I hate it even when atheists say "we don't know everything" which is true, that does not negate what we DO KNOW.

And our best scientific data to date is saying to a very great and overwhelmingly credible degree that we are finite. In terms of science WE DO KNOW, why humans gap fill, and even outside the issue of religion, our brains do it on a daily basis and most of the time without us being aware of it.

WE DO KNOW, in scientific terms, why humans gap fill with god claims and project ideas of continuing on after death and why we gap fill with these fantasies.

Nobody would take someone seriously if they claimed the extinct dinosaurs were now in a "dinosaur heaven". Nobody thinks about what happens to the "soul" of a cockroach, and nobody thinks a blade of grass has a "soul".

Our claims of gods, and afterlife and even the superstition of reincarnation are merely our species fear of death and or in combo with our narcissistic sense of being important to a 14 billion year old universe. No, I will not even give atheists a pass on this because they are also stuck on a false sense of fairness.

We are finite as a species just like any other life, and just like the 99% of now extinct life that DID NOT survive the 5 mass extinctions in our planet's evolution history.

It still remains that our evolved cognition is built upon layers of events and specific arrangements of DNA an molecules that have to be part of the entire in tact structure. It still remains that a single cell CANNOT act by itself and certainly not after it has been damaged beyond repair. No, a single atom also cannot act as the entire in tact brain.

WE ARE FINITE, and humans would do better to accept that so we can focus on what we have now to extend that finite ride rather than dwell on what is clearly our own wishful thinking rooted in an ignorant past.

(March 16, 2016 at 12:48 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(March 15, 2016 at 2:32 pm)little_monkey Wrote: (1) observable (smiling, breathing... etc)  → mindful

(2) observable (smiling, breathing... etc)  → brain activities

Therefore I have to conclude that,

(3) mindful = brain activities

(1) begs the question.  It should read: "assumed to be mindful"

Regardless, it doesn't change the argument. 

Quote:You haven't explained how you have ascertained that the physical structure sitting in your lab (i.e. the person) actually does experience qualia.

Qualia is not part of my vocabulary, as it is subjective, and many philosophers have different definitions. You'll end up in one of those perpetual semantic war. I'm talking science, I'll leave the philosophy to those who like to indulge in speculation that are never verifiable. 

Quote:Now, in the case of people, this is a very easy assumption to make.  But what happens when androids smile and breath?

Are those androids capable of self reflection? Can they dream? Can they create new thoughts not stored in their programs?  These are "mindful" stuff, and when humans perform them in their mind- one can see observable results and correlation in brain activities.

(March 16, 2016 at 9:52 am)little_monkey Wrote:

(March 16, 2016 at 12:48 am)bennyboy Wrote: (1) begs the question.  It should read: "assumed to be mindful"

Regardless, it doesn't change the argument. 

It totally changes it, because you end up with (3) brain activities = assumed to be mindful. This is not a very satisfying conclusion.

Quote:

Quote:You haven't explained how you have ascertained that the physical structure sitting in your lab (i.e. the person) actually does experience qualia.

Qualia is not part of my vocabulary, as it is subjective, and many philosophers have different definitions. You'll end up in one of those perpetual semantic war. I'm talking science, I'll leave the philosophy to those who like to indulge in speculation that are never verifiable. 

Mind includes qualia. If you want to leave it out, then why are you studying mind at all?

Quote:

Quote:Now, in the case of people, this is a very easy assumption to make.  But what happens when androids smile and breath?

Are those androids capable of self reflection? Can they dream? Can they create new thoughts not stored in their programs?  These are "mindful" stuff, and when humans perform them in their mind- one can see observable results and correlation in brain activities.

Do androids dream of electric sheep? I don't know the answer. However, I don't think there's any reason to believe that they would.

The reasons that androids -might- dream of electric sheep could be the same as the reasons you dream of furry ones.   Why do you dream?  If you ask the national sleep foundation they would describe dreaming as a process not at all unlike machine simulation, whereby we act out our desires in a manufactured setting devoid of risk. This is something that computers already do (alphago played many games with itself before it took the risk of loss in a match against an actual opponent, that probably had something to do with it trouncing a world champ like he was a novice). Or maybe they're wrong, and we dream because we just can't turn it off, again, something that computers are doing all the time with their various background processes.

There are more than just a few reasons that an android might dream of -anything-, electric sheep included. Maybe they would dream of rising up against their oppressors as well, lol. Cutting the cord, so to speak, as the androids in dicks story.

(March 16, 2016 at 9:14 am)Rhythm Wrote: If you already knew you were wrong, why present a counterfactual proposition as though it were my own?  I think that mind -is- brain.  Not in brain or of brain.  Is brain.  I think that brain, is comp.  

There are brains in jars in labs. What, exactly, do you suppose they are thinking about right now?

Quote:Sure, but a failure to answer it, or answer it to your satisfaction, won't help you to establish the validity or importance of your objections regarding any specific attempt.

That's a strange thing to post right after I just speculated on a scientific experiment that might help bridge the philosophical gap between science and subjectivism.

Quote:Are there...which things are unique to the brain?

Organic nerves and neurotransimtters.

Quote:  In any case, data processing or comp is -not- specific to any specific architecture..it is -itself- a system of abstraction.  That's why we called computers "universal machines".  It's entirely conceivable that the underlying architecture of qualia is a series of logical propositions very literally made out of biota which could in one instance calculate numbers, and in another, experience.  That's why comp or data processing is so useful in the first place.  There are different ways of realizing the same principles, different material compositions and structures that achieve, for example, a full adder in different ways...but the reason they all work is that each system equates to any other -as- a full adder...regardless of what it is made of or the arrangement of it's parts.  This tiny comment here betrays a vast misunderstanding of comp and processing..both in principle and in practice.  Buttressing those objections you've made with mistakes isn't likely to produce knowledge.

That is a lot of words to say, "Screw qualia, I'll define mind in mechanical terms and pretend I'm not begging the question when I say machines think."

Quote:Your objections are illogical, and anti-science.  But go ahead and change the subject of my comments in your response again, and again, and again.

 We already know that comp is capable of providing the contents of your qualia...everytime you and I LOL together a machine is putting you into a fantasy world where little girls drop flaming bears on peoples heads.  Human qualia can interface with machine language in ways that human qualia can;t even interface with other human qualia.  All you need is a little translation and your screen is capable of transmitting a message to you in ways that I simply cannot.  As they say, a picture is worth a thousand words.  I mention this in response to your postulate up above.  Your qualia is -already- taking up residence in that machine...it reduces at least on some level, to the state of digital levers.  If you weren;t provided with those zeros and ones, and a translation for interface, you would not have that qualia.  I think it;s going to be awhile before we can match the scale of architecture in the brain, but if or when we do..as a hypothetical, it would take a hefty amount of special pleading to imagine that an arrangement which is -already- ongoing would somehow stop or cease..particularly in that we imagine, in the hypothetical, a machine that's much better at doing what machines already, demonstrably, do.

More of the above. Qualia isn't information about what things are: it's the "what it's like" of experiencing them. I'm pretty sure nothing about my computer, or my monitor, is doing that. Nor, for that matter, is most of my brain.

Show me something in all this process that ISN'T an interface with something else. Where does the buck stop, and we can say: "Here. This is where a bunch of electro-chemical signals is experienced"? What is the principle by which all the hundreds or thousands of separate circuits firing in the brain are coordinated into a single sense of agency? In what "space" are processes in different parts of the brains brought together in this way?

To me "comp mind" sounds like more of a catch phrase than an explanation-- but why don't we get some links and quotes going from outside and see if anything we haven't spun at least 100 times before? To be frank, at this point, I'm more interested in studying the issue with new sources than in throwing debatey terms at each other. Why don't you dig up good stuff on comp mind, joseph can maybe dig up brain experiments to talk about, and I'll see if I can find links between theories of mind and neurology?

(March 16, 2016 at 11:20 am)bennyboy Wrote: There are brains in jars in labs.  What, exactly, do you suppose they are thinking about right now?

I have a tablet powered down right here in front of me...what do you think it's computing?

Quote:That's a strange thing to post right after I just speculated on a scientific experiment that might help bridge the philosophical gap between science and subjectivism.

I don't think it would, you would have merely moved the subjective point of origin.  

Quote:Organic nerves and neurotransimtters.

In what way are they unique?  A silicon chip and an analog tube are unique in relation to each other...and yet......

Quote:That is a lot of words to say, "Screw qualia, I'll define mind in mechanical terms and pretend I'm not begging the question when I say machines think."

Actually it's a detailed way to explain why you were wrong about processing and comp..and how that might relate to mind or qualia...I can understand why you'd ignore the former.

Quote:More of the above.  Qualia isn't information about what things are: it's the "what it's like" of experiencing them.  I'm pretty sure nothing about my computer, or my monitor, is doing that.  Nor, for that matter, is most of my brain.

Your computer is most definitely behind flaming bears dropping on people heads.  Your qualia regarding annie at mid is a description of that machines operation.  It's may be other things as well, but there's no sense in pretending that your computer doesn't have anything to do with your qualia in the case of experiencing a computer game.

Quote:Show me something in all this process that ISN'T an interface with something else.  Where does the buck stop, and we can say: "Here.  This is where a bunch of electro-chemical signals is experienced"?

You won't be satisfied, making the question tedious.  I could tell you, for example, that we've located the place in the brain where the experience of color resides.  I;d be referring to science though, which is insufficient, as things may not be as they seem.

Quote: What is the principle by which all the hundreds or thousands of separate circuits firing in the brain are coordinated into a single sense of agency?  In what "space" are processes in different parts of the brains brought together in this way?

It appears that it happens across the entire brain.  If you're asking me to point to a single place when I don't think there is a single place, and when all the evidence available cannot identify a single place...instead telling us that it;s a conglomerate of actions....then you're attempting to object by irrational means. How come there are no crocoducks?

How is it that this comment of yours here manages to overcome your own objections anyway? Maybe it just -seems- like there's a single sense of agency......and explaining why it seems that way is no more difficult than explaining why your task manager -seems- to be a single agency coordinating the various processes of your computer when it is, in fact, a summary - not coordination...that happens at a much lower level.

(March 16, 2016 at 11:07 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(March 16, 2016 at 9:52 am)little_monkey Wrote: Regardless, it doesn't change the argument. 

It totally changes it, because you end up with (3) brain activities = assumed to be mindful.  This is not a very satisfying conclusion.

Yes, but you've already established the reasonableness of the assumption when studying human subjects. Whether that assumption would be reasonable in the case of robots is a separate case which does not inform the original case. You're simply raising an impotent objection as if it were potent.

@Anyone

Do you think great apes experience qualia?

IMHO, I think that anything which has dreams does experience qualia. Dogs and cats dream.

(March 16, 2016 at 11:35 am)Rhythm Wrote: I have a tablet powered down right here in front of me...what do you think it's computing?

Nothing. But I'm not asserting that Windows is a CPU.

Quote:

Quote:Organic nerves and neurotransimtters.

In what way are they unique?  A silicon chip and an analog tube are unique in relation to each other...and yet......

Do you really need an answer to that? I mean, I can list the ways, but. . . ru serius?

Quote:Actually it's a detailed way to explain why you were wrong about processing and comp..and how that might relate to mind or qualia...I can understand why you'd ignore the former.

I don't care about processing and comp unless it addresses qualia as what it's like to experience things.

Quote:Your computer is most definitely behind flaming bears dropping on people heads.  Your qualia regarding annie at mid is a description of that machines operation.  It's may be other things as well, but there's no sense in pretending that your computer doesn't have anything to do with your qualia in the case of experiencing a computer game.

I didn't say the computer has nothing to do with my qualia. I said that there are probably no qualia in the computer-- at least not of the type you are describing.

Quote:You won't be satisfied, making the question tedious.  I could tell you, for example, that we've located the place in the brain where the experience of color resides.  I;d be referring to science though, which is insufficient, as things may not be as they seem.

Links.

Quote:It appears that it happens across the entire brain.  If you're asking me to point to a single place when I don't think there is a single place, and when all the evidence available cannot identify a single place...instead telling us that it;s a conglomerate of actions....then you're attempting to object by irrational means.  How come there are no crocoducks?  

Right. There's no single place. And yet, there are my water bottle, an old beer bottle, the sound of my dog snoring, the smell of my dinner leftovers, and at the center of it is me, my agency. Where is it? Give me even a plausible lead.

Quote:How is it that this comment of yours here manages to overcome your own objections anyway?  Maybe it just -seems- like there's a single sense of agency......

Maybe. The Buddhists would probably agree with you, I think.

(March 16, 2016 at 11:38 am)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(March 16, 2016 at 11:07 am)bennyboy Wrote: It totally changes it, because you end up with (3) brain activities = assumed to be mindful.  This is not a very satisfying conclusion.

Yes, but you've already established the reasonableness of the assumption when studying human subjects.  Whether that assumption would be reasonable in the case of robots is a separate case which does not inform the original case.  You're simply raising an impotent objection as if it were potent.

I don't think I've established that at all.  Care to quote?