“Normative” ethical theories

[Lucian]

Interesting re Incans. I will leave that one there but simply ask again, whose morality should we be promoting and why do you call any given act moral. If it is just a matter of definition then I see no reason why it should guide our actions. It is the same as calling something an airplane - a conventionalised form-meaning pair that varies in different linguistic communities.
I don’t disagree that moral statements might have some utility in persuading someone, but not in compelling someone. I just don’t see what you are adding to “Jim hit someone” when you say “that is immoral” if all that means is “Jim hit someone”. If what you are adding is “and don’t dot it” then I don’t see why that is realist in terms of the metaethics. Why is your “don’t do it” better than anyone else's

And sure, there is nothing wrong with fiction… it can however in moral fiction make people hurt each other (which I don’t like and not because it is objectively wrong). If you don’t want people doing horrible stuff to each other in the name of some fiction, then maybe jettison it?
Are you admitting here that realism is merely fiction? I don’t think you are, but am not understanding

[The Grand Nudger]

Whose morality do you think we should be promoting. Which one would actually give you the most good feels? What if incan morality was actually the one which gave you the most good feels?

Obviously, as a person who doesn't believe that this is what morality is about, that wouldn't work for me even if it did appeal to me. I'm capable of believing that the right morality and the morality that best appeals to me (you, god, the housecat) are not the same thing. You say there's nothing wrong with fiction and then describe what can be wrong with fiction. I think jim should keep his hands to himself, no matter what jim thinks, no matter what the incans thought, no matter what viracocha thought - no matter what I think. Just for the record, absolutely clocking some poor sob comes to my mind very often. Trouble is, I know better.

All that potential, and nowhere to put it. Where's a good warlord when you need one, eh? Ends and means, ends and means.

[Lucian]

Sorry, I meant by my comment on fiction that I disagree with you to an extent. The there is nothing wrong with fiction…” part was meant to be a “yeah, true, until”. Poor communication on my part
I want to promote actions that result in people prospering and feeling happy. But that isn’t on realist grounds. On what grounds as a realist do you promote a given action. What are you appealing to that makes it moral and therefore is useful for compelling. If it is just a fiction, my previous question roughly restated as “well so what, why should I care about your fictions” returns. How are you grounding “Jim should keep his hands to himself” better than I am by appealing to moral realism? Is that just your opinion?

[The Grand Nudger]

Why should I care and is it true are not the same question. Realism could be true and we may still not care.

In realist -or- quasi realist argumentation we promote action on objective metrics because we believe that people are compelled by such statements. I am grounding "Jim should keep his hands to himself" better than you because I am grounding it -at all-..even if I am grounding it in a compelling error.

Or do you mean something else by better?

Do I think it's just my opinion? Well, no. Do you? If you share my opinion it isn't -just- my opinion. Is it just you and me? What if we both want to hit people but at least one of us realizes that we shouldn't, even so, for reasons that are no less (or more) true than any other fact alike statement? The only sense that moral realism is ever "better" in the way you're asking is when or if it is more accurate. More accurate both as a description of how we apprehend moral content, or more accurate as to the facts of the matter at hand that we are purporting to report on (and...hypothetically, failing, as the case seems to be or must be in our possible anti-realist world). Better, in a utilitarian sense, is just whatever makes people move.

Obviously, if realist normative ethics have cause enough trouble™ in the world to warrant their abolition the ability to move people can hardly be questioned.

[Lucian]

It is late UK time so I will need to reply properly tomorrow. I suspect two things are happening here though, one - I may be misunderstanding what you mean by realism - could you link me to something that adequately covers your definition? 2 - I am likely missing some terms

[The Grand Nudger]

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

An example in use. The author we are/were discussing makes a realist or quasi realist case that there is actually something bad about certain beliefs on moral desert, and that society would see improvements if that sort of ideation was abandoned in ways that cannot be reduced to Just™ that authors opinion. To the extent that this author has confused those beliefs, which fit in any metaethical viewpoint, with a particular metaethical view or even morality as a whole the author may be objectively right that such beliefs cause exactly those issues and objectively wrong that this, then, demonstrates that any metaethical view is incorrect -or- that there is any normative or utilitarian ought in it's abolition.... even if incorrect.

[Lucian]

Thanks. I gave that a read and am still unconvinced (unsurprisingly). Game for going through that section by section rather than me give a long rambling reply where it will turn this in to a mess?
Re Morris’ views, he isn’t making a realist or quasi-realist case. He is explicit that it is about “if you want to see x society and if you see x type of behaviour as something you want to avoid then y is the approach to take”. It is an instrumental ought not a realist type of ought so he isn’t confusing any beliefs.
He also doesn’t ground his abolitionism in simply rejecting a metaethical stance. As noted in previous posts it is based on listing the type of things that moral realism has led to, claiming that on the whole moral realism has led to outcomes averse to the type of world that the author wants to see; then saying that if moral realism has caused more problems in that framework then abolition may be the way to go. More steps than that, but claiming he is realist or quasi-realist goes against his very clear assertions that he is an error theorist.

[The Grand Nudger]

Whether or not something makes a realist or quasi realist case isn't an issue of speaking magic words or a personal identity. The author posits that a real and recognizable harm to society is a property of a particular class of moralizing. The author does not believe this harm is just his bad feelings, just his opinion, and certainly not the dictates of his culture or society as he is broadly rejecting this in the effort. The author cites facts and studies and inferences from them as-though facts of that matter, well..matter..and implicitly believes that such argumentation will be compelling to his audience. It's realism in a beard.

If we were to grant that it is merely quasi realism, moral desert, moral agency, and metaethics are not the same thing, and so this harm (however defined) could be true and the contention that we ought to pursue moral abolitionism on those grounds would -still- be in error. IOW If he makes a good argument (whatever this means outside of realist semantics) that we should stop doing That™...the That™ in question is not morality in general or necessary to realism in particular.

All that said, I don't want you to get the impression that I'm not a fan, or that I don't agree with the specific contention. Pages back when I introduced desert and mentioned that I was an under punish guy....his reasons are why. I do have a tendency to find error theorists criticism compelling, and that probably comes down to shared ground between realism and error theory. Both are cognitivist metaethics - the notion that moral or ethical statements are fact alike - rejecting non cognitivist assertions such as the notion that these statements are ultimately grounded in our emotions or desires or opinions, error theory positing that moral or ethical statements do purport to report facts, and facts about the object in question, but do not get the facts right. Ever.

I'm always down for wherever you want to take the thread.

[Lucian]

You and I still very much disagree re realism in the works of Morris. It comes down to our definitions here, what you consider realism I consider to just be assertions about natural facts with no moral veneer that can be true or false applicable to them. I will try to find some specific quotes on this, but it seems like we are in the biology vs intelligent design semantics game here where the biologist says “the eye is designed to see”, the ID person says “he says design, that is ID terminology so he is really a believer in intelligent design” and the biologist saying “nope, I use that term in a specific way”. Neither of us would accept the ID proponent come back that the biologist’s language is like theirs and therefore this is just ID at base.


Your penultimate paragraph is an interesting one. Good that we have some level common ground on the thread. For what it is worth regardless of any disagreements, it has been a useful discussion for me

Given that Stanford page covers a lot of ground. What part of it do you feel applies best to your position? Maybe we can start there?

[The Grand Nudger]

You and I still very much disagree re realism in the works of Morris. It comes down to our definitions here, what you consider realism I consider to just be assertions about natural facts

This is also what natural realism sees valid moral statements to be.  Likewise, to get in front of a likely follow up question, the "normative force" in realist translation is the same as our expectations of a rational being confronted with accurate statements in valid inferences.  

with no moral veneer that can be true or false applicable to them.

If you look for an additional veneer before you decide something is "realist" then perhaps this is why you do not recognize realist content or conceit when it presents itself.  

I will try to find some specific quotes on this, but it seems like we are in the biology vs intelligent design semantics game here where the biologist says “the eye is designed to see”, the ID person says “he says design, that is ID terminology so he is really a believer in intelligent design” and the biologist saying “nope, I use that term in a specific way”. Neither of us would accept the ID proponent come back that the biologist’s language is like theirs and therefore this is just ID at base.

I go the other way with it, and have recently on the boards...but yeah, in principle I'm a-okay making such statements.  In general, the only difference between a psuedoscientific ider and a biologist, is that one of them thinks a god did it.  It becomes pretty clear they're talking about the same process. There's actually a term for this.  A stolen concept fallacy.  Employing a concept while simultaneously denying the logical and hierarchal validity upon which that concept depends.  

Long story short, id is evolutionary biology with a beard.  Often literally......

Your penultimate paragraph is an interesting one. Good that we have some level common ground on the thread. For what it is worth regardless of any disagreements, it has been a useful discussion for me

Given that Stanford page covers a lot of ground. What part of it do you feel applies best to your position? Maybe we can start there?

My position on whether a moral argument for moral abolitionism can succeed or in general? For the former, it seems self explanatory. For the latter..that I;m a realist is just an acknowledgement that I apprehend realist semantics and argumentation to be accurate and compelling. They may be wrong in-fact but that does not change my experience of them. That said, I also find that countervailing metaethics, moral skepticism, and error theory all make valid points and highlight difficulties in principle, and even more often difficulties in practice, that could confound a moral agent regardless of their being a moral truth and access to it. You know the saying that math is perfect, but people aren't? You run into the effects in woodworking and manufacturing pretty often. On paper everything lines up. IRL there are gaps, nearly imperceptible misalignments, bending and twisting and unexpected issues. The same is true of ideologies and systems in-practice. Knowing right from wrong (or believing that you do) may not be or even seem to be incredibly helpful if all you have to choose from are wrongs or not rights. When you have an idea of how things should go and should fit but nothing actually will or does. Exclusively suboptimal decision fields. I think that's one of the main factors involved when we lapse into intuitionism, emotivism, subjectivity, or even relativity. For us, timely answers may be more fit than accurate ones. If we consider the neurological basis for moral decisionmaking and specifically when we are prompted to make objective judgements it's pretty clear that we're trying to limit those error potentials...but...ofc..we routinely fail.

If and when I find myself in that position then I start to defer to those basis. If I can't really decide then I'll weigh my closest relatives interests and perceptions, my society's, go with my gut..or flat out flip a coin.

-as for where to start, i mean, right at the start I'd suspect. In what way is the statement that murder is bad different from the statement that nyx is a black cat?