Any Moral Relativists in the House?

[vulcanlogician]

[The Grand Nudger]

You may be arguing against moral defeatism-as-moral relativism, bit more by the end. Cognitive nihilism would besomething like the claim, as indeed it is, that we can get it right, but we get it wrong. This is not relativism. In relativism, we can get it right, and do, and it's about culture.

Since a relativist believes that the truth value of a moral proposition is dependent on culture, there's no other way a moral statement could be accurate. All moral statements are thus accurate or inaccurate with respect to culture. When you say, put in a more nihilistic manner..I think you might be hitting something. You're actually arguing against nihilism, even in the disagreement about whether we can rationally judge another culture.

Mind...we're both still realists - I think relativists are wrong too..but they actually couldn't be wrong for the reasons we've been discussing.

[Kitan Etos]

Everyone is right, everyone gets a participation trophy.

[The Grand Nudger]

A statement that neither a realist or a relativist could maintain - for example. To a relativist or realist, we can't all be right, and getting a trophy is the least of the wrong participants worries.

[Kitan Etos]

Tell that to Oprah.

[vulcanlogician]

You may be arguing against moral defeatism-as-moral relativism, bit more by the end.  Cognitive nihilism would besomething like the claim, as indeed it is, that we can get it right, but we get it wrong.  This is not relativism.  In relativism, we can get it right, and do, and it's about culture.

Since a relativist believes that the truth value of a moral proposition is dependent on culture, there's no other way a moral statement could be accurate.  All moral statements are thus accurate or inaccurate with respect to culture.  When you say, put in a more nihilistic manner..I think you might be hitting something.  You're actually arguing against nihilism, even in the disagreement about whether we can rationally  judge another culture.

Mind...we're both still realists - I think relativists are wrong too..but they actually couldn't be wrong for the reasons we've been discussing.

Well, then maybe this is our impasse, because I think Rachels and Boghossian produce valid criticisms of relativism. I think you actually accept Rachels arguments (as he doesn't argue that relativism is incoherent... he thinks it's just plain wrong). So (correct me if I'm wrong) your real issue is with Boghossian's criticism.

So I want to ask then: doesn't Boghossian's argument say at least something significant? I mean, if a completely unbiased, newly minted philosopher were shopping for a good metaethical theory, would Boghossian's viewpoint serve (at the very least) as a strike against relativism? Would it be worth consideration at all?

Do you think Boghossian's argument is (to borrow the term) incoherent?

[The Grand Nudger]

I do accept the argument that relatavism is plain wrong, yes, and..yes, in the reliance on moral absolutes and the slippery slope of defeatism as an argument against relativism...well, I simply cant be so unfair to the position.

I do think boghossians argument relies on indefensible positions (to the realist) which paint an unrepresentative picture of genuine relativism, yes. A flase relativism, where the nihilist pretends to be a relativist, is what I would call it. I think that the critics of relativism have been very successful in framing the discussion.

[vulcanlogician]

I do accept the argument that relatavism is plain wrong, yes, and..yes, in the reliance on moral absolutes and the slippery slope of defeatism as an argument against relativism...well, I simply cant be so unfair to the position.  

I do think boghossians argument relies on indefensible positions (to the realist)  which paint an unrepresentative picture of genuine relativism, yes.   A flase relativism, where the nihilist pretends to be a relativist, is what I would call it.   I think that the critics of relativism have been very successful in framing the discussion.

Well, if you are going to assert that moral facts can only be true relative to a certain (arbitrary) moral code, then you're basically a nihilist. Just a nihilist with some arbitrary rules. (That's the criticism anyway.) I don't see the strawman. I totally see where Boghossian is coming from. Sure, relativists have a reply to Bogossian. But I think that they are replying to a genuine criticism. Not a fallacious argument.

If anything, I think Boghossian does a good job of questioning the sort of "default relativism" that many atheists (including myself) are prone to find appealing. At the very least, he raises good objections against a certain kind of relativism: a relativism that thinks it's more well founded than it actually is.

I'd need to think more about whether this is a slippery slope argument or not. Maybe his point is fallacious in this way. But maybe not. The problem with slippery slope arguments is that they are ambiguous. (Yes A leads to B, but that doesn't mean B leads to C, C leads to D, then D leads to E.) He doesn't seem to rely on ambiguity of this sort. I think he draws a direct line and explains each step, and explains the implications of each conclusion. But, as I said before, I need to give it more thought.

[The Grand Nudger]

Perhaps a genuine relativist doesn't believe that there's anything arbitrary about anyone's moral code? Sure, nihilists might say that these things are arbitrary-but you're cool with nihilism, right? Relativists....not so much.

[vulcanlogician]

Perhaps a genuine relativist doesn't believe that there's anything arbitrary about anyone's moral code?

Let's hear this new and improved relativist theory that actually says something about the status of moral facts. Nobody in this thread as yet has defined a kind of relativism that survives Boghossian's criticisms. It isn't strawmanning unless you replace the better argument with a worse one. But I haven't heard the better argument. So let's hear it.