[Serious] Moral Obligations toward Possible Worlds

[The Grand Nudger]

Isn't it possible for a person to want something very much and for that thing to be bad? With respect to assisted suicide, the moral nature of the thing -in some systems- is not equivalent between the two moral agents in the relationship. A person wanting to die may not be bad - but another person willing to kill them - or a society willing to do so, could be. We could repeat the same for abortions or for environmental activism. Another thing that might be working on our conclusions here, is that the setup rules out doing good things and asks us to consider whether there's a difference between two bad things. Presumably, there are many, but two bad things with many differences are both similar in being bad things. The good thing to do -again in some systems- would be to eliminate their pain without eliminating their life..and it's only when circumstances dictate that this is impossible when we begin to consider the alternatives from an exclusively sub-optimal list. Do we let the man suffer, or kill him?

Here's a fun one. Is it our moral responsibility to kill the man? Would we be considered bad people for refusing to kill a person begging for the mercy of death? I'd suspect that even people who can see the moral argument for assisted suicide will stop long before the point where that moral argument for the sufferers desires extends to the responsibilities of the man with the knife. Individual petitions will be more or less compelling based on the feelings that the assistant has for the sufferer rather than the state or assumption of a given moral postulate held apprehended or constructed by either person. "Do it for me", I think, can be expected to work better than "do it because it's the right thing to do". In alot of those cases, the person doing it might end up having severe misgivings about it, and do it anyway. I doubt that the person who smothers granny with a pillow, for her own good, will tell that story often at the water cooler.

[Angrboda]

Isn't it possible for a person to want something very much and for that thing to be bad?  With respect to assisted suicide, the moral nature of the thing -in some systems- is not equivalent between the two moral agents in the relationship.  A person wanting to die may not be bad - but another person willing to kill them - or a society willing to do so, could be.  We could repeat the same for abortions or for environmental activism.

It wouldn't matter as the mitigating circumstance would still mitigate the moral conclusion in all those systems. I don't need for the morals to differ in a specific way. I only need there to be a difference because of a subjective element.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's how you think it should work, not how it does work, in those systems. There are bound to be tons of differences in a moral situation that resolve to subjective differences. Realist thinking about abortions or environmental activism or any other thing - moral responsibility in general- don't rule these things out or even ignore them.

Moral realists very often are and moral realism allows for descriptive subjectivity and descriptive relativity. Those things are, themselves, facts - and facts are what realism concerns itself with.

Another fun q to play with - would we expect a species like us in every way except one - that they reproduce asexually, to see immorality in homosexual attraction or acts between human beings - or between acts of intimacy for pleasure between themselves? In the same vein, we might feel that we have responsibilities towards children because there would be no humans left alive to wonder if we didn't believe as much. Both of these, in moral philosophers terms, would be relativistic assertions. They don't pertain to an individual agent and they don't map to moral truth (if there is any) - they do map to species and societies.

[Angrboda]

That's how you think it should work, not how it does work, in those systems.  There are bound to be tons of differences in a moral situation that resolve to subjective differences.  Realist thinking about abortions or environmental activism or any other thing - moral responsibility in general- don't rule these things out or even ignore them.

Moral realists very often are and moral realism allows for descriptive subjectivity and descriptive relativity.  Those things are, themselves, facts - and facts are what realism concerns itself with.

We were talking about what harm is, remember? Not about unrelated aspects of these moral theories. If subjective factors change whether something is harm then my example applies. Moral realism which considers the harm something other than the death of my father or his roommate are not relevant as that is not what is at issue here. If you have a system in which either the harm to my father or his roomate is not an issue, or in which the harm to my father and the harm to his roomate is the same, then present it. When and if you do I suspect that the system you present will be unusual. You make a lot of vague claims about moral theory in general. That's effectively an argument from authority with you as the authority. You're not an authority. And when I ask for specifics you always demur. I suspect the reason is that you don't actually understand the specifics to the degree that you think you do. The way to resolve that is to talk about the specifics, those of the case, and of the system which you think deviates. But you never talk specifics because vague handwaving statements is what you're better at.

[The Grand Nudger]

My own fits the bill for the latter, I suppose? You've done the same harm to any man you kill. They're equally dead. You may have better or worse reasons to kill and people may have reasons to think better or worse of you for having done it - modification and desert. In either case, however, you're doing the same thing. Killing. The harm that you have done is the same. Even the intent to specific harm was the same. You intended to kill - and did kill.

What would some assertions to there being adifference between them rely on? Your father wants to die, yeah? I think that we can grant that's a big difference to alot of people - the crux of the assisted suicide argument. Well, that's not a subjective factor. That is, at least in the example - objectively true. In a disagreement here, it's unlikely that you and I will bicker over realism. Realism is assumed in the wishes of your father stated as a relevant fact of the matter at hand. Or perhaps that we got the wrong guy. That's different from killing the right guy. That also doesn't seem to be up for debate as a fact in the example. Is the fact of your having intended to kill and killing not the same kind of observation?

[Angrboda]

My own fits the bill for the latter, I suppose?  You've done the same harm to any man you kill.   They're equally dead.  You may have better or worse reasons to kill and people may have reasons to think better or worse of you for having done it - modification and desert.  In either case, however, you're doing the same thing.  Killing.  The harm that you have done is the same.  Even the intent to specific harm was the same.  You intended to kill - and did kill.

Morally significant harm. Yes, killing is killing. Don't be dense.

[The Grand Nudger]

I may be failing to properly communicate. I do think that killing is morally significant harm. There's no split there in the type of morality I try (and mostly fail) to practice.

You were asking about systems that considered the act of killing your father in an act of assisted suicide and killing someone else by accident are the same harm. Natural realism could (and does) do this. The natural realists case in either outcome could be that you did intend to do a thing, the same thing, considered to be a morally significant harm. It would be difficult to explain how it all happened otherwise.

[Angrboda]

I may be failing to properly communicate.  I do think that killing is morally significant harm.  There's no split there in the type of morality I try (and mostly fail) to practice.

You were asking about systems that considered the act of killing your father in an act of assisted suicide and killing someone else by accident are the same harm.  Natural realism could (and does) do this.

Do you acknowledge that unnecessary harm is more morally repugnant than necessary harm?

[The Grand Nudger]

Personally, I find necessary harm as difficult to swallow in the doing as unnecessary harm. The difference, very explicitly, is in necessity - not the moral nature of the thing.

[Angrboda]

Is that a yes or a no?