An Argument Against Determinism

[Disagreeable]

Here is an argument against determinism by the philosopher Michael Huemer:



Thoughts on this argument?

Source of the argument: https://substack.com/home/post/p-107082834

I think that there is a missing premise. And that premise is that incompatabilism about free will is true. Otherwise the conclusion doesn't follow from premise 7.

[HappySkeptic]

A contradiction only proves that there is a wrong premise, or a wrong set of logical steps.

Whenever I see a "should" in logic, my spidey sense starts to tingle.

Let's define "should" as "there is a preference for this outcome, should it be possible".

Then 1. becomes "believing only the truth is a preference compared to all alternatives, should it be possible".

2. then says, all preferences are possible to occur in reality. That is an invalid premise.

3. then says determinism implies that all possible events actually occur. This could be valid. One could argue that events that do not occur under determinism were never possible.

4. says that determinism requires all preferences to actually occur. This is clearly false because of the invalid premise 2.

I don't really need to go on.

Yes, determinism means that choice is an illusion. Your preferences don't always happen, so this logic can't solve things either way.

[The Grand Nudger]

If determinism were true then prior events and natural laws produced my belief that I have free will. - alot of the premises could be (and should be...bam) replaced for that. I take it from the semantic choices that the arguer is primarily aiming at some version of determinism one hair shy of (or possibly crossing over into) fatalism?

Couldn't there be deterministic reasons for believing false things? Couldn't there be a deterministic mismatch between our responsibilities or our expectations and our abilities or outcomes? If the understanding of the term "should" being used in premise 1 is normative, as in we have a responsibility to believe only true things - we'll need some additional premises about the possibility of normative failure and I can't personally think of a set which would not admit that possibility. An incompetent agent. If it's some sort of opinion about cognitive function and biological fitness and what we would expect from a creature like us with a mind like ours that would need to be expanded....but maybe we're either primed by those events and laws to believe at least some false things or we're mechanically defective in some hilarious and instructive way - even so.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Does determinism require the success of its subjects in order to be true? What if the atoms in your life line up to make you a stone-cold fuck-up? Couldn't determinism lead people into believing and acting upon stupid shit?

Yeah, we should believe only true things, but that clearly not the case. Lots of people believe clearly incorrect stuff. However, that doesn't mean the we aren't determined to believe false things. We may well be if the atoms around us steer us in that direction.

Full disclosure: I'm agnostic on the question.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Here is an argument against determinism by the philosopher Michael Huemer:



Thoughts on this argument?

Source of the argument: https://substack.com/home/post/p-107082834

I think that there is a missing premise. And that premise is that incompatabilism about free will is true. Otherwise the conclusion doesn't follow from premise 7.

Premise #2 is invalid.

Boru

Edit: Yeah, what Happy said.

[Disagreeable]

My counterargument is:

[1] "Ought" implies "can". If we ought to do something then we are able to do it.
[2] Therefore, it is only the case that we ought to believe the truth in cases where we can believe the truth.
[3] We ought to believe the truth in cases where we can believe the truth.
[4] If determinism is true, then if we can believe the truth then we do believe the truth.
[5] Therefore, if determinism is true and we believe determinism then we ought to believe determinism. But if indeterminism is true and we believe indeterminism then we ought to believe indeterminism.

So basically my counterargument shows that I can use some of the same premises as the original argument but it doesn't entail that determinism is false.

One of the problems with the original argument is the inconsistency between on the one hand accepting that ought implies can but on the other hand accepting the premise that we always ought to believe the truth in a completely unqualified way where ought does not imply can.

[Angrboda]

One of the tricky aspects is the implied counterfactuals. It's not clear what makes a reasonable counterfactual, such as, "I'd have made that putt if I hadn't flinched," from an unreasonable counterfactual such as, "I'd have made that putt if the gravitational constant of the universe had varied appropriately." Thus, speaking to Rhythm's plaint about insufficiency, there exist a range of counterfactuals ranging from not realizing the truth due to some reasonable counterfactual to not realizing it due to an unreasonable counterfactual to not realizing it because there is no valid counterfactual, i.e. it is impossible to realize the truth. The question then becomes whether the impossible exists on the same continuum as reasonable and unreasonable counterfactuals, or whether it should be considered categorically distinct. I suspect there are interesting modal consequences depending upon which is what. Regardless, the argument assumes that counterfactuals have meaningful semantics and that isn't necessarily the case if determinism is true.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Attempting to logically prove or disprove free will/determinism is an exercise in futility.

Boru

[Ivan Denisovich]

Does determinism require the success of its subjects in order to be true?

No.

What if the atoms in your life line up to make you a stone-cold fuck-up?

Then you're stone-cold fuck-up. Stone-could fuck-up who might think that it is his choices that lead him to such stance or who might think that universe determined it for him. It's irrelevant because it was determined either way.

Couldn't determinism lead people into believing and acting upon stupid shit?

It could. Determinism only means that whatever you think or act isn't done by your choice (even if you think differently). It is determined that you held opinion x (or opinion y) but it's also determined that tomorrow you will hold opinion y (or continue holding opinion x). At least such is my take on it.

Full disclosure: I'm agnostic on the question.

I don't think that free will is anything but excuse of religious types for their deity non-intervention so I suppose I'm closer to determinism spectra of things. I don't subscribe to it all the way though. In my view people have agency but are influenced by myriad of factors like cultural capital, upbringing or even money or lack of them.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Does determinism require the success of its subjects in order to be true?

No.

What if the atoms in your life line up to make you a stone-cold fuck-up?

Then you're stone-cold fuck-up. Stone-could fuck-up who might think that it is his choices that lead him to such stance or who might think that universe determined it for him. It's irrelevant because it was determined either way.

Couldn't determinism lead people into believing and acting upon stupid shit?

It could. Determinism only means that whatever you think or act isn't done by your choice (even if you think differently). It is determined that you held opinion x (or opinion y) but it's also determined that tomorrow you will hold opinion y (or continue holding opinion x). At least such is my take on it.

Full disclosure: I'm agnostic on the question.

I don't think that free will is anything but excuse of religious types for their deity non-intervention so I suppose I'm closer to determinism spectra of things. I don't subscribe to it all the way though. In my view people have agency but are influenced by myriad of factors like cultural capital, upbringing or even money or lack of them.

Those questions were objections to the OP.