It's probably useful to mention that I don't think that the self "calls upon" anything.

(August 4, 2016 at 11:53 am)Rhythm Wrote: Regardless of whether or not our description of self is accurate - I'd say that this desire comes from the brain, sure.  That there is no "outside damage" is, I think...a stretch.  The various causes of strokes would be the "outside damage".   Should've skipped a few more deserts, stayed away from smokes, etc.  

Okay, so just because something occurs inside the body doesn't make it of the self. Agreed?

Quote:I don't know.  I don't think it is a part of the self.  It's a part of the same system...but in the example offered, where you still "have self" and just cant move your leg...I'd say that's probably not an issue of damage to the self, even if it is damage to an associated mechanism.  Doesn't appear to be damage to the will or intent either.   I know you hate the computer analogy...but, is a computer any more or less free before or after it's been damaged, or depending on the source of the damage as interior or exterior?  It just doesn't seem to be informative with regards to -that-.

Well, in order to determine if an individual agent has free will, we first have to establish what an individual agent IS. Let me put it this way, I'd say that free will is as real as the self.

So what's the self? It probably doesn't include the leg, since if you lose your leg, you still are yourself. As for will-- yes, the will is damaged in this case, since the intent cannot be manifested as movement, and that is exactly how I define will-- it is the capacity to manifest intent as behavior.

(August 4, 2016 at 6:48 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Okay, so just because something occurs inside the body doesn't make it of the self.  Agreed?

Agreed. 

Quote:Well, in order to determine if an individual agent has free will, we first have to establish what an individual agent IS.  Let me put it this way, I'd say that free will is as real as the self.

Agreed.  

Quote:So what's the self?  It probably doesn't include the leg, since if you lose your leg, you still are yourself.  As for will-- yes, the will is damaged in this case, since the intent cannot be manifested as movement, and that is exactly how I define will-- it is the capacity to manifest intent as behavior.

The will is not damaged.  The ability to carry out that will, in that singular expression, is damaged.  Not that you need damage for this particular distinction to express itself.  No matter how hard I will it....I cannot fly.  The subject in your example could manifest intent as behavior, particularly the urge to move his leg and fuck a goat - all manner of ways.  My will is no more damaged by my inability to fly than the will of the goatfucker is damaged by being unable to move his leg.  I'll suggest again that this example is uninformative. Damaged, undamaged, it doesn't tell us anything about free will either way, even as you define it.

(August 4, 2016 at 6:54 pm)Rhythm Wrote: The will is not damaged.  The ability to carry out that will, in that singular expression, is damaged.

We are using different definitions. I think you are calling "will" what I call "intent." I'm using this definition of will: the capacity to manifest intent outside the agent. So I want my leg to move, and it moves. Between my formation of the intent to move, and the actual moving, I call will.

Quote:Not that you need damage for this particular distinction to express itself.  No matter how hard I will it....I cannot fly.  The subject in your example could manifest intent as behavior, particularly the urge to move his leg and fuck a goat - all manner of ways.  My will is no more damaged by my inability to fly than the will of the goatfucker is damaged by being unable to move his leg.  I'll suggest again that this example is uninformative.  It doesn't matter which way it goes, it doesn't tell us anything or lead to any comment on free will -even as you define it-.

Okay, I've fine moving forward with your definition, but you haven't defined "will" yet, and aren't using my definition. I'd say "No matter how hard I intent it, I cannot fly, because the will is incapable of manifesting that intent."

(August 4, 2016 at 6:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: We are using different definitions.  I think you are calling "will" what I call "intent."  I'm using this definition of will: the capacity to manifest intent outside the agent.  So I want my leg to move, and it moves.  Between my formation of the intent to move, and the actual moving, I call will.

With all this translation being needed back and forth, I have a growing suspicion that we'll ultimately arrive at a description of free will that isn't particularly free, or willful..even if you choose to call it that.   

Quote:Okay, I've fine moving forward with your definition, but you haven't defined "will" yet, and aren't using my definition.  I'd say "No matter how hard I intent it, I cannot fly, because the will is incapable of manifesting that intent."

If you'd rather my criticism refer to intent, then so be it, but good luck with will as you define it, when intent is under the bus.  Your definition of will specifically referenced it. The terms are redundant in context, and as such all questions and criticisms of one apply equally to the other.

I'm kind of mystified why you would choose to define will in such a way as that my inability to fly could be taken to mean that I do not have the will to fly, or perhaps even will.

(August 4, 2016 at 7:15 pm)Rhythm Wrote: If you'd rather my criticism refer to intent, then so be it, but good luck with will as you define it, when intent is under the bus.  Your definition of will specifically referenced it.  The terms are redundant in context, and as such all questions and criticisms of one apply equally to the other.

I'm kind of mystified why you would choose to define will in such a way as that my inability to fly could be taken to mean that I do not have the will to fly, or perhaps even will.

I'm fine with the ambiguity. In the case of a lost leg, I can no more walk than I can fly. I can still generate the intent, but there is no longer the capacity to manifest it in reality.

I'm open to redefining definitions and looking at new angles. In fact, I've already started doing this already in this thread. But let me give a specific example, so you know what I mean by "will." Let's say I want to move my arm. I form the intent to move it, and then I will it-- the "will" being something like a wish almost. I do not really know how my arm moves-- I just want it to, and it does. That's what I mean by will. Now, if I'm in an environment in which I can move my arm back and forth as much as I want, at a whim, then I'd say I have free will, at least in regard to that behavior.

But I'm perfectly willing to carry on a discussion under whatever definition you want to propose, and perhaps the outcome will be different.

Compatabilist free will is trivially true and incompatabilist free will is completely false.

/thread

(August 5, 2016 at 1:14 am)Alasdair Ham Wrote: Compatabilist free will is trivially true and incompatabilist free will is completely false.

/thread

I think you've captured the essence of the debate, yes.

However, when I'm buying my ice cream, the absolute truth doesn't matter to me too much-- I'm just happy to get my Rocky Road!

Same.

I think the free will debate is much like the agnostic one. Benny here is wrong about both issues, in my view, but only because he is confused about semantics, not because he's illogical.