Morality without God

[Belacqua]

Yes, I think the desire to win very often overcomes any sense of fairness we may have.

You pose that as if they are at odds, but fairness is also a strategy for winning.  Our genes make it feel different from selfishness, but ultimately both are aiming at the same outcome, figuratively speaking, in genetic fitness.

If you're talking about a genetic group, then I can see the truth of this.

On an individual level, being fair often means giving up a fight without a win.

[Duty]

I missed/forgot my go-to response for threads like these, so catch-up time...ahem...

Morality without God

 
Which god? Thor, Vishnu, Ganesh, Zeus etc etc etc?

[Belacqua]

Essentially humanism is the stance that we can't appeal to divine authority or ideological or religious dogma to resolve moral issues. 

emphasis added

Humanism, in the sense you're using it, is an ideology. If we are using the definition of ideology offered first by Google:

ideology
/ˌʌɪdɪˈɒlədʒi/
noun
noun: ideology; plural noun: ideologies
1.
a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy.
"the ideology of democracy"

Humanism espouses democracy, freedom, progress and the equal worth and dignity of everyone and advocates for policies that will help us thrive, including protecting the world we live in. A lot of atheists are basically humanists even if they don't label themselves that way or know what humanism is.

It's also an awfully lot like a dogma, in the sense quoted below, from Wikipedia:

Dogma in the broad sense is any belief held unquestioningly and with undefended certainty. It may be in the form of an official system of principles or doctrines of a religion, such as Roman Catholicism, Judaism, or Protestantism,[1] as well as the positions of a philosopher or of a philosophical school such as Stoicism. It may also be found in political belief systems, such as communism, progressivism, liberalism and conservatism.[2][3]

Since it isn't the kind of thing we can prove scientifically (it's ought, not is) then it's something we hold to without proof. I suppose if you hold to it tentatively, rather than "unquestioningly," then you're not being dogmatic about it.

I happen to think it's quite a good ideology. But I don't want to make it seem superior by claiming that other people have a set of tenets about how the world should be and they have an ideology, whereas I have a set of tenets about how the world should be but mine is somehow NOT ideology. 

We can claim that our ideology is best, but not that it somehow rises above the ideological.

[vulcanlogician]

Dogma in the broad sense is any belief held unquestioningly and with undefended certainty.
...

Since it isn't the kind of thing we can prove scientifically (it's ought, not is) then it's something we hold to without proof. I suppose if you hold to it tentatively, rather than "unquestioningly," then you're not being dogmatic about it.

Exactly. You can have moral beliefs about how to treat other human beings, and so long as you are willing to have a discussion about it-- and you don't insist that others hold the belief just because you say so-- then it ISN'T a dogma.

You can have a discussion about "oughts." Your oughts can face criticisms from moral skeptics or people who argue for different oughts. So long as you are willing to subject your particular beliefs to rational discourse, then you aren't being dogmatic.

Sure, science can't tell us anything definite about oughts. But that's why we have moral philosophy. I mean, physicists can't tell us anything definite about economics... that's why we have economists. The natural sciences are great, but they can't tell us everything. That's why we have other disciplines.

Humanism is a definsible view. So it doesn't need to rely on "undefended certainty." And therefore, it isn't dogmatic.

[The Grand Nudger]

There's also the possibility that natural science can and does already tell us much or all of what we contend to be definite about our oughts.

[vulcanlogician]

It's possible. But then you have all your work ahead of you to explain where the oughts come from. You have to contend with Hume's skepticism.

I think Hume makes a good point. A simple study of the facts doesn't produce an ought.

So I think the discussion is more properly basic. "My tire is low on air. Therefore, I OUGHT to go fill it at the gas station." This isn't a scientific statement. But it is nonetheless reasonable. You don't get the ought from the "is." You get it from understanding the ideal state of your tires, and comparing it to its current state.

[Rahn127]

My tire is low on air and I'm concerned about well being, specifically the well being of myself, others in the car and those that we might run into if the tire should suddenly go low, blow out, etc.

Or it's winter tire and my tire is low on air which gives me added traction in the snow. Additional traction is helpful and because I'm concerned about well being, I'll keep them that way until the driving conditions change.

[Belacqua]

Exactly. You can have moral beliefs about how to treat other human beings, and so long as you are willing to have a discussion about it-- and you don't insist that others hold the belief just because you say so-- then it ISN'T a dogma.

You can have a discussion about "oughts." Your oughts can face criticisms from moral skeptics or people who argue for different oughts. So long as you are willing to subject your particular beliefs to rational discourse, then you aren't being dogmatic.

Sure, science can't tell us anything definite about oughts. But that's why we have moral philosophy. I mean, physicists can't tell us anything definite about economics... that's why we have economists. The natural sciences are great, but they can't tell us everything. That's why we have other disciplines.

Humanism is a definsible view. So it doesn't need to rely on "undefended certainty." And therefore, it isn't dogmatic.

I guess I have a less negative view of the word "dogma." To me it meant just a set of guidelines or rules that we know to be unprovable -- committed to, rather than proved. But I guess it's more negative than I thought. 

As long as people acknowledge that their particular set of rules is contingent and chosen, rather than somehow universal, then I agree that we can have reasonable discussions. There are always "if - then" statements that need to be made, concerning what we want our morals to aim toward."If individual freedom is more important than the overall good of the collective," etc. 

In my experience, anyone who claims not to have an ideology is just someone who hasn't examined his ideology. So I guess a humanist who doesn't understand that he has one is more dogmatic than one who does. 

I just want to avoid prideful statements. Like the people who separate belief from knowledge by asserting that the things they don't agree with are belief while the things they themselves believe are knowledge. Likewise a humanist who says that a non-humanist has an ideology but he doesn't.

[The Grand Nudger]

It's possible. But then you have all your work ahead of you to explain where the oughts come from. You have to contend with Hume's skepticism.

I think Hume makes a good point. A simple study of the facts doesn't produce an ought.

So I think the discussion is more properly basic. "My tire is low on air. Therefore, I OUGHT to go fill it at the gas station." This isn't a scientific statement. But it is nonetheless reasonable. You don't get the ought from the "is." You get it from understanding the ideal state of your tires, and comparing it to its current state.

How do you know the ideal state of your tires, or it's current state?  You see where this is headed. Both of those statements are at well at-home in natural sciences. Talking about psi and materials and load after all. Those sentences are missing, but would provide clarity - ofc they're only missing in the sentences above (and also in how we communicate our oughts, fwiw) - but that shouldn't be taken to mean that they aren't there. We love silent premises.

Appropriate to the thread, Hume was considering those moral systems of his day and began his problem thusly -

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.

He may not have been so skeptical of the moral systems discussed today, particularly in that it's been resolved multiple times for different moral systems, though no particular way of resolving the issue means that we can't pose the question still and again (the silent premise in that being that those resolutions are inaccurate).

I think that if a person begins with the notion that moral x's are or must be something other than natural or analytic x's - it's not going to be surprising that they fail to find their moral x' in those places - even if those moral x's were there, and obviously so, staring them right back in the face. We may desire more from morality than it is. The "deeper" explanation that we sometimes reach for. Maybe there is such a thing, and maybe there are oughts and moral questions that must refer to such a thing. I don't personally think that there is, but assuming that there were, there are probably still at least some oughts that resolve to synonymous claims in the natural sciences.

The go-to example being pleasure-ought. A pleasure-ought is almost trivially accommodating to scientific (or empirical..if we prefer) inquiry. It's hard to maintain that there's no way to bridge the two. More an issue in that silent premise up above that we believe that's an inaccurate response, not an impossible response.

[polymath257]

The problem with moral questions is that they ALL depend on there being a goal. Once we know the goal, science can help us determine the most efficient way of achieving it. But you have to select the goal first.

So, if the goal is one that 'should' be attempted, then we *ought* to do things making that goal achievable.

The question then becomes whether there are goals that can be said to be universal. If there are, then we can legitimately say that those actions leading to those goals are moral and those that lead away are not. Those that do neither are morally neutral.

One goal that most people can agree to is the continued existence of our species. Another could be the goal of having a stable society that functions over the long term and allows intellectual and artistic development.

Now, we can debate the appropriateness of those goals, but I think that most people do agree that those are, at least, minimal ones.

But those already tell us a great deal of moral behavior. To even have a stable society requires that there be rules of interaction between people. Societies where people are not happy tend to not be stable in the long run, for example. Those that ignore threats also don't tend to last long. To allow for artistic and intellectual development requires both tolerance and honesty. To now allow self-criticism means that needed responses won't be done, leading to instability.

But we can go further. To pollute our environment, poisoning our water and air, is not in keeping with long term survival. But to not allow for economic development also leads to instabilities, so there is a balance to be made.

Anyway, I don't have a well thought out system, clearly, but I do think that deciding on a few basic goals can lead to a lot of what we tend to think of as moral principles.