Daniel Dennett Wrote:Consciousness is the fame in the brain.

(April 14, 2016 at 9:38 am)bennyboy Wrote: You're claiming a fallacy fallacy?  What color pot are you, then?

............................?

Quote:I'm arguing against your composition fallacy, and have always been.  You need to identify, physically speaking, exactly what constitutes a computer, and why you think it can experience anything subjectively.  So far you have: computers store data 'n' stuff, therefore. . . mind!  This really isn't much of a step up from theism, IMO.  Your system needs some actual physical details, or it's as woo a philosophy as any other woo philosophy.

No, you aren't, and I have absolutely no confidence in your ability to identify fallacies at this point.  I have already defined the term for you, and I have explained their operation.  If you don't know what a computer is by now I can't help you.  

So far I haven't gotten past the point of arguing computers into existence (ffs)...so there is no "therefore" for you to complain about.  If you want a therefore, we're going to have to agree that we're talking about something to begin with.  There's no point in me attempting to explain to you what a comp system can do, and how, so long as you maintain the notion that there is no such thing, is there? If you'd like to discuss how a comp system would achieve some "x", lets first confirm that we both understand what we're referring to with the term....which I've conveniently defined for you, and that they do..in fact....exist. Shall we?

Quote:You have explained neither.  All you've done is begged the question and proclaimed an ontology.

It's not -my- why or how to explain, it's yours.  You can have the conversation of what supervenes, and upon what, with someone who requires it.  I think that mind -is- brain, remember, not that mind supervenes upon brain.

Quote:No.  Some things are our constructions, and some things aren't.  

Sigh, no shit, and we named them all....

Quote:You can choose whatever word you want to represent mind, but you don't get to define mind other than as it is-- at least not if you want to talk about anything important.

I defined computers.............both those of our construction, and those that aren't (I even gave a t complete definition, so it would be more specific for our conversation). I don't have an interest in defining mind. I'd rather explain the "x" that has been defined -as- mind, so whats the relevance of this comment?

Quote:Okay, you have an idea.  Great.  Say what it is, and I will be suitably enlightened, and we can move on to other discussions.

*beings holding breath*

When I'm finished explaining how we unify the functions of a comp system...like your pc...can I get some assurance that this objection won't crop up again in a few pages, as all the rest have? In a modern pc, bussing. The shared copper trace lines on the PCB of a modern PC unifies the operation of the system's components. Not exactly mysterious, surprisingly simple to accomplish.

(April 14, 2016 at 3:54 pm)Rhythm Wrote: So far I haven't gotten past the point of arguing computers into existence (ffs)...so there is no "therefore" for you to complain about.  If you want a therefore, we're going to have to agree that we're talking about something to begin with.  There's no point in me attempting to explain to you what a comp system can do, and how, so long as you maintain the notion that there is no such thing.  Non-existent things don't do anything, ofc.  How does that line up against your experience, btw.  Your pc non-existent?  Does it not-sit there doing nothing?  OFC it exists, and it does something.  You tell me that CTM needs detail, as though computation weren't already very detailed. The details are in commercial operation, a physical demonstration before your very eyes..... on your own desk.   Forgive me if I doubt that any detail I could add to the field would change your tune when your own hands on the keyboard won't.  

You are equivocating on the man-made object we call "computer" and on a philosophical principle of mind. Since the question at hand is exactly what about the brain allows for (or is, if you want it that way) mind, then you can't just wave at the whole "system," unless you are claiming that the entire system is mind. We've been through this already-- are veins mind? Cerebral fluid? Hormones?

See, the brain-waving is sufficient if you are trying to prove that the brain is the seat of mind, rather than say the heart or the balls. It isn't sufficient if you are trying to explain the fact of subjective awareness, and exactly what about the brain makes it possible.

Quote:I defined computers.............both those of our construction, and those that aren't.  I don't have an interest in defining mind.  I'd rather explain the "x" that has been defined -as- mind, so whats the relevance of this comment?

What you haven't done is explain why a system experiences what it's like to be a system-- comp or otherwise. You've been rambling for almost 30 pages about computers and "comp mind," and said nothing about the existence of qualia. So yeah, you've implicitly defined mind as function rather than experience. But unless you can draw a bridge to qualia, you are in fact just begging the question.

(April 14, 2016 at 2:47 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(April 14, 2016 at 12:08 pm)ohreally Wrote: I don't get how your analogy of an engine is any better.  It seems like every argument you make against a comp mind can be applied here as well just as effectively.

What you said isn't in accord with what you quoted.

What is your point of the analogy then? I just don't see why you even mentioned it. As a comparison to the brain?

(April 14, 2016 at 5:18 pm)ohreally Wrote:

(April 14, 2016 at 2:47 pm)bennyboy Wrote: What you said isn't in accord with what you quoted.

What is your point of the analogy then?  I just don't see why you even mentioned it.  As a comparison to the brain?

It's not really an analogy, which was the point.  I'm saying that Rhythm's statment that mind is brain is not the same as any other physical explanation for things. It poses as a physicalist explanation, while not actually bothering to identify the physical systems involved-- even in stating that "brain is mind."

(April 14, 2016 at 4:49 pm)bennyboy Wrote: You are equivocating on the man-made object we call "computer" and on a philosophical principle of mind.

Predictable failure.  No, I'm not. I'm using a computer as an example of a -comp system-.

Quote:Since the question at hand is exactly what about the brain allows for (or is, if you want it that way) mind, then you can't just wave at the whole "system," unless you are claiming that the entire system is mind.  We've been through this already-- are veins mind?  Cerebral fluid?  Hormones?

Is the air an airplane?  This is nonsense.  Either you allow for identity and specificity, and we have a rational conversation, or you do not...and we do not. We -have- been through this....why are we revisiting it? Refer to my previous response, my mind hasn't changed in the meantime, nor has the definition I gave you of a comp system.

Quote:See, the brain-waving is sufficient if you are trying to prove that the brain is the seat of mind, rather than say the heart or the balls.  It isn't sufficient if you are trying to explain the fact of subjective awareness, and exactly what about the brain makes it possible.

I don't see why you would say that, or how you could even know it to begin with?

Quote:What you haven't done is explain why a system experiences what it's like to be a system-- comp or otherwise.  You've been rambling for almost 30 pages about computers and "comp mind," and said nothing about the existence of qualia.  So yeah, you've implicitly defined mind as function rather than experience.  But unless you can draw a bridge to qualia, you are in fact just begging the question.

There's no question to beg.  There can't be until we can agree that comp systems exist. Until you grant us something to beg -about-.

The physical systems involved are the material interactions between nuerons (would you like to discuss nueropeptides, or nueral states...?). Nothing exotic. The -proposed- ability of nuerons to form representations based upon sense data, leveraging those material interactions, and then store and manipulate those representations based upon comp principle is the comp theory of mind. This has been explained countless times in this thread and others.

Mind is not brain -- I would say mind is the conscious part of the brain.

(April 14, 2016 at 9:09 pm)Rhythm Wrote:

(April 14, 2016 at 4:49 pm)bennyboy Wrote: You are equivocating on the man-made object we call "computer" and on a philosophical principle of mind.

Predictable failure.  No, I'm not...and wtf is the "man-made" business doing here, lol?  A comp system is a comp system, regardless of who or what made it.  It's a simple issue of fitting a technical description.  

Stop making this thread about you and your pet theory. We're talking about mind. . . actual mind. And if you want to participate in that discussion of computers, you'll have to demonstrate that a "comp mind" and the subjective experience of qualia that people call mind are the same thing.

Quote:

Quote:Since the question at hand is exactly what about the brain allows for (or is, if you want it that way) mind, then you can't just wave at the whole "system," unless you are claiming that the entire system is mind.  We've been through this already-- are veins mind?  Cerebral fluid?  Hormones?

Is the air an airplane?  This is nonsense.  Either you allow for identity and we have a rational conversation, or you do not...and we do not.

Either the brain is mind, or parts of the brain are mind, or some brain function is mind. But you don't get to wave toward the brain and say it's all mind.

Quote:

Quote:See, the brain-waving is sufficient if you are trying to prove that the brain is the seat of mind, rather than say the heart or the balls.  It isn't sufficient if you are trying to explain the fact of subjective awareness, and exactly what about the brain makes it possible.

I don't see why you would say that, or how you could even know it to begin with.  Perhaps we could discuss the abilities of comp systems as soon as you allow for them in your universe.

In the case of the computer under the desk, I don't really need to know what parts of it are responsible for Windows 10, because that is not a very important philosophical discussion. A computer is what a computer is, because we made it and we get to label it. I've never argued against comp systems. I'm arguing against brain-waving. I know there's no difference to you, but there's an important philosophical difference to anyone who cares about mind as an experience of qualia.

Quote:

Quote:What you haven't done is explain why a system experiences what it's like to be a system-- comp or otherwise.  You've been rambling for almost 30 pages about computers and "comp mind," and said nothing about the existence of qualia.  So yeah, you've implicitly defined mind as function rather than experience.  But unless you can draw a bridge to qualia, you are in fact just begging the question.

There's no question to beg.  There can't be until we can agree that comp systems exist.

That's not a very well thought-out sentence. If you think someone's begging the question about God, for example, do you have to agree that God can exist in order to point out that they are begging the question?

I'm fine with comp systems when you are talking about computers, because it's just an ontology. However, when you want to say that a comp system is mind, you'll have to do more than wave your hand toward computers, and say, "See? I said minds are comps, and there are comps everywhere, and the brain acts like a comp, too. So comp mind, gotcha!"

(April 14, 2016 at 9:27 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I'm fine with comp systems when you are talking about computers, because it's just an ontology.  However, when you want to say that a comp system is mind, you'll have to do more than wave your hand toward computers, and say, "See?  I said minds are comps, and there are comps everywhere, and the brain acts like a comp, too.  So comp mind, gotcha!"

Excellent.  Computers exist.  I think that mind is a comp system, not that a comp system is a mind.  I don't think my desktop has a mind or is a mind.  Glad to clear that up for you. I think they're both comp systems, sure. So is an atari and my pc - quite a difference between them, though, eh?

(April 14, 2016 at 9:53 pm)Rhythm Wrote:

(April 14, 2016 at 9:27 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I'm fine with comp systems when you are talking about computers, because it's just an ontology.  However, when you want to say that a comp system is mind, you'll have to do more than wave your hand toward computers, and say, "See?  I said minds are comps, and there are comps everywhere, and the brain acts like a comp, too.  So comp mind, gotcha!"

Excellent.  Computers exist.  I think that mind is a comp system, not that a comp system is a mind.  I don't think my desktop has a mind or is a mind.  Glad to clear that up for you.  I think they're both comp systems, sure.  So is an atari and my pc - quite a difference between them, though, eh?

So your view on mind is that it processes stuff?  By George, you've solved it!