Any Moral Relativists in the House?

[vulcanlogician]

The conclusion provided may be a nonseq, but I think it misrepresents relativism.  It's not a relativist argument so much as the statement that descriptive relativism is true followed by the conclusion that relativism is not objectivism, therefore subjectivism, imo.  

To be fair to cultural relativism we should probably respect the distinction between the opinions of a subject and facts of a culture in which that subject resides, and acknowledge that objectivism, relativism and subjectivism all make assertions to truth-in-general, that a moral claim can be true or false and at least some are.

I'm sure there are more refined theories out there. I'm not opposed to giving them a looking over.

But (if I'm being honest) that was more or less the argument that sold me on relativism years ago. And I'm sure others have reached the conclusion based on that premise. So Rachels is right to address it. Before that passage, he does present relativism quite charatably. And that was only his first argument.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's interesting, because..if the conclusion were true, then cultural relativism would be false. There's no way to get to the position that there is no objective truth in morality* or that morality is a matter of opinions from cultural relativism.

It's not really an issue of refined positions or more refined positions. Cultural relativism asserts that moral facts are objectively true of cultures rather than objects or subjects. That something about my culture is why eating puppies is bad, not something about eating puppies or my opinion of eating puppies.

*frankly, I think this one is doing alot of the work - it's a subtle equivocation silently presenting an appeal to undesirable consequences - so what if a moral truth doesn't refer to the specific parameters a person may prefer - that won't make the assertion any more or less accurate

[vulcanlogician]

That's interesting, because..if the conclusion were true, then cultural relativism would be false.  There's no way to get to the position that there is no objective truth in morality* or that morality is a matter of opinions from cultural relativism.

What conclusion?

[The Grand Nudger]

-any of these no 2s

1. The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead, whereas the
Callatians believed it was right to eat the dead.
2. Therefore, eating the dead is neither objectively fight nor objectively
wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to
culture.

Or, alternatively:
1. The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans
believe infanticide is immoral.
2. Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively
wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to
culture.

Clearly, these arguments are variations of one fundamental idea They are both
special cases of a more general argument, which says:

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective “truth” in morality. Right and wrong
are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.

It doesn't follow - but it's also not relativism.  What would follow, and actually be relativism, would be something like

1. Different cultures have different moral codes
2. Therefore, the true set of moral assertions varies from culture to culture.

[vulcanlogician]

Anybody else uncomfortable with the terms 'fact' and 'moral' being tied together?

Seems to me that all descriptive terms for moral philosophical positions fall under the term relative,.......... maybe excluding objective. They all fall somewhere of a moral sliding scale.

That's about as philosophical as I want to get.

You should be uncomfortable. Skepticism is warranted. Anyone who claims that there are (or may be) "moral facts" needs to explain themselves. And I'll tell you right now: no matter what their position is concerning moral facts, it will be unsatisfying in some way.

Respecting that you may have just wanted to say your piece and move on... without getting dragged into a philosophical debate.... I don't wanna make you hear a bunch of shit you aren't interested in. In which case, just don't click the box:

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Take James Rachel's definition of morality: ""Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one's conduct by reason––that is, to do what there are the best reasons for doing––while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected by what one does."

If someone accepted that definition, and (for whatever reason) chose to act accordingly, wouldn't certain objective facts about what is good to do to others vs what is bad emerge? And wouldn't these facts be relevant to their enterprise?

To me, that's all moral facts amount to. Not some monolith of "thou shalt" that hangs over all people. Rather an objective and factual account of how one may do good to another (if one is so inclined). I think if one is serious about pursuing this sort of activity (which most people are, maybe for biological reasons, sociological reasons... it doesn't matter)... if one wants to make this effort, there are seemingly objective facts one may realize concerning how to proceed.

"Burning other people with a hot iron when they annoy me fails to give equal weight to their interests." That's a sample moral fact. Or (put more simply) "burning people with a hot iron because they annoy me is wrong." We can have a discourse using logic about the rightness or wrongness of burning people with a hot iron for being annoying. It could be argued that such a thing is warranted in some cases. It could also be argued that it isn't warranted most of the time. The point is, we could have an objective (fact-centered) debate about it.

"Why accept Rachel's definition?" I hear you ask. We don't have to. We could have a debate about which definition to accept. I think that would be fruitful. But, keep in mind, we could also have a debate about whether scientists should make genuine observations or (instead) simply fabricate the results of an experiment. You could be opinionated about such a debate.... or you could be rational. If you are being rational, it's possible that you'll pick something different than if you're being opinionated. There is nothing written in the cosmos that says we should accept the observations of science simply because these observations are accurate. But many of us do lend credence to scientific observations. Why? Because we are rational. We prefer science because it is accurate and are pleased with it because it is accurate. But only because we are rational. If we were irrational... or so opinionated, we may select a different goal for science.

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[The Grand Nudger]

[vulcanlogician]

It doesn't follow - but it's also not relativism.  What would follow, and actually be relativism, would be something like

1. Different cultures have different moral codes
2. Therefore, the true set of moral assertions varies from culture to culture.

That doesn't follow unless you take the word "true" out.

[Angrboda]

Anybody else uncomfortable with the terms 'fact' and 'moral' being tied together?

Seems to me that all descriptive terms for moral philosophical positions fall under the term relative,.......... maybe excluding objective. They all fall somewhere of a moral sliding scale.

That's about as philosophical as I want to get.

You should be uncomfortable. Skepticism is warranted. Anyone who claims that there are (or may be) "moral facts" needs to explain themselves. And I'll tell you right now: no matter what their position is concerning moral facts, it will be unsatisfying in some way.

You know, it's not the nihilist who suffers anxiety so much as those around him who are trying to grapple with their incredulity and revulsion concerning his nihilism.

[The Grand Nudger]

2 follows so plainly..that it might simply be a restatement of number 1. Bachelors exist, therefore there are unmarried men. Consider that the true set of solutions to a given math problem also varies from base to base.

The difference between the three broad positions we've been discussing is not whether or not some assertion is true, but what it's true of. Since you mentioned Boghossian earlier, I believe he had some comments on this. Hidden parameters?

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found

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Galileo, we may suppose, discovered that truths about motion are unexpectedly
relative to a frame of reference. What does that mean?
A natural first thought is that the unexpected relationality is to be found in the
propositions expressed by ordinary motion sentences. On this view, whereas we
might have been tempted to construe a sentence like:
(1) ‘‘The Earth moves’’
as expressing a proposition involving the monadic concept of moving, after
Galileo we know that it really expresses a proposition involving the relational
concept of moving relative to a frame of reference, with the variable frame of
reference being contextually supplied.
On this view, then, what Galileo discovered is that a form of contextualism is
true for motion sentences: the proposition expressed by a given motion sentence
varies as a function of the context in which it is used.
Let us consider a case for which such a contextualist proposal is tailor-made,
the case of the spatial relation expressed by the phrase ‘... to the left of ...’ How
does this work?
Here is a first stab. Whenever someone utters a sentence of the form:
(2) ‘‘A is to the left of B’’
he doesn’t express the proposition:
(3) A is to the left of B
but rather the proposition:
(4) A is to the left of B relative to reference point F
where F is some contextually supplied frame of reference

https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/ph...tivism.pdf

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[brewer]

Anybody else uncomfortable with the terms 'fact' and 'moral' being tied together?

Seems to me that all descriptive terms for moral philosophical positions fall under the term relative,.......... maybe excluding objective. They all fall somewhere of a moral sliding scale.

That's about as philosophical as I want to get.

You should be uncomfortable. Skepticism is warranted. Anyone who claims that there are (or may be) "moral facts" needs to explain themselves. And I'll tell you right now: no matter what their position is concerning moral facts, it will be unsatisfying in some way.

Respecting that you may have just wanted to say your piece and move on... without getting dragged into a philosophical debate.... I don't wanna make you hear a bunch of shit you aren't interested in. In which case, just don't click the box:

---

Take James Rachel's definition of morality: ""Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one's conduct by reason––that is, to do what there are the best reasons for doing––while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected by what one does."

If someone accepted that definition, and (for whatever reason) chose to act accordingly, wouldn't certain objective facts about what is good to do to others vs what is bad emerge? And wouldn't these facts be relevant to their enterprise?

To me, that's all moral facts amount to. Not some monolith of "thou shalt" that hangs over all people. Rather an objective and factual account of how one may do good to another (if one is so inclined). I think if one is serious about pursuing this sort of activity (which most people are, maybe for biological reasons, sociological reasons... it doesn't matter)... if one wants to make this effort, there are seemingly objective facts one may realize concerning how to proceed.

"Burning other people with a hot iron when they annoy me fails to give equal weight to their interests." That's a sample moral fact. Or (put more simply) "burning people with a hot iron because they annoy me is wrong." We can have a discourse using logic about the rightness or wrongness of burning people with a hot iron for being annoying. It could be argued that such a thing is warranted in some cases. It could also be argued that it isn't warranted most of the time. The point is, we could have an objective (fact-centered) debate about it.

"Why accept Rachel's definition?" I hear you ask. We don't have to. We could have a debate about which definition to accept. I think that would be fruitful. But, keep in mind, we could also have a debate about whether scientists should make genuine observations or (instead) simply fabricate the results of an experiment. You could be opinionated about such a debate.... or you could be rational. If you are being rational, it's possible that you'll pick something different than if you're being opinionated. There is nothing written in the cosmos that says we should accept the observations of science simply because these observations are accurate. But many of us do lend credence to scientific observations. Why? Because we are rational. We prefer science because it is accurate and are pleased with it because it is accurate. But only because we are rational. If we were irrational... or so opinionated, we may select a different goal for science.

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The box was relatively moral. 8 out of 10 on my sliding scale.