(October 1, 2018 at 2:17 am)robvalue Wrote: Thank you, I'll check it out

My objection is that moral realism doesn't seem to be actually saying anything. Everyone comes up with statements that apply to them, subject to the way they apply their values to the world. Those are their "ethical facts", if you like. How do you compare one person's facts to another? Is one "better" than another? It depends entirely on what ethics are trying to achieve, which has already been covered in their individuals values; hence it is circular. Maybe you're trying to achieve wellbeing, or survival of the species, or whatever. For these ethical facts to transcend the individual, there has to be a "correct framework", and I find that to be a meaningless idea.

I'll come back with more after I've read the suggested piece.

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Okay well... I agree that this looks like a better analysis than Harris, but I still find big problems in the framing used here.

The article discusses the idea of "correct ethics" or "correct systems of ethics", without ever defining what that is supposed to mean, as far as I can see. Correct in what way? To say cultural reletavism is or isn't correct is as meaningless to me as saying moral realism is correct. It talks about some objective standard for measuring the ethics of different cultures. Can there be one? Of course there can. There are infinitely many. But which one do you pick? This is again a circular problem. The correct one is correct, because it is the correct one. But correct for what purpose? If I want correct information about something, I need to specify what I actually want to know about it. There seems to be an implicit assumption that there is some "correct goal" of morality here. But morality means nothing until you've set the goal.

To me, cultural relativism is more a matter of observation than anything else. I don't use it to make statements about what is objectively right and wrong, because I find such notions incoherent on their face. The article talks about being unable to criticise other cultures. What I don't get is why this even matters, except to make one culture feel good about themselves; or to try and justify some sort of forcing of ethics onto another society. "We are right and you are wrong, so you should change!" To me, the discussion is all about the underlying values. Do the different cultures have the same values? If so, are they applying them in a logical, scientific and consistent manner? If the values are different, can one side convince the other to be closer to theirs?

So I'm still in the position of being unclear what a "true ethical statement" is supposed to be. If such a thing did exist, if there were somehow ethics that are inherent to the fabric of reality, then no one would care what they are. If they turned out to be different from our own ethics, no one would change them just because the new ones are "correct". A change in ethics requires a reason, and just "being correct" is not a reason.

Okay, so all moral realism (or ethical objectivism) is is the claim that there are moral facts. If I say "There is 20 mL of water in that glass," that is a factual statement. I could have my facts wrong, too-- but it is nonetheless a factual statement. Someone else may disagree: "No, there is actually 30mL of water in that glass." Even though this other person and I disagree on the amount of water in the glass, one thing we do agree upon is that there is a measurable portion of water in the glass.

There is a class of philosophers who are so skeptical to doubt that there is an objectively measurable quantity of water in the glass. They say all reality is subjective. Unless kicking a stone is going to prove the point, there isn't much that can be done about runaway skepticism such as this. At some point, you have to say, "No. It's reasonable to assume that the glass of water is objectively there," and get on with the business of measuring the amount. That's the nature of skepticism. It's mighty useful for cutting away errors: when someone claims their house is haunted, skepticism does well to show that this supposed haunting can be easily explained by mundane phenomena. But what do you do when the skeptic then goes on to cast the existence of the house itself into doubt?

Well, one solution is to get scientific... or more accurately... empirical. We can all see the house. So it's foolish to doubt it's there. Empiricism shores up a defense against runaway skepticism in that regard. Of course, our senses can sometimes fool us, so we therefore arrange empirical tests to learn more about what we see (that is science) and to ensure that what we do in fact see is there. Along this line of thinking, telescopes, infrared goggles, and other technology are merely and extension of (perhaps expansion of) our basic senses.

The moral realist contends that morals are real... much the same way that the house is real. But there is a problem. Moral facts are not empirical facts, and so can't be subjected to the rigors of science. Let me ask you this: is justice real? If one of your loved ones was wrongfully accused of a crime, you would want the investigation to be fair and just, wouldn't you? And in conceiving of what this "justice" concerning your friends treatment would be like, you would also see objectivity involved, right? You wouldn't just wish that the proceedings were "subjectively" in your friend's favor. You wouldn't just think "I hope the judge is in a good enough mood to let my innocent friend go." You'd wish that real objective justice was done.

Here's the thing. None of our five senses or scientific equipment will ever detect "justice." Yet, in my view, justice is a real and objective matter. As a moral realist, I also say that about morality. The problem is, however, since we can't detect morality with our five senses, there is no safeguard in place against the runaway skepticism we spoke of earlier.

Just so we are on the same page, I want you to forget about wellbeing for now. Wellbeing as related to morality is like saying there is 20mL in the glass. Other ethicists (like Kant) say that wellbeing has nothing to do with morality--rather fairness. So he is saying there is an amount of water in the glass but it isn't 20mL. We aren't talking about how much water is in the glass. We are talking about if you can measure the amount of water in the first place. We aren't talking about "Is morality related to wellbeing?" We are talking about if morality is objectively real in the first place. Once we figure out that it's real, THEN we can talk about if it's related to wellbeing or not.

Keep in mind, that all moral realism IS is the belief that there are moral facts of some kind. It doesn't say anything about if those facts are correct or incorrect. For instance, I think murder is immoral. Somebody could be a moral realist but still disagree with this statement, odd as that would be.

So there are two main branches of moral skepticism: relativism and nihilism. One way to determine if moral facts are real or not is to examine all the types of moral skepticism and see if they are "runaway skepticism" or not. Each branch has two main offshoots:

MORAL RELATIVISM
Cultural relativism: the view that moral values are only a construct of one's overarching culture [James Rachels successfully argued against this IMO, but if it is still a thing with you, we can discuss it.]

Individual relativism: the view that what ever one personally thinks right/wrong is all there is to morality.

MORAL NIHILISM

Error theory: Moral statements are in fact misstatements. They are errors. Just like when someone says "The grace of God carried me through the proceedings" they aren't talking about anything real, when I say "Murder is immoral." I am (similarly) not talking about anything real.

Expressivism: Moral statements are actually emotional expressions. When I say "Murder is wrong." What I'm really saying is "Murder--yuck!" or "Murder--blehhhh!"

So which mode of moral skepticism do you find most compelling? In order for me to defend moral realism, I need to know where you're coming from. You sound a bit like an error theorist, but I figured I'd lay them all out just so we could be clear before proceeding.

I appreciate you trying to explain, but I still don't understand I'm afraid. We can make factual statements to answer well-defined questions, such as how much water is in something. We've said exactly what information we want, and we've prescribed what units we want the answer in.

I don't see this analogy as being enough to describe what a "moral/ethical fact" is supposed to be. I'm particularly bemused by your statement that moral facts may not be correct. So in what way are they facts?

As for things like "justice", I consider them to be abstract concepts that we use to help us understand and process our environment. I don't believe they exist in the same way physical objects exist. There is no such thing as "objective justice", there can only be a logical adherence to some specific rules of justice that have been agreed. What counts as justice in the first place is highly subjective. Morality is just the same.

I think (supposed) objective moral statements are merely a person (or group) stating how they want things to be. To try and remove their points of view and their goals is analogous to removing the specific information from the question about water in a vial. If I ask, to use a different example, "What is the best mode of transport?" I'm asking an ill-defined question. What is best, and perhaps factual, depends entirely on what my requirements are. The "best way to act" is similarly incoherent to me. There's not enough information in the question to form any facts about it.

My question is: what is an ethical fact supposed to be telling me? With no framework around it, it is totally meaningless to me.

(October 1, 2018 at 4:12 am)robvalue Wrote: I appreciate you trying to explain, but I still don't understand I'm afraid. We can make factual statements to answer well-defined questions, such as how much water is in something. We've said exactly what information we want, and we've prescribed what units we want the answer in.

I don't see this analogy as being enough to describe what a "moral/ethical fact" is supposed to be. I'm particularly bemused by your statement that moral facts may not be correct. So in what way are they facts?

No one says: "In my opinion, the sun rises in the east and sets in the west."

They state it as a fact: "The sun rises in the east and sets in the west."

But someone else might point out that this fact is incorrect: "No, sir. Actually the sun is motionless relative to the earth. The earth rotates giving rise to the illusion that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west."

Just as people get empirical facts wrong, they also get moral facts wrong. See what I mean?

PS: I think objective morality is an incoherent contradiction in terms. I think that could best sum up my position.

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(October 1, 2018 at 4:23 am)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(October 1, 2018 at 4:12 am)robvalue Wrote: I appreciate you trying to explain, but I still don't understand I'm afraid. We can make factual statements to answer well-defined questions, such as how much water is in something. We've said exactly what information we want, and we've prescribed what units we want the answer in.

I don't see this analogy as being enough to describe what a "moral/ethical fact" is supposed to be. I'm particularly bemused by your statement that moral facts may not be correct. So in what way are they facts?

No one says: "In my opinion, the sun rises in the east and sets in the west."

They state it as a fact: "The sun rises in the east and sets in the west."

But someone else might point out that this fact is incorrect: "No, sir. Actually the sun is motionless relative to the earth. The earth rotates giving rise to the illusion that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west."

Just as people get empirical facts wrong, they also get moral facts wrong. See what I mean?

Sure, statements of attempted fact can be wrong. The underlying facts can't be wrong. I guess I misunderstood you here

I don't know what it means to get a moral fact wrong or right, because I don't know what it is. It isn't well-defined enough. I would just say that it isn't a factual matter.

It doesn't become one by someone making factual-type statements. I could say, "yellow is the best colour"; yet it doesn't make "the best colour" a factual matter. I've just made a poorly defined statement.

I'm a still a bit unclear about the whole "fact" thing, and it appears to undermine moral realism.

If something is a matter of fact, then there are only correct and incorrect answers; it doesn't make sense to me that you could disagree about a fact, which is correct by definition.

If it was a fact that "murder is moral", then there's nothing to disagree with, it just is moral. The problem, again, is that I don't know what this statement actually means. And the idea that you could find moral facts immoral makes me conclude that it can't be the same meaning of the word "moral".

It seems to me the motivation for moral realism is essentially to avoid undesirable philosophical situations, but it does so by either assertion or equivocation.

(October 1, 2018 at 4:12 am)robvalue Wrote: As for things like "justice", I consider them to be abstract concepts that we use to help us understand and process our environment. I don't believe they exist in the same way physical objects exist. There is no such thing as "objective justice", there can only be a logical adherence to some specific rules of justice that have been agreed. What counts as justice in the first place is highly subjective. Morality is just the same.

Do you think that logic or reason can be used to come up with specific rules or a specific system of justice? Of course wisdom knows when to suspend logic and reason so that cultural mores can play a part when creating a system of justice. But inasmuch as something is designed according to logic and reason it is not subjective.

In America, our system of government is laid out more or less according to the ideas of the English philosopher, John Locke insofar as we have a balance of powers: three different branches in our government. This system was chosen according to the dictates of reason... not somebody's personal opinion or sense of aesthetic.

Insofar as our system provides us with justice, justice is not subjective. It is the fruit of reason.

(October 1, 2018 at 6:23 am)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(October 1, 2018 at 4:12 am)robvalue Wrote: As for things like "justice", I consider them to be abstract concepts that we use to help us understand and process our environment. I don't believe they exist in the same way physical objects exist. There is no such thing as "objective justice", there can only be a logical adherence to some specific rules of justice that have been agreed. What counts as justice in the first place is highly subjective. Morality is just the same.

Do you think that logic or reason can be used to come up with specific rules or a specific system of justice? Of course wisdom knows when to suspend logic and reason so that cultural mores can play a part when creating a system of justice. But inasmuch as something is designed according to logic and reason it is not subjective.

In America, our system of government is laid out more or less according to the ideas of the English philosopher, John Locke insofar as we have a balance of powers 9three different branches) in our government. This system was chosen according to the dictates of reason... not somebody's personal opinion or sense of aesthetic.

Insofar as our system provides us with justice, justice is not subjective. It is the fruit of reason.

I think we're talking past each other quite a bit, and I'm not sure how to remedy the situation.

Justice, like morality, is not a well-defined concept to begin with. To come up with an objective system, which you can totally do, you have to lay out exactly what justice means, how it should manifest, and so on. You have to agree on that first, and the end result may be logical and objective in one sense, but is still subjective in that it depends on these initial definitions.

Who gets to say how exactly justice works? All we can do is discuss it, and come up with a best compromise. If there really was some sort of inherent, objective justice, it is again an equivocation to compare that to our own attempts to make things "seem fair". Objective facts don't have to conform to any of our ideas about how they should work. Again, if there was such a thing as objective justice and we could somehow find out what it is, we wouldn't care. It would be meaningless. If it didn't happen to "seem fair" to us, we'd ignore it; same with morality. It's the reasoning behind these things that gives them weight.

My question remains: what is a moral fact supposed to tell me? Without such a definition, it's a meaningless term, and I can't even properly comment on it.

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PS: I've realized you're replying to some of my earlier comments piecemeal, so sorry if I've got ahead of myself!

(October 1, 2018 at 3:49 am)robvalue Wrote:

(September 28, 2018 at 11:30 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I have to say, I don't really see the two parts of this dilemma as a true dilemma.

For example, you can arbitrarily set moral goals, and then use science to achieve them objectively, whereas arbitrary methods might not be able to.

If the goal is to minimize suffering over time, and maximize a sense of well-being, then there's a lot of science to be done
1)  Determine which brain functions are associated with a sense of well-being
2)  Determine what situations trigger those functions
3)  Statistically determine how best to achieve societal outcomes such that the mean level of well-being is improved.

All of this may or may not be more useful than just making shit up, though.

I agree with what you're saying here, too.

The bigger problem is how completely ill-defined wellbeing is. Even if everyone could agree on the elements involved, how exactly you measure and weight each element is up for grabs. Also, this still doesn't account for the ethics of the methods used to achieve these goals. It's an "end justifies the means" scenario.

That's an epistemological problem which comes after acknowledging that morality does consist in promoting well-being. It's an important practical consideration, but of no use in disputing the philosophical point. Whether we could come up with reasonable metrics doesn't seem to be all that different a problem than we have today, of determining what is moral and what is not. We're clear and unambiguous about some things, and lost and confused about some others. A perfect system is not required. Only one that reasonably captures the bulk of such things. Arguing otherwise is just letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. Given that the so-to-speak prime directive of life is to survive and reproduce, we have an anchor from which we can reason outward.

I'm going to cast my lot in with suggesting that Rob subscribes to some form of radical skepticism and therefore is a moral nihilist, most likely of the error theory variety (though there are strong elements of non-cognitivism). Just my two cents worth.

Sure, I agree that if we were to set aiding survival and reproduction as the ultimate goal of morality, we could be well on our way to setting up factual rules. If instead we set another goal for morality, we'd end up with different rules. All we are really doing though is setting up rules for survival and reproduction. "Morality" is a meaningless middle-man.

It's the idea that there is somehow a correct set of rules, without first setting up a goal, that I object to. It makes absolutely no sense. I probably am some sort of nihilistic error

I find nihilism a similarly problematic concept. Subjective meaning trivially applies, whereas objective meaning is an incoherent term, in my opinion. It's the subjectivity that gives things meaning. From "no point of view", value isn't a thing that makes sense, just like with morality. Following from this, I don't know what nihilism is supposed to mean, because it seems trivially the case. Even if what is going on in our reality somehow matters to an outside agent, or counts towards some extra bonus life, these meanings are still subjective in those regards. This meaning isn't inherent to anything, as I see it. I don't know why meaning has to be objective in order to "matter" to some people.