that a dream constitutes good evidence, while someone from another culture will hold it to be true that evidence must always be repeatable empirical quantifiable science-type evidence. Each person has a set of values or standards of evaluation that he uses, and these are a part of his belief system. Mr. A believes that tradition and authority constitute good evidence, while Mr. B believes that such things are insufficient. That's belief.

So when you say that theists have never met the burden of proof, you are showing that you have beliefs about what constitutes good proof. And since religious claims are seldom science-type claims, your beliefs about evidence constitute metaphysical beliefs. It is a statement of metaphysics to say that reliable knowledge from divine revelation is impossible, for example. 

So you do have a set of beliefs, and this is intrinsic to your atheism. 

Other atheists may have different sets of beliefs, and may reject religious claims for different reasons. For example, one person may reject all of religion just because the nuns were mean to him. This would be a weak reason, but it would be a reason nonetheless. 

Just as "religion" includes all kinds of different categories and beliefs, "atheism" also includes a large number of reasons why people reject religious claims. But atheists draw conclusions about religious claims based on their own beliefs. 

Just because one is an atheist, does not make them a skeptic or a critical thinker.

I think that a lot of atheists would be improved as critical thinkers if they acknowledged their own beliefs and standards of judgment, rather than pretending that their minds are at some sort of default setting. They are not.

[The Grand Nudger]

How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?

This is the question you asked, which I answered immediately.  If we have no other way of knowing™ than feeling a certain way about a thing, we know nothing.  There are no cognitive propositions, so there can be no true or false propositions.  All propositions resolve to feeling a certain way about a thing. Emotivism. I strongly suspect that you hadn't really thought that question, or at least it;s wording through, and staring now at the implications of it being a cognitive statement, it seems so ridiculous that you feel the need to pretend as though you never asked and I'm an asshole for explaining it to you. An asshole for producing a distinction that you asked for, and imagined did not exist. Is that knowledge, or do you feel a certain way about something?

I suggested no such thing.  You did.  You asserted that something was true.  That assertion implicitly contains the assertion that it can be false.   You've been chasing strawmen from the word go.  That doesn't really bother me much, but I will point out that any argument that depends on the refutation of a strawman is basically invalid.

I asserted that things -can be- true. Don't really have to, mind you, it's a silent but necessary assumption in all logical discourse. I would certainly assert that feeling a certain way about things doesn't exhaust the list of ways that human beings can arrive at knowledge, real or perceived.  It doesn't actually matter if that's true, so long as it can be true or false, it's a cognitive position. As mentioned twice now, supposing that we're incapable, then we're incapable, but there's still a difference between cognitivist and emotivist propositions as categories.

I haven't said this either.

Are you prepared to finally answer the question I asked, or am I going to have to suffer through several more posts filled with falsehoods, red herrings, and strawmen from you before I get an answer?

Like the answer you got immediately?  WTF is wrong with you? If you don't want to suffer, work on better questions. This has been a tedious disappointment. I was wrong, we can't do better. I enjoy a good disagreement, but I refuse to argue the contents of a text exchange into existence. We can disagree about how often human beings engage in the one or the other calling both knowledge - though I doubt we'd really disagree, but we cannot disagree about the things that you and I have written, that are there for anyone to read, yourself included.

[Angrboda]

How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?

This is the question you asked, which I answered immediately.  If we have no other way of knowing™ than feeling a certain way about a thing, we know nothing.  There are no cognitive propositions, so there can be no true or false propositions.  All propositions resolve to feeling a certain way about a thing.  Emotivism.  I strongly suspect that you hadn't really thought that question, or at least it;s wording through, and staring now at the implications of it being a cognitive statement, it seems so ridiculous that you feel the need to pretend as though you never asked and I'm an asshole for explaining it to you.   An asshole for producing a distinction that you asked for, and imagined did not exist.  Is that knowledge, or do you feel a certain way about something?

I asked how we know. You answered how we don't know. It's possible that we don't know anything. But I started with the assumption that what you said was true, that we know things on the one hand, and that we have faith on the other hand. I asked you to show me how. What you gave me isn't a way to know something. Maybe it's a way to not know something. But it's not a way to know something, which is what I asked for.

I suggested no such thing.  You did.  You asserted that something was true.  That assertion implicitly contains the assertion that it can be false.   You've been chasing strawmen from the word go.  That doesn't really bother me much, but I will point out that any argument that depends on the refutation of a strawman is basically invalid.

I asserted that things -can be- true.  Don't really have to, mind you, it's a silent but necessary assumption in all logical discourse.  I would certainly assert that feeling a certain way about things doesn't exhaust the list of ways that human beings can arrive at knowledge, real or perceived.  It doesn't actually matter if that's true, so long as it can be true or false, it's a cognitive position.  As mentioned twice now, supposing that we're incapable, then we're incapable, but there's still a difference between cognitivist and emotivist propositions as categories.  

Oh this is complete bullshit. You asserted that a specific thing was true. Now you're just backpedaling and lying in the process. I haven't questioned either that there can be cognitive propositions or that there can be knowledge. You have, apparently because you can't show how either is possible so instead you offer some chicken little cum argument from ignorance of, "Well if it's not the case, then that would be horribly horribly bad!" Maybe. If that was the case. But that alone wouldn't lead to the conclusion that that is not the case, as that would be an argument from ignorance and invalid.

I haven't said this either.

Are you prepared to finally answer the question I asked, or am I going to have to suffer through several more posts filled with falsehoods, red herrings, and strawmen from you before I get an answer?

Like the answer you got immediately?  WTF is wrong with you?  If you don't want to suffer, work on better questions.  This has been a tedious disappointment.  I was wrong, we can't do better.  I enjoy a good disagreement, but I refuse to argue the contents of a text exchange into existence.  We can disagree about how often human beings engage in the one or the other calling both knowledge - though I doubt we'd really disagree, but we cannot disagree about the things that you and I have written, that are there for anyone to read, yourself included.

As I just explained, that was not an answer to my question, unless you're now changing your position to one of asserting that knowledge is not possible. You asserted that knowledge was possible by some other means than feeling like we know but that faith wasn't knowledge. I simply asked you to demonstrate the truth of your assertion, which you have not done. "Because if it's false, then knowledge is not possible," doesn't show that what you said is true, it only shows that it's possible that knowledge isn't possible. That's certainly a live option, but I wasn't in any sense implying that it was the actual case.

You're either arguing your case extremely fucking badly, or you're trying to argue your case by answering objections that might be made to your answer to my question in advance of my having made them. You're not a mind reader. You don't have the first clue where I'm headed with this. And apparently you don't feel up to the task you've set for yourself of defending your initial statement. If you can't support your initial statement as true, then it's just an article of faith with you. Nothing more.

(ETA: It's possible you are misreading the question. If my question were, "How do we know that we know apart from feeling like we know?" then your response would have been an answer to my question. That wasn't what I asked, however, but rather, "How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?" And note, my question itself assumes that we do in fact know things, so this rant of yours about not knowing as an answer to that particular question would just be a red herring.)

[Foxaèr]

That is what is semantics.

[The Grand Nudger]

I asked how we know.  You answered how we don't know.  It's possible that we don't know anything.  

It's not possible, but true by definition, that we don't know anything - if we have no way of knowing other than feeling a certain way about a thing.  

You drawing a blank for knowledge claims that arise from something other than feeling a certain way about a thing?

But I started with the assumption that what you said was true, that we know things on the one hand, and that we have faith on the other hand.  I asked you to show me how.  What you gave me isn't a way to know something.  Maybe it's a way to not know something.  But it's not a way to know something, which is what I asked for.  

Have you considered the difference between feeling a certain way about christ, and noticing that you breath, as I suggested?  

(ETA:  It's possible you are misreading the question.  If my question were, "How do we know that we know apart from feeling like we know?" then your response would have been an answer to my question.  That wasn't what I asked, however, but rather, "How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?"  And note, my question itself assumes that we do in fact know things, so this rant of yours about not knowing as an answer to that particular question would just be a red herring.)

Do you feel a certain way about a thing, or know that?

[Angrboda]

I asked how we know.  You answered how we don't know.  It's possible that we don't know anything.  

It's not possible, but true by definition, that we don't know anything - if we have no way of knowing other than feeling a certain way about a thing.  

You drawing a blank for knowledge claims that arise from something other than feeling a certain way about a thing?

Producing such a knowledge claim would be a valid method of supporting your initial assertion. So, produce an example of a knowledge claim that we know to be true apart from feeling that we know and I will accept, at least provisionally, that you have supported your initial assertion. Failing that, I'm left to conclude that at this stage I have no reason to conclude that your assertion is true except perhaps ipse dixit.

But I started with the assumption that what you said was true, that we know things on the one hand, and that we have faith on the other hand.  I asked you to show me how.  What you gave me isn't a way to know something.  Maybe it's a way to not know something.  But it's not a way to know something, which is what I asked for.  

Have you considered the difference between feeling a certain way about christ, and noticing that you breath, as I suggested?  

I have, and I noted something that I thought to remark upon earlier, which is that you seem to be conflating truth and knowledge. The specific example you gave was being alive. You said, ""I am alive" is not knowledge, it's not true - it's just a feeling." It's possible for the proposition, "I'm alive," to be true without it being knowledge. Truth and knowledge are different animals. So while under most conceptions of knowledge, it is necessary for something to be true if it is knowledge, the reverse is not true. Truth and knowledge aren't interchangeable.

(ETA:  It's possible you are misreading the question.  If my question were, "How do we know that we know apart from feeling like we know?" then your response would have been an answer to my question.  That wasn't what I asked, however, but rather, "How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?"  And note, my question itself assumes that we do in fact know things, so this rant of yours about not knowing as an answer to that particular question would just be a red herring.)

Do you feel a certain way about a thing, or know that?

I don't know that they're necessarily mutually exclusive, so it's possible that your question represents a false dichotomy. Without knowing whether it is or isn't a false dichotomy, I can't answer the question. I'm not asserting one way or the other. You are. Which leads us back to the above questions which must be resolved, therefore, before this question here can be resolved. You've got the cart ahead of the horse.

[The Grand Nudger]

Producing such a knowledge claim would be a valid method of supporting your initial assertion.  So, produce an example of a knowledge claim that we know to be true apart from feeling that we know and I will accept, at least provisionally, that you have supported your initial assertion.  Failing that, I'm left to conclude that at this stage I have no reason to conclude that your assertion is true except perhaps ipse dixit.



I have, and I noted something that I thought to remark upon earlier, which is that you seem to be conflating truth and knowledge.  The specific example you gave was being alive.  You said, ""I am alive" is not knowledge, it's not true - it's just a feeling."  It's possible for the proposition, "I'm alive," to be true without it being knowledge.  Truth and knowledge are different animals.  So while under most conceptions of knowledge, it is necessary for something to be true if it is knowledge, the reverse is not true.  Truth and knowledge aren't interchangeable.


I don't know that they're necessarily mutually exclusive, so it's possible that your question represents a false dichotomy.  Without knowing whether it is or isn't a false dichotomy, I can't answer the question.  I'm not asserting one way or the other.  You are.  Which leads us back to the above questions which must be resolved, therefore, before this question here can be resolved.  You've got the cart ahead of the horse.

Do you know any of that?  Is a single proposition in that entire post a cognitive proposition...or do you feel a certain way about a thing?

If you feel that any sentence in any of your posts is the kind of thing that can be true or false, then it seems silly to ask me to produce yet another example of such a claim to knowledge, doesn't it? Your (our, housecat's) claims to knowledge may be mistaken, but they are, at least, claims to knowledge which arise from something other than feeling a certain way about a thing, even if you also happen to feel certain ways about things.

The set of cognitive propositions is not exhausted by true things that we don't feel any certain way about - just as the set of even numbers is not exhausted by numbers that end in 2, even though there are a hell of alot of 2's in the set of even numbers.