An Argument Against Determinism

[Disagreeable]

QM, since you asked earlier, modifies determinism with the inclusion of randomness and probability to natural law.

And can something be both random and predetermined?

I don't think that true metaphysical randomness is possible if predeterminism is true. But pseudo-randomness is possible. It could just be, for example, that so-called quantum "randomness" isn't truly random but is just very, very unpredictable.

[Thumpalumpacus]

It could just be, for example, that so-called quantum "randomness" isn't truly random but is just very, very unpredictable.

What's the difference between "random" and "unpredictable"? I'd think if determinism is true, "random" would be a null set, while "unpredictable" would simply mean we lack sufficient knowledge of the antecedents to make an accurate prediction -- or it could mean that QM is truly random. How would we be able to tease out that difference?

[Disagreeable]

It could just be, for example, that so-called quantum "randomness" isn't truly random but is just very, very unpredictable.

What's the difference between "random" and "unpredictable"? I'd think if determinism is true, "random" would be a null set, while "unpredictable" would simply mean we lack sufficient knowledge of the antecedents to make an accurate prediction -- or it could mean that QM is truly random. How would we be able to tease out that difference?

Well the difference is between epistemic randomness and metaphysical randomness. Epistemic randomness is just the fact that we're unable to predict something, whereas metaphysical randomness is things being uncaused and unstable in reality regardless of if we're able to predict it or not.

[Thumpalumpacus]

What's the difference between "random" and "unpredictable"? I'd think if determinism is true, "random" would be a null set, while "unpredictable" would simply mean we lack sufficient knowledge of the antecedents to make an accurate prediction -- or it could mean that QM is truly random. How would we be able to tease out that difference?

Well the difference is between epistemic randomness and metaphysical randomness. Epistemic randomness is just the fact that we're unable to predict something, whereas metaphysical randomness is things being uncaused and unstable in reality regardless of if we're able to predict it or not.

Right -- but how would we actually know which one was which? I should have phrased my question better.

[Disagreeable]

Well the difference is between epistemic randomness and metaphysical randomness. Epistemic randomness is just the fact that we're unable to predict something, whereas metaphysical randomness is things being uncaused and unstable in reality regardless of if we're able to predict it or not.

Right -- but how would we actually know which one was which? I should have phrased my question better.

Good question. It's possible that we couldn't possibly know the difference despite there being one.

This goes in favor of your point of determinism being unfalsifiable. I also think that it's unfalsifiable. But I am a determinist, or a necessitarian to be more specific, because I think that there being only one possible world is more parsimonious than there being multiple possible worlds. Reality can make sense just as well without assuming that things could have happened in multiple different ways at any given moment, we don't have to assume that there is more than one way that things can go in any given moment, all we have to assume is that we're capable of imagining things going multiple different ways, even if they can't.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Right -- but how would we actually know which one was which? I should have phrased my question better.

Good question. It's possible that we couldn't possibly know the difference despite there being one.

This goes in favor of your point of determinism being unfalsifiable. I also think that it's unfalsifiable. But I am a determinist, or a necessitarian to be more specific, because I think that there being only one possible world is more parsimonious than there being multiple possible worlds. Reality can make sense just as well without assuming that things could have happened in multiple different ways at any given moment, we don't have to assume that there is more than one way that things can go in any given moment, all we have to assume is that we're capable of imagining things going multiple different ways, even if they can't.

It's cool. I like to tell myself I have free will, not because I am sure that's true, but because I don't want to think of myself as an automaton. A multiverse, one universe with multiple possible outcomes, or one universe with only one possible outcome -- not only is that above my own pay-grade, it's well outside the scope of current human knowledge.

Like it or not, "I don't know" is the most accurate answer, in my opinion.

[Disagreeable]

Like it or not, "I don't know" is the most accurate answer, in my opinion.

Although I lean towards determinism, I am not certain of determinism.

[Angrboda]

I think free will is overrated. If my current decisions weren't determined by my past, I'd likely be calling my psychiatrist.

[Paleophyte]

How does randomness help? Whether it's a mechanistic event or a random event should matter little. Either one represents an external influence rather than a person's will.

[Disagreeable]

How does randomness help? Whether it's a mechanistic event or a random event should matter little. Either one represents an external influence rather than a person's will.

I agree. I'm a hard incompatabilist, personally, so I think that regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is true we don't have free will.

So even if I agreed to all of the premises of the argument in the OP, and added the required premise, for the conclusion to follow, of incompatabilism being true, I can consistently not believe in free will and accept the conclusion that determinism is false.