Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[I_am_not_mafia]

Gonna keep you up at night, eh? 

Yeah.

I want to go home and rethink my life.

Maybe start selling death sticks or something.

[SaStrike]

I used to love sticks...then I drove a semi.   Fuck all that noise. All auto all the time for me, now. I put the bitch in drive and cruise, that's how I like it.

I agree. Saying manual is better is like saying a nokia 3310 is better than a smart phone. And I mostly drive manual. I do admit in my teen days I also had a hipster phase where I was all for manual, using the "it's cooler, less boring, more control etc etc" justifications.

[vulcanlogician]

I guess I'm going to have to read this fucking book. I'm a moral realist, so I agree with Sam on this. But I have the sinking feeling that Plato puts it better than Harris.

[robvalue]

Lol, I very much look forward to your thoughts on it!

I'm extremely confused by moral realism as a concept in the first place. As far as I can see, you can only formulate an ethical statement to be a fact once you've picked a framework to evaluate outcomes (as Khem was saying regarding the is/ought problem). Once you've done this, surely the truth of those statements is based on your own framework, and hence only applicable to you? And any person could pick any framework they like.

The second thing that confuses me is how wellbeing is defined. This is such a hugely vague concept that trying to evaluate it, even after deciding on using it as a framework, seems to be impossible if you're coming up with anything nuanced. Of course, we can make very simple statements that I'd be willing to concede as facts for the sake of argument such as, "It's unethical to punch someone for no reason". But all you're really saying is that punching people is bad for their wellbeing.

---

PS: maybe I'm misunderstanding, but moral realism appears to be suggesting there is a "correct" framework to pick. If so, I see this as a circular statement.

[vulcanlogician]

[bennyboy]

I have to say, I don't really see the two parts of this dilemma as a true dilemma.

For example, you can arbitrarily set moral goals, and then use science to achieve them objectively, whereas arbitrary methods might not be able to.

If the goal is to minimize suffering over time, and maximize a sense of well-being, then there's a lot of science to be done
1) Determine which brain functions are associated with a sense of well-being
2) Determine what situations trigger those functions
3) Statistically determine how best to achieve societal outcomes such that the mean level of well-being is improved.

All of this may or may not be more useful than just making shit up, though.

[robvalue]

[bennyboy]

Lol, I very much look forward to your thoughts on it!

I'm extremely confused by moral realism as a concept in the first place. As far as I can see, you can only formulate an ethical statement to be a fact once you've picked a framework to evaluate outcomes (as Khem was saying regarding the is/ought problem). Once you've done this, surely the truth of those statements is based on your own framework, and hence only applicable to you? And any person could pick any framework they like.

The second thing that confuses me is how wellbeing is defined. This is such a hugely vague concept that trying to evaluate it, even after deciding on using it as a framework, seems to be impossible if you're coming up with anything nuanced. Of course, we can make very simple statements that I'd be willing to concede as facts for the sake of argument such as, "It's unethical to punch someone for no reason". But all you're really saying is that punching people is bad for their wellbeing.

---

PS: maybe I'm misunderstanding, but moral realism appears to be suggesting there is a "correct" framework to pick. If so, I see this as a circular statement.

I would agree with you 100%.  Harris uses a particular form of argument by baby-step.  He insists there are some moral positions we would ALL agree on-- that it's better to praise someone than to burn them in an oven, or something.

What he's really doing is finding states so agreeable to all or so reprehensible to all that nobody in a particular audience would be willing to disagree.  It's unlikely that in an academic lecture someone will stand up and shout "No. . . burning babies is fucking great!"

[downbeatplumb]

Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

Probably the queen. She has a lot of paintings.

I'm home sick today.

Expect comments.

[robvalue]

I have to say, I don't really see the two parts of this dilemma as a true dilemma.

For example, you can arbitrarily set moral goals, and then use science to achieve them objectively, whereas arbitrary methods might not be able to.

If the goal is to minimize suffering over time, and maximize a sense of well-being, then there's a lot of science to be done
1)  Determine which brain functions are associated with a sense of well-being
2)  Determine what situations trigger those functions
3)  Statistically determine how best to achieve societal outcomes such that the mean level of well-being is improved.

All of this may or may not be more useful than just making shit up, though.

I agree with what you're saying here, too.

The bigger problem is how completely ill-defined wellbeing is. Even if everyone could agree on the elements involved, how exactly you measure and weight each element is up for grabs. Also, this still doesn't account for the ethics of the methods used to achieve these goals. It's an "end justifies the means" scenario.

This is why I personally don't adhere to any "moral system". I take every situation on its own merits, and I try and consider every aspect of it as thoroughly as I can. The somewhat self-referential problem of how you achieve moral goals, and how you balance this with actually achieving those goals, makes things massively complicated.