Atheism's Definition - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

[Darkstar]

I have no idea who Jstrodel is. But I know that the question of beliefs, knowledge and their truth and falsehood is relevant to the definition of atheism.

Do you have a link to an important argument of his or something? I'm curious.

I have no idea if this is the best (i.e. worst) one.
http://atheistforums.org/thread-18024-po...#pid422813

I'm not even sure how he's using epistemology here.

[Ben Davis]

Read this carefully: I'm not confusing knowledge and belief.

I said 'conflating' not 'confusing'. And yes you are. I'm not letting you off the hook with this one.

In line with the most widely held views in epistemology, I take knowledge to be merely a subcategory of belief, namely, knowledge is "justified, true belief". If a belief is thus both true and rationally warranted, it counts as knowledge.

...Finally! You clearly understand the attributes of the definitions so why are you not prepared to accept the different applications? Here's the thing: the differences between knowledge and belief are not 'mere', they're substantial. Subjects that qualify as beliefs do not necessarily qualify as knowledge, they must meet the additional criteria of 'demonstrability' (i.e. the practical test which meets the standards of 'truth' and 'rational warranty'). Those additional criteria set 'knowledge' apart from 'belief' in a practical context and mean that subjects meeting the discreet definitions behave differently. Hence the need for different uses of the words.

Thus when you are asked "Does God exist?" It doesn't matter whether you say "I know God exists" or "I believe God exists". The difference is merely a question of epistemology.

Once again, with the 'mere'. This is misdirection. It's not just a question of epistemology, that's a useless oversimplification; there's also the matter of practical applicability. It matters entirely whether you say 'I believe...' or 'I know...' because the difference is 'demonstrability'. That has real-world applications which must be recognised and not dismissed by claims of 'mere epistemology'.

On the question of metaphysics, which is what the existence of God is actually about, either answer takes the same metaphysical view.

The existence of god is not just about metaphysics to the majority who practice a variety of religions, worldwide. Most gods are claimed to be 'interventionists', that is to say they make practical, real-world differences to the lives of their believers. That's why claims of belief and knowledge must be treated differently and that's reflected in the linguistic use.

[Vincenzo Vinny G.]

I have no idea who Jstrodel is. But I know that the question of beliefs, knowledge and their truth and falsehood is relevant to the definition of atheism.

Do you have a link to an important argument of his or something? I'm curious.

I have no idea if this is the best (i.e. worst) one.
http://atheistforums.org/thread-18024-po...#pid422813

I'm not even sure how he's using epistemology here.

He's right that some arguments from authority are not fallacious.

For instance, accepting a definition because it comes from a dictionary is a valid appeal to authority. Or believing something because a police officer, lawyer or judge says it could be a valid appeal to authority.

Read this carefully: I'm not confusing knowledge and belief.

I said 'conflating' not 'confusing'. And yes you are. I'm not letting you off the hook with this one.

In line with the most widely held views in epistemology, I take knowledge to be merely a subcategory of belief, namely, knowledge is "justified, true belief". If a belief is thus both true and rationally warranted, it counts as knowledge.

...Finally! You clearly understand the attributes of the definitions so why are you not prepared to accept the different applications? Here's the thing: the differences between knowledge and belief are not 'mere', they're substantial. Subjects that qualify as beliefs do not necessarily qualify as knowledge, they must meet the additional criteria of 'demonstrability' (i.e. the practical test which meets the standards of 'truth' and 'rational warranty'). Those additional criteria set 'knowledge' apart from 'belief' in a practical context and mean that subjects meeting the discreet definitions behave differently. Hence the need for different uses of the words.

Thus when you are asked "Does God exist?" It doesn't matter whether you say "I know God exists" or "I believe God exists". The difference is merely a question of epistemology.

Once again, with the 'mere'. This is misdirection. It's not just a question of epistemology, that's a useless oversimplification; there's also the matter of practical applicability. It matters entirely whether you say 'I believe...' or 'I know...' because the difference is 'demonstrability'. That has real-world applications which must be recognised and not dismissed by claims of 'mere epistemology'.

On the question of metaphysics, which is what the existence of God is actually about, either answer takes the same metaphysical view.

The existence of god is not just about metaphysics to the majority who practice a variety of religions, worldwide. Most gods are claimed to be 'interventionists', that is to say they make practical, real-world differences to the lives of their believers. That's why claims of belief and knowledge must be treated differently and that's reflected in the linguistic use.

I believe atheism entails, at it's core, a metaphysical claim. There is an epistemic component, but it simply isn't important. When people think of theism or atheism, they think God or no God. They don't think "belief or knowledge." Thus if epistemology plays a role, it's merely secondary to the question of God's existence.

To prove this, think of other views like this: Realism vs anti-realism- at bottom this debate is about whether something is or isn't real. The question of whether we know or believe realism/antirealism is a side-issue.

Or look at an even more everyday example: Political liberalism vs conservatism- is it centrally about whether you believe or know that your political view is good for the country? Or is it centrally about whether liberalism or conservatism itself?

Clearly then, the knowledge/belief argument is secondary.