(January 19, 2016 at 12:39 pm)robvalue Wrote: I'd never argue for solipsism, I just can't find any way to rule it out.

There is an existential choice between taking the world as absurd or as intelligibly ordered. Committing to the second removes solipsism from consideration. Solipsism is not compatible with the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). If the PNC is proscriptive (a requirement for the world's intelligibility) then it represents something absolute that is external to the mind of any particular observer.

(January 19, 2016 at 4:59 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote:

(January 18, 2016 at 1:37 am)ChadWooters Wrote: Are you saying that psychological facts don't count? (Mary's Room, Jackson).

The Mary's room' thought experiment doesn't really disprove physicalism though...Mary was -intentionally- deprived of the PHYSICAL experience of seeing color!

Not exactly. Mary was deprived of the physical data set necessary to experience color. The thought experiment focuses on whether any kind of monist reduction is possible. It takes no particular stand with respect to supervenience.

(January 19, 2016 at 5:02 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: The question posed by the study is not 'what is the nature of the knowledge she has learned,' but rather, DID she actually learn anything new.  

When someone acknowledges that Mary learns something, it entails certain conclusions about the nature of what was learned, i.e. a non-physical fact.

(January 28, 2016 at 12:40 pm)ChadWooters Wrote:

(January 19, 2016 at 4:59 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: The Mary's room' thought experiment doesn't really disprove physicalism though...Mary was -intentionally- deprived of the PHYSICAL experience of seeing color!

Not exactly. Mary was deprived of the physical data set necessary to experience color. The thought experiment focuses on whether any kind of monist reduction is possible. It takes no particular stand with respect to supervenience.

K...would you mind rephrasing your above thoughts in a manner that a person (me) who does not have a Ph.D. In philosophy or theology can more easily understand? Your esoteric language is very annoying, and at times seems intentionally obfuscating...

(January 28, 2016 at 12:52 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote:

(January 28, 2016 at 12:40 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Not exactly. Mary was deprived of the physical data set necessary to experience color. The thought experiment focuses on whether any kind of monist reduction is possible. It takes no particular stand with respect to supervenience.

K...would you mind rephrasing your above thoughts in a manner ...more easily understand[able]? Your esoteric language is very annoying...

I intend to be clear, not annoying (this time).

Jackson’s thought problem tacitly appeals to Leibnitz’s law, “The Identity of Indiscernables.” Basically, if someone can say something about one thing that cannot be said about the other, then those two things are not identical. Everything true of Clemens is also true of Twain, hence they are identical. If brain and mind are identical then every true statement about the physical system of the brain is true about the mental experiences and vice versa. (Brain is a Clemens. Mind is a Twain.)

A physical reduction would mean that a complete description of something’s material composition and observable changes would exhaust all possible knowledge about that thing. Jackson’s initial claim was that conscious experiences are not identical to physical facts because a complete knowledge of the physical facts associated with consciousness does not include knowledge of what it is like to experience consciousness. To me, it shows that mental properties are not identical to brain states. This not to say that mental properties and physical brain states can exist independently, only that the existence of each should be considered distinct.

On the other hand, supervenience is a one-way causal relationship in which the existence of particular mental properties depends necessarily on specific physical processes, but not the other way around. It’s a separate, although related, issue.

He thinks that his mind and his brain aren't the same thing.  The language, as you've noticed, is fluff.

Jackson's experiment suggests that it is possible to have the same knowledge, only in different forms. If Mary indeed knows all there is to know about brain states of seeing red then she knows 'about' her own brain state when she sees red. To argue that she is experiencing something different than what she already knows is begging the question that her experience of redness is not equal to the indirect knowledge she has about the brain states making up the experience of redness. I may have a book of the physics of gasoline combustion, that book doesn't necessarily have to explode for it to be considered complete. And if I should create a gasoline explosion in the lab, it doesn't teach me anything I couldn't have learned from the book; only the form of the knowledge is different.

(January 28, 2016 at 5:51 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Jackson's experiment suggests that it is possible to have the same knowledge, only in different forms…If Mary indeed knows all there is to know about brain states of seeing red then she knows 'about' her own brain state when she sees red.

You’re conflating sensation with conceptualization. Knowing in concept what happens to the brain physically is not the same as knowing what any given experience associated with that brain state feels like. Inside the box, Mary has conceptual knowledge of color perception. Outside the box, she gains sensual knowledge of color perception. To my mind, Jackson’s thought problem is overly complex. I say, if someone has been blind from birth, no amount of book-learning on sight can compare with its visceral experience.

(January 4, 2016 at 11:56 am)ChadWooters Wrote:

(January 3, 2016 at 11:39 am)LadyForCamus Wrote: I find it very annoying when theists play fast and loose with the definition of the word "knowledge."

The definition is quite simple: justified true belief. Any qualifications of that definition come from your own bias.

Forgive me but I'm new to the thread and I'm interested to see what ChadW has brought to the discussion.  While that is veritably the textbook definition it seems to me that what counts as "justified" lets in a world of disagreement.

(January 28, 2016 at 7:08 pm)Whateverist the White Wrote:

(January 4, 2016 at 11:56 am)ChadWooters Wrote: The definition is quite simple: justified true belief. Any qualifications of that definition come from your own bias.

Forgive me but I'm new to the thread and I'm interested to see what ChadW has brought to the discussion.  While that is veritably the textbook definition it seems to me that what counts as "justified" lets in a world of disagreement.

Calling it 'bias' may have had the wrong connotations. It might have been more accurate for me to instead have said 'prior commitments'.