(June 18, 2018 at 7:30 am)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(June 18, 2018 at 7:00 am)SteveII Wrote: What are the differences between natural theology arguments and pseudoscience? The arguments are just that: inductive premises usually set in a deductive syllogism. Some of the premises are backed by science, some are backed by reasoning, and some are backed by experiences. Pseudoscience are claims that have actual scientific reasons not to believe them. So it would seem that your "similarities" are that neither natural theology nor pseudoscience are purely scientific--which is correct but of little consequence because as we know, verificationism is all but dead.

Since the question was about the qualitative aspects of natural theology arguments as explanations and their similarity and substance on that axis, or lack thereof, you've talked around the question without actually engaging it.

Okay, this seems to be the point from your earliest post, so I will address that:

Quote:Indeed, theism as an explanation has much in common with what we know to be really bad explanations from pseudoscience and superstition, and almost nothing in common with what we know to be really good explanations from the physical sciences. So why should we think theism is a good explanation like those from science, rather than a really terrible explanation like those from pseudoscience and superstition?

This is one big category error. The article uses the term 'explanation' and then complain that the natural theology arguments don't meet the requirements of a scientific explanation (including what makes a for a good scientific explanation).  Inductive premises and the deductive conclusions of natural theology infer God as a fundamental feature of reality--not a scientific explanation. While support for some of the premises contain lots of science, the conclusion is always a metaphysical explanation. As further evidence of a category error, every scientific explanation always has a 'why?' on the far side of them, requiring a further explanation--and so on...forever. The natural theology metaphysical explanations: God, is a far better stopping point to an infinite regress of 'whys?' because, really, there is no sense to ask 'why' once you get to God. 

I think that in order to think the natural theology arguments and pseudoscience ('pseudo' means false) claims are similar, you have to 1) not really understand the natural theology arguments themselves and the support for each premise--which can fill chapters in a book and 2) already assume the natural theology conclusions are not true --which is question begging:

1. Natural theology claims are false
2. Therefore they are similar to pseudoscience ('false' science) claims

(June 18, 2018 at 12:17 pm)SteveII Wrote:

(June 18, 2018 at 7:30 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: Since the question was about the qualitative aspects of natural theology arguments as explanations and their similarity and substance on that axis, or lack thereof, you've talked around the question without actually engaging it.

Okay, this seems to be the point from your earliest post, so I will address that:

Quote:Indeed, theism as an explanation has much in common with what we know to be really bad explanations from pseudoscience and superstition, and almost nothing in common with what we know to be really good explanations from the physical sciences. So why should we think theism is a good explanation like those from science, rather than a really terrible explanation like those from pseudoscience and superstition?

This is one big category error. The article uses the term 'explanation' and then complain that the natural theology arguments don't meet the requirements of a scientific explanation (including what makes a for a good scientific explanation).  Inductive premises and the deductive conclusions of natural theology infer God as a fundamental feature of reality--not a scientific explanation. While support for some of the premises contain lots of science, the conclusion is always a metaphysical explanation. As further evidence of a category error, every scientific explanation always has a 'why?' on the far side of them, requiring a further explanation--and so on...forever. The natural theology metaphysical explanations: God, is a far better stopping point to an infinite regress of 'whys?' because, really, there is no sense to ask 'why' once you get to God. 

I think that in order to think the natural theology arguments and pseudoscience ('pseudo' means false) claims are similar, you have to 1) not really understand the natural theology arguments themselves and the support for each premise--which can fill chapters in a book and 2) already assume the natural theology conclusions are not true --which is question begging:

1. Natural theology claims are false
2. Therefore they are similar to pseudoscience ('false' science) claims

Well, let's start there, then. What do you mean, then, when you say that God is the best explanation for this or that fact of the natural world?

Wa is the best explanation for god.

Prove me wrong.

(June 18, 2018 at 1:36 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(June 18, 2018 at 12:17 pm)SteveII Wrote: Okay, this seems to be the point from your earliest post, so I will address that:

This is one big category error. The article uses the term 'explanation' and then complain that the natural theology arguments don't meet the requirements of a scientific explanation (including what makes a for a good scientific explanation).  Inductive premises and the deductive conclusions of natural theology infer God as a fundamental feature of reality--not a scientific explanation. While support for some of the premises contain lots of science, the conclusion is always a metaphysical explanation. As further evidence of a category error, every scientific explanation always has a 'why?' on the far side of them, requiring a further explanation--and so on...forever. The natural theology metaphysical explanations: God, is a far better stopping point to an infinite regress of 'whys?' because, really, there is no sense to ask 'why' once you get to God. 

I think that in order to think the natural theology arguments and pseudoscience ('pseudo' means false) claims are similar, you have to 1) not really understand the natural theology arguments themselves and the support for each premise--which can fill chapters in a book and 2) already assume the natural theology conclusions are not true --which is question begging:

1. Natural theology claims are false
2. Therefore they are similar to pseudoscience ('false' science) claims

Well, let's start there, then.  What do you mean, then, when you say that God is the best explanation for this or that fact of the natural world?

I mean that given the premises, 

1. It is unlikely there is a possible naturalistic explanation. Not because we haven't figured it out yet, but because there is some metaphysical reason that any naturalistic explanation will probably not be forthcoming.
2. Absent a naturalistic explanation (the inference from most of the premises), we ask what characteristics must a cause have? 
3. Upon examining the list of necessary characteristics for causes, we find them to sound a lot like God. 
4. A cumulative view of multiple arguments gives a broader array of God-like characteristics strengthening the whole enterprise.
5. Concluding God also has the benefit of being an explanatory ultimate (if God exists, he exists so necessarily)