Mindfulness or Mindlessness?

[emjay]

There are all sorts of fun ways to describe the issue (or potential issue) as some see it.  Here's one I enjoy - that you might.

Imagine a race of dogs complete with dog philosophers of mind and dog scientists.  They believe that they have a thing they call dognomenal content, or dognomenal states.  This is rich and directly apprehended content meaningful to them and deeply woven into how they perceive the world and themselves along those lines you might expect for a dog.  The feel of the atomic weight of an element, off the top of my head.  The important thing to remember, is that whatever imagined dog experience you come up with, human beings absolutely don't have it, and don't even possess the required structures to have it..no matter whether we report a what-it's-like-ness to smell or can accurately give them the atomic weight of an element.  We seem like them..but we're just not.

Would that race of dogs be justified in considering us dzombies?  Are the dog brain scientists justified in not seeing dognomenal states in humans?  Are the dog philosophers justified in believing that we are not conscious, on account of lacking those dognomenal states?  Is the combined institution of dog science and dog philosophy justified in asserting that human processing cannot explain or even help to explain dog consciousness?

Thanks but I'm gonna bow out now. It was nice to see you again, but this stuff just goes so over my head, and it will just get worse as we go along, so I'm gonna quit while I'm behind. It just doesn't feel like it clarifies any of my pzombie concerns but only muddies the waters, or just sidesteps them. I know you're trying to find intuition pumps, but this isn't really pumping for me, as my issues with pzombies are not about the form of experience (ie the phenomenal content that we can assume differs greatly between different species etc), but just the experience of phenomenal content full stop, whatever form it takes, and in whatever organism/system it occurs. But as I've said I realise my own concerns are such a philosophical rabbithole, that it seems pointless/futile to even discuss them.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think that you don't give yourself enough credit. That there may be different forms of internal content that are all accurately described as consciousness is precisely the point. The dog scientists aren't wrong when they say we lack dognomenal content, just wrong when they decide that we aren't conscious on account of that. The human scientists may not be wrong when they say that a pzombie lacks phenomenal content - but they are wrong when they decide that they aren't conscious on account of that.

.....The pzombie may not be wrong when it says that the roomba lacks schmenomenal content.......

Each representative fails to see x in the next representatives mere processing. Each is convinced that some sort of sidestepping or conflation has occurred. None of them feel as though processing explains their content. This, however, doesn't amount to an explanatory gap. There's no actual hole in this rabbit hole. Only the perception of a hole precisely in line with the cognitive limitations and biases informing the question.

It's worth thinking about the next time we hear some explanation for some type of consciousness and say "no, no, that's processing, I'm talking about dognom...i mean...phenomenal states! How are they produced?" Well...processing...maybe.

[emjay]

I think that you don't give yourself enough credit. That there may be different forms of internal content that are all accurately described as consciousness is precisely the point. The dog scientists aren't wrong when they say we lack dognomenal content, just wrong when they decide that we aren't conscious on account of that. The human scientists may not be wrong when they say that a pzombie lacks phenomenal content - but they are wrong when they decide that they aren't conscious on account of that.

.....The pzombie may not be wrong when it says that the roomba lacks schmenomenal content.......

Each representative fails to see x in the next representatives mere processing. Each is convinced that some sort of sidestepping or conflation has occurred. None of them feel as though processing explains their content. This, however, doesn't amount to an explanatory gap. There's no actual hole in this rabbit hole. Only the perception of a hole precisely in line with the cognitive limitations and biases informing the question.

It's worth thinking about the next time we hear some explanation for some type of consciousness and say "no, no, that's processing, I'm talking about dognom...i mean...phenomenal states! How are they produced?" Well...processing...maybe.

This hasn't clarified anything either So yeah, let's just call it a day?, please. We had fun in the equivalent of this thread years back, but I'm just not in that headspace any more. Even that book I asked you to read was the first thing I'd read on that sort of subject for donkey's years. Talk of philosophy and logic is second nature to you guys, but though I may have been able to keep up before I can't any more. Each post that takes you minutes to write takes me hours to dissect and I just don't have the energy or capacity for that any more. So I'm sorry if I'm coming across as rude, I don't mean to, but I just can't do this. I'll ponder what you've said in time, and continue to read threads like this at my own slow pace, but I can't keep up with it as a discussion.

[DLJ]

Then, the question becomes... do we have enough science and technology brain-power here and now (on this forum) to work it out.

I'm up for it if you are.

Well beyond my pay grade.  In any case, electricity and magnetism several centuries ago were viewed as being mysterious, even magical; today, no one thinks of those phenomenon in that way.  In five hundred years, the same may be true of consciousness.

Or longer

After Buddha died, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead—but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will still be shown.—And we!—We still have to vanquish his shadow, too!

[Ahriman]

My dad bought me a book about mindfulness today. I've always been a very observant, mindful person. I'm not sure what I could learn about mindfulness from a book, but it was a nice gesture.

[vulcanlogician]

Why do you think functionalism is true compared to biological naturalism, Angrboda?

I don't know that I do think functionalism is true.  I don't understand it well enough to say that.  But I think functionalism is very misunderstood by its opponents, particularly Searle.  As a person with a mathematics and computer background, I'm more sympathetic to it.  Perhaps through familiarity, or perhaps due to a better understanding of its power.  I think Searle's biological naturalism is just silly.  It's fundamentally anti-reductionist.  If a biological structure has a reducible physical structure, then that structure can be simulated.  It comes down to Searle's assertion that simulations can't duplicate reality, which undercuts all his arguments, as imagining any scenario is simulating it.  If simulation can't duplicate the relevant features of biological consciosness, then imagining a Chinese Room can't foresee all the properties that the Chinese Room would have if it were actual.  He wants to have his cake and eat it, too.  In the case of his simulation of the Chinese Room, he doesn't need an actual Chinese Room, just a simulation.  In the case of the brain, he does need an actual biological brain, as a simulation is unsatisfactory.  He can't have it both ways.

I wrote a lengthy research paper about Searle and functionalism in a metaphysics course. This is how I know all this stuff concerning Searle. I'm not really a Searle fan or anything. The Chinese Room? I hate it. It's a shitty thought experiment that equivocates if it does anything. It is well worth the criticisms you gave in your previous post, the above post, and then some. I didn't even mention it in my research paper.

One of my professors was Searle's assistant. She said he was a dick and she hated being around him. What's more, he'd tell his students that he'd solved the mind/body problem. And other professors were tasked with correcting them when they repeated this claim in their papers.

All this being said, I do think Searle clarified a few things about the mind/body problem. For one: a critique of dualism. Dualists like to divide reality into two columns. In one column (physicality) belongs things like extension and physical properties. In the other column (mentality) belong things like subjectivity and intentionality. Searle rightly calls the dualists out on this conceit. They assume that subjectivity and intentionality belong necessarily to the mental realm. Searle sees subjectivity and intentionality as physical properties of physical things. For whatever reason, no physicalists (including functionalists) have really done an analysis like this. I thought this was a good analysis. And it meshes well with his theory, biological naturalism.

As for biological naturalism itself? I do think it's a decent theory. As I said earlier, my thinking as far as the hard problem goes is between functionalism and [some better theory]. Maybe biological naturalism is a contender there. I might be biased because it does mimic the thinking of Spinoza. But--like I admitted-- this is a bias. I have no reason to accept Spinoza's ideas as true here. I just enjoy reading the guy, and I think he's brilliant. That doesn't mean he is correct. (Exhibit A: Plato.)

Searle thinks you CAN possibly create artificial consciousness. He doesn't rule it out, anyway. If you arrange proteins in such a way that resembles nerve fibers, they would be conscious. Attach them to a computer somehow, and the computer would be conscious. It might not even need to be protein-based to Searle. It would just need to do the same physical thing as a neuron-- NOT the same informational thing, as the functionalist contends. I wouldn't call it anti-reductionist. Just reductionist in a different way.

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Also, I think you had a good criticism of my puzzlement in the first place. I AM searching for a sort of "locality for consciousness," and inasmuch as that's a fool's errand, I am a fool. I do think you have a point in this regard, especially if functionalism turns out to be true. But (in my defense), searching for where memory is located isn't entirely a fool's errand. Start taking ice cream scoops of someone's brain out, and I'll bet memory will fail or begin to fail them at a certain stage. There is a sort of physical locality to memory. (For instance, take 1,000 ice cream scoops out of Jupiter's atmosphere, and I can remember things fine. So memory does have some kind of local connection to the brain. There is a place that it is: my brain. And a place it is not: Jupiter's atmosphere.)

For me, you gotta remember: I'm Socrates. When I don't know, I say I don't know. It's nice to point out which theory is most plausible, but I'm not one to decide on the most plausible theory until I have a sufficient degree of certainty. I'm not there with consciousness. Besides, it's so interesting to consider the possibilities, why not? But more than just "it's interesting".... we should respect the Socratic adage, and be sure to not think is true what we don't know. After all, ether seemed more plausible than "no ether" to 19th century physicists. And, given what they knew about waves, ether was the most plausible conclusion. But they were wrong.

What I'm doing is testing the ideas for strength. If ether exists, how come x? If functionalism is true, what about qualia?

It's interesting seeing you and vulcan discussing this in this thread... 

Duuuuuude..... emjay.... whatup, bro? So happy to see you man. How you been?

You might have missed this, but it was a few pages back.  A sim doesn't have to look like anything, but it will look like -something-.  We might see red for another color, or another thing.  We might hear red instead of seeing it.  In whatever case, your question could be applied, but in every application the complaint could not credibly be that functionalist theories can't explain it, but that you think the explanation is or may be wrong.

To functionalists, who posit multiple realizability, it's doing the experience of red, however done and however experienced, that counts as the thing.  Not the specific bits and parts in the individual experiencer.  Many functionalist theories of mind aren't even theories of human mind.  If articial intelligence is possible, multiple realizability is true.  If machine consciousness is possible, multiple realizability is true.  If there's any other conscious creature anywhere on earth or in the universe..multiple realizability is true.  The only state of affairs where multiple realizability could even be false..is if we are the sole conscious agents in the cosmos and it's completely irreproducible any other way.

The thing is Nudger, there is a question mark attached to qualia. Sure, the wavelengths of light perceived as red must look like something. But why do they appear red? There must be a reason. Or (at the very least) there *might* be a reason. I've not dismissed the idea that consciousness can be simulated. And btw, neither has Searle, as I said in my reply to Angrboda. Where do you stand on the back of our toilets being "slightly conscious." I feel like I want to draw the line there. Even though I can agree that, especially in a behaviorist sense, the back of our toilets are "aware."

I'm not sold on the notion that "awareness" entails conscious experience. Mind you, I'm not ruling it out entirely. But, I feel like questions are warranted. Those are the questions I'm asking.

[The Grand Nudger]

The thing is Nudger, there is a question mark attached to qualia. Sure, the wavelengths of light perceived as red must look like something. But why do they appear red?

Perhaps they don't.  Perhaps they just look like something.  

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When we're born, our brains most likely do the same thing, the scientists said. Our neurons aren't configured to respond to color in a default way; instead, we each develop a unique perception of color. "Color is a private sensation," Carroll said.

https://www.livescience.com/21275-color-...tists.html

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Where do you stand on the back of our toilets being "slightly conscious." I feel like I want to draw the line there. Even though I can agree that, especially in a behaviorist sense, the back of our toilets are "aware."

I'm not sold on the notion that "awareness" entails conscious experience. Mind you, I'm not ruling it out entirely. But, I feel like questions are warranted. Those are the questions I'm asking.

Neither am I, I think it's just one building block.  I'm much more sold on the notion that attention is the thing we're talking about when we talk about consciousness.  Does the back of a toilet seat attend to anything? An attention control model can, for example, attend to some of the concepts or contents within a body model, and, to the concepts being manipulated by that control model in time. The body model is aware of it's dimensions and environmental data, but an attention model is specifically and explicitly aware of it's awareness and can report on and manipulate elements of that awareness.

Or, at least, in machines. Maybe we can't do that. I mean that seriously. It may be that a machines apparatus provides a more cogent, coherent, or competent form of x than our own. We might lack an attention control, even though we definitely have a body control. Or, as is so often the case, our body and attention model both bear the stamp of our lowly origin. I probably won't outrun a car, either.

[emjay]

It's interesting seeing you and vulcan discussing this in this thread... 

Duuuuuude..... emjay.... whatup, bro? So happy to see you man. How you been?

Hey Vulcan, nice to see you too I'll keep my reply in hide tags tho, cos I don't want to intrude on this thread any more than I have already have done...

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Nothing exciting to report really, just been pottering around, playing a lot of games, trying to avoid Covid. And walking a lot... at least that - an appreciation for walking - has come out of this pandemic; you don't know what you've got till it's gone kind of thing... like at the beginning of the lockdowns I was limited to walking laps around our small garden, which was very constricting, but sometimes meditative. But later when those rules were relaxed, I worked out a route around my town of about 5000 steps - which takes me about an hour to walk - using my a pedometer app on my phone, and have enjoyed walking that same route in rain or shine, seeing it in all seasons, and treating is as a time for meditation or reflection, so yeah, wouldn't trade that for anything now. Other than that, I've had my two jabs but don't feel much safer, especially with Delta so prevalent, so it's a just a weird world we live in now, and I doubt it'll ever go back to the way it was, sadly.

Anyway, as I said, I don't want to intrude on this thread any more than I already have done... ie it was a very intellectual thread until I came along and lowered the tone/average IQ ... I should've stuck to lurking. With that in mind, do you mind if we don't further this conversation here... maybe catchup properly some other place some other time? I'll still keep reading this thread with interest, but I kinda want to draw a line under my involvement in it, so catch you some other time

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[LadyForCamus]

Trying to absorb all this. (I love it when you guys dig in deep, btw). But I am in the same boat as Em; takes me days to research and process what you guys bang out in minutes!

With regard to the p-zombie argument; maybe I don’t understand it properly, but it seems to me to beg the question. “Imagine a being, or a world of beings that behave exactly as if they’re conscious, but they’re not.” What is the justification for assuming that’s a coherent or logically possible scenario in the first place? If a zombie told me it was conscious, what reason would I have for not accepting that as true, except for the sake of making an argument against monism? Am I making any sense?

[The Grand Nudger]

Pzombies are conceivable, whatever is conceivable is possible - therefore pzombies are possible.

I think it has utility in considering evolutionary explanations of phenomenal content, just as one example.